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PALMERSTON AND THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY, 1846-1855
By David Stuart Brown
This thesis considers the career of Lord Palmerston during the important, but
hitherto rather neglected, period of his political career immediately preceding his
accession to the premiership in 1855, in a broader context than has previously been
attempted. By combining a high political, that is governmental, approach to the
question with what might be termed a low one
- essentially all non-governmental
factors
- the reasons for Palmerston's supposed political invincibility, or at least
longevity, can be more clearly understood. Such a focus simultaneously reveals a
great deal about the nature and working of the Victorian constitution and the
political influence of parts of the population traditionally regarded as falling beyond
its pale.
Through an examination of political manoeuvring in government, making
extensive use of private papers, this thesis demonstrates the extent and ways in
which Palmerston was able to exercise an influence over and manipulate his Cabinet
colleagues, thereby securing their approbation for his foreign policy at a time when
there were great pressures from the Crown and Parliament to remove him. The
analysis is followed though to the history of the Aberdeen Coalition (1852-55) to
explain why Palmerston came to be allied with many of his former adversaries in the
first place and secondly how he managed, from his official post at the Home Office,
to continue to wield great influence over the conduct of foreign policy
- a question of
special importance given that it was this government which was faced with the
problem of managing the Crimean War.
It is clear, however, that personal and party political relationships are
incomplete means by which to explain Palmerston's career and elucidate the general
theme of the politics of foreign policy. Palmerston's political strength rested to a
large extent on the rather nebulous perception that he was 'popular', carrying with
him the support of the country and embodying the mood of the nation. Public
opinion, generally conceived, had a profound and complicated impact on politics
during this period, particularly on Palmerston, yet this is an aspect of Palmerston's
political life rarely examined by historians. It is in this thesis' attempts to underpin
an account of political life at the centre with an analysis of political forces and
influences beyond that a great deal of the work's originality is to be found.
Examination of the role of the press, various forms of extra-parliamentary opposition
(and support) across all social classes, and parliamentary opposition, including not
only on what grounds were attacks made but why and with what effect, add a unique
contribution to our understanding of Palmerstonianism and demonstrate the success
and considerable good fortune Palmerston enjoyed in manipulating political life to
his own ends.Ill
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i) Background to the problem
Lord Palmerston, variously regarded as a Tory, Liberal Tory, Canningite, Whig and
Liberal; successively a Junior Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary at War, Foreign
Secretary, Home Secretary and Prime Minister, left an indelible mark on the history
of Victorian politics. From the last candle of the Eighteenth Century'1 to the 'genius
for adaptation' whose governments were a 'conscious introduction to the new era' of
democratic politics,2 Palmerston's career spans an important transitional period in
British politics whilst in many ways also shaping that change. His career and
interests, at least after about 1830, were concerned primarily with foreign policy yet
through this specific and in certain senses peculiar and unique area of public
business, he contributed to the evolution of a new style of government and gave the
impression of some sort of re-casting of the political nation. Heretofore, however,
studies of Palmerston have tended to focus almost exclusively on a 'high political'
approach to his career, that is studying his ministerial and diplomatic involvements,
or have covered only his life down to 1841.3 The approach taken by Professor
Bourne in his work, Palmerston: The Early Years, J 784-1841 represents a break
with this tradition in seeking to place Palmerston's career and political outlooks in a
1 P. Guedalla, Palmerston (London, 1937 edn.), p.4O5
2 E.D. Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 1855-1865 (Cambridge, 1991), p.367
3 See, for example, H.C.F Bell, Lord Palmerston 2 vols. (London, 1936), Guedalla,
Palmerston, J. Ridley, Lord Palmerston (London, 1970), M.E. Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston
(Cardiff, 1987), D. Southgate, 'The Most English Minister...': The Policies and Politics of Palmerston
(London, 1966), C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841 2 vols. (London, 1969)much broader personal and private context, which adds greatly to an understanding
of political life in the period covered, yet unfortunately, this volume is concluded in
1841 with the end of Palmerston's second term as Foreign Secretary, and Bourne was
unable to complete the projected second volume which would have taken the
analysis down to 1865.4 More recent writing on Palmerston has sought to develop
an understanding of Palmerston's career as Prime Minister from 1855 until, with
only a brief hiatus in 1858-1859, his death in 1865, focusing on the difficult problem
of Palmerston's relationship with Liberalism and the Liberal party.5 There remains,.
however, a noticeable lack of work for the 1840s and early 1850s. With the
exception of those studies which treat of Palmerston's whole career generally,
primarily in the work of Bell, Southgate, Ridley, and Chamberlain, attention to
Palmerston or Palmerstonism for these years is scarce and monographs are few,
perhaps the most important being Kingsley Martin's The Triumph of Lord
Palmerston, which is concerned with the role and response of public opinion leading
up to and during the Crimean War.6
Between the fall of Melbourne's government in 1841 and the creation of Lord
John Russell's in 1846, Palmerston was not idle, although more so than at any other
time in his career (at least since 1830) his energies were devoted to affairs of a
non-political nature. He continued to contribute to debates on questions of foreign
4 K. Bourne, Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784-1841 (London, 1982)
5 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism. J.R. Vincent, The Formation of the British Liberal
Party, 1857-68 (Harmondsworth, 1972) is still persuasive, despite Steele's attempts at revisionism.
Specifically concerned with Palmerston's premierships, there is also D.F. Krein, The Last Palmerston
Government: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Genesis of 'Splendid Isolation'(Ames, Iowa,
1978), although Krein is concerned primarily with the formulation of foreign policy between 1861
and 1864. See also A. Hawkins, Parliament, Party and the Art of Politics in Britain, 1855-59
(Stanford, California, 1987)
6 K. Martin, The Triumph of Lord Palmerston: A Study of Public Opinion in England before
the Crimean War (London, 1963 edn.)policy, notably that relating to the Ashburton-Webster treaty,7 but it was, as one
biographer observes, 'Palmerston's longest "holiday"'.8 During the decade between
1846 and the establishment of the first Palmerston government, however, Palmerston
did much to place himself at the forefront of political life, forging a reputation which
would allow him to face down opponents and install Palmerstonism as a distinct
political creed.
From the bureaucrat of Bourne's Early Years, Palmerston emerged in the
later 1850s and early 1860s as 'the defining political personality of his age'.9 In large
part this rested upon his achievements and conduct immediately prior to his
accession to the premiership. This thesis seeks to elucidate the key features of that
period, by examining the politics of foreign policy, in order to establish quite how
Palmerston managed to carve out a specific role in politics and, against the odds, rise
to the highest office in government at the age of seventy. In so doing, the thesis is
concerned with questions of constitutional practice and theory, for in large part
Palmerston's strength was derived from constituencies traditionally seen as operating
beyond the pale of the constitution, in particular the unenfranchised and also,
importantly, from among the middle classes whose political importance emerged
clearly during this period. To some extent this was a condition of the particular area
of politics with which Palmerston pre-occupied himself, namely foreign affairs; yet
also it was grounded in a particular view of the potential for invigorating a new force
in government and politics. Palmerston's mobilisation of popular support for
political ends during this period does more than hint at a Canningite legacy, it
7 See Chamberlain, Palmerston, pp.59-61
8 Bell, Palmerston, I, p.322
9 J. Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain, (New Haven and
London, 1993), p. 194suggests an important element in the conception of the Victorian constitution
- that
is, the growing role and use of public opinion
- with repercussions for not only
ministers and the people, but also the monarchy.
The foundations of Palmerstonism
Whig orthodoxy was suspicious of monarchical authority and trusted to the
benevolence of a parliamentary government which included some measure of
accountability. Palmerston, schooled in the Whig tradition of political economy at
Edinburgh under Professor Dugald Stewart, had learned these principles to a certain
degree, but ultimately his political outlook was conditioned by a diverse range of
influences. Simultaneously radical and reactionary, Palmerston had adopted various
philosophies which boiled down, ultimately, to a belief in pragmatism above abstract
principle, or as has been observed of his later years as Prime Minister, that politics
was 'largely a matter of getting from Monday to Friday without conspicuous
damage'.10
Above all, however, Palmerston regarded foreign policy as operating beyond
party: partisan contests had no role to play in issues concerned exclusively with the
national interest, although differences could well still exist in terms of the execution
of that policy. Thus, foreign policy was to be constructed with reference not only to
parliament, party, cabinet and government, but also the 'nation'. In an age of
growing national consciousness (and indeed coherence), Palmerston, not quite the
disciple of Canning but at least the heir to Canning's legacy, drew upon his erstwhile
mentor's approach and grounded the moral justification for his foreign policy in the
10 P. Smith, review of Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, in English Historical Review, 108
(1993), p. 145weight of popular approbation. In part this was a political tactic
- to counter-balance
Cabinet opposition, or at least disquiet, over his policy
- but it was also indicative of
a sincere perception of ministerial responsibility (and especially that of the Foreign
Secretary) to conduct affairs of state in the interest of the nation as a whole, as he
perceived it. If, as E.D. Steele suggests, it appeared to contemporary observers that
Parliament in this period between the Reform Acts had become virtually the
representative chamber of not only the enfranchised but also the unenfranchised,
then it was the responsibility of the politicians, so they believed, to articulate such
views as were thus representative.11 To the Chartists this would have appeared a
curious judgement, yet with regard to the particular area of foreign affairs, as David
Urquhart's ultimately unsuccessful attempts to channel Chartist forces towards a
credible and consistent critique of Palmerston's foreign policy illustrated,12 the
proposition carries some force. Even the unenfranchised and generally exploited
members of society still seemed capable of feeling part of the nation when it came to
dealing with the foreigner, as Dickens illustrated in his portrayal of the inhabitants of
Bleeding Heart Yard in Little Dorrit.li
This argument assumes too readily, however, the existence of a uniform
extra-parliamentary view of foreign policy, whereas such interest was, typically,
much more sporadic, but it helps to explain not only Palmerston's courting of
popular approval
- playing up to the public gallery as some contemporaries observed
scathingly
- but his continued political potency: the People's Minister14 had a vital
role to play if this was to be the People's Parliament. Necessarily, however,
1' Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, passim
12 See below, pp.276-277
13 See below, p.229
14 See below p.249Palmerston's conduct of policy and his so-called popular appeal were not in any
meaningful sense inclusive of a comprehensive picture of the 'nation' and of all the
elements which constituted the nation. Palmerston's popular appeal and indeed
conduct of foreign policy reinforced certain specific characteristics of the 'national'
character. He was 'the most English Minister' (as Lord John Russell dubbed him),
and not, significantly, the most British. The ambiguities of this were little explored
at the time. Certainly he was not the most Scottish Minister, neither Welsh nor Irish,
but 'Englishness' in the nineteenth century was not confined exclusively by the
boundaries of England. He represented strong, masculine qualities, he embodied
Protestant godliness: the British Foreign Secretary was the true English patriot.15
Palmerston's outlook was an informed one and his popular maverick reputation was
not indicative of an absence of reason. The origins of his political philosophy,
indeed of the phenomenon of Palmerstonism as a distinct political system, are to be
found in Palmerston's undergraduate days at Edinburgh.
Dugald Stewart, a former student himself of Adam Smith, held the Chair in
Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh from 1785 until 1810 and oversaw the education of
many future prominent Whigs; indeed many of the writers for the Edinburgh Review
are held to owe an intellectual debt to Stewart. Focusing on political economy
during Palmerston's time as a lodger in Stewart's house in 1802 and 1803, Stewart
lectured primarily on population, the theory of national wealth, free trade and the
circulation of money, the poor law and education of the lower classes. According to
Bourne, Stewart's lectures were not striking and were merely diluted versions of
Smith.16 Nevertheless, Palmerston's time was not wasted here. He learned about
15 For a fuller consideration of these stereotypes and their particular relevance to Palmerston,
see below, esp. ch.5
16 Bourne, Palmerston, p.27hard work and he was perhaps gratified to find in Stewart a tutor more concerned
with rational convenience rather than intellectual challenge. Stewart himself
observed on one occasion that he agreed with Hume in seeing 'the danger of
dwelling too much on details and of rendering the mind incapable of those abstract
and comprehensive views of human affairs, which can alone furnish the statesman
with fixed and certain maxims for the regulation of his conduct'.17 Palmerston was
no philosopher and Stewart's approach seems to have suited him well.18 Stewart's
teaching did, however, concern itself with important questions regarding the nature
of public opinion, the people, the legislature and the mutual responsibilities of each.
Stewart was certainly committed to the Whigs and clashed frequently with
local Tories,19 but he was not an extremist as some feared. Palmerston felt obliged
to reassure his parents early on, for example, that Stewart and his other tutors were
not 'at all inclined to be Demo's, but ...rather the contrary if anything'.20 Much of
what Stewart taught the young Palmerston provided an intellectual rationale for
much of the latter's future career and conduct. Most important were Stewart's views
on constitutional responsibilities. The stability of modern government, Stewart
believed, depended 'on the coincidence between [government] measures and the tide
of public opinion', yet significantly this was a tide thus not static; therefore the
modern government should be prepared for 'gradual and prudent accommodation of
established institutions to the varying opinions, manners, and circumstances of
mankind'. This was a period of increased enlightenment, Stewart argued, and his
17 Quoted D. Winch, 'The System of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils', in S. Collini, D.
Winch and J. Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual
History (Cambridge, 1983), p.33
18 Bourne, Palmerston, pp.28-29
19 Winch, 'The System of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils', pp.32-33
20 Quoted Bourne, Palmerston, p.298
work demonstrated a belief in the 'possible attainments of mankind' fulfilling their
potential through the 'general and infallible progress of human reason'.21 This was
not the prologue to a belief in democracy, however. Stewart, the Whig, advocated a
kind of virtual representation: 'the happiness of mankind depends,' he argued, 'not on
the share which the people possess, directly or indirectly, in the enactment of laws,
but on the equity and expedience of the laws that are enacted'.22 Furthermore, and
importantly, Stewart also spoke of 'patriotic exertion' on behalf of the common
good.23 If he took nothing else from Edinburgh, then, Palmerston had at least been
exposed to notions of responsible government for (rather than of) the people and to
some extent a sense of this responsible government combining with national or
patriotic honour or duty. Palmerston adopted, at least rhetorically, Stewart's view of
public opinion, or the people, as representative of and integral to an enlightened and
advancing civilization but this was to be tempered in later life by a practical
understanding and familiarity with the nature of mid-century public opinion. Once
occupied with affairs of state, opportunities for academic treatment of such questions
were limited, and philosophic reflection, as Michael Bentley has argued, was a
luxury few statesmen could afford.24
Thus, public opinion, or more specifically, popular approval, supplied the
moral weight to justify such courses as were settled upon, and this had particular
resonance for questions relating to a national foreign policy. Later commentators
such as Walter Bagehot and John Stuart Mill would ascribe to such support
21 See Winch, 'The System of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils', pp.34-35
22 Quoted ibid, p.36
23 Ibid, p.43
24 M. Bentley, 'Party, Doctrine and Thought', in M. Bentley and J. Stevenson (eds), High and
Low Politics in Modem Britain (Oxford, 1983), 123-153constrictive qualities,25 yet Palmerston followed Canning in a belief that careful
manipulation of public opinion would ensure that it fulfilled the political economists'
prescription of advancing society, and that through an abdication of authority in
favour of a governing class or elite, that responsible government would prevail.
Good government for the people was, ipso facto, good government of the people.
More importantly, establishing a control over that opinion and containing its
excesses underpinned Palmerstonian notions of political stability.
During his 'political apprenticeship', however, in the Tory ministries of
Spencer Perceval and Lord Liverpool, Palmerston displayed little inclination to put
such principles into practice. He had become an early adherent to the teaching of
Pitt to whom he had been introduced in 1799 by his father,26 and Palmerston's
political patrons, particularly the first Earl of Malmesbury, all sprang from the Tory
ranks. Palmerston's own desire to spend time acquiring experience rather than glory
combined with a growing alienation from his earlier patrons, however, hindered the
development of a significant parliamentary career.27 He was increasingly linked to
no special Tory faction, he socialised with Whigs but was not one of them; until
William IV ascended the throne he enjoyed little or no royal support and in short,
therefore, Palmerston found no-one willing to take a leading part in the development
of his parliamentary career.28
25 J. Burrow, 'Sense and circumstances: Bagehot and the nature of political understanding', in S.
Collini, D. Winch and J. Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century
Intellectual History (Cambridge, 1983), p. 173
26 Within a year of leaving Stewart's house Palmerston was to be found criticising the decision
of his friend, and later brother-in-law, Laurence Sulivan, who had refused to join Pitt on the grounds
that Fox had been left out (Palmerston to L. Sulivan, 30 Sept. 1804, K. Bourne (ed.), The Letters of
the Third Viscount Palmerston to Laurence and Elizabeth Sulivan, 1804-1863 (Camden Fourth
Series, Vol.23, 1979), pp.30-32).
27 Bourne, Palmerston, pp.85-115
28 H.L. Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 3 vols, (London,
1870-1874), I, p. 15010
Palmerston the bureaucrat, an efficient but uninspired Junior Lord of the
Admiralty and later Secretary at War,29 attended to public office more in the fashion
of a manager than an innovator. He had, after all, as much interest in the charms of
society as the draw of politics, and was content to remain in his relatively junior post
- which in the years following the Napoleonic Wars was little more than a 'hack job'
- gaining experience and biding his time, even if, by the time he turned 44 he still
appeared destined for an undistinguished public career.30 Work on his Irish estates
occupied as much of Palmerston's time in the early 1820s as did his parliamentary
duties and there seemed no obvious way out of the political rut in which he was
mired.
Unlike his contemporary, Lord John Russell, Palmerston was not part of the
Whig 'great grandmotherhood' and his Whig education was not consolidated at one
of the great Whig salons of the day. Consequently, in these early years, political
issues rarely inspired Palmerston
- even over Catholic emancipation, for example,
Bourne argues that political expediency probably played as great a part as any other
consideration in determining Palmerston's course31
- and he displayed none of the
particular interest in foreign policy which characterised his later career. Only after
1827 when Cabinet meetings brought him into regular contact with such questions
did diplomacy begin to fire his imagination.32 Significantly, his interest in foreign
29 Palmerston served as a junior Lord of the Admiralty 1807-1809. He refused Perceval's offer
of the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1809, preferring instead the office of Secretary at War
as being 'one better suited to a beginner'. He turned down the offer of an accompanying seat in the
Cabinet and remained at the War Office until 1828. See Chamberlain, Palmerston, pp.20-32.
However well disposed Perceval may have been towards Palmerston, after 1812, Palmerston enjoyed
fewer demonstrations of faith in his ability.
30 Chamberlain, Palmerston, p.28
31 Bourne, Palmerston, p.230
32 Palmerston accepted a Cabinet seat in April 1827 although he remained in his post at the
War Office. Canning had offered Palmerston the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer along with
this Cabinet post but it was commonly agreed that it would be dangerous for Palmerston to have to
defend his seat at an election if he accepted a new appointment.11
policy evolved just as George Canning's career was at its zenith. As Foreign
Secretary between 1822 and 1827 and then serving a very short-lived premiership
between April and August 1827, Canning succeeded in establishing certain
principles or practices in foreign policy which Palmerston's own later handling of
foreign policy was to mirror, or at least invoke. Not only did Canning's 'English'
policy represent a positive alternative to the 'European', or supposedly unduly
conciliatory approach of Castlereagh, but his view of the use and foundation of such
policy arguably echoed in some respects Palmerston's Edinburgh schooling. Whilst
serving in Tory ministries Canning belonged to the liberal faction within those
governments (which ultimately saw his adherents break ranks and defect to an
alliance with the Whigs in 1830) and indeed in many ways has been seen as
establishing a distinct liberal strand in politics of this period.33 Significantly, if
Canningism meant anything it represented a contribution to the understanding of the
political importance and indeed influence of the people. Through the employment of
a deliberate foreign policy, Canningite policy was used as a means of establishing
public confidence in the ministry as a whole. In more ways than one did he call the
new world into existence to redress the balance of the old.34
Palmerston very quickly adopted a Canningite line and in his first
parliamentary speech on foreign affairs of consequence he demonstrated clearly his
belief in the strength and value of popular support. 'There is in nature no moving
power but mind,' he argued, 'all else is passive and inert; in human affairs this power
33 Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, p.39
34 Canning had used the phrase in defence of his Spanish policy in 1826. Arguing that the
European balance of power had changed and that Spain was no longer an empire of great significance,
Canning defended his failure to resist French occupation of Spain on practical grounds. 'No, I looked
another way -1 sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such
as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain "with the
Indies". 1 called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the old' {Hansard, 2nd ser.,
XVI, 397 (13 Dec. 1826))12
is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion; and he who can grasp this power,
with it will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his
purpose1. Thus, he continued, the statesmen who find the means by which to harness
such passions and opinions exercise a 'sway over human affairs, far out of all
proportion greater than belong to the power and resources of the state over which
they preside'.35
Canningism did not entail subservience to a popular will at all costs,
however. Public opinion and popular support were instruments of government or
symbols of moral strength; the initiative for policy still lay within government,
although good government would act in accord with such opinion blurring these
distinctions. According to Jonathan Parry, Canning established three liberal
principles: that the state was no longer oligarchical but rested on public opinion; that
public opinion was Protestant, patriotic and liberty loving; and that open government
which sought to liberate public energies would make great progress. Yet this
popular role in government was in no sense substantial: operating under an
unreformed electoral system, the best that Canning could do was to flatter public
opinion by attributing to its influence the course of government policy.36
Nevertheless, Canning, though not a Whig, represented an important
example of the political creed expounded in the Scottish universities; that a sense of
movement in society was always prevalent and that good government would result
from heeding such movement and trusting to the enlightened views of the people.
Canningism did not invest public opinion with the authority to act as an enlightened
guide but Palmerston's education found in Canningism a certain embodiment of
35 Hansard, 2nd ser., XXI, 1668 (1 June 1829)
36
Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, pp.43-44, 48-4913
philosophic principles learned as a student. This held true if only as a counter-point
to the scepticism displayed by the Duke of Wellington over the role of public
opinion in such matters but on these grounds at least, then, there was reason enough
for the Canningites to disassociate themselves from the Tory ranks and effect a
marriage of convenience with the Whigs, although even here there was not complete
accommodation of Palmerston's increasingly mature views on foreign policy.
Significantly, though, Palmerston had learned from Stewart not only an
intellectual appreciation of the importance of the public opinion in politics, but he
also knew how to speak the Whig language. There was in the Canningite attachment
to the force of public opinion and the Whig orthodoxy to which Palmerston had been
exposed at Edinburgh a rhetorical over-lap and this was not unimportant in the
development of an alliance of convenience between the Whigs and Canningites in
the late 1820s. His commitment to a popular foreign policy was driven more by a
desire to secure the continued dominance of parliament and the traditional governing
elite by acceding to the moral imperative of giving voice to the 'national' opinion
- to
allow those beyond the pale of the constitution to enjoy a vicarious interest in
national politics. Simultaneously, however, this would ensure public opinion was
contained within appropriate channels.
Palmerston and the Whigs
The Whig world was, as Leslie Mitchell observes, 'as much a social organism as it
was a political party1 and references to family ties, both real and rhetorical, are
common.37 Palmerston was not directly descended from any of the great Whig
37 L. Mitchell, Lord Melbourne, 1779-1848 (Oxford, 1997), p.3. Melbourne himself once
described Whigs as 'all cousins' whilst the higher echelons of Whiggery were often referred to as the
'great grandmotherhood'.14
families, although by association and later by marriage to Emily Cowper (nee Lamb)
he did establish sound Whiggish credentials and, more importantly, through his wife,
as hostess of one of the major Whig salons of the period, Panshanger, Palmerston
came to occupy a central role in Whig circles of the period.38 Whigs themselves
were not an homogenous political party which perhaps made accommodation of
Palmerston more acceptable, yet much of Palmerston's success in integrating himself
within these circles was due to his penchant for foreign affairs above all other issues.
His membership of Whig administrations in the 1830s and 1840s was beneficial
both to minister and ministry, though ultimately Palmerston was to emerge from this
period as an important contributor to the emergence of a Liberal party.
Central to the Whig governments of the 1830s and 1840s were the Foxites,
the ideas of the eponymous erstwhile leader of that faction being perpetuated by his
nephew, Lord Holland, through the Holland House salon. Traditionally Whigs and
especially Foxites were suspicious of monarchical influence and authority, and
George Ill's reign had done little to assuage such concerns, and thus parliamentary
government, no longer simply the eighteenth century system of checks and balances,
was held up as the means of resisting malignant monarchical power and enforcing
the principle of government representative of the people. Democratic government,
however, was envisaged in a very limited sense and in speaking of 'government' the
Foxites meant for rather than of the people; and in speaking of the 'people', they
alluded to propertied members of the population and not the masses. Holland
himself, for example, cautioned an opponent for using 'the word democracy in a very
fallacious sense when he applied it to the mass of the people. Though the opinion of
38 Ibid, pp.9-1015
the mass of the people was not to be followed in every case, yet every government
was made for the benefit of the mass of the people'.39 The people had an abstract
right to representation for, as Fox himself had taught, they 'were the legitimate
sovereign in every community'.40
The Reform Bill, then, was a Foxite measure in that it sought to extend the
representation of the property owners, and thereby extended the virtual
representation of the people, although its importance goes beyond this. Whilst the
government now perceived itself as more accurately and legitimately representing
the people, the people commensurately expected more in return. For not only did the
Act redistribute the franchise, but also as a natural corollary of this, ministerial
accountability was increased at both a local and national level.41 Representation was
still for many virtual, but government authority was now much more clearly
grounded in popular acquiescence rather than in royal power. It was the necessary
accommodation of social and economic change, an acknowledgement of movement.
Palmerston himself acquiesced in the measure, although he disapproved of
the manner of its execution, for whilst he distrusted the integrity of many portions of
the population, he had already learned the value of popular support for policy and
had previously demonstrated a commitment to government for the people. Over his
foreign policy, however, he found not all Whigs and members of the governments of
Grey and Melbourne approved of his conduct. He could not afford not to be
associated with them, nor they with him, however, since party was a necessary
function of the protective responsibility of government. As Angus Hawkins has
39 Quoted L. Mitchell, Holland House (London, 1980), pp.64-65
40 Quoted P. Mandler, Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform: Whigs and Liberals,
1830-1852 (Oxford, 1990), p.l9
41 See Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, pp. 113, 11616
argued, the Whigs believed if parliament was to remain autonomous, and not
become the instrument of either monarchy or the people, then 'political associations'
of a certain kind were required. Only in this way, at least according to the Whig
view, could royal prerogative be controlled, and the preoccupations of Westminster
be properly defined as the 'demarcation of respectable polities', keeping down
dangerous populism and preserving at the head of this an aristocratic leadership
committed to civil and religious liberty.42 Only through the maintenance of party
could dangerous fracturing of politics into extremes be avoided, as Holland observed
in a letter to his son in 1824: 'I therefore think that if you have any publick object for
yourself or others you will, you ought, nay you infallibly must, under whatever name
you disguise it, persue [sic] it by party means'.43 For the Whigs, an increasingly
popular and 'national' minister such as Palmerston represented an important asset
and a force for cohesion within the party and between the government and people.
Throughout the 1830s and until his death in 1840, Lord Holland, believing
himself entitled to a prominent role in foreign affairs yet excluded from such a role
on the grounds of general distrust of his political integrity,44 continued to involve
himself in questions of foreign policy and indeed in the early 1830s, Holland House
'for a moment became the Foreign Office'.45 A personal connection with Talleyrand
of France and Holland's Foxite Francophilism served, in Mitchell's phrase, to
provoke 'guerrilla warfare' between Holland House and Palmerston's Foreign Office,
and threatened also to undermine the new Grey government. Despite the close
political connection between Grey and Holland, the two standing at the centre of
42 A. Hawkins, '"Parliamentary Government" and Victorian Political Parties, 0.1830-0.1880',
English Historical Review, CIV (July 1989), pp.642, 647
43 Quoted Mitchell, Holland House, p.68
44 See ibid, pp.11-38, 146-17, 269-301
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what Disraeli spoke of as 'pure Whiggery', it was Palmerston's handling of foreign
affairs that won through, although Grey certainly believed that he exercised a degree
of control over Palmerston which would compensate for his appointment and did
continue to consult Holland (along with Lansdowne) in a sort of inner Cabinet.
Under Melbourne's administration of the second half of the 1830s, however,
Palmerston enjoyed a much freer hand. The Holland House set continued to
interfere, but, significantly, Melbourne himself grew increasingly weary of this
salon's vociferous meddling: 'the talking at Holland House is inconceivable' he
complained to Lord John Russell in September 1840.46 Whilst Melbourne's style.
was to allow his ministers some degree of independence in their own departments,
he had notoriously little interest in foreign affairs and the Foreign Office became
very much Palmerston's personal domain during these years.47
Palmerston's foreign policy was tolerated in many ways because it evoked
images and impressions which the ministries to which he belonged wished to
exploit. A foreign policy directed explicitly in the interests of liberal causes and
patriotic interests and with the general approbation of the people (or at least the
perception of it) gave the governments of the 1830s and 1840s grounds to be seen as
the guardians of the national interest.48 Palmerston had joined the Whigs in 1830
largely because he needed, along with his fellow Canningites, a party base which the
Wellingtonian Tories were unlikely to provide and the Whigs appeared to share a
common interest in extending the base of political strength. It was essentially a
pragmatic response and did not indicate a move into the Whig family. Even
Melbourne, with whom Palmerston enjoyed such family ties with the Whigs as he
46 Melbourne to Russell, 19 Sept. 1840, quoted Mitchell, Melbourne, p. 156
47 Mitchell, Melbourne, p. 162
48 Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, p. 15318
was able to lay claim to, was not especially committed to partisan politics, at least
for their own sake.49 Indeed, he had entertained seriously the prospect of returning to
a Wellington administration as late as October 1830 on condition that Earl Grey as
leader of the Whigs and Huskisson, de facto leader of the Canningites, join him in
the venture. As Leslie Mitchell points out, Melbourne wished to dissolve party
distinctions and continued to seek an independent voice; party political connection,
he felt, only heightened the risk of'embarrassment and degradation'.50
A sense of national honour and service, or at least a pre-occupation with, in
Palmerston's case especially, issues of a national significance, tended to a view of
politics as serving a national interest and in many ways above party divisions.
Palmerston and Melbourne were, in Peter Mandler's analysis, passive liberals,
sharing other liberals' aversions, but not their dogmas; representing in short,
lowest-common-denominator liberalism.51 Ironically, however, such an approach
resulted in something akin to a party nonetheless, that of a clique of Palmerstonians
which included a range of parliamentarians,52 but also a number of diplomats and
junior public figures. Patronage certainly contributed to this group, yet it was more
than this that defined it. Palmerston was associated with no particular domestic
cause yet he stood clearly for a particular foreign policy, aggressive, liberal and
patriotic which could unite Whigs, Liberals and even Conservatives.53
The rhetorical teaching of politicians such as Palmerston, as Parry observes,
was directed towards rousing opinion against abuses of power and in defence of
49 Mandler, Aristocratic Government, p. 105
50 Mitchell, Melbourne, p.l 17
51 Mandler, Aristocratic Government, p. 107
52 John Vincent identifies Lord Overstone as a 'Palmerstonian' for example (Vincent,
Formation of the Liberal Party, p.46).
53 Mandler, Aristocratic Government, pp. 109-11019
local liberties. More than this, however, Palmerston had acquired a much more
positive outlook and through participation in groups such as the Alfred Club in the
first decade of the nineteenth century had developed a powerful sense of national
destiny based on a sort of expansionist nationalist Protestantism, an enthusiasm as
the Tory Robert Southey put it, for 'making the world English'.54 By the time that
Palmerston had reached the peak of his career, these sentiments had developed into
something not only more distinctly Palmerstonian, but also more popular.
As this thesis demonstrates, Palmerston's constituency extended beyond the
traditional boundaries of political support and in many ways this was the product of
his broad based foreign policy. Able at different times and to different degrees to
present his foreign policy as liberal, popular, patriotic, strong and godly, such by the
1850s was his reputation in the field of foreign affairs, that Palmerston was able,
through his work at the Foreign Office, and indeed, later, at the Home Office, to do
much to justify his image as 'the most English Minister' and even if he was not, in
1855, I'inevitable, he did at least enjoy a legitimate claim to be considered for the
premiership.
Palmerston was fortunate that he had been able to avoid entangling himself
in contentious domestic political wrangles. For, whilst his foreign policy might not
always have been uncontroversial, he succeeded generally in presenting his policy as
that best able to achieve results complementary to the national interest. Over Don
Pacifico, for example, few sympathised with Pacifico himself, yet almost everyone
applauded the evocation of the famous 'civis Romanus sum' principle. Palmerston
enjoyed the indulgence of Lord John Russell's fragile ministry of 1846-1852 largely
54 Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, p.16, 34-3520
because his foreign policy supplied much of the adhesive that held the
administration together. He maintained his alliance with that government (until
December 1851) largely because he feared the alternatives represented by ministries
driven by protectionism or worse still, unchecked constitutional reform.
However, by the early 1850s, Palmerston's own personal position was much
stronger. He had the opportunity now, as Peter Mandler points out, to whip up
domestic authoritarianism and patriotism against the Whigs.55 Never truly a Whig
cousin, Palmerston had struggled throughout the previous decade to establish an
ascendancy over the 'natural' leader of the Whigs, Lord John Russell. With the
emergence of a definite liberal identity within the administrations of Grey,
Melbourne and Russell, which Mandler has sought to 'tease apart' from whiggery,
Palmerston was able to forge a more liberal strand within the government and
ultimately to lay some of the early foundations of a Liberal party. Clearly
Palmerston was not the sole architect of such a scheme, indeed to suggest that there
was in any sense a deliberate search for a Liberal party at this time is misleading, but
his foreign policy embodied many principles associated with liberalism and his
contribution to the emergence of a Liberal party should not be seen to originate in
the Willis' Rooms in 1859.56 As Parry claims, the Liberal party stood for British
interests (as opposed to the English bias of the Conservatives), for open politics,
political economy and religious diversity (though this serves to illustrate well the
" Mandler, Aristocratic Government, p.273
56 This view is corrected in M.E. Chamberlain, 'Who founded the Liberal Party', Inaugural
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ambiguity of Russell ascribing to Palmerston the mantle of most English minister).
Above all, for national government ahead of class government.57
Palmerston, argues Parry, 'established his credentials with the mass of the
provincial Liberal party from 1847', through his advocacy of intervention in support
of liberal causes abroad, which he demonstrated particularly in 1848 and again in
1854 (however contrived the logic of that might have been in the latter case).58
Whilst Parry is concerned to stress the centrality of religious issues in political life,
he concedes that taxation and, at least as far as this thesis is concerned, more
importantly, foreign policy questions were also, when 'inflamed', the only issues
'able to link the world with which the politically interested public was concerned to
the high political world'.59 Arguably, however, the politically interested public was
more broadly defined for questions of foreign policy than for taxation questions,
whilst foreign policy itself was frequently bound up with, or invoked considerations
of, religion. In terms of defining the 'nation', and more particularly the
ever-broadening political nation, foreign affairs offer a most important means of
assessment. Palmerston's ready association with this particular area of business is
thus central to the main considerations of this thesis.
According to John Vincent, Palmerston, whom he represents as something of
a paternalist liberal, focused on middle class interests when he based his politics on
'crude belligerence abroad and class fear at home', and the lower classes, whom he
distrusted as being 'under the control of a small clique of socialist agitators', received
attention from Palmerston only from a sense of (party) duty.60 Steele, with some
57 Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, p.4
58 J. Parry, Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875
(Cambridge, 1986), p.25
59 Ibid, p. 53
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justification, has challenged this view, regarding Palmerston as a 'demagogue', (as
Cobden described him), and seeing in his premierships the revelation of a 'genius for
adaptation'.61 Whilst Steele rightly signals the importance of a broadly conceived
public opinion, however, he pays little attention to the manner in which it was
manipulated, and to the reasons for this manipulation, and offers only a very thin
explanation of the transformation of Palmerston from 'Whig' Foreign Secretary into
the first Liberal Prime Minister.
Steele sees Palmerston's inexorable rise to the premiership originating in the
late 1820s, and culminating in the months leading immediately to the formation of
his first government as Palmerston rode the tide of popular approval into office.62
His account indeed of the years 1855-1865 seems to take for granted that Palmerston
enjoyed popular support, yet there is no attempt to look for the foundations of this
support nor, more importantly, is there any real effort made to investigate the ways
in which Palmerston carefully cultivated the image of a popular minister. He
certainly did not find popular approval bestowed upon him unsolicited; it had to be
courted and if it was Russell (and not Palmerston) who was thought to be 'influenced
by personal ambition rather than concern for the country', as Steele argues, it was not
to suggest, as Steele does, that in the final analysis Palmerston did not share a similar
desire for personal advancement. Palmerston had, to a large extent, learned how to
use extra-parliamentary forces to influence politics at the centre.
Palmerston in 1852 had not been a suitable choice for Prime Minister yet
within only three years he was installed in that office. His success in climbing the
greasy pole owed a great deal to his ability to manipulate extra-parliamentary forces
61 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, pp. 15, 367
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(and the fact that in this regard his contemporaries were less adept) and bring them
to bear on Westminster politics in what, it must again be stressed, was still
essentially a pre-democratic age.
The great advantage to Palmerston deriving from his popularity founded on a
reputation in the field of foreign affairs was not so much that he actually instituted a
new style of government which relied for its inspiration on the determination of a
broadly defined public opinion, but that he was able to present himself as capable of
keeping that opinion in hand. There is something to be said for Parry's argument
that Palmerston used popular approval to 'consolidate respect for him in
parliament',63 but Parry's view, if taken without qualification, is too cynical.
Palmerston did believe in the value of popular involvement in questions of foreign
policy (however superficial) and whilst the chief benefit was that this allowed him to
steal a march on less popular rivals, he did develop the Canningite belief in the force
of public opinion. Steele presses his case too far, however, in seeing Palmerston as
offering a conscious introduction to a new era of democratic politics. Palmerston
had no desire to prepare the ground for a more democratic system of government: he
simply saw the advantage both to himself and the country of investing his foreign
policy with a sense of popular, national, support.
ii) Outline and structure of the thesis
Clearly there are problems associated with the period 1846-1855 that demand
attention. Palmerston, the Tory, or Canningite, having effected a marriage of
convenience with the Whigs, emerged during this period as the chief rival to Russell
63
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to lead that group. Whilst Russell and other Whigs may have acknowledged the
importance of public opinion, they failed to appreciate the importance of courting it
and the techniques by which to work with that opinion. Palmerston was allowed a
much freer reign than would have been expected for a minister who was not only not
a true Whig but also within high political circles, was widely distrusted. His
political longevity was frequently ascribed to his 'popularity' but this short-hand
explanation was not, and has not, been properly explained. This thesis seeks to
study Palmerston's political career and the political environment of the later 1840s
and early 1850s in order to provide a fuller account of politics in this mid-century
'age of equipoise' and analyse the implications of Palmerston's popularity.
The theory of nineteenth century constitutional practice remained vague and
the ambiguities of political rights and powers were a source of friction at the centre,
particularly in the face of Palmerstonian politics. The blurring of constitutional
boundaries, however, allowed Palmerston to dominate the Cabinet of Russell and,
indeed, for that matter of Aberdeen, with regard to foreign policy and to use those
debates and contests as the forging ground for his ultimate accession to the
premiership. He was, indeed, able to outmanoeuvre many of his colleagues over key
foreign policy issues, but a sense of inevitability about his appointment to the
premiership in 1855 is lacking. He said himself, as is well known, that he was, by
this point, I'inevitable, and some contemporaries agreed, but the Queen was certainly
unhappy about having to accept him, Lord Derby only reluctantly turned down his
own commission, and Russell, essentially Palmerston's chief rival for the lead of the
Whigs and Liberals, was not convinced that, until his own abandonment of the25
government in January 1855 damaged his credibility, Palmerston had successfully
stolen a march on him.
Palmerston's rise to the premiership, then, is easily demonstrated but the
story of the minister, the Cabinet and the Court does not represent the complete
picture and the sense that he was the obvious choice carries little conviction. The
impetus for his inevitable triumph came largely from a sense of his popularity
beyond Westminster. The People's Minister (as the Mayor of Southampton
described him) came to the premiership in the midst of a war which demanded a
national leadership. However, Palmerston's extra-parliamentary reputation was not
based on a spontaneous demonstration of popular approbation. Palmerston, who
saw more clearly than Canning could have done the implications of an appeal to
public opinion, set out to control that opinion.
To the increasingly important middle classes, Palmerston appealed through
the newspapers and periodicals. He did not regard the press as having any role in
informing his conduct, whatever grandiose claims journalists made for the power of
the fourth estate. Newspapers existed, for Palmerston, largely as an effective
medium for communication with the people. He carefully cultivated sympathetic
titles as a counter-balance to more hostile journals and through the pages of these
papers placed before the country what he wanted it to know. Such manipulation was
particularly significant during the Aberdeen government as Palmerston sought to
undermine the Aberdonian policy on the Eastern question without attracting to his
own name unfavourable attention if or when the ship of state ran aground.
Palmerston's political skill, however, was to court a much broader
constituency. Exploiting a reputation forged in an area of 'national' concern, foreign26
policy, Palmerston was able to present himself as the guardian of the country's
interest more effectively, in that ultimately it was rhetorically more simplistic, than
could his main rivals. 'Liberal', 'English', 'Protestant'; however much these labels did
or did not attach to his domestic politics, they were widely apprehended to define his
foreign policy and they possessed a strong emotive capacity at a time when a sense
of national identity and a concept of the nation were being constructed very much by
reference to other countries, that is, in terms of what Britain was not as much as
what Britain was. Palmerston went out and told the country he was the national
minister and then returned to Westminster with echoes of this sentiment to augment
his armoury.
Few other politicians had grasped the value or mastered the techniques of
this form of demagoguery. Palmerston could therefore ride criticism of his policies
as he played up to an increasingly vociferous popular support. This ultimately
carried a good deal of political weight, especially when parliamentary opponents
were unable to muster sufficient strength to overcome Palmerston at Westminster.
This thesis, then, sets out to explain mid-nineteenth century British politics
on a number of levels. Palmerston emerges as an effective political operator and
whilst this reveals a good deal about the nature and operation of the Victorian
constitution, it also opens up and links a number of important questions and issues.
Public opinion and popular politics are seen not merely as interesting side-shows
but, even in this pre-democratic age, as integral to the conduct of politics at the
centre, particularly when there appeared a statesman capable of understanding the
dynamics of extra-parliamentary politics. The middle classes are accorded a27
significant role but, in line with much recent work,64 this thesis also seeks to explain
the nature and uses of political influence among the unenfranchised. This influence,
though ill-defined, possessed a curiously impelling force which a skilful politician
such as Palmerston was able to harness and present to his colleagues as he wanted it
to be interpreted.
This thesis breaks down into two parts but should not be read as two discrete
studies. Discussion of the high politics of the years 1846-1855 reveals a great deal
of what was happening in terms of the politics of foreign policy but, and particularly
with regard to Palmerston, does not adequately explain why. Through an
examination of newspapers as a means of communicating with the nation and as a
barometer of the mood of a particular portion of it as well as an important
battle-ground for political disputes by proxy, political issues were brought down to
the level of those not only within but also without the traditionally conceived
political nation. However, Palmerston, bereft of an obvious, or effective, party
support, frequently alienated within the close political circles often defined by
familial connection (despite Lady Palmerston's best efforts as a political hostess)
needed support from a quarter largely untapped by his contemporaries. Without
fully understanding and certainly without fully empathising with the 'people',
Palmerston exploited a popular credibility and sense of national solidarity (however
artificial it might have been) to underpin his position. He found a country widely
disposed to adopt him. The significance of this connection is explored carefully
through a variety of sources in order to illustrate the nature and impact of such
popular support.
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The analysis is brought back to Westminster with a consideration of
parliamentary opposition. Finding little effective opposition voiced out of doors,
Palmerston's main threat, beyond that within the government itself, came from the
opposition benches. However, disunity, inconsistency, eccentricity and a lack of
general sympathy weakened such critiques and left Palmerston, popular,
ineffectively opposed and capable of punching above his weight in government.29
CHAPTER 2. RISE AND FALL: PALMERSTON AND THE POLITICS OF
FOREIGN POLICY, 1846-51
i) Palmerston, Russell, the Queen and foreign policy before 1846
Whereas Evelyn Ashley's Life of Palmerston1 gives the impression that, at least as
far as foreign policy was concerned, there was no-one else at Westminster but
Palmerston, he did not rule the Foreign Office unsupervised, he did not enjoy the
luxury of Cabinet support on all issues, and he was definitely not the Crown's
favourite. Palmerston's third, and final, occupancy of the Foreign Secretaryship
between 1846 and 1851 during the government of Lord John Russell, was in essence
a perpetual struggle to secure control of the Foreign Office, a struggle dominated
though not completely defined by the curious triangular relationship of Crown,
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. When, in 1848, Palmerston had to defend his
record before the House of Commons and famously declared in answer to charges of
inconsistency that Britain had no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies,2 he was,
perhaps, offering also a fitting epigram for himself. He certainly captured the
essence of Palmerstonism: free from ties and above all pragmatic in its outlook.
Observers of this period have been apt to describe the role of Russell as
something of a broker between the Court and the Foreign Office, perpetually striving
to maintain some semblance of harmony and stability by which his rather fragile
administration might be able to continue. Whilst not an unhelpful view, this is by no
1
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means a wholly satisfactory one, and whilst there is indeed some value in seeing the
Prime Minister as an intermediary between Crown and minister, there remains a
great deal more to be said of this subject.
Lord John Russell and Viscount Palmerston were not thrown together in
1846 for the first time. They had both served in the Whig ministries of Lords Grey
and Melbourne between 1830 and 1841, in both of which Palmerston had filled the
role of Foreign Secretary whilst Russell had served as Paymaster-general until he
was installed as Home Secretary in 1835, then taking the office of Secretary for War
and Colonies in the autumn of 1839. Not only was Palmerston's office (unofficially)
of a higher rank than those held by Russell, but so too were his reputation and
influence the more imposing.3 Whilst Russell did not necessarily become, in the
course of these early ministerial associations, a proselyte to the Palmerstonian frame
of mind, he tended frequently to concur with Palmerston and side with the Foreign
Secretary within the Cabinet on foreign affairs. A letter written to Palmerston once
Russell had been promoted to the Home Office displays a remarkably Palmerstonian
attitude to such questions: 'I think the Cabinet would have done better to have agreed
with you & me respecting our naval force on the coast of Spain', he wrote. 'To suffer
our men to be shot from time to time, & remonstrate as if we were neutrals, while
we are in fact allies, & belligerents, is unbecoming, & degrading to our flag.4
This was an early and unconvincing flirtation with foreign policy, however.
It was not indicative of a frequent and interested concern with the conduct of
Britain's external relations and signals little more than a genuine sympathy with the
3
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4 Russell to Palmerston, 27 Sept. 1835, Broadlands Papers, Southampton University Library,
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line adopted by Palmerston over a particular issue. Not until the closing months of
the Melbourne government did Russell became in any meaningful way interested in
foreign politics.5
Initially Palmerston was able to carry Russell with him on most aspects of
foreign policy. Over Afghanistan for instance Lord John made no objection to the
invasion, and with regard to the opium question he was quite in agreement with
Palmerston that now was the time to say 'we mean to knock the Chinese Emperor
down for this impudence'.6 However, Russell had not been at the Colonial Office
long before he started to come into much more frequent contact and friction with
Palmerston.7
Over the boundary question involving Canada and the United States of
America Russell believed that the Foreign Office was dragging its feet in not signing
a convention to settle the dispute, but it was over the Eastern question that Russell
really fell out with Palmerston, or at least the Palmerstonian approach. Following
the abortive attempts in the early 1830s to break free from the shackles of the
Ottoman Empire, Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, facing a vengeful suzerain in Sultan
Mahmoud II, sought once more in 1838 to declare independence. Although the
declaration was withdrawn, the attention of the Great Powers was again drawn to the
potential for collapse within the Ottoman Empire, for as one historian points out, it
was clear that Mehemet AH was merely postponing and not abandoning his plan.8
The Ottoman Empire represented a vital counter-balance, helping to preserve some
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sort of great power equilibrium by simultaneously obstructing Russian expansionist
tendencies and preserving French and British lines of communication with areas of
imperial and commercial interest.
At the close of 1838 and the beginning of 1839, the Sultan's desire to settle
what was rapidly developing into the second Mehemet Ali crisis led to hostile
confrontations between the Turks and Egyptians which in April escalated into war.
Now the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, long predicted, often averted, seemed
close by, and matters only worsened when Mahmoud died at the end of June and was
succeeded by the 'weak and stupid' sixteen year old Abdul Medjid.9 Little wonder,
then, that the Turkish forces collapsed, with the Turkish fleet going over to Mehemet
Ali. With the Porte thus undermined, the Great Powers
- primarily in this instance
Russia, France and Britain - finally intervened and the Mehemet Ali question
became above all one of European diplomacy, although this did not usher in a
speedy settlement and a period of harmony. Anglo-Russian relations, always
sensitive in the Near East, were tense and a breach was developing between Britain
and France. Though the French did not declare openly for Mehemet Ali, neither
would they adopt an anti-Egyptian line: important commercial interests in Egypt and
a desire to construct a viable counter-poise to British influence in the Mediterranean
area weighed heavily with the French government. A certain Anglo-Russian
rapprochement emerged as Palmerston became increasingly Francophobic and
receptive to Russian overtures whilst the Russians were keen to seize an opportunity
to conciliate a Near Eastern rival and also upset the Anglo-French entente.
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Over this question Palmerston came into direct conflict with his own Cabinet
which contained a sizeable Francophile element, not least amongst the Holland
House Foxites. But still Palmerston pursued his chosen line to the detriment of
Anglo-French relations which took another turn for the worse when Thiers took
charge in March 1840 offering an even more uncompromising attitude to the
Ottoman business. Meanwhile Mehemet Ali proffered a negotiated settlement. The
European Powers resented the humiliation implicit in a Turco-Egyptian settlement
which would have been constructed without their help, and, worse still perhaps, with
French backing. It was largely due to Ponsonby, the British minister at
Constantinople, that the Porte rejected the Egyptian overtures.
At this point Russell and Palmerston began to diverge. Russell declared that
he did not regard the difference between British and French proposals as a
reasonable cause of war, and told the Foreign Secretary that he 'must therefore
propose at the Cabinet on Monday that some step should be taken to demonstrate our
willingness to settle the question by negotiation'.10 Following this Cabinet meeting,
Russell wrote once again to Palmerston, saying he would resign thereby 'leaving to
you the whole credit of the success of your policy,' which, he said, it 'seems to me
that I have no right to share in any claim to foresight, when my predictions are
anything but sanguine'.11
Russell was dissuaded from this course and although he did shift closer to the
Palmerstonian stand-point once Palmerston had secured the support of Russia,
Austria and Prussia, it was Palmerston's policy that had won the day and Russell
who had suffered a political defeat. In seeking some sort of reconciliation, Russell
10 Russell to Palmerston, 24 Sept. 1840, Broadlands Papers, GC/RU/41
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wrote to Palmerston early in November tacitly acknowledging Palmerston's approach
to have been workable and proposing possible instructions to be issued forthwith to
advance the situation.12 On the letter containing Lord John's proposals, however,
Palmerston has minuted rather caustically that they were 'Not adopted by me'.13
Nevertheless, whilst Palmerston had lost much favour with Cabinet by the
end of the negotiation, Russell was once more sympathetic to the Palmerstonian line.
This may well have been a pragmatic decision since Russell was acutely aware of
the importance of party in fashioning an effective anti-Conservative group at this
time. When the Melbourne government fell in 1841 Russell fully appreciated that he
must keep Palmerston with him if the Whigs were to stand as a viable opposition to
the Tories under Peel. 'Before we meet again,' he wrote to Palmerston in October
1841, 'we must not only be organized, but it must be considered for what purposes
we are organized. There is sufficient matter, as I think, both in the principles of free
trade, and in the maintenance of the general policy we have maintained in Poland, to
give us a distinct ground for party union'.14 Not only had Palmerston's handling of
foreign policy been a triumph of liberalism and self-determination
- despite his stand
over Egypt
- but he was also widely recognised as an able and capable statesman.
12 Russell to Palmerston, 7 Nov. 1840, Broadlands Papers, GC/RU/50. One of Russell's chief
concerns had been the role of Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador to the Porte. On 1 November
he had written to the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, to warn that he could not remain a member of
the government for much longer. 'The measures taken by Lord Ponsonby', he wrote, 'for extending
the blockade of Alexandria to ships of War, & employing our squadron in enforcing it, has, I see,
been opposed by Lord Palmerston. This appears to me, for reasons which are obvious, a very
dangerous step. You tell me in a note I have this moment received "We have now a prospect, and as
it appears to me a very good one, of settling this matter amicably." I confess I see no such prospect.
The very first preliminary to any arrangement must be, in my view, the removal of Lord Ponsonby
from his post' (Russell to Melbourne, 1 Nov. 1840, Broadlands Papers, GC/RU/48).
In his letter to Palmerston of 7 November, however, Russell tacitly admitted defeat and
conceded that 'it would be unjust & discouraging to all engaged to recall him, or send a special
Embassy to the Porte'.
13 Minute in Palmerston's hand on letter from Russell to Palmerston, 7 Nov. 1840, Broadlands
Papers, GC/RU/51
14 Russell to Palmerston, 4 Oct. 1841, Broadlands Papers, GC/RU/60/1-235
Indeed Russell could hardly afford not to appease Palmerston when even Aberdeen,
Peel's Foreign Secretary, was forced to admit that Palmerston's management of the
Eastern question during the 1830s had, as Palmerston gleefully reported to
Melbourne, 'made him forgive me many things of former years, which he had
thought he never should have forgiven'.15
Thus Palmerston had established himself as an able manager of foreign
policy. His pugnacious and self-willed manner was offensive to many at
Westminster but none could deny that he was now vital to any resurrection of Whig
and Liberal fortunes. As Sir Robert Peel brought his party towards a wreck on the
rocks of the Corn Law question towards the end of 1845, attempts were made to
bring into office a new government, a Whig ministry which would be headed by
Lord John Russell, and when in December 1845 Peel resigned the Queen sent for
Lord John. Whilst a new government would still uphold the Peelite insistence on the
need for repeal of the Corn Laws, it was felt, or at least hoped, that such a ministry
could pass this legislation without destroying itself. Outwardly, there was no reason
to doubt the sincerity of such aspirations, but in reality it was to prove impossible for
Russell to pull together the various factions with whom he sat on the opposition
benches in order to supplant Peel. Upon consideration of the immediate political
programme to be pursued, Russell was able to secure widespread concurrence
among his allies, as Prince Albert recorded in a memorandum:
He [Russell] had written to all his former colleagues to join him in
his attempt, amongst others to Lord Grey, who answered, 'that he
could only belong to a Government which pledged itself to the
principle of absolute free trade and abolition of all protection; that
he had his own views upon the sugar question (as to which he
advocated the admission of slave labour) and upon the Irish
15 Palmerston to Melbourne, 26 Dec. 1845, A.C. Benson and Viscount Esher (eds.), The Letters
of Queen Victoria: a selection from Her Majesty's correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861,
3 vols. (London, 1907) [hereafter LQV\, II, pp.79-8236
question (as to which his principle was to establish entire religious
equality); that he hoped that in the formation of a new Government
no personal considerations should stand in the way of a full
attention to public Duty.'
Lord John replied that he advocated free trade, but as the
immediate question before them was the Corn Laws, he thought it
wiser not to complicate this by other declarations which would
produce a good deal of animosity; that the sugar question and
Ireland might be discussed in Cabinet when circumstances
required it; that he agreed entirely in the last sentence.
After this Lord Grey declared himself quite satisfied....16
Palmerston remained an intractable problem, however. Despite his conservative
reputation in domestic affairs, Palmerston was not as vehement in his objections to
the repeal movement which drove on his colleagues such as Russell as was widely
suspected and he proclaimed himself to be happy to serve in a ministry committed to
such measures. Charles Greville thought, somewhat cynically but not unreasonably
that:
as Palmerston's objection was grounded on the assumption that it
[the Edinburgh Letter in which Russell expressed his conversion
to the principle of free trade] would strengthen Peel, now that Peel
is out of office, and the doors of the F.O. are open to him, he will
no doubt be reconciled to it; for I don't imagine he cares about
corn, fixed duty, sliding scales, or anything else except so far as
they may bear upon his return to that abode of his bliss.17
Nevertheless, whilst Palmerston was quite genuinely prepared to serve in a Russell
government, some of his colleagues were unwilling to accommodate him. An
influential minority, led by the third Earl Grey but including also Labouchere,
George Grey and Macaulay, could not tolerate the idea of working in harmony with
Palmerston.18 F.A. Dreyer has suggested that Lord Grey along with Sir Charles
Wood had long sought to establish some sort of Conservative-Liberal coalition and
16 Memorandum by Prince Albert, 20 Dec. 1845, LQV, II, pp.69-71
17 C.C.F. Greville, The Greville Memoirs (second part): A Journal of the Reign of Queen
Victoria, from 1837 to 1852 (ed. H. Reeve), 3 vols. (London, 1885), II, p. 318 (12 Dec. 1845)
18 Third Earl Grey, Journal, 18 Dec. 1845, Grey Papers, 3rd Earl, Durham University Library
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they were exploiting opposition to Palmerston as a means of furthering this end.19
Palmerston was not the only member of the proposed Cabinet to whom Grey
objected but he was a politically useful target.20 Having failed to establish an
alliance with Peel, despite sharing common views on financial policy, Grey and
Wood joined the Russell government in July 1846 preferring that to remaining in
opposition with few immediate prospects of government. Russell's offer of the
Chancellorship of the Exchequer to Wood certainly made the decision easier, but as
Minto's journal reveals, the Grey faction continued to look to a future as a separate
political body.21 Opposition to Palmerston was founded on more than the personal
ambition of his antagonists and rested to a large extent on fears about Palmerston's
ability to avoid costly foreign entanglements.
Russell stood little or no chance of forming a ministry without Palmerston
which would be sturdy enough to weather the coming parliamentary storms; yet he
faced similarly bleak prospects of forming a ministry with him at the Foreign Office,
and Palmerston would take no other post. On a party level he could not allow
Russell to gain too great an ascendancy over him and since there was no chance of
Palmerston being offered the premiership himself, that served to emphasise the need
for him to be in a position to check Lord John. Not only did Palmerston have
personal political reasons for wanting to curb Russell; doubts were being expressed
in Whig circles at this time about Lord John's ability to execute the duties of the
Prime Minister. Palmerston felt he had a national responsibility to monitor Russell's
19 F.A. Dreyer, 'The Russell Administration, 1846-52', (unpublished D.Phil thesis, University
of St. Andrews, 1962), p.31. Dreyer claims to be able to trace this scheme of Grey's back to 1841
when Melbourne's government fell.
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conduct and he was not necessarily voicing sentiments peculiar to himself when he
said to Shaftesbury a few months later of Russell: 'Oh, he's a very foolish fellow, but
we shall go on very well now'.22 Even Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford, was
struck by a sense of unease when confronted with the possibility of Lord John
assuming the position of First Lord of the Treasury.23
Palmerston therefore insisted on taking the Foreign Office and in the face of
various objections to such an arrangement, Russell could not fulfil his commission.
Peel might have adverted to the 'want of deference shown to the Queen' and the 'new
and unconstitutional' nature of Russell's failure to follow through his promise to
form a new administration;24 but Russell could do nothing else, acknowledging that
fissures among his colleagues meant that, 'I cannot form a government which can
have a chance of success, even in the first measure they would have to propose'.23
Russell was relieved to be able to resign his task, recognising that it would have
been far from easy to perform the duties of Prime Minister, but he reserved still a
certain obloquy for Grey's conduct. 'I write to you with a great sense of relief on
public affairs', he told his wife the day after his audience with the Queen. 'The
Queen, as usual, was very gracious and was angry with Lord Grey for his
determination; she was, in short, convinced that I was right in wishing to retain
Palmerston at the Foreign Office', adding the following day: 'Howick [Grey] is so
much to blame that I am resolved never to act with him in public again. Only think
22 Palmerston to Shaftesbury, nd [c.July 1846?], A. Wyatt-Tilby, Lord John Russell (London,
1930), p. 106
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of his advising us to accept office on Tuesday and Thursday, and making his
objection on Friday'.26
It is significant that the Queen concurred in the necessity of retaining
Palmerston at the Foreign Office and this was one of the last royal endorsements of
Palmerston's abilities and claims to the control of foreign policy. When Victoria
first acceded to the throne in 1837, aged only eighteen, she had been inexperienced
in the arts of government and diplomacy and her letters to Palmerston at this time
reflect this. Primarily they are concerned with seeking advice about diplomatic
protocol: on the correct form for communications; on the suitability of gifts for
different sovereigns; on invitations to functions at Windsor (who to invite, where
they should sit at dinner, whether or not they should be invited to spend the night at
the Castle) and so on, whilst the rest simply acknowledge and approve suggestions
made by the Foreign Secretary.27 Palmerston must have been delighted with the new
state of affairs, and when in August 1837, for example, the Queen wrote to ask him
'not to send any more [despatches] until she has done with those which she already
has with her', he surely believed that here indeed was a sovereign with whom he
could deal happily.28
For the next few months the Queen continued to trust Palmerston, confining
the majority of her communications with her Foreign Secretary to simple questions
about diplomatic practice and conventions. The first letter from the Queen which
survives in the Broadlands collection to deal with a specific question of policy is
dated 11 November 1840 and in it the Queen is keen to point out that in raising
26 Russell to Lady John Russell, 20, 21 Dec. 1845, S. Walpole, The Life of Lord John Russell,
2 vols. (London, 1889), I, pp.416, 417
27
See the letters from the Queen to Palmerston, 1837, Broadlands Papers, RC/F/1 -14
28
Queen to Palmerston, 12 Aug. 1837, Broadlands Papers, RC/F/15/140
points about Palmerston's drafts she 'does so with strict impartiality having had
ample opportunity of hearing both sides of this intricate and highly important
question'.29 The experienced and self-assured manner of Palmerston had instilled in
the Queen a genuine feeling of confidence in his abilities. In May 1839 she wrote to
her Foreign Secretary, taking 'this opportunity to express to Lord Palmerston how
much she laments losing his valuable services, wh. he has performed in so admirable
a manner, & which have so greatly promoted the honour & welfare of this country in
its relations with Foreign Powers, wh. will ever be gratefully remembered as also
Lord Palmerston's readiness at all times to serve the Queen'.30 These sentiments
were voiced again in 1841 when the Queen really did lose Palmerston's services
adding as evidence of the cordiality of their relations her wish 'for his and Lady
Palmerston's welfare and happiness'.31
However well disposed the Queen was towards Palmerston, this did not
compensate for the antagonism towards Palmerston among the disaffected Whigs
and Russell was unable to form a government in December 1845 and Peel was
obliged to resume the premiership. The political death of Peel and the destruction of
the Conservative party were now, in a sense, inevitable. With the passing of the
repeal of the Corn Laws, Peel could not hold a ministry together any longer and
Russell was required to construct an administration somehow. Overtures made to
Cobden and to the Peelites were unproductive and Russell himself ruled out the only
other possible alliance,32 one with the Protectionists.33 Thus the ministry was to be
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constructed from amongst Russell's friends, but this raised for a second time the
troublesome Grey-Palmerston dilemma. However, affairs had altered since the
previous winter and Grey was now far more amenable. He recognised that it was
inappropriate and unprofitable to obstruct the formation of a government the
establishment of which necessity demanded, whilst, furthermore, Palmerston had
done much in the intervening period to repair his reputation abroad: a visit to Paris
over Easter 1846, for example, had ensured that there at least, ce terrible Lord
Palmerston had become ce eher Lord Palmerston^ however short-lived that might
have been.35 Thus Charles Wood was able to report to Russell at the end of June that
Lord Grey 'was quite prepared to waive any objection on the score of Palmerston
...
and that he felt the necessity of making the machine work easily if he came in. He
felt the separation from all his friends very much if he was not included'.36
On 6 July 1846 Russell finally accepted the Queen's commission and the new
ministers assumed their seals of office at Osborne. Yet Russell's government was
not a particularly strong and united one and the divisions which had hampered Lord
John in December 1845 were to plague him still. Even to Prince Albert the factional
nature of the new ministry was obvious:
There is the Grey Party, consisting of Lord Grey, Lord Clarendon,
Sir George Grey, and Mr Wood; they are against Lord Lansdowne,
Lord Minto, Lord Auckland, and Sir John Hobhouse, stigmatising
them as old women. Lord John leans entirely to the last-named
gentlemen. There is no cordiality between Lord John and Lord
Palmerston, who, if he had to make a choice, would even forget
what passed in December last, and join the Grey Party in
Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, I, p.499.
See also below pp. 170-171
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preference to Lord John personally. The curious part of all this is
that they cannot keep a secret, and speak of all their differences.37
Modern analyses of whig-liberal politics have agreed with the Prince in viewing this
as a period of factions, yet in such work the distinctions between groups are treated
with greater sophistication.38 Clearly the ministry was susceptible to internal
division but more than this, within Parliament, too, support for the new government
was weak. Whilst acknowledging the difficulties in assessing party strength at
Westminster between the time of Peel's fall and the dissolution of 1847, Dreyer,
taking the division lists for the third reading of the corn bill and the second reading
.
of the coercion bill in Hansard, has estimated that the 'nominal supporters of the
Government were in a minority and probably numbered altogether something like
270 to 280 members. The Protectionist party represented about 270 and the Peelites
about HO'.39 It was an inauspicious beginning, something which the Queen
recognised. With Peel and Aberdeen at the helm, she told her uncle, the King of the
Belgians, in July, she had felt safe: 'Never
... did they ever recommend a. person or
thing which was not for my or the Country's best, and never for the Party's advantage
37 Memorandum by Prince Albert, 6 July 1846, LQV, II, pp. 101 -3
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only; and the contrast now is very striking; there is much less respect and much less
high and pure feeling...', adding a week later: 'The present Government is weak, and
I think Lord J. does not possess the talent of keeping his people together'.40 These
weaknesses were to have important ramifications for Palmerston and the conduct of
foreign policy during the subsequent five and a half years.
ii) 'Exchanging power for influence'?: The monarchy and the control of foreign
policy, 1846-5141
The Crown, the constitution and foreign policy
Crucially, one of the government's main problems during this period was the
confused state of constitutional practice, particularly in the arena of foreign policy.
Here the role of the monarchy emerges as the most curious and ill-defined and it is
the ambiguous nature of the Crown's constitutional role and the differing
interpretations ofthat role offered primarily by Melbourne and Prince Albert that lay
at the heart of many of Palmerston's struggles. Queen Victoria was not only in need
40
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Palmerston went further a couple of months later, criticising Aberdeen for having damaged
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Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/5F, fols 96-97).
41
The phrase is Harold Laski's, quoted F. Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria,
1861-1901, 2nd Edn. (Oxford, 1938), p.23744
of instruction in the specific etiquette of diplomacy, but in the arts of government
generally. The task of educating the young Queen fell largely to the incumbent
Prime Minister at the time of her accession, Lord Melbourne, and he schooled the
Queen in what he conceived to be Whig political theory. The weight of Melbourne's
responsibility was acknowledged throughout the political world, and as Lord
Aberdeen observed, not since the days of 'Protector Somerset' had a minister been so
placed. 'He has a young and inexperienced infant in his hands,' he noted in a letter to
Princess Lieven, 'whose whole conduct and opinions must necessarily be in
complete subservience to his views. I do him the justice to believe that he has some
feeling for his situation ...but in the nature of things, this power must be absolute, at
least at court'.42 During these early years of Victoria's reign, Melbourne was able to
exercise a considerable influence over the political role of the Court. Whilst the
Queen became during these early years of her reign both politically and personally
committed to Melbourne, the closeness of this relationship combined with political
scandals in the later 1830s over Lady Flora Hastings and the Bedchamber Crisis
eventually brought the integrity of the Court into question.43
When Prince Albert married the Queen in 1840 the image of the monarchy
was already severely tarnished and whilst the Queen's marriage represented a caesura
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in her relations with Melbourne, it simultaneously introduced an important new
element into British political life, and more specifically, to the political outlook of
the Queen, which was to have important ramifications for the future of the British
monarchy.
Albert's position as consort to the Queen was constitutionally ambiguous, yet
his own background
- deliberately educated in political theory in Coburg and later in
Bonn as a student of the 'Historical Law School', an increasingly fashionable branch
of scholarship investigating the historical roots of representative institutions
- made
his union with the Queen in 1840, at an important transitional period for the
monarchy in Britain, of vital importance to the course of British politics. Very early
on Victoria's uncle, King Leopold, urged that Albert 'ought in business as in
everything to be necessary to the Queen', and that there 'should be no concealment
from him on any subject',44 envisaging him clearly as some sort of personal secretary.
Very soon, however, the Prince started to offer advice to the Queen. He was
concerned, for instance, about the extent to which the monarchy had become
embroiled in questions of party under Melbourne's influence, and within a year of
becoming Prince Consort was positively encouraging the Queen to recover
monarchical rights he believed had been sacrificed to whiggish interests. As Albert's
private secretary, George Anson, recorded in a memorandum: 'The Prince ...urged
that her Majesty should by degrees regain possession of the privileges which through
youth and inexperience she had been induced to yield up ...The Prince said he could
never feel satisfied till he saw her in the same position as when she ascended the
throne'.45 As the ministry of Lord Melbourne foundered in 1841, the Prince was able
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to establish himself as more than just the Queen's private secretary, and became
effectively her chief political adviser, guiding her through the troubled months
surrounding the end of the government.
For the next twenty years, the British monarchy was, if not totally, then at
least largely, moulded by Albert and represented by him, and it is significant that
Frank Hardie was able to discern Victoria's own voice in politics only once the
Prince was dead.46 With the advent of a second Peel administration, Albert was
fortunate to find a Prime Minister now who, unlike Melbourne, was less a rival for
the ear of the Queen and more an advocate for the kind of government that Albert
himself admired.47 Albert had no desire to fashion the British monarch into an
apolitical functionary of the state, in fact quite the reverse, as his explicit
demonstrations of support for Peel's attempts to repeal the Corn Laws bears
testimony,48 and in the field of foreign affairs he clearly believed that the Court had a
positive contribution to make.
Albert was, like the Queen herself, related to many heads of state and
enjoyed an intimacy with them that could be of potential benefit to the interests of
the nation. However, ministerial interests, or interpretations of events, and those of
the Court were not always identical, and whilst during Aberdeen's tenure of the
Foreign Office this had not created any great problems, there was nevertheless
evidence of indiscretions in Court correspondence undermining the integrity of the
government.49 Albert's connections, particularly with central European states, were
in many ways a great asset to British governments, but he had not yet learned enough
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about the British system of government, or was perhaps pressing revisions too
rapidly, not to avoid clashes with ministers on occasion, and particularly so once
Palmerston had returned to the Foreign Office in 1846. Albert's influence on the
Queen and directly on British politics as half of the royal 'we' contributed expressly
to a contemporary concern with understanding the nature of British constitutional
practice.
Such a debate about the constitution was not carried on solely at a high
political level regarding the role of the Crown. There was also a flourishing
contemporary debate among many members of the journalistic and educated classes
concerned with the wider questions of British constitutional practice. Palmerston's
own conduct at this time tested many assumptions about the constitution and thereby
offered an implicit contribution to this debate.
In 1867 Walter Bagehot published The English Constitution which
challenged many of the mainstream orthodoxies of mid-Victorian constitutional
theory. Central to Bagehot's thesis was an appreciation of the distinction between
the 'dignified' and the 'efficient' parts of the constitution, the dignified parts being
those which 'excite and preserve the reverence of the population' whilst the efficient
parts were 'those by which ...[the constitution], in fact, works and rules'.50 Neither
had any value without the other, thus:
There are two great objects which every constitution must attain to
be successful, which every old and celebrated one must have
wonderfully achieved: every constitution must first gain authority,
and then use authority; it must first win the loyalty and confidence
of mankind, and then employ that homage in the work of
government. ...The dignified parts of Government are those which
bring it force
- which attract its motive power. The efficient parts
only employ that power. The comely parts of a Government have
need, for they are those upon which its vital strength depends.51
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The Queen, Bagehot concluded, was only at the head of the dignified part of the
constitution whilst the Prime Minister headed the efficient part. 'The Crown is,
according to the saying, the 'fountain of honour'; but the Treasury is the spring of
business', he reasoned.52 Power rested within Parliament in the Bagehotian model
and whilst the Prime Minister could choose in what capacity ministers would serve,
he could only select from amongst those whom parliament offered. Implicit in this
view was also an undermining of the monarchy and thus Bagehot contended that to
see Ministers as in any sense the Queen's servants was 'fictional'. Only once an
administration had been constructed, did the balances shift and then the Cabinet
became the key to government: 'A Cabinet is a combining committee
- a hyphen
which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the State to the executive
part of the State. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the
other.'53
However, whilst seeking to draw attention to what he perceived as the
ultimate subjugation of the monarch's governing power, Bagehot was nonetheless
keen to illustrate the valuable, indeed indispensable, role the Crown still had to play
in the government of the country. The monarchy offered distractions, represented
religious strength, continuity, national morality and all along provided a facade of
stability in a period of change and upheaval.54 The Bagehotian monarchy therefore
had no legislative power, nor did it form the executive; it had ultimately only three
rights: 'the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn'.55
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During the Russell government, however, Victoria clearly sought to be more
than a source of counsel over foreign policy. Inspired no doubt by Albert, the Court
was to complain frequently of Palmerston's handling of foreign affairs and notes
were often exchanged between the Queen and Russell and Russell and Palmerston in
which Victoria's complaints about her Foreign Minister's conduct were aired. The
Queen had learned during the life of the Peel ministry that certain of her prerogative
rights (or what she came to regard as her prerogative rights) had previously been
eroded and had found in Aberdeen a minister keen to fulfil his obligations to the
Queen. Over the practice of sending despatches to the Queen before they were sent
abroad, for example, Peel's Foreign Secretary had advised her that ordinarily these
diplomatic communications were sent to the Court at the same time as being sent
from the Foreign Office. 'Should Your Majesty then be pleased to make any remark
or objection,' he told her, 'it would be immediately attended to by Lord Aberdeen,
who would forthwith either make any necessary alterations, by additional
instructions, or he would humbly represent to Your Majesty the reasons which
induce him to think that the interest of Your Majesty's service require an adherence
to what had already been done'.56
The Queen clearly expected a similar treatment from Palmerston when he
returned to the Foreign Office under Russell. Thus when in the autumn of 1848
Palmerston wrote to Russell expressing his fears for his sovereign's independence of
& impartial History of Greece would, if he got Sir E. Lyon's Dispatches before him say: "we have got
most interesting documents before us, but we must take care not exclusively to trust to the statements
contained therein, without comparing them with the evidence of the writer's contemporaries, as they
are evidently written under great personal excitement & in a violent party spirit." It is in the place of
such an impartial judge that I strive to place myself'in order to come to a satisfactory conclusion
about a state of things which is of the greatest European importance' (Prince Albert to Palmerston, 4
Jan. 1848, Broadlands Papers, RC/H/26 [my italics]).
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will, claiming that, 'Unfortunately The Queen gives Ear too readily to Persons who
are hostile to her Government, and who wish to poison her mind with Distrust of her
Ministers; and in this way, she is constantly suffering under groundless uneasiness',57
Russell agreed that all was not well with the Queen; though the irony of Palmerston's
letter was not lost on him:
That the Queen is constantly suffering under uneasiness is too true,
[he replied] but I own I cannot say it is always groundless. It is
surely right that a person speaking in the name of Her Majesty's
Government should in important affairs submit his dispatches to
the Queen & obtain the opinion of her Prime Minister before he
commits the Queen & her Government.
This necessary preliminary you too often neglect, & the
Queen naturally, as I think, dreads that upon some occasion you
may give her name to sanction proceedings which she may
afterwards be compelled to disavow.
I confess that I feel some of the same uneasiness, but as I
agree with you very constantly in opinion, my only wish is that in
future you will save the Queen anxiety, & me some trouble by
giving your reasons before, & not after an important dispatch is
sent.58
Clearly the influence of the monarch extended beyond that of an adviser and Russell
himself, though a committed Foxite Whig, was keen to uphold and enforce the
monarchy's position as a figurehead and symbol of continuity.
Russell certainly had one eye on his rivals at Westminster, for if the
opposition should ever be able to pose a serious threat to the continuance of his
ministry, then the Queen's position would become more important. In an age of
unsettled politics and fluid political relationships, few governments of the
mid-nineteenth century were anything other than a coalition and in this sense the
monarchy did then have a central role to play for the Queen must under such
circumstances actually rather than just theoretically choose her prime ministers.
Often, there was no choice as in 1845 and 1846 when arguably Russell was the only
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candidate capable of replacing Peel. Then the choice had been straightforward: at
any given time, only one of the two alternatives was a viable one, but had a new
potential leader emerged during the later 1840s, the issue might not have been so
clear cut. Russell's relatively weak ministry would not have fared well against a
strong challenge, and against a weak one he would probably have needed the
Queen's sponsorship. It was important that the Queen remain favourably disposed
towards Russell and his colleagues for as long as possible.
In many ways therefore, Bagehot was too hasty in dismissing the Queen's
role as largely decorative. Brougham in his book The British Constitution adhered
to the view that the sovereign had the right to dismiss ministers at will and Baron
Stockmar, the Crown's own adviser brought to Britain by the Prince Consort,
counselled the Queen during one of her spats with Palmerston that 'having once
given her sanction to a measure, the Minister who, in the execution of such measures
alters or modifies it arbitrarily commits an act of dishonesty towards the Crown
which the Queen has an undoubted constitutional right to visit with the dismissal of
that minister'.59 G.H.L. Le May has argued that in fact the Queen never relinquished
this perceived prerogative right and would have exercised it in 1851 to remove
Palmerston had Russell not been obliged to pre-empt her.60 In the event, the Queen's
strength would probably not have extended that far, but constitutionally it would
have been problematic ever to test such power. Ultimately, what prevented the
Queen exercising this right of dismissal was another ministerial responsibility: that
to Parliament, though it was this responsibility to Parliament that provided the
means by which the Queen could still play an active role in government. Based on
Memorandum by Baron Stockmar, 12 March 1850, LQV, II, 282
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the ancient legal fiction that 'the king can do no wrong', Brougham argued that: 'For
every act done by the Crown there must be a responsible adviser and responsible
agents; so that all Ministers, from the highest officers of State down to the most
humble instrument of Government, are liable to be both sued at law by any one
whom they oppress, and impeached by Parliament for their evil deeds'.61 Thus, as
D.A. Smith reasons:
To hold that every act of the Crown must be considered the act of
an adviser responsible to Parliament and to the law does not
necessitate the quite distinct proposition that the king must act
only upon the advice of such an adviser. The latter proposition
may represent a further development of the former principle, but it
is not an ineluctable one. The former allows the king freedom of
independent action; the latter does not. The former allows the
king the right to dismiss ministers; the latter does not. The former
and not the latter, represents the view of ministerial responsibility
which prevailed in the middle of the nineteenth century.62
The principle was, arguably, established by the case of Melbourne's 'dismissal' by
William IV in 1834. Sir Robert Peel's speech in the House in the wake of this
upheaval acknowledged the share he must take for what had passed. 'God forbid', he
said, 'that I should endeavour to transfer any responsibility which ought properly to
devolve upon me to that high and sacred authority which the constitution of this
country recognizes as incapable of error, and every act of which it imputes to the
advice of responsible counsellors'.63 In accepting responsibility for what the King
had done, Peel simultaneously accepted the power of the King to dismiss his
ministers. In securing the approval for his actions from those who succeeded the
dismissed ministers, the King's actions acquired a certain stamp of constitutionality,
but such conduct remained contested and not accepted constitutional practice.
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Simultaneously, however, this perceived royal coup d'etat served as a warning to
Whigs that the King posed a serious threat to parliamentary life and was grist to the
Foxite mill.64
Yet Queen Victoria was not to enforce her 'rights' quite so assuredly and
whilst she regularly became frustrated with Palmerston and even with Russell, she
could not bring herself to push them from office. Relations between the Palace and
Palmerston were never warm and Albert was to become one of Palmerston's sternest
critics from the outset in 1846. Relations between the Court and Foreign Office
became increasingly strained by late 1847 as Albert continued his practice of
maintaining a regular correspondence with foreign sovereigns,6^ and by 1848 Russell
was receiving summons to attend the Queen to hear her complaints against
Palmerston. Russell stood by his Foreign Secretary in the face of royal pressure to
replace him with Clarendon, yet by 1850 the Prime Minister too was tired of the
Palmerstonian approach. In February the Queen wrote to Palmerston complaining
that a draft despatch which she had wished to be altered according to the
recommendations proposed by Lord John Russell, had been sent off without
modification. 'The Queen must remark upon this sort of proceeding,' she wrote, 'of
which this is not the first instance & plainly tell Lord Palmerston that this must not
happen again. Lord Palmerston has a perfect right to state to the Queen his reasons
for disagreeing with her views & will always have found her ready to listen to his
reasons, but she cannot allow a servant of the Crown, & her Minister to act contrary
to her orders & this without her knowledge'.66 Palmerston denied the validity of
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these complaints,67 but clearly the Queen had adopted the opinions of Stockmar and
believed it her constitutional prerogative to command obedience from 'a servant of
the crown & her Minister'.
The year 1850 was to become a difficult one for Palmerston. After the
contretemps of February plans were hatched to remove him and in May Russell
wrote to his Foreign Secretary a letter reporting his doubts about the continuance of
the ministry as he had expressed them to the Queen. If the government did survive
the oncoming parliamentary challenges, he said, 'without imputing blame to you, I
thought it must be confessed that looking at the position of England, her readiness to
acknowledge all forms of Government despotic and democratic, & her wish to
respect the rights of all foreign nations, she was encountered by more hostile feelings
in her course than was natural, or necessary. That I thought if you were to take some
other department, we might continue the same line of foreign policy, without giving
the same offence'.68
Had not the Don Pacifico affair and his 'civis Romanus sum' speech rescued
Palmerston's ailing fortunes he could well have found himself out of office there and
then.69 The Prince Consort recognised Palmerston's abilities but doubted his
integrity:
Lord Palmerston is an able politician with large views and an
energetic mind, an indefatigable man of business, a good speaker;
but a man of expediency, of easy temper, no very high standard of
honour and not a grain of moral feeling. He is consequently quite
unscrupulous as to any line of policy that he is to follow, or any
means he is to use as long as they lead to his ends. Whilst he is a
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most easy colleague and minister with regard to other departments,
never making any difficulty, he is self-willed and impatient of any
control of his own. His obstinacy arises from personal conceit,
which makes him almost pity those who differ from him in
opinion. He carries his own points with the greatest boldness, by
what is commonly called bullying, but if this fails he is equally
ready to resort to any trick which may serve his purpose and is
perfectly at his ease if it has succeeded. He has generally great
luck, but requires success to carry him through his policy; success
failing, he steers without a compass and makes one almost doubt
his sagacity.
It was only Palmerston's renewed importance, indeed indispensability, that served to
defend him against the royal onslaught. As Palmerston remembered:
Towards the End of the Session Ld John again brought the subject
[of Palmerston's removal from office] forward & proposed to me a
change of office. I replied that after what had passed in the House
of Commons on Roebuck's Motion, and after the general and
decided approbation of my Policy & Conduct which had been
Expressed from one End of the Country to the other by all the
Liberal Party it was quite impossible for me to consent to any such
arrangement. To do so would be to pass Condemnation on myself
after I had received a public approval, and to say that I thought the
Hs of Lords which had blamed me was in the Right, and the House
of Commons which had approved me was in the wrong. I said that
...if it was any Convenience to the Government I was ready now as
I had been after the Vote in the Lords, to relieve my Colleagues of
all Difficulty by retiring altogether, but that if I remained in the
Govt I could not give up the Foreign Office.
Ld John said that he wished me to remain a Member of the
Govt, and he afterwards said that The Queen had consented
thereto.71
Whatever constitutional conventions were on the side of the Queen, it appeared in
this case and for now, that personality transcended convention; that age, experience,
vitality, audacity and sureness of aim counted for more than theoretical and
supposedly even established tradition.
In the wake of the Don Pacifico debate the Prince Consort penned a note to
Lord John in which he conceded that: 'When overruled by the Cabinet, or convinced
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that it would from political reasons be more prudent to waive her objections, she [the
Queen] knew her constitutional position too well not to give her full support to
whatever was done on the part of the Government'.72 The Don Pacifico affair, whilst
it revealed much about British attitudes to nationality and British national interest,
also exposed a great deal about domestic politics, for the Pacifico debate in the
House of Commons was not so much concerned with the issues and problems raised
by the affair, as with Palmerston's conduct of this policy. Palmerston successfully
represented the attack on his foreign policy as an attack upon himself personally. In
his lengthy contribution to the debate, he made full use of his unlimited access to
Foreign Office files, and argued persuasively that to have engaged in any policy
different from that which he had pursued would have been un-English.73 The
reaction was overwhelmingly favourable to Palmerston and even his erstwhile rivals
had to concede that Palmerston's stock now stood higher than ever before: Earl Grey
himself testified to Palmerston's newly acquired popularity telling Greville that there
could be no doubt that the debate had left Palmerston 'the most popular man in the
country'.74
However, all government functions are not to be regarded equally. In order
to judge more accurately the theoretical foundations of mid-Victorian government it
is necessary to define these foundations. In the field of foreign policy, these
functions divide broadly into two spheres: policy and diplomacy.
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Royal interventions in foreign policy
Whatever might be judged about the role of the Crown in the conduct of everyday
governmental and parliamentary business, it cannot be doubted that where foreign
affairs are concerned the environment is quite different. As Evelyn Ashley observed
in 1879:
Foreign policy is that policy in which Sovereigns, who are thus
brought into competition with their equals, take the most interest.
The Prince Consort, with whom Her Majesty lived on such terms
of confidence as rendered her application to him on questions of
importance a matter of course, was not only a Prince of
considerable ability, but one who gave a minute and scrupulous
attention to any business on which he was consulted. ...[But] he
had for adviser [Baron Stockmar] a man who, though well
qualified to have taken a place amongst the first statesmen in
Europe, was clearly no admirer of popular or Parliamentary
control over foreign affairs, which he regarded as the special
concerns of royal and imperial minds.75
Not only did Stockmar's view of the royal position encourage the Queen to see in
foreign policy an important role for herself, but by virtue of the fact that foreign
policy brought her face to face with her fellow sovereigns, Victoria's impression of
her role was exaggerated by these 'equals' with whom she was now in competition.
Letters from foreign royalty, founded on the assumption that Victoria's constitutional
position mirrored their own, which was scarcely the case, engendered in the Queen a
feeling that she could really control her country's foreign affairs. It was from such a
premise that Victoria came to believe that one of her duties was to monitor all
diplomatic communications and insist that they acquired her approval before being
sent off.76
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The sheer volume of material with which a Foreign Secretary had to deal
meant that it was often impractical for the Queen to see everything.77 During the
Peel ministry, when Aberdeen had held the Foreign Office, this had not been too
much of a problem since Aberdeen was, like his Prime Minister, well-liked and
respected at the Palace. Because of this, although the Queen had been troubled by
the failure to submit to her all drafts of despatches, she had accepted that it was not
always possible.78 Conversely, Palmerston was not well-liked and the Queen and
Prince took literally Aberdeen's parting injunction 'you must try to keep him
straight'.79 Palmerston did not find that he enjoyed the confidence of the Crown as
he had when he had served at the Foreign Office during the reign of William IV, nor
indeed as he had when Queen Victoria had first ascended the throne.80 The Queen
now was concerned with what was said by her government to others, and indeed by
whom, for, clearly, the Foreign Secretary could not meet personally everyone with
whom he dealt and she therefore took a keen interest in both the content of
despatches and the selection and appointment of diplomats.
The appointment of diplomatic representatives was the responsibility of the
Foreign Secretary, in that these were effectively extensions of the government in
which the Foreign Secretary served, and thus in effect, instruments of his own work.
Palmerston argued, however, that candidates for postings overseas should be
assessed solely on the basis of merit and not as functionaries of party interests.
Depend upon it [he told Russell] you will find the greatest
advantage to the public Service & to the Credit of your
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Government in Selecting Men for Foreign Missions of Importance
from a Regard for their Fitness; The advantage of so acting is
permanent and felt in Times of Difficulty which may arise when
least foreseen. The Advantage of acting upon other
Considerations is Temporary, & when Evil arises from it, even
those who may have pressed it upon you at the First will be the
last to stand up and justify the Selection on the Grounds which it
was made.81
Russell acknowledged the need to appoint men of ability to Britain's overseas
postings, but unlike his Foreign Secretary he was also keen to pay attention to the
political tendencies of candidates. As he said in reply to Palmerston's letter: 'I quite
agree with you that in making diplomatic appointments the merit and fitness of the
candidates are the chief points to be considered. But at the same time in this
representative govt, the general means of carrying on a govt, are to be likewise taken
into account1.82 Nevertheless, although no letter seems actually to suggest that
Palmerston decided appointments alone, there are several examples of Russell
praising the Foreign Secretary's choice of diplomatist. Constitutionally certain
appointments were exclusively in the gift of the Foreign Secretary,83 and in general it
would have been too time consuming for any Prime Minister to usurp this role, and
Palmerston created a diplomatic staff with which Russell was generally satisfied.
The Queen, however, did take a close interest in the selection of diplomats.
If she could not choose her Foreign Minister unfettered, she would at least try to
influence the choice of diplomats through whom he would have to work. Thus on
one occasion, for example, she seized 'this opportunity of mentioning two very
deserving people in whom she takes interest & whom she wishes shld not be
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over-looked in any change wh. may take place
- viz: Mr Clarke, the son of Sir J.
Clarke, & Mr Lonsdale. They would both be found very useful, & we are not rich in
promising Diplomatists'.84 Whilst the Court was not necessarily pursuing a policy
designed deliberately to undermine Palmerston, there was clearly some concern lest
the Foreign Secretary be granted too much of a free rein in this quarter. The Queen
agreed that merit and fitness must be the governing factors in making appointments,
as Palmerston himself had said to Russell, but she did not believe that Palmerston
always abided by his own rules and felt compelled on one occasion to spell out to
her Foreign Secretary the grounds upon which selections must be made. Having
made suggestions for a set of appointments, and having then almost immediately
changed them, Palmerston prompted Victoria to write: 'The principle wh. the Queen
wld. wish to see acted upon in her diplomatic appointments in general is, that the
good of the service should preclude every other consideration & that the selection of
an Agent should depend more on his personal qualifications for the particular post
for which he is to be selected, than on the mere pleasure & convenience of the
person to be employed, or of the Minister recommending him'.85
Palmerston, however, regarded royal interventions in this field as a nuisance.
When Prince Albert forwarded to the Foreign Secretary through Russell some
suggestions for diplomatic appointments, Palmerston could not help venting his
anger: 'H.R.H. seems also to have forgot that there is a responsible Secy of State for
Foreign Affairs which however I am not likely to forget', he scribbled on this letter,
returning at a later date to add the acerbic note: 'I did not take any steps in
Queen to Palmerston, 5 Feb. 1848, Broadlands Papers, RC/F/345
Queen to Palmerston, 31 Jan. 1851, Broadlands Papers, RC/F/477/1-261
furtherance of this Extraordinary attempt to Interfere with the arrangts of my
Department'.86
However contentious were diplomatic appointments, ultimately the character
of the policies those diplomats were charged with pursuing lay at the heart of foreign
policy questions. Donald Southgate has observed that in seeking to keep Palmerston
straight the royal couple concentrated much of their efforts in trying to alter the
'slant' of the drafts which Palmerston wrote. However, 'in foreign affairs "slant" is, if
not everything, nearly everything' and the Crown's behaviour did little to incline
Palmerston towards the Queen.87 However well-meaning their interjections may
have been, there was no escaping the view that they were to become a hindrance. If
only because Palmerston represented the country when discussing affairs with
foreign powers, it was important that he be seen to be voicing a firm opinion and not
the aspirations of a particular faction.
In the early days of the ministry, the Court's surveillance of drafts bore the
appearance of advice rather than dictation. On a draft written very soon after the
Russell government came into being, Victoria wrote: 'The Queen has read very
attentively Lord Palmerston's Draft to Mr Bulwer wh. came down to her this morg.
-
she cannot conceal from Lord Palmerston that its perusal has raised some
apprehensions in her mind, which she thinks it right to state to Lord John Russell,
whom she will desire to communicate them to Lord Palmerston...'88 Palmerston
conceded in a letter concerning another draft a few days later that he had happily
amended it according to Russell's suggestions which caused the draft to be now
'much better'. To some extent a wary eye cast over diplomatic drafts helped guard
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against error, as Palmerston admitted on one occasion, having written the draft 'late
last night & in a Hurry,' he had 'relied upon your correcting what might require it'.89
Not only was pressure of business prone to cause Palmerston himself to miss flaws
in documents, but his staff too were susceptible to lapses now and then. A draft of
January 1847 had troubled the Court, but as Palmerston explained, this was nothing
more than a simple mistake: 'The obscurity, a delicate word for nonsense, observed
upon by The Queen, was occasioned by a Blunder of my Clerks who had put in a
'not' where it had no Business to be. I have struck out that word & made sense of the
Passage'.90 In monitoring Palmerston's correspondence there was a clear and
valuable service to be performed by the Court (if only as proof-readers), but
generally Palmerston did not like receiving royal corrections through Russell, which
he viewed as an implicit undermining of his authority in foreign affairs.
So long as royal interference went no further than raising queries about drafts
where there was indeed something to question, Palmerston had little cause to
complain. It was only when the Queen's interest went beyond that of the style of the
drafts and started to involve also the substance that Palmerston began to raise serious
objections. Palmerston's pride was certainly at stake, but so too was the integrity of
the country's foreign policy. Minto became increasingly concerned about the likely
ramifications of the constant royal attacks on Palmerston, believing that 'the violent
prejudice which the Queen has conceived against him ...has encouraged the factions
abroad & at home to combine in a vast conspiracy for his overthrow'.91
Once the Queen started to bring into question Palmerston's ability
satisfactorily to frame a despatch, and to demand regular and indeed full accounts of
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proceedings, the Foreign Secretary, therefore, began to resist royal intervention ever
more strenuously. In August 1846 Prince Albert had written to Palmerston to thank
him for sending to the Queen a private letter received from Lord Howard de Waiden.
The Prince hoped such would become a standard practice 'as our chief wish and aim
is, by hearing all parties, to arrive at a just, dispassionate, and correct opinion upon
the various political questions. This, however, entails a strict scrutiny of what is
brought before us'.92 In this Palmerston can have found little to which to object, yet
in fulfilling this need he was also giving the Crown much ammunition to use against
him. By 1848, as royal tolerance of Palmerston diminished, the Queen and Prince
paid ever closer attention to Palmerston's drafts, even going so far as to compile a
dossier on his diplomatic misdemeanours.93 Spain, for example, became a point of
contention between the Palace and Foreign Office at this time, with the Queen
arguing that the country was suffering 'under the evil consequence of that system of
diplomacy, which makes the taking up of party politics in foreign countries its
principal object' which Palmerston was bent on pursuing.94 More than seeking
simply to restrain a Foreign Secretary who behaved 'like a naughty child',95 the
Queen wished to see a policy of non-intervention directed towards the preservation
of established authority: reflecting a sort of Hanoverian reactionary spirit, the chief
author of which it was not difficult to identify.96
Palmerston himself did little to appease the Queen and appears to have paid
little attention to his wife's admonition that 'you contradict her notions too boldly';97
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Palmerston believed he could disarm the Court simply by restricting the flow of
information to the Palace. Early attempts to forestall royal criticisms by dispatching
documents before they had been reviewed were met with relative good humour,98 yet
within a year of returning to the Foreign Office the Queen's reprimands were
becoming much sterner. 'The Queen has several times asked Lord Palmerston
through Lord John Russell, & personally, to see that the Drafts to our Foreign
Ministers are not dispatched previous to their being submitted to the Queen;
notwithstanding, this is still done, as for instance today with regard to the Drafts for
Lisbon' she wrote. 'The Queen therefore once more repeats her desire that Lord
Palmerston shld prevent a recurrence of this practice'.99 Palmerston made a poor job
of preventing a recurrence of this practice, however, and as late as December 1849,
Victoria still felt compelled to write acidly: 'The Queen sends these 2 Dispatches to
Lord Palmerston in order to draw his attention to the date of their reception at the
Foreign Office; viz: Nov 26; & they were only sent to the Queen on 22d of Dec. The
Queen wishes that similar delays in sending her the Dispatches shld not again take
place'.100
Palmerston was not always guilty of holding up drafts for lengthy periods
and was on occasion the victim of his own poor reputation at the Palace leading the
Queen to make erroneous assumptions about his conduct,101 but he could be a
pedant, and was not averse to fulfilling the letter whilst subverting the spirit of his
constitutional obligations. Thus was Russell forced to complain in February 1849:
The Queen spoke to me the other day about the drafts sent to her
for her approval
- that they were sometimes sent at the bottom of a
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box, which she did not conceive required immediate attention:
That sometimes they were sent as immediate & the messenger
ordered to wait when there was no reason for hurry; but above all
that they were sent to her for approval before I had seen them, &
while they were still liable to alterations suggested by me, or by
the Cabinet.
She desired these irregularities to be corrected, & that in
future the drafts should be sent in a separate box, & after they have
been returned by me to the office, or settled by the Cabinet.102
Whether this was simply an example of forgetfulness or inattentiveness on
Palmerston's part or indeed an underhand ploy to scuttle the Queen, he had
succeeded in his aim, which was undoubtedly to prevent the Crown's troublesome
meddling in the affairs of his department. The Queen was not the only one whose
interventions were unwelcome, however, and he resented intrusions from any quarter
equally. Russell was drawn to complain early in February 1850 for example about a
communication to Wise at Athens which according to the Prime Minister's and
Cabinet's will should have conveyed an important notice about a discretionary power
to be granted to Wise and Admiral Parker. 'How then is a dispatch gone on an
important subject which is not in conformity with the Queen's opinion, or mine, or
that of the Cabinet', enquired Russell. 'This is a serious deviation from the usual and
right course on such subjects1.103
Palmerston had a whole battery of reasons to explain his conduct which he
deployed at intervals to appease his adversaries, favourite amongst these being that
of pressure of business which by the middle of the nineteenth century was truly
great. He told Lord Normanby in 1848: 'As to your not always getting letters from
me by every messenger who passes through Paris, never wonder at that nor think it
extraordinary. Wonder rather when I am able to find time to write at all; I am sure
you would if you saw the avalanche of despatches from every part of the world
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which come down upon me daily, and which must be read, and if you witnessed the
number of interviews which I cannot avoid giving every day of the week1.104 It was
not necessarily obstructionism then that limited Palmerston's supply of
correspondence to the Queen; as Palmerston stated to Russell eloquently in January
1849, he really had no option but to act alone at times:
You are very Expeditious & regular, but She often keeps Drafts a
long Time, and as Despatches cannot be sent off Every Day, like
Letters by the Post, it often happens that the Delay of Two or
Three Days by preventing a Despatch from going by one
periodical opportunity involves a Delay of several Days further;
and when Events are going on at a Hard Gallop, ones Instructions
become rather stale before they reach their Destination,... But if
you & The Queen wish it I can alter the present Arrangement &
order all drafts to go first to you, & not to the Queen till after you
have returned them but this will reduce my Flint Gun to a
Matchlock. The number of Despatches received & sent out in
1848 was upwards of 29,000. The number in 1828 was a little
above 10,000.105
Palmerston, aware that his own position was dangerously threatened with isolation,
was also determined that Britain's external relations could not be managed
effectively if all foreign business was not channelled through the Foreign Office.
Hence his censure of Russell when he found the latter guilty of passing over the
Foreign Office in communicating with the Admiralty: such communications were,
he told the Prime Minister, embarrassing:
First of all because they throw apparently a Responsibility upon
the Secry of State for Foreign Affairs, in regard to orders as to
which he has not been consulted, & of which he has been kept in
Ignorance till after they have been given; & secondly because it is
impossible that the First Lord of the Treasury can know what may
have passed at former Periods upon similar matters, & he may
therefore give Directions which he would not have given if he had
been more fully informed.... & Thirdly this course of proceeding
renders the Records of the F.O. imperfect & misguiding for
succeeding Govts inasmuch as important acts bearing upon our
Foreign Relations will have been done, without the Records of the
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F.O. having any Trace of an Explanation as to why or wherefore
such acts were ordered...106
The irony of this complaint appears to have been lost on Palmerston, yet he had
already warned Russell of this danger, advising him that if business concerning his
department was to be conducted without his knowledge, 'it is impossible that I can
continue a Member of your Government. No man who has any Regard or respect for
himself would serve upon such terms'.107 He could legitimately appeal to pressure of
business, to the transient and volatile nature of foreign affairs and to his uniquely
advantageous position to justify his perceived want of respect towards the Crown
and his colleagues, but Palmerston could not appease the Queen. She was offended
by his conduct and genuinely concerned about the damage she believed he was doing
to Britain's external relations. So strained did relations between the Palace and
Palmerston become that the Queen was eventually prompted to write a letter to
Russell, 'in order to prevent any mistake for the future', in which she laid down
precisely what she expected of her Foreign Secretary:
She requires 1st That he will distinctly state what he proposes in a
given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly, to what
she is giving her Royal Sanction.
2ndly Having once given her Sanction to a measure, that it
be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister: Such an Act
she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, &
justly to be visited by the exercise of her Constitutional Right of
dismissing that Minister.
She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him
& the foreign ministers, before important decisions are taken
based upon that intercourse - to receive the foreign dispatches in
good time, & to have the drafts for her Approval sent to Her in
sufficient time to make Herself acquainted with their contents
before they must be sent off.108
Palmerston took these criticisms on board and pledged himself to remedy the
situation. He appealed to the 'great Pressure of business, &
... the many Interruptions
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and Interviews &c to which I am liable' as the reason for the delays of which the
Queen complained, and said that in order to revert to the old practice of making
immediate copies of despatches as they were received as a way of resolving the
problem, he would 'require an Additional Clerk or Two. You must be liberal &
allow me that assistance'.109
Thus the Queen concerned herself with diplomatic practice as this was where
her honour was at stake and where questions of prestige were paramount since this
was where her peers seemed to have more independence and encouraged her to
believe that she, too, could exercise similar power. However, when the Queen
sought to influence policy, her comments were often over-ridden and the Queen's
constitutional position was such that she could do nothing but accept this. Even if
she were to have dismissed her Ministers for failing to enact her wishes, as William
IV had with Melbourne, she would have required another Peel to accept
responsibility for her actions and there were no obvious candidates to form a
ministry to succeed Russell's.110 With no-one to replace Russell, the Queen could
not dismiss him, and thus her views on policy became, ultimately, meaningless. But
this is not to suggest that Victoria was ignored: frequently she would be able to offer
wise counsel,111 but in the final analysis, responsibility for policy rested with the
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Cabinet, which collectively endorsed and therefore took responsibility for the
construction of that policy. This was no mere phenomenon of the Russell
government either. A few years later, when Palmerston's and Russell's roles of
1846-51 were reversed, the Queen found herself again running up against the same
wall. 'What is the use', she asked Russell, 'of the Queens open & she fears at times
wearisome Correspondence with her Ministers, what [is] the use of long
Deliberations of the Cabinet if the very Policy can be carried out by indirect means
which is set aside officially, & what Protection has the Queen against this
Practise'.112 In fact the parallels with 1846-51 are striking, and Russell in seeking to
control the business of his department at the Foreign Office under Palmerston
offered defences very like those employed by Palmerston during the Russell
government, even reserving the right to resign if his policy was over-ruled."3
The Queen's early input into discussion of foreign policy was really as that of
adviser: she was almost satisfying Bagehot's criteria for monarchical influence;
namely to be consulted, to encourage and to warn. Early in the Russell
administration's term the Iberian Peninsula threw up fresh problems for the
statesmen of Europe. The Spanish Marriages question exercised a great many
European minds, not least that of Queen Victoria, for it had undeniably significant
ramifications for the royal houses of Britain and France in particular. The
matrimonial intrigues which brought the Due de Montpensier to the side of Luisa,
younger sister of the Queen of Spain, Isabella, provoked consternation at Osborne.
qualities: 'It may be unconstitutional for a Minister to seek advice from his Sovereign, instead of
proffering it; but ...Your Majesty cannot but be aware how highly Mr Disraeli appreciates your
Majesty's judgement and almost unrivalled experience in public life'. Disraeli to Queen, 17 April
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Victoria complained bitterly of the turn events had taken. 'If our dear Aberdeen was
still at his post,' she wrote to her uncle the King of the Belgians, 'the whole thing
would not have happened; for he would not have forced Enriquito (which enraged
Christine),"4 and secondly, Guizot would not have escamote Aberdeen with the wish
of triumphing over him as he has done over Palmerston, who has behaved most
openly and fairly towards France, I must say, in this affair. But say what one will, it
is he again who indirectly gets us into a squabble with France!'. Yet, Victoria
concluded, Palmerston's want of tact and sense of propriety could be easily
overcome: 'Lord Palmerston', she declared, 'is quite ready to be guided by us'."5
Since she and Lord John Russell, she believed, were generally in accord over foreign
policy, her role was, then, to be that of adviser, primarily to Palmerston."6 In July
1848, for instance, in a letter to Palmerston, Victoria could not help but notice
contradictions in Britain's policy:
She cannot conceal from him that she is ashamed of the policy we
are pursuing in the Italian Controversy, in abetting wrong, & this
for the object of gaining influence in Italy. The Queen does not
consider influence so gained as an advantage & though this
influence is acquired to do good, she is afraid that the fear of
losing it again will always stand in the way of this. At least in the
Countries where the greatest stress has been laid on that influence,
& the greatest exertions made for it, the least good has been done;
the Queen means in Spain, Portugal and Greece. Neither is there
any kind of consistency in the line we take about Italy & that we
follow with regard to Schleswick; both cases are perfectly alike
(with the difference perhaps that there is a question of right mixed
up in that of Schleswick); whilst we upbraid Prussia, caution her
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&c, we say nothing to Charles Albert except that if he did not
wish to take all the Emperor of Austria's Italian Dominions, we
would not lay any obstacles in the way of his moderation."7
Similarly, a few months later, she remarked upon the manner in which Britain was
seeking to force Austria to give up her 'lawful possessions', when the parallels with
Ireland and even with Canada and Malta and other British territories seemed so
obvious. British actions ought really in all instances, she suggested, to be governed
by a simple principle which she outlined in a note to her uncle: 'Was du nicht willst,
dass dir geschieht, das thu' auch einem andern nicht'."8
Had the Court offered little more than advice, Palmerston would in all
probability have found little of which to complain. After all, Prince Albert, through
whom much business was actually transacted, especially during the 1840s when the
Queen was frequently confined through pregnancies, was regarded by Palmerston as
a generally well-informed and able statesman. Prince Albert himself was keen to
help Palmerston whenever he could, even after relations between the Palace and the
Foreign Office had become decidedly cool. In May 1849 for instance, he sent a note
to Palmerston about German affairs. 'As you say you would like to converse with
me on the affairs of Germany,' he wrote, 'I shall be ready to see you to day after Ld.
Ponsonby's audience'. And as evidence of a desire to promote open government and
fair dealing with the Foreign Secretary, or at least to coerce rather than dictate to him
in favour of 'legitimate' interests, the Prince added: 'I got a letter from my brother
yesterday of which I enclose a translation (I have had made for you) just to show you
an example of how difficult the situation of these poor smaller Sovereigns is'.119
This was not the first private letter from his brother which the Prince so shared with
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Palmerston. Yet whilst Palmerston had a high regard for the Prince's knowledge, he
could not escape the view that the Prince was just a little too German for the British
government at that time. Thus whilst the Prince's desire for the reorganisation of
Germany under the suzerainty of Prussia would indeed be 'advantageous for the
peace and general interests of Europe', and 'conducive to the Interests of England',
the Foreign Secretary argued that 'the British Government would, I think, be
stepping beyond its legitimate or its safe ground, if it were to become the Partisan or
the advocate of any particular scheme or of the views of any particular German
Power'.120
Palmerston feared that Albert's influence at Court threatened to undermine
the integrity of his foreign policy. Too easily, he believed, the Queen, not
understanding German affairs, adopted the Prince's views on them and this served
only to make Palmerston's position at the Foreign Office increasingly untenable. On
one such occasion, for example, he complained that the Queen's 'real objections are
so much at variance with our settled Policy on this important Question that I cannot
undertake to frame a Despatch which shall remove these objections, or be in
Conformity with the German & Prussian views of the Prince'.121 Furthermore,
Albert was establishing contacts with members of the Cabinet other than Palmerston
with whom he could discuss foreign affairs. Lansdowne enjoyed an occasional
correspondence with the Prince, primarily with regard to France, in which he
discussed policy openly and exchanged diplomatic documents with the Palace.122
More ominously from Palmerston's perspective, Lord Grey, still apprehensive lest
Palmerston's foreign policy led the country into expensive overseas adventures and
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compromised trade, met with the Prince to discuss public business and just at the
time that Albert was ever more sceptical about Palmerston's policies in 1848, Grey
found himself 'much inclined to believe him [Albert] to be right' in his
disapprobation of Palmerston's course over Germany and Italy.123
Increasingly, the royal antagonism towards the Foreign Secretary became a
more personal issue and by 1850 Minto was complaining that the Queen's growing
dislike of Palmerston 'prejudices her judgement of whatever proceeds from him to
such a degree as to be a constant source of difficulty and embarrassment'.124 Tacitly
acknowledging that her own position was indeed subordinate to that of the Cabinet
with regard to policy, the Queen, having heard little of foreign affairs recently, wrote
to Palmerston 'to urge ...[him] to keep her informed of what he hears, & of the views
of the Government on the various important questions before us'.125 Yet still she was
keen to uphold the facade of monarchical control, a manifestation of her concern
with presenting an image of control to other sovereigns, and is to be found in June
1848 complaining of a Draft about Austrian policy that 'Lord Palmerston speaks in
the beginning of the letter only of the Cabinet & adverts nowhere to the proposition
having been submitted to her'.126
The revolutions which swept across the continent in 1848 did little to soothe
the strained relations between Palmerston and the Court. The Queen became
increasingly disturbed about the rise and spread of republicanism, whilst her Foreign
Minister, already the popular champion of constitutionalism, now became in
Guedalla's words, 'more than ever, ...a European figure. Perhaps there were no
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others left. The waters of 1848 had submerged so many of his equals'.'27 To the
Court such an ascendancy boded ill for the country, as the Queen recorded, she had
told Russell how, 'I had no confidence in him [Palmerston], and that it made me
seriously anxious and uneasy for the welfare of the country and for the peace of
Europe in general, and that I felt very uneasy from one day to another as to what
might happen'.128 The Foreign Secretary, despite working theoretically under the
jurisdiction of his ministerial colleagues, seemed not to be controllable by them.
Denying that royal opposition to Palmerston was founded on policy differences only
but rested rather on personal grounds,129 the Queen admitted, in effect, that not only
was monarchical ability to control a minister brought into question, but so too was
the notion that the Cabinet could control Palmerston.
Russell, however, keen that such an exposure should not be allowed to
scuttle his ministry, clung to the impression of a united government. He had, he
stressed, 'always approved in the main of the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston', and
maintained therefore, 'I am quite ready to resign my office, but I could not make
Lord Palmerston the scapegoat for the sins which will be imputed to the Government
in the late negotiations'.130 Whatever else might be at issue, questions of policy were
the Cabinet's preserve and, like Palmerston, Russell knew this. The conflict with the
Crown, then, obscured the real arena of political struggles: within the Cabinet.
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jit) The Cabinet and Foreign Policy. 1846-51
Given that the Cabinet was, according to Bagehot at least, the central focus of the
legislature, it remained important, theoretically at least, that there should appear to
be concurrence among its members in the line of policy to be pursued about any
particular issue. Whatever factors determined the course of foreign policy, all policy
needed the backing of the Cabinet, without which, as in the Bulwer case for
instance,13' or later over the Crimean War,132 such policies became confused, weak
and potentially damaging. When, in the early months of Russell's government,
Austria annexed the free state of Cracow and effectively signalled the extinction of
this last remnant of an independent Poland, causing a breach of the Treaty of Vienna
as well as affronting western liberal opinion,133 the Prime Minister thought it was 'so
grave a proceeding, [that] while the Cabinet is ready to assemble, ought to be placed
before them'. Even though he was determined to support Palmerston's proposed
course and expected little opposition, he would not allow such an important question
to pass without consulting the Cabinet.134
Essentially Palmerston, and to a slightly lesser degree Russell, had to be the
spring of business concerning foreign affairs if only because he was, and never tired
of telling people, the one best qualified to pronounce on such questions. 'On matters
where he fully believed that he was master of the subject his conclusions were very
decided and positively unchangeable,' remembered the Earl of Shaftesbury, who had
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good claims to know Palmerston's mind.135 Why should the Foreign Secretary
subordinate himself to the Cabinet when he had made no secret of the fact that he
believed there were 'very few public men in England who follow up foreign affairs
sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have not happened'?136 It
was essential that Palmerston enjoyed the confidence of his colleagues and initially it
appeared, outwardly at least, that he did. 'I have the greatest reliance on his
sagacious perception of the true interests of his Country and I have the truest
satisfaction in constant cooperation with him upon all our foreign relations', Russell
told Count Jarnac, the French envoy, in October 1846.137
Palmerston's foreign policy did not unite a Cabinet prone to division,
however. From the outset Lord Grey had had his reservations about Palmerston, and
his fears were echoed in a pamphlet written anonymously by a 'Free Trader' and
published in December 1845:
...You may think to control tendencies - but not intentions ...You
may expect new things from caprice, but not from determined will.
...You may check what you know, but you may be fatally
committed by acts concealed and purposes unavowed. Such has
been before, the case between us and this colleague
- between him
and Parliament. ...[He] is not to be trusted. Be it from arrogance
-
be it from inveterate, unacknowledged, yet not deliberately
culpable predilections if you will:- still, the fact remains, he has
undershafts and galleries in which he labours at his solitary tasks
...which are only disclosed to us when some mine is to be sprung,
when the match is already lighted, and we have nothing to do but
retire behind the screens he provides. ...[He] cannot be controlled,
and ...we have oft-times been puppets in his hands. ...Lord
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Palmerston cannot act secretly, and at the same time enjoy the
benefits of frankness and candour....138
With the control of foreign policy in his hands, Palmerston's conduct raised fears
among his colleagues which went beyond the domestic political implications of his
actions. As Sir Charles Wood, who was concerned about Palmerston's Francophobic
obsession with British defences, observed, whilst the difference between the two of
them was 'of a very small amount, & arises a good deal from my being paymaster',
he could not help but remark that he was 'sure that the character we have to acquire
& maintain, as a Government, is that of being prudent steady people, & thus
re-assuring the great bulk of the world who have been taught to look upon us as
likely to set everything in a blaze, at home & abroad. We have quite enough upon
our hands at present'.139
That national defence should have been such a live issue in the late 1840s
was not surprising, according to Wood for, as he told Hobhouse, 'all the foolish
alarm about [a French] invasion was caused by Palmerston's correspondence &
perpetual broils'.140 Palmerston might have aroused fears within the Cabinet, but
concern about the state of national defence was a problem bequeathed to the Russell
Cabinet by Peel's government and Palmerston's pre-occupation with a potential
French invasion originated in the earlier 1840s. A conversation between Russell and
the King of the French in 1845, suggestive of a threat to Britain in its current
defenceless state, had highlighted the issue and convinced not only Palmerston, but
also Shaftesbury to whom Palmerston reported the exchange, of the need for
action.141 Indeed, although Palmerston was the only consistent and pro-active
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advocate of greater defence provisions, the issue was clearly not without resonance
for other ministers and the opposition within the government to expansion in the
arrangements for national defence was based on questions of economic and political
(domestic rather than foreign) considerations, especially as the issue became tied up
with questions of a national militia.142 Even members of the government who
sympathised with Palmerston's concern, such as Minto, eventually began to feel
'beaten & disheartened, seeing the low views that prevailed in all great questions of
external policy' amongst the majority of the Cabinet.143
Palmerston's management of foreign policy became increasingly disagreeable
to many of his colleagues. As he emerged as the European figure of 1848, it was not
only the royal couple whose concerns about the Foreign Secretary became more
pronounced. 'His dispatches are ...couched in a language that ought never to be
addressed to an independent state', wrote Hobhouse, the President of the Board of
Control, at the beginning ofthat year, '...and I think that his diplomatists
- Bulwer
and Normanby and Lyons mix themselves up a good deal too much with the internal
politics of the country to which they are sent'.144
Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, the British Minister at Madrid, had been implicated
in designs to re-introduce Leopold of Saxe-Coburg's name to the list of possible
suitors to Queen Isabella, allegedly with Palmerston's approval, and his conduct
caused particular consternation at home. In the autumn of 1847 Clarendon had
confided in Lansdowne that he felt that although Bulwer 'writes very able dispatches
& honestly thinks himself the pivot upon wch all things turn I fear he is use & now
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not much made [?more] apt for business than the King is for matrimony'.145 The
Cabinet's doubts about Bulwer were not assuaged as Palmerston continued to work
with him without bringing before the Cabinet details of what was transacted between
them. When Bulwer was expelled from Spain on account of his meddling in the
internal affairs of that country, Palmerston successfully kept his colleagues in the
dark and as Hobhouse recorded in his diary, 'we knew nothing of the Bulwer
correspondence until it was over
- nor did the Cabinet know that Bulwer's conduct
had received the approbation of the Government until we saw the fact in the papers
laid before Parliament'.146 It may have been, as Palmerston maintained on one
occasion, that it 'is of course for the Secy of State to judge what Papers in his office
shall be laid before Parliament to Explain the Grounds on which the Government
may have acted',147 but it was dangerous for him to act without Cabinet support in
this manner.
Only the Prime Minister's ineffectiveness preserved his position. Russell had
demonstrated to the Cabinet that he was not able to exercise a dominating influence
over the Foreign Secretary, having begged Lansdowne to interfere in the matter in
March 1848, 'before I say all I think' in an implicit acknowledgement of the political
hold Palmerston had over the ministry.148 As Lord Grey observed, this represented a
'very lamentable weakness' on Russell's part. 'Had P[almerston] played such a prank
in my father's administrat'n', he continued, 'he wd have been dismissed without
ceremony, nor can I conceive any prime minister submitting to such conduct without
requiring it to be so punished'.149
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Grey believed that finally Palmerston would have to go. The Bulwer
incident was merely the latest of many 'offences' and now Grey 'thought that it must
have led either to Palmerston's retirement or the break up of the Govt. - the former
wd. have given me infinite satisfact'n'.150 Palmerston was not likely to go quietly,
however: too many concessions had been made to him over the years in order to
keep him on board and now this deferential attitude was returned to plague the
Cabinet. Thus the Peelite Sir James Graham noted when Russell sought to bring
him into the Cabinet in January 1849, there were two main objections to joining the
ministry. One was finance, the second the Foreign Secretary: 'Palmerston', he wrote
to Peel, 'has had too much and too long his own way to yield either to the influence
of his colleagues or to the control of public opinion'.151 Such fears were not
motivated simply by a determination to prevent Palmerston gaining too much in
personal stature. There were real political and parliamentary considerations to take
into account. Increasingly, the opposition members were able to summon
considerable resources to mount challenges to the government and by about 1850 it
seemed almost every aspect of the ministry's business was under attack.152
Heretofore, much of the government's strength had derived from the fact that
its opponents, still reeling from the rupture caused by Peel in 1846, could not present
a viable alternative to the government. Indeed, opposition members had good reason
to desire the preservation of the government, as Minto discovered when he shared a
train ride with a group of 'ultra-tories' in late 1848. They had been 'amusingly
complimentary to Lord J. Russell & anxious for his continuance in power; this being
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the expression of their fear and hatred of Peel their old idol', he noted in his journal
afterwards.'53 Now this was no longer the case, due in no small part to the fact that
Peel had died in 1850 and this had removed one of the greatest obstacles to unity
amongst those sitting on the opposition benches. This was particularly significant
given that Palmerston was being accused in some quarters of being no longer up to
his task, particularly in the light of his 'failed' Italian policy. Palmerston's position
seemed ever more vulnerable and though something which he would never have
conceded, and succeeded in disguising quite well, nevertheless illustrated that he
needed the Cabinet on his side. And as even Grey admitted in a letter to Russell, any
policy sanctioned by the Cabinet would of necessity be consistently defended by that
Cabinet. 'But', he added,
when the fact is, that the subject never was brought before the
Cabinet, when I & most of the members of it first saw the
objectionable despatches in the newspapers, & when it is notorious
that if the questn. had been submitted to us, we shd most of us (I
believe including yourself) have entirely disapproved of the
adoptn. of such a tone towards an independent Govt, the case is
entirely altered, & I can recognize no obligate, to support a policy
which none of our opponents can condemn more than I do.154
For practical reasons and because the Cabinet had to endorse policy in this way,
there emerged something of an inner Cabinet on foreign affairs, not in itself a
novelty in nineteenth century governments. It was not a terribly large clique,
comprising primarily Palmerston, Russell and Lansdowne. Lansdowne was the
government's spokesman in the Lords on foreign policy and thus would be expected
to be intimately acquainted with the details of Foreign Office business, but he was
not expected, by Russell at least, simply to peddle the Palmerstonian line. On a
point about a draft written by Palmerston in June 1848, Russell declared that he was
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'willing to guided by Lansdowne's opinion & shall send this note to him1.155
Lansdowne himself assumed the function of adviser happily, recognising
Palmerston's field of expertise and responsibility, but answered Russell's injunctions,
for example, to 'write anything that occurs to me with the papers enclosed in this
box', and offered Palmerston advice without issuing orders.156 In reciprocation,
Lansdowne did expect similar fair dealing from Palmerston, which was not always
forthcoming. 'Palmerston is very obliging in sending me a good deal of private
information which he receives,' wrote Lansdowne, 'but very seldom the private
instructions which he sends.'157
Palmerston however, had little patience with Cabinet interference in the
details of his policy. Once the general principles had been established he expected a
large degree of independence and established very early on in the life of the
government that if he could not count on that, then his position within the ministry
would have to be reconsidered.158 Nevertheless, given that Lansdowne had to defend
the government's course in the upper House, Palmerston's stubbornness was a great
nuisance.
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Other ministers, such as Clarendon, Sir Charles Wood, Minto, Grey and
Labouchere, did make observations about policy but they were apparently infrequent
and inconsistent. The voicing of unease about specific questions, or the tone of the
occasional draft, did not constitute profound and influential counsel, or even
intimacy with the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet this in itself is not surprising.
Perhaps more than ever before, foreign politics was becoming a field of special
expertise which demanded a serious commitment, not a trifling interest. Russell for
one acknowledged this, telling Palmerston on one occasion when German affairs
were pressing that: 'You who are constantly treating in these matters are alone able
to judge what is the real meaning'.159 Even Earl Grey, arguably one of Palmerston's
sternest critics, found little time to write to Palmerston to discuss foreign policy,
confining his correspondence to a relatively innocuous commentary on colonial
affairs.160 Charles Wood and Clarendon both sought to offer advice, but stopped
short of trying to exercise control: they both acknowledged that they had neither the
time nor the grounding in foreign affairs for such a task. Few other Cabinet
members apparently concerned themselves with foreign policy outside the Cabinet
meetings at all.
Within the Cabinet, however, debates over foreign policy were often the
scene of bitter encounters. Significantly though, such conflicts were generally
dictated more by partisan interests amongst the Cabinet's factions than by
disagreements about the policy itself. Minto identified a 'Grey faction' within the
Cabinet on foreign questions, comprising primarily Lord Grey, Sir George Grey and
Sir Charles Wood, but also including Sir Francis Baring, Lord Carlisle (who had
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been, until 1848, Lord Morpeth) and possibly Henry Labouchere which offered a
regular line of opposition to Palmerston's foreign policy and which stood as a
counter-point to the pro-Palmerston lobby of Russell, Lansdowne, Lord Campbell
and Minto himself.161 Earl Grey became something of a de facto leader of this body
of dissent and frequently urged Russell to 'interfere more regularly' in Palmerston's
handling of foreign affairs.162 Ideally, Grey would have welcomed Palmerston's
removal from office completely and in 1849 when the supply of arms to Sicily
exposed Palmerston to censure, it seemed to Grey and his allies that an opportunity
to effect such a result had arisen. In collaboration with Sir George Grey and Wood,
Grey impressed upon the Prime Minister the desirability of dismissing the Foreign
Secretary.163 In a Cabinet meeting to discuss the issue, however, such hopes were
soon dashed, much to Grey's disappointment:
There was then some vague discuss'n in wh I was to the last degree
disgusted by the apparent insensibility of the Cabinet to the gravity
of the case & to the disgraceful figure the Govt will make in
pleading 'inadvertance' as the excuse for such a proceeding. I
endeavoured to treat the matter somewhat more seriously & to
show how bad a posit'n we shd be placed in but nobody backed
me...164
Despite considerable Cabinet reservations about the course the Foreign Secretary
was pursuing, it seemed that there was little to be done to alter that course and even
Grey was forced, reluctantly, to acquiesce in the policy rather than take
responsibility for an action which would almost certainly end in the break up of the
government.165 Meanwhile, Palmerston, perhaps guilty, as Minto once observed, of
trusting too much to fortune,166 turned an attack into a source of strength. 'The
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foolish and ignorant manner in wh he has been attacked has almost set on its legs a
policy for which I fear the case is not really so good as it has appeared1, complained
Grey in defeat.167
Russell was in many ways susceptible to strong members of the government
taking policy hostage. Minto, whilst recognising Russell's sympathy for the Sicilian
cause, had expressed concern in October 1848, fearing that the Prime Minister might
be forced 'to yield to the opinions of some whose resignation must break up his
government'.168 This supposed threat from the Grey party eventually came to
nothing, but Palmerston was able to exercise a similar influence over Russell. More
than most other areas of business, foreign policy remained an area in which it was
possible for a strong minister to dominate the Prime Minister, although the fragile
foundations of this government were also exposed over other contentious issues such
as Ireland. Over electoral reform, though it remained a controversial question
throughout this period, however, when the issue came before the Cabinet in late
1850, according to Minto at least, as 'Lord John will not consent to abandon his
intention, there is no doubt that the rest will give way to his determination'.169 To
some extent, by 1850, the political atmosphere was different, but foreign policy
remained a unique area of business.
Nevertheless, accounts of Cabinet meetings sent to the Queen displayed no
sign of discord and presented all decisions as collective ones.170 In discussion of
foreign questions, only on the question of Palmerston's proposed reception of
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Kossuth in December 1851 did Russell inform the members of the Cabinet that he
'would not ask for any collective resolution', but he did stress in his report to the
Queen that there had been general agreement that Palmerston should not receive
him.171 Palmerston, when deputising for Russell, used these official communications
with the Queen as an opportunity to expound the principles of his policy at length,
but here too there is little evidence of the Cabinet discord that did occur.'72 The
Queen, however, clearly suspicious about this degree of supposed accord, and
perhaps disappointed that Palmerston was not being more severely checked by his
colleagues, asked on one occasion to see the Cabinet minutes discussing the Sicilian
guns question. Minto thought this 'strange ignorance on her part, as she ought to
have known that there are no minutes of matters treated of in the Cabinet', but it also
left the field open to intrigue and he expected 'some mischief to occur during the
forthcoming visit to Windsor of George Grey and Charles Wood.173
Thus it was on two broad counts that Palmerston needed the backing of the
Cabinet; both constitutionally and in order indeed to underwrite his own political
survival. As Russell put it to Palmerston as the latter drew close to his last days at
the Foreign Office:
Seeing the persevering enmity which the foreign policy of the
Government excites, & the displeasure with which it is viewed in
high quarters, I think it behoves you to guard most carefully
against misapprehensions as well as misrepresentations. I think
you owe this to me, & to your other colleagues who have stood by
you in defence of the course which has been pursued in regard to
our foreign relations. I think you owe it to the country, which in
these difficult times ought not to be exposed in case of a rupture,
to encounter unnecessary odium from the governments that be. I
trust therefore without swerving an inch from our policy, you will
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avoid as much as possible, giving cause for irritation and
hostility.174
Furthermore, there was a genuine sense in which the Cabinet could fulfil a useful
advisory and consultative role. As Palmerston admitted, some questions stretched
his capabilities to their limit and beyond. Italy in 1848, for instance, he described as
'a chaotic Labyrinth through which I can not see my way'.173 More than this, some
members of the Cabinet could bring to the Foreign Secretary's attention important
information and sidelights on events which were to be gained from no other source.
Clarendon, in particular, was valuable in this respect. From the Board of Trade he
wrote to Palmerston with news from his clandestine 'Paris informant', probably the
Paris correspondent of the Times, M. Reilly,176 who was able to supply Clarendon
with inside information about the French Government. Clarendon willingly shared
this information 'not because it is of much consequence but because you may think it
worth while to watch the unscrupulous lies that the late entente cordiale may tell'.'77
Certainly Palmerston can only have received gratefully the news that a foreign prince
visiting London had told the King of the French, Louis Philippe, 'qu'il prie le
gou[vernem]ent francais de ne pas faire de concession ä L[ord] P[almerston]
parceque nous pouvons par lui correspondre avec la Reine et le Prince Albert'.178
Still, whatever the benefits, there were, for Palmerston, limits. However
politically costly, he would not sacrifice what he believed were his duties and
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responsibilities. So long as he was at the Foreign Office, he would do the job of
Foreign Secretary, and not until he was replaced would he relinquish this role. His
attitude towards the Cabinet and its role in foreign policy did not mellow with age.
As Clarendon recalled to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, when Clarendon had served
as Foreign Secretary in Palmerston's first ministry: 'I remember once [Palmerston]
agreeing with me that Vera Cruz ought to be blockaded, and desiring me to write
accordingly to the Admiralty. I said - "Surely not without bringing it before the
Cabinet?" - "Oh ah: the Cabinet," was his answer, "very well; call one then, if you
think it necessary"1.179
Since this cavalier approach antagonised some members of the government
just as it did the Queen and Prince, Lord John's role as arbitrator was vital. Sir
Charles Wood recognised this at a very early stage and hoped Russell would satisfy
this need. He warned that a state of hostile feeling had been produced over relations
with France and concluded: 'I press upon you to look to these things yourself. I see
no other remedy. The Cabinet cannot interfere, for the mischief is done before we
hear of anything. It is no easy matter, I am well aware, even for you. ...Forgive me
venturing to intrude all this advice, but I am not a little alarmed'.180 The Queen
equally placed much faith in Russell's ability to rein in Palmerston. He had, she
believed, 'the power of exercising that control over Lord Palmerston, the careful
exercise of which he owes to the Queen, his colleagues, and the country, if he will
take the necessary pains to remain firm'.181
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Russell recognised his position as umpire within the government, not only
between the Court and Foreign Office, but also between Palmerston and his other
colleagues, and felt confident that, in the final analysis, his decision was binding.182
To some extent Russell did succeed in keeping Palmerston in check, indeed the
Foreign Secretary was, according to Minto, 'more hampered than I shd like to be in
the conduct of his department by Lord John's controul',183 but there were political
exigencies which demanded this. By 1850, however, with Peel dead and opposition
members increasingly able to offer an alternative ministry, and with internal Cabinet
divisions bespeaking ever more of fracture and defection rather than consideration of
broader interests,184 Palmerston's position became proportionately stronger. There
were fewer interests for which he might reasonably be sacrificed and more reasons
for retaining him for his own sake. This situation did not last, however.
iv) 'Give a rogue a rope and he will hang himself...': Palmerston's fall, November
-
December 1851185
The Russell government was a fragile one, particularly by 1850, and whilst
Palmerston's fall might herald that of the ministry also, it came to be seen by those
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members of the Cabinet growing weary of Palmerston's conduct, increasingly as a
worthwhile risk. Two events in the closing weeks of 1851 sealed his fate. Despite
much opposition from various quarters, Palmerston intended to receive Louis
Kossuth, the Hungarian nationalist leader, and was only just dissuaded from this
course by his Cabinet colleagues and Russell. He dismissed suggestions that
receiving Kossuth would represent a slight upon the Queen's government, arguing: 'It
is not as chief Enemy of Austria that Kossuth has hitherto been looked upon, nor is it
in that Capacity that he is about to be received by the British nation. He has been
regarded as a Man who among others has stood up for the Rights of his Country'.186
Palmerston was determined to have his own way, and once more resorted to a
hitherto efficacious tactic when Russell wrote a stern instruction not to receive
Kossuth and threatened to resign.187 The Queen was 'deeply wounded' by
Palmerston's conduct and she only desisted from pressing Russell to remove
Palmerston on the grounds that this would inevitably lead to a breaking up of the
Cabinet.188 When a few weeks later Palmerston approved the President's coup d'etat
in France he finally pushed his colleagues too far.
As Palmerston failed to contradict reports of his alleged communication with
Walewski concerning the coup, Russell's hand was forced. On 17 December he
wrote 'with great reluctance' to Palmerston to ask for his resignation. The
'complaints are too frequent, & too well founded', he argued, and whilst professing
to 'concur in the foreign policy of which you have been the adviser', he could not 'but
observe that mis-understandings perpetually renewed, violations of prudence &
decorum too frequently repeated have marred the effects which ought to have
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followed from a sound policy and able administration'.189 Palmerston conceded
defeat graciously. He wrote to offer to give up the seals of office whenever Russell
may choose to appoint a time, adding that he had 'the satisfaction of thinking that the
Interests, the Honor, the Character, and the Dignity of the Country have not suffered'
during his term of office.190 Russell lowered his guard and agreed wholeheartedly
with Palmerston on this point.191 Palmerston's fall had become unavoidable; he
might have liked to claim that his removal from office was not universally popular
within the Cabinet,192 but Lord Truro was not the only member of the government
who felt that 'Palmerston's retirement is good'.193 Even Lord Minto, one of
Palmerston's most consistent supporters in the government, had to tell the outgoing
Minister: In bringing my mind to the painful conviction, to which I must not expect
your assent, that under all the circumstances of the case your retirement had become
inevitable, I do not regard it less as a public calamity, than as a subject of private
regret1.194
Yet Palmerston's dismissal is not so easily explained. Over Kossuth there
had been agreement between Russell, Lansdowne and Minto that whilst receiving
Kossuth would be liable to mis-representation and it would therefore be better that
he did not see him at all, he did have a right to receive him in a private capacity.195
They certainly feared the prospect of a Palmerston-led opposition,196 but as Lord
Grey conceded, the Cabinet did not appear strong or determined enough at this time
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to press his removal anyway.197 Russell claimed that he had stood by his Foreign
Secretary for as long as possible,'98 but eventually he could no longer sustain
Palmerston, even though the policies he enacted were still acceptable.199 Yet, as
both Clarendon and Lord Grey observed, it seemed surprising that Palmerston
should be removed now when so many opportunities of a similar nature had
presented themselves over the previous five and a half years.200
The Queen believed that affronts to the Court had made Palmerston's
position untenable,201 but the 'deviations from the principles laid down by the
Cabinet for his conduct,' and the 'personal and arbitrary perversion of the very nature
and essence of those principles',202 of which the Queen complained were, again, not
new. She also recognised that insisting on Palmerston's dismissal, as a royal
demand, would not only have been 'a most disagreeable task' but also one 'not
unattended with a small amount of danger, inasmuch as it would have put me too
prominently forward'.203 There was another catalyst in this particular reaction.
Neither the Crown nor the Cabinet, whilst the executors of that dismissal, could
offer any substantially new cause of complaint to justify the change. Public opinion
was still largely pro-Palmerston and dissenting voices here were scarcely sufficient
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to dislodge him.204 The press, too, largely regretted his fall and saw the potential
dangers of his removal.205
In February 1852, on the occasion of the fall of the Russell government in
toto, Minto recorded that the causes for this had been three-fold: the increasing
number and voracity of Protectionist attacks; Palmerston's dismissal; and the
unpopularity of Lord Grey.206 In a sense, then, Palmerston had fallen in December
1851 because there was no longer a good reason to keep him on board. Cabinet
unity was clearly fictional and the position of Grey simply underlined this.
Simultaneously, opposition forces were gathering and threatened to undermine the
government from outside. Palmerston's position under Russell had been secured
largely on the grounds that he supplied the government with political weight; as
Russell himself conceded late in 1851, he 'was in fact the weakness and Lord
Palmerston the strength of the Government from his popularity with the Radicals'?01
When the ministry seemed fundamentally weakened by other factors, however, there
was less obvious reason to continue to accommodate Palmerston. He could even be
made the scapegoat for ministerial and royal conflict, an expendable and perhaps
apparently exhausted political force sacrificed in the greater interest of Whig unity.
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CHAPTER 3. RISING AGAIN: PALMERSTON AND THE POLITICS OF
FOREIGN POLICY, 1852-1855
i) Palmerston, the Derby Government, and the search for office, February to
December 1852
Though the weaknesses of Palmerston's position within the Whig party had been
exposed in December 1851, Palmerston did not share Lord Dufferin's opinion that
Palmerston 'is completely floored, and people seem to think he is not likely to rise
again'.' He successfully carried his amendment to the militia bill in February 1852 by
a majority of 13
- not a huge margin
- relying in large part upon a curious alliance of
Protectionists and some Peelites. Russell, perhaps, had reason to welcome the vote:
his government was unquestionably tottering to its fall, and had it not been the
militia question, it might have been something bigger
- electoral reform for example
- which might have had more damaging ramifications for the future careers of the
ministers. As Palmerston himself acknowledged in a letter to Clarendon, 'the cabinet
were glad to make use of the militia question as a convenient parachute to avoid a
ruder descent and a more dangerous one in Table Bay'.2 Palmerston reflected, with
evident satisfaction, that he had now had his 'tit for tat' with Lord John, which not
only undermined Russell personally, but also reinforced Palmerston's commitment to
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the question of national defence and helped satisfy a growing demand for a change
of government.
Palmerston was not yet in a position to claim the premiership for himself - he
had no obvious and coherent party backing for one thing
- but he had reaffirmed his
political vitality. During the succeeding months he was able to play factions and
individuals off against each other at Westminster. He was fortunate, however, that
foreign affairs became inflamed during this period as this allowed him to add to his
political arsenal the weight of popular support. Possessing little real command of an
efficient political party, Palmerston had to exploit a reputation of being the national
minister. What follows explains how he manipulated the parliamentary environment
to his ends whilst succeeding chapters examine the grounds which explain how and
why he was able to achieve this.
The Derby government of 1852 which succeeded that of Russell in February
remained throughout a minority one. Even on the back of the election held during
the summer of that year in which the Derbyites enlarged their representation in the
House of Commons from 280 to 310, there was still no clear majority in that
chamber, and throughout its life Derby's first ministry was subject to an almost
constant battering. Not only was the position of the government vulnerable within
the palace of Westminster, but, according to the Duke of Argyll at least, the Prime
Minister was not well suited to the task now before him:
...Lord Derby, though a splendid speaker, was not very well fitted
to enforce the authority of his opinions on others, or to keep his
Cabinet in subordination. He was too rollicking, too apt to treat
everything as a joke; the result was a Government obviously
provisional. It commanded no sure majority in the House, and
until it was seen what a Protectionist Government was going to do96
about Protection, nobody of the Free Trade sections of the House
would support them, or do anything but watch and wait.3
Those not sitting on the Treasury benches in fact were not quite so passive and in the
face of this new government, they set about establishing a coherent and effective
opposition. Within days of the establishment of the Derby government Russell
wrote to Palmerston, perhaps surprisingly, seeking a common understanding in order
more effectually to counter the position adopted by Disraeli over foreign affairs on
behalf of the new ministry. 'At present I have no very settled opinion as to what
should be done,' he wrote, 'but it is desirable that all who are for free intercourse
with foreign countries should know each other's course before we confront Disraeli'.4
Palmerston, however, replied that it appeared to him scarcely consistent with the
position in which he had been placed in December last to attend such a meeting as
Russell proposed,5 and Russell was obliged to concede Palmerston had 'a perfect
right' to adopt such an attitude.6
Palmerston's political force was clearly still not spent, something which was
recognised on both sides of the House. Disraeli had been quick to impress upon
Lord Derby that 'it is everything for your Government that P. should be a member of
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it. His prestige in the House is very great; in the country considerable', assuming a
little too hastily that this would be readily achieved provided that it was borne in
mind that he 'will not give you trouble about principles, but he may about position'.1
No longer was anti-Palmerstonism or even anti-Palmerstonianism a 'possible
common cause for fragmented Conservative opinion'.8 And indeed, not only had
Palmerston underlined his continuing political vitality and potency, but in the
aftermath of the split with Russell and Russell's revival of the Reform question,
there was reason to believe that Palmerston might be receptive to such Conservative
overtures.
Palmerston's problem in 1852 was that whilst he retained a broad base of
parliamentary and popular support, he still, as Roebuck noted, 'wants the support of
the sedate portion of the politicians'.9 Greville went further, observing that 'though
he is very popular, and can excite any amount of cheering in the House of
Commons, he has no political adherents whatever'.10 In many ways this was the
ideal platform for the Palmerstonian performance. He could stand independent of
party affiliations, speak his mind, adopt a contrary position whenever it suited him,
and in so doing capitalise on what had always been his greatest asset: his strong
personality.
Having offered to meet with Malmesbury in order to discuss the main
principles of foreign policy, an offer which Malmesbury, who had been reluctant to
take the Foreign Office, 'gratefully accepted', Palmerston impressed upon the newly
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installed Foreign Secretary the importance of the responsibilities he had now
assumed in taking office under Derby: 'You have no idea until you know more of
your office what a power of prestige England possesses abroad, and it will be your
first duty to see that it does not wane ...take care you yield nothing until you have
well looked into every side of the question'.11 Although he did voice criticisms of
the new government's foreign policy
- as in the case of the maltreatment of a British
subject in Tuscany by an Austrian officer in the summer of 1852, a stand strongly
reminiscent of his civis Romanus sum declaration - he adopted an attitude towards
the ministry, according to Herbert Bell, of 'marked benevolence'.12 He reserved for
the Russell government of 1846-52 a degree of censure clearly more personal, or at
least so it appeared to contemporary observers. On 29 June Grey, on his way home,
met Lansdowne 'who told us that Palmerston had been making a very bitter attack on
the late govt, in the House of Commons with reference to Foreign Affairs, there
being no one present to answer him'. Having had a chance then to read this speech,
Grey observed that it was 'a very bitter attack principally on Lord John', which was
'most discreditable' to Palmerston.13 Little wonder, then, that, presuming he would
join anyone at all, it was the Conservative mast to which it was believed Palmerston
would nail his colours, and not that of Russell and the Whigs.
Throughout the ten-month life of the Derby administration, there was a
constant search for a more stable government, a desire to do something given that
'Lord Derby's ship', was 'gradually going down'.14 Significantly, in all of the
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combinations proposed to remedy this weakness, Palmerston's name was to be found
in some regard.15 Palmerston gave serious consideration to the notion that he might
bolster the position of the Derby government and felt that he simply awaited a
suitable opportunity. As late as the autumn of 1852, for instance, there was still a
suggestion that Palmerston would join Derby, as Charles Greville reported to
Clarendon from Broadlands:
I have had a long conversation with Palmerston and a good deal of
desultory talk with Lady P. and Lord Shaftesbury, and the result is
a strong conviction that it will end in P. joining Derby, provided
the latter will give him a decent opportunity for so doing. She
evidently wishes it very much. ...He will not, however, join alone,
whatever may happen, and I see that he will expect a good many
changes and exclusions and that he should come in with some
adherents.16
Quite what Palmerston might have regarded as a 'decent opportunity' remained
unclear. According to Greville, foreign affairs continued to pre-occupy Palmerston
and it appeared that this was the area in which he would hope to contribute to the
ailing Derby administration: 'P. talks with the greatest contempt of Malmesbury,' he
noted, 'and seems fully aware of the great danger of having our foreign relations in
such incompetent hands in the present state of Europe. Though he relies much on
Louis Napoleon's pacific professions, he seems a good deal alarmed at the vast and
matured preparations of France and at the utterly defenceless position we are in, and
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he owns that the new Emperor's policy may any day take another turn and that his
present intentions afford a very imperfect security for us to rely upon'.17
However, Palmerston said he was reluctant to return to the Foreign Office.18
He spoke of the arduous labours involved in managing that office, and claimed that
he was no longer young enough to execute such responsibilities efficiently. Others
thought he was intriguing to satisfy different ambitions: Sir George Cornewall Lewis
had no doubt for example, that Palmerston sought, or at least would secure for
himself, a commanding position. In September 1852, as speculation about the future
of the government abounded, it was accepted that Palmerston did not want the
Foreign Office, but he was thought to be in line for the lead in the Commons, which,
Lewis pointed out, if he accepted, 'with his political standing, his official experience,
his self-confidence, his love of work, & his disregard for other men's feelings, he
would soon make himself the cabinet, in the midst of such a set of colleagues, & Ld
Derby would find not only that he had got a master, but a master who made him feel
his servitude every day
- & rode him with a sharp bit & a hard hand'.19 Above all,
Palmerston was thought to want the premiership, as Lewis suggested to Sir James
Graham in late October. In a reconstructed Derby ministry, he wrote:
Ld Derby might be first minister in name, but if Palmn. not being
Foreign Secretary, were to lead the House of Commons, he wd be
17
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compelled to inform himself about all questions, & he wd in fact
guide the policy of the govt. He would be the real Prime Minister,
& it wd no longer be what it is at present
- a Derby Dizzy affair.
This is a change which it is easy to make in conversation, or on
paper, but I doubt whether it wd be easily made in fact, or if made
whether it wd last. Palmn. however will shortly become very
impatient. Neither he nor Ld John will give way to the other, an
intermediate ministry under Ld Lansdowne is an impossibility, &
as he starts from the assumption that he must be in office
somehow, it remains only that he shd join Ld Derby.20
Whilst, as Lewis argued, Russell and Palmerston were ill-disposed to make
concessions to each other in the interests of a new government, Palmerston's interest
in an association with Derby was little more than a pragmatic response and did not
signal a shift in him towards protectionism. So long as the prospect of a
Lansdowne-led, 'Liberal' ministry had seemed a viable one, Lewis thought that
Palmerston was keen to throw in his lot with the Whigs.21 Palmerston looked above
all for a chance to resume office and envisaged a central role for himself, yet there
was a degree of flexibility, or ambiguity, in his sense of party allegiance.
On union with the Whigs and Liberals
It has been said that Palmerston by late 1852 was keen to take up office, or at least
Lady Palmerston was keen that he should do so, for pecuniary reasons,22 but if this
20
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were the case, he might have been expected to pursue more vigorously opportunities
to join Derby's administration. Rather he waited for the elusive 'decent opportunity'.
Palmerston had been unhappy about the Derby government, and was to be less than
sanguine about the prospects of an Aberdeen ministry, yet he joined the latter,
reluctantly, whilst allowing the former to go to the wall. With neither did he have an
obvious affiliation, although arguably he was more closely connected with the
Whigs than any other 'party', and thus his conduct in the closing months of 1852
begs questions about his political motivations.
Although active in the search for an alternative to the Derby government, the
various factions sitting opposite the Treasury benches were not particularly well
placed to challenge the government. There was a need for some sort of re-alignment
of parties, as the Duke of Newcastle argued in a letter to Aberdeen in August 1852
regarding the Peelite position. 'Union with Lord Derby is impossible' he suggested.
'Isolation is pleasant but not patriotic. Co-operation with other Liberals is
requisite'.23 The Peelites and the Protectionists were no longer united under the
Conservative banner,24 and the Whigs, who were led in opposition by Russell, were
equally incapable of supplanting Derby themselves. Russell could not command the
loyalty and respect of sufficient colleagues and Minto was forced to concede that his
should join this [Aberdeen's] Government. I am very anxious too as I think it would unite him again
with all his Old Friends. ...I think that if you could speak to Pain, again & urge him strongly to
reconsider his determination that he might perhaps be induced to do so. We have heard that
Clarendon is to have the Foreign Office and not Canning, & I know Palmerston thinks this gives a
different Character to the Government & would therefore make him more inclined to accept'. This
appeal was not to be communicated to Palmerston (Lady Palmerston to Lansdowne, 'Wednesday',
Dec. 1852, Lansdowne Papers, British Library, Lans 3/42, fol 64). Interestingly, Palmerston was later
to describe Lansdowne as 'the Person by whose advice I joined the present Government' (Palmerston
to Lansdowne, 22 April 1853, Lansdowne Papers, Lans 3/42, fol 37). It is not possible to determine
the extent to which Lady Palmerston had an impact upon Lansdowne's advice to Palmerston.
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son-in-law could no longer claim to be able to carry the Whigs forward as a united
body. 'Palmerston', he wrote in his journal, 'is I conceive the great difficulty at
present; as he would not serve under tho he may be ready to serve with Ld John as a
Colleague and it is to open the door for his return to us that some of our friends have
desired to substitute Lansdowne for Lord John as prime minister'.25 It was, then, in
large measure a personal antagonism or rivalry between Palmerston and Russell
which damaged Whig prospects and the decent opportunity which Palmerston
awaited was not to join Derby, but to return to his former colleagues under a
different leadership. Palmerston was attempting to play Derby off against Russell
during 1852 as a way of restructuring the Whig hierarchy in such a way as to make it
more palatable; to pave the way to his own accession to the premiership in place of
Russell.
Palmerston's confidence was mis-placed as the political climate was not
conducive at this time to such an enterprise. Now was the time when a new
arrangement was called for, be that a union of the opposition members, or some sort
of coalition. Newcastle imagined this was a watershed in British politics and sought,
'with a view to real fusion of all Liberals,' to abandon the names 'Whig' and 'Peelite'.
A new party, he believed, must be established 'not by one party joining another.
With this view all old names as well as old jealousies must be abandoned'.26 He was
only expressing what Aberdeen himself had already said, a little over a week earlier,
when he had written to Newcastle expressing his dissatisfaction with the Derby
Administration: 'I cannot look to the continuance of the present Government in
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power with any degree of satisfaction...', he said, concluding that, since Lord John
alone could not regain his old position:
I think therefore the time is come when we ought to act in cordial
concert with Lord John and the Whigs. I am not aware of any real
difference between us. Free Trade, with all its legitimate
consequences, is quite safe; and I do not anticipate anything but
agreement on the subject of our financial policy. Different views
may be entertained respecting education, and the Church; but
perhaps these are more theoretical than practical, and in which the
necessity of mutual forbearance will be strongly felt. It is to be
hoped, after the lesson of last year, that we shall have nothing to
apprehend from any hostile interference on the part of the Whigs
with religious freedom.27
Such aspirations were, however, a little premature. Few had the inclination to stand
above party in the manner of Palmerston; fewer still had the ability. An impasse had
been reached and the country seemed destined to endure weak government and by
definition even weaker opposition for the foreseeable future. Shaftesbury, no great
admirer of political factions, bemoaned the country's predicament. 'Party will do its
work, and complicate our difficulties', he wrote,
Aberdeen & Canning will essay to destroy the government, tho
they cannot form one; the Whigs, the same, with equal incapacity.
Party spirit, the strongest of the evil spirits, is the curse of
representative government; it will destroy the present
administration, &, eventually, the Kingdom. All are alike; where
is there an honest public man, who prefers the general good to his
own real, or fancied, particular? These men are no better than
those who assail them; they may do well now; but, in opposition,
they were reckless and unprincipled!28
Aberdeen may have been, in Shaftesbury's eyes, unlikely to be able to form a
government, but he was the best option. Recognising the need for some sort of
Peelite-Whig combination which might underpin a Liberal government, Newcastle
had written to Aberdeen as early as August arguing that in the present 'peculiar'
circumstances, 'the state of parties [is] unprecedented, and I believe that, if all will
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lay aside selfish and personal views and wishes, you can better serve the Queen and
the Country than any other person'.29 At the same time, Russell told Sir James
Graham that he was 'quite ready to support Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister, if the
Liberals prefer him to me'.30 Aberdeen, however, displayed less confidence in his
ability and prospects. There had been talk of him replacing Russell in 1848 on
which occasion he had told his daughter-in-law, Lady Haddo, 'This would be a
dreadful affair, and I trust will never be realised'.31 His reluctance to take up the
reins was entirely personal, as he explained a week later when it appeared that there
was little chance of him being called upon, but declaring that if the Russell
government was indeed to fall, 'it is my determination to preserve my own
freedom'.32
By 1852, the ground had shifted. Peel was dead and Aberdeen was quite
clearly the leading light amongst Sir Robert's old colleagues. There was also
considerable support within the Peelite ranks for an Aberdeen government, and a
clear need at Westminster for a new administration. Still Aberdeen was a reluctant
candidate and even in the autumn he felt distanced from the attempts to supplant
Derby. 'Shortly after the meeting of Parliament,' he told Graham, 'we shall see more
clearly what we have to expect. In the mean time, I am disposed to preserve my
character of spectator; and as I have really no object of my own, I may do this the
29
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more easily'.33 He evidently felt hampered by the vagaries of politics of late 1852.
He would not attempt to construct a government which would stand little or no
chance of survival purely for the sake of replacing Derby, and he seems not to have
felt confident of his ability to do otherwise. Foreign affairs, as ever, continued to
interest Aberdeen, and it was the poor management of this department which lay at
the root of much of his frustration with Derby's government. However, he also
maintained that 'the presence of Palmerston, as an influential member of any Govt,
would create a serious difficulty; and this he must know perfectly well himself.34
ii) The formation and foundations of the Aberdeen Coalition
In the closing month of the year the issue was brought to a head. The Derby
government was defeated in the House of Commons on a resolution for the increase
of the House Tax, and had not sufficient resolution to continue.35 Although the
Derbyites still out-numbered other factions at Westminster, combinations of these
opposition groups now appeared well-placed to supplant the government. Derby
himself reported to the royal couple that 'he had heard lately from good authority that
the Whigs and Peelites had come to an agreement, and were ready to form an
Administration on Conservative principles, to the exclusion of the Radicals, under
the lead of Lord Aberdeen. Although only 150 strong, they thought, that with all the
33
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talent they had at their command, they would be able to obtain the confidence of the
country, and hold the balance between the two extreme Parties in the House'.36
Derby advised the Queen to seek immediately the counsel of Lansdowne and
not call upon Aberdeen straight away as such a move would be read by Derbyites as
having been prompted by Derby and lead those among the ranks dissatisfied with
Derby himself to with-hold support from Aberdeen, whilst those Conservatives who
felt betrayed by the Peelites would ally themselves with the Radicals in a perverse
act of revenge. It was sensible advice and although the Prince Consort deemed it
unconstitutional that an out-going premier should proffer such a recommendation, it
did not go altogether unheeded.
The Queen, after consulting Lansdowne and Aberdeen and mooting the idea
of some sort of ministry headed by the two of them, was obliged to turn to the latter
only as Lansdowne, prepared to support a new 'liberal' administration, was not
disposed to attempt to lead one. The Queen had long admired Aberdeen, but still
she recognised the difficulties he would face in trying to fulfil his commission. As
she wrote to her uncle, the King of the Belgians:
You will have heard of our crisis, and of the resignation of the
Government; its overthrow was inevitable; but we must now get a
strong and durable Government, one combined of the best
Conservatives and Liberals, which is what the country expects,
demands, and requires. Lord Aberdeen has undertaken the task,
but I cannot yet announce, as I wish I could, the formation of the
new Government.37
Aberdeen did succeed, however. The new Cabinet comprised six each Whigs and
Peelites and one Radical and although it was not to everyone's taste, it was workable.
The Whigs especially were unhappy with the balance in the Cabinet given the
36
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discrepancy in numbers in the House, but Russell found that however much he
tussled with Aberdeen, he could do little to remedy this fact.38 Russell was vital to
any Whig or Whig-Peelite administration which might be established, and even
though he had toyed with the idea of not joining at all until Aberdeen had hinted that
he would renounce the premiership in his favour sooner rather than later (an
expensive hostage to fortune which was to return to haunt Aberdeen later in the life
of the government) Russell was unlikely to stand outside this new government. Less
certain, however, was Palmerston's position. He had successfully carved out
something of an independent position during the previous ten months and it was not
so clearly established that he would automatically join this government; indeed there
were those amongst his friends who believed he should not. But if the Aberdeen
government was to achieve anything, Palmerston, holding a certain balance between
the Protectionists on the one hand and the Whigs and Peelites on the other, must be
brought on board.
Palmerston was therefore able to choose his own course. When he joined the
government he surrendered, apparently, claims to his old domain at the Foreign
Office, and wrote to make his peace with Russell, assuring Lord John that 'we shall
meet again as far as I am concerned just as good Friends as if we had never
separated'.39 Perhaps as Palmerston had told Lansdowne, he did not hold a grudge
against Lord John, and now that Russell was beaten into second place by Aberdeen
and that he could 'serve with him on equal Terms under a Third Person', all was
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well.40 So, Russell and Palmerston were reconciled, and Aberdeen and Palmerston,
the 'Harrow Boys', were able to re-new their school-boy friendship.41
Palmerston's accession to the government was seen in some quarters however
as a very expensive and submissive act. The Duke of Argyll for instance felt that
Palmerston had made a great sacrifice 'of personal feeling to public duty'. 'It must
have cost him a great deal to see that great office [the Foreign Office] deliberately
with-held from him,' he continued, 'and given, at least for a time, to the Minister who
had summarily dismissed him from it. I was curious to see his bearing under
circumstances of union, and under the leadership of a statesman whose arguments
against his own policy he had described in the House of Commons as "antiquated
imbecility'".42 Shaftesbury, too, confided in his diary at the time that Palmerston's
acceptance of office, in direct contradiction of everything he had said previously,
surprised him greatly, believing Palmerston had in some way been duped by
Aberdeen and Russell. 'Johnny & the Scotchman are cunning enough;' he wrote,
they wanted to gag P.; and they have succeeded; they have bound
the wild one between two tame elephants... It is a strange
transaction; it is either the highest instance of Christian
forgiveness, (for everyman in the Cabinet is his enemy) or the
most striking concession of principle in exchange for office. His
mortification will, I fear, be great almost daily. I regret it for his
sake; I am fond of him; he is kind-hearted & friendly; he is getting
40
'I said that my private & personal Regard & Friendship for John Russell remain unaltered,
and that I must always entertain towards him individually those sentiments of Kindness which one
feels for a private Friend with whom one has been acting in public Life for more than Twenty years.
But I said that my political Confidence in him is gone, and that I could not again act under him as a
chief who should be the arbiter of my Official Position or the Guide of my political Course. That as a
Political Leader he is not to be depended upon, is infirm of Purpose, changeable in his views, and
perpetually swayed by Influences which are known and felt only by their Results. ...I said to the Duke
of Bedford that the upshot of all this was, that I could not again serve under John Russell, but that I
should not object to serve with him on equal Terms under a Third Person' (Palmerston to Lansdowne,
4 Oct. 1852, Lansdowne Papers, Lans.3/42, fol 35).
'Lord Aberdeen said that when he saw Lord Palmerston, who then declined office, nothing
could have exceeded the expressions of his cordiality; he had even reminded him that in fact they
were great friends (!!!) of sixty years' standing, having been at school together. We could not help
laughing heartily at the Harrow Boys and their friendship'. Memorandum by Prince Albert, 22 Dec.
1852, Z.0K, II,p.511.
Argyll, Autobiography and Memoirs, I pp.378-89110
on in life; & I could have wished him some respect & affection
from those who are associated with him in his later days.43
It was not so much an act of forgiveness, nor was it quite a concession of principle.
Rather, after months of 'acting the part of a very distinguished tight-rope dancer',
now was the time, he suggested to his brother-in-law, for practical reasons, to cease
playing the part of 'a reckless adventurer' and commit to the cause of 'the great
Liberal Party, not in the House of Commons, nor at Brook's, nor at the Reform Club,
but in the United Kingdom' and to fulfil his duty to his Tiverton constituents.44
There is a keen sense of realism running through Palmerston's
correspondence of this time. As he observed, his differences with Aberdeen over the
years on matters of foreign policy were not reason enough to refuse to serve with
him, and besides, there were in the new government those, notably Russell and
Lansdowne, who had been parties to his own foreign policy in earlier governments.
The new ministry was not perfect, but likely there never would be such an
administration. 'People must in this world take things as they find them,' he wrote,
'and deal with them as best they can; and they who think they can have every thing
their own way, generally find that every thing goes the way they wish it not to go'.45
The Queen was pleased to have a government 'so brilliant and strong', which
she held 'deserves success, and will I think, command great support'.46 The fact that
Aberdeen was at the head of the government was 'a great happiness and comfort', but
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she was also greatly relieved to see that Palmerston's capacity to disrupt public
affairs was much reduced. To her uncle she wrote: 'Lord Palmerston is terribly
altered, and all his friends think him breaking. He walks with two sticks, and
seemed in great suffering at the Council, I thought'.47 It took more than a bit of gout
to keep Palmerston down, however. His colleagues did not assume that he was a
spent force, but they did take heart from the fact that his new public role seemed to
distance him from his traditional sphere of influence. As the government's new Lord
Privy Seal observed: 'The only member of the Government who was considered a'
dangerous man, and who in very recent years had gone near to embroiling us with
France, was safely tethered within the peaceful pastures of the Home Office'.48
Palmerston was not to see his public duties as being neatly confined within
the arena of domestic affairs, but at the outset all signs augured well for a stable and
effective new government. Aberdeen recognised that this Whig-Peelite 'coalition',
was a 'great experiment, hitherto unattempted, and of which the success must be
considered doubtful. In the meantime, the Public have regarded the new
administration with singular favour1. Nevertheless, he could not deny that whilst the
coming Parliamentary session would be difficult, 'I am sanguine in my belief, that
our good measures will procure for us sufficient majorities in Parliament, as well as
the support of the country'.49 A fortnight later he was even more optimistic, telling
Guizot: 'I have every reason to be satisfied with the disposition of my colleagues,
and trust it may continue'.50 Even the Whigs could find grounds for a small measure
of optimism. As Clarendon told his wife, 'people were in better heart' now
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concerning the prospects of the ministry, even 'the Whig Chiefs who were so
alarmed 2 or 3 days ago & if there is a rattling opposition to keep them all together
the experiment may succeed but there is many a rock ahead'.51 Minto was worried
about the 'rival ambition of party distinction' undermining a government 'combining
such an amount of talent, experience & high character' which on paper gave 'a
promise of good government to the country', but he too was prepared to be positive:
'We must however hope for the best where so many men of sense & public virtue are
combined for a common object and united by a common interest'. Such hopes, he
believed, would be fulfilled provided the Peelites recognised the importance of not
alienating Russell and the Whigs, numerically the mainstay of the new
administration.52 Walter Bagehot went further, describing the Aberdeen Cabinet as
'the ablest we have had, perhaps, since the Reform Act', but as he also noted, it was
'a Cabinet not only adapted, but eminently adapted, for every sort of difficulty save
the one that it had to meet'.33 And that difficulty, significantly, was one of foreign
affairs.
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Palmerston, the Home Office and foreign policy
On taking up the reins of office in December 1852, Aberdeen felt it one of his first
duties to address the question of the government's foreign policy. Particularly with
Palnierston sitting on the Treasury bench, it seemed requisite that some sort of
declaration be made and Aberdeen played deftly upon a common belief that any
future threat to the integrity of Britain would come from France. 'The truth is,' he
told the House of Lords:
that for the last thirty years the principles of the foreign policy of
this country have never varied. There may have been differences
in the execution, according to the different hands intrusted with
the direction of that policy: but the foundation of the foreign
policy of this country has been, I repeat, for the last thirty years the
same. It has been marked by a respect due to all independent
states, a desire to abstain as much as possible from the internal
affairs of other countries, an assertion of our honour and interests,
and, above all, an earnest desire to secure the general peace of
Europe by all such means as were practicable and at our disposal.54
Muriel Chamberlain has said that this 'assertion of the essential continuity of British
foreign policy caused understandable surprise, but he had worded the statement very
carefully and there was, perhaps, an element of casuistry in it'.55 Surprise it may
have caused, but anyone who looked closely at what Aberdeen had said might not
have been so taken aback. Principles were reasonably consistent, in that it was the
responsibility of any Foreign Secretary to promote national interests, but also,
differences were to be seen in the execution of this policy. It might have been that
Aberdeen and Russell regarded Palmerston's earlier conduct as 'freakish', but that did
not mean that they did not share his concern with national interests. In emphasising
the desire to assert British honour and interests, and to preserve European peace,
Aberdeen simply drew out those factors which underpinned all foreign policies,
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which represented the similarities between all British Foreign Secretaries of the.
nineteenth century: the legacy of Pitt.
The question of the basis of British foreign policy and indeed, the manner of
its implementation, is particularly important during this period. During the
nineteenth century, at least down to the early 1880s, there are commonly held to be
two distinct traditions, or schools, of foreign policy. On the one hand, Castlereagh,
Aberdeen and Gladstone represented the 'European' approach, whilst Canning,
Palmerston and Disraeli are seen to have pursued 'English' policies. It is the younger
Pitt who is frequently seen as the first British statesman to have established with any
degree of clarity the foundations upon which British foreign policy ought to be
based. His Memorandum on the Deliverance and Security of Europe of 19 January
1805 is a good elucidation of these principles.56 In essence he laid down that British
foreign policy should be directed towards the promotion of British interests,
particularly economic and commercial; and, integral to this, that a balance of power
in Europe must be established and maintained. It is the interpretation of these terms,
of course, which has caused confusion.
Castlereagh sought to bind the European Powers together, in a congress
system, which he succeeded in doing, for example, in the Treaty of Chaumont
(March 1814) which tied Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria together in the search
for peace, and later in the Quadruple Alliance (November 1815), which re-affirmed
Chaumont, and also the peace settlement of Vienna (March 1815). Canning
followed him into the Foreign Office, but quickly set about changing such a 'new
and very questionable policy', which would involve Britain 'deeply in all the politics
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of the Continent, whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in
great emergencies, and then with commanding force'.57 To contemporaries, at
Westminster at least, the differences between these two approaches were fairly
obvious, and in the 1850s, there was an important clash between these two
traditions, as Palmerston and Aberdeen fought to establish a supremacy in the
Cabinet for their own strategies over the Crimean situation.
Meanwhile, Palmerston was safely ensconced at the Home Office where he
was to set about his new duties with vigour and enthusiasm. The demands of a new
role represented an exciting challenge, and not only was he content to forego any
claims to the Foreign Office, but he believed that foreign affairs were unlikely to
figure very greatly in the coming political season. He did continue to concern
himself with questions of national defence, but, with regard to the threat from
France, he told Aberdeen, 'I think that with common Prudence, & common Good
Fortune we are safe for 1853 and I should hope for 1854', and thus the priority for
the government was 'to employ this interval in preparing actively permanent means
of Defence'.58 But this could, of course, be monitored easily from the Home Office.
The new Home Secretary busied himself with domestic affairs and set about
his new duties with the same vigour as had characterised his tenure of the Foreign
Office, even to the extent of demanding of his new clerks, as he had at the Foreign
Office, that they pay great attention to their hand-writing. During the life of the
government Palmerston oversaw the introduction of the Factory Act of 1853, which
whilst not fulfilling all of the hopes of reformers such as Shaftesbury, did go some
way towards improving industrial working conditions, especially for children. He
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also attempted to pass legislation which would have confirmed the rights of Trade
Unions to combine for lawful purposes as laid down in an Act of 1825 (although he
resisted trade union demands for the legalisation of peaceful picketing) and, more
successfully, introduced the Truck Act under the terms of which workers were
entitled to payment in money, rather than goods or tokens for employers' own shops.
Palmerston also sought to improve the condition of society, both environmentally
and morally. He pioneered legislation aimed at curbing pollution with the weak but
well-intentioned Smoke Abatement Act in August 1853, for example, and
throughout was a firm friend of the Temperance societies. Nor did he shy away
from the thorny problems associated with prisons and their reform.59
Although the duties of the Home Office were great,60 Palnierston's
colleagues, or at least some of them, still wanted him to be involved in foreign
politics. From the outset Palmerston was regarded as an important figure in foreign
affairs, significantly being among the select group which met the diplomatic corps in
January,61 and the government was not yet three months old when, at Clarendon's
suggestion, Palmerston was invited to join Aberdeen, Russell, Graham and
Clarendon for a meeting at the Admiralty to discuss affairs relating to
Constantinople. With the Eastern question again developing into an issue of great
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moment, by keeping Palmerston within the inner circle it was hoped to avoid him
damaging the government's foreign policy from without.
It is not insignificant that Palmerston's interest in home affairs, whilst sincere
enough, was to wane as problems in the East developed. The Home Office was
engrossing and, he thought, worthwhile, but he could not disguise the fact that
foreign affairs remained his first concern. When strikes broke out in the north of
England as workers demanded a 10 per cent wage increase, the Economist asked
with some justification, 'is Palmerston aware of these things?',62 whilst the Home
Secretary placed his faith in the market to resolve the problem.63 When asked by the
Queen for news about these strikes it is said that Palmerston replied: 'There is no
definite news, Madam, but it seems certain that the Turks have crossed the
Danube'.64 Later, Shaftesbury was to complain when measures for various reforms
seemed to be making little or no ground at Westminster, that: 'I have much to
complain of in the sluggishness, indifference, & yet promises & professions of
Palmerston. He undertakes every thing, performs nothing, but actually destroys a
great deal'.65
With matters in the Ottoman Empire now coming to a head, Palmerston had
no desire to pass up an opportunity to engage once again in matters of foreign policy.
He might have told Clarendon that it was 'a great Comfort and Satisfaction to me to
know that the Conduct of our Foreign Relations is in such able Hands as yours; and
your administration of your important Department is attended with this great
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advantage to the Country that, from a variety of Circumstances, you can say and do
Things which could not so easily have been said or done by me',66 but still he felt
that a degree of guidance was required. Implicit in the letter which Palmerston
wrote to Clarendon in August 1853 is a suggestion that the Home Secretary felt that
his experience would be valuable to the Foreign Secretary who had been:
put into the position of a general who, having taken the command
of an army one day, should be called upon to go into action the
next, before he had made himself acquainted with the qualities,
habits and dispositions of his officers, and before he had had time
to sound the tactics of his opponents; and who, moreover, should
find himself fettered by a council of war some of whose members
were of the slow-march school.67
Clarendon's insistence that Palmerston be included within the inner Cabinet bore
testimony to the importance of Palmerston's decade-and-a-half spent at the Foreign
Office, but Palmerston's inclusion was also a safety device, as Aberdeen explained to
the Queen on one occasion:
Unless he [Palmerston] should continue to be a cordial Member of
Your Majesty's Government, he may very easily become the leader
of the Opposition. Lord Aberdeen is, at this moment, ignorant of
his views, and intentions. He has more than once, recently, been
thwarted in his endeavour to press a warlike policy upon the
Cabinet; and it has been reported to Lord Aberdeen, that he has
expressed himself in terms of great hostility. This cannot, perhaps,
be avoided, and is only the result of taking different views of the
public interest; but it is very essential that Lord Palmerston should
have no personal, or private, cause of complaint against Lord
Aberdeen.68
Nevertheless, even Aberdeen was to find this ultimately unacceptable. Bell has
written of the growing dissatisfaction which the Prime Minister felt as he saw the
influence Palmerston had over Clarendon,69 and by the autumn of 1853 Russell, who
undoubtedly had ulterior motives in view, wished that Palmerston could, in some
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way, be ejected from the government. Palmerston was an active Home Secretary,
but he did not confine himself to domestic labours, and nor was this what influential
members of the Cabinet wanted of him. However, Palmerston was not to be the
steady counsellor which Aberdeen for one would have liked, but rather he was to
seek to press upon the Cabinet a Palmerstonian outlook. The Eastern question
brought the problem to the forefront of politics and the nature of the divisions within
the British Cabinet did little to prevent the Ottoman business erupting into chaos and
war.
The origins of problems in the East
It has for a long time been commonplace to talk of the Ottoman Empire during the
nineteenth century as moribund, decaying and weak. Without doubt, there was at
Constantinople a lesser degree of stability than was to be found, perhaps, in the
capital cities of the other Great Powers, but it was not inevitable that the particular
sickness of that Empire in the 1850s would drag the others into a costly and
damaging conflict.70 The crisis of 1839-41 had done little to halt the disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire, nor were antagonisms between the Great Powers of Europe
which were centred around the Near East completely overcome. Rivalries were,
however, noticeably less acute and the 1840s witnessed something of a
rapprochement, most significantly perhaps in the so-called agreement between
Russia and Britain concluded in 1844. Whilst the Tsar continued to regard the
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collapse of the Ottoman Empire as imminent, he was desirous of averting this
problem for as long as possible, thus allowing provisions to be made for a stable
partition of the territory. The nature of the balance of power meant that Russia
would not, indeed could not, achieve this single-handed, but Franco-Russian
relations were not conducive to an accord and overtures towards Metternich in 1843
had failed to bring Russia and Austria together on the issue. In Britain, Peel's
Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been more receptive to the Tsar's appeals and an
agreement between Britain and Russia was forged in the summer of 1844 founded in
no small measure upon a mutual dislike of France.7' In effect it represented little
more than a commitment to cooperate in the event of an attack upon, or a collapse
of, the Ottoman Empire. There was no discussion of what constituted a genuine
threat to Turkey's existence, nor was there any specific discussion of how Ottoman
land would be disposed of in such a case. The Tsar, though, was satisfied. He saw
to it that the agreement was 'formalised' in what has become known as the
Nesselrode Memorandum, and in Britain, Peel and Aberdeen accepted this summary
of the summer's dialogue as accurate.
It has been said that the Tsar mistakenly placed too much trust in this
agreement and saw the Nesselrode communication as a symbol of a solid alliance.
Certainly, the Russians placed a good deal more stock in the understanding than did
the British, especially given that, not having been formalised by treaty but rather by
more casual means it was not to survive in any meaningful way beyond the life of
Peel's government which fell in 1846. As Anderson argues, subsequent events
- the
revolutions of 1848 for instance - served only to illustrate the great divide which
Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 111121
separated Russia and Britain.72 Nevertheless, when the dispute arose over the Holy
Places in the late 1840s, the Tsar believed he could count on British support and by
1853, with Aberdeen back in office, now as Prime Minister, he perhaps had grounds
to feel sanguine. Thus it was that in January 1853 Nicholas sought to revive the
'spirit of 1844' by opening conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British
Ambassador to Russia.
According to Anderson, the Tsar's approaches to Seymour 'provided apparent
justification for British distrust by indulging in another venture in personal
diplomacy'.73 Indeed the role of Seymour points to the importance of personalities
on both sides in exacerbating the tensions. It was a fundamental aspect of nineteenth
century diplomacy that diplomats themselves exercised a good deal of personal
influence, and, significantly, in the first half of 1853, according to Gavin Henderson,
'Seymour was ...anti-Russian at a time when the British Cabinet and the Russian
Government were still on the most amicable terms: and, presuming that the Czar's
assurances contained some real security against Russian aggression, Seymour had
ceased to be a suitable minister for the maintenance of cordial relations1.74 So the
British Minister at St. Petersburg was ill-suited to his task and the Tsar had
dispatched to Constantinople on what Goldfrank calls a 'mission impossible' to tie
Russia and Turkey together against the western Powers, 'the perennially sarcastic,
nationalist-minded, lackadaisical Minister of the Marine since 1830, Prince A.S.
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Menshikov, a man with questionable diplomatic credentials'.75 It did not augur well
for a peaceful year in the East.
In London these developments had far-reaching ramifications. The Duke of
Argyll believed that there was reason initially to expect unity and firmness within the
Cabinet, the Eastern question, he suggested, being the one foreign question which
would not tear the new Aberdeen administration apart, pointing especially to
Aberdeen's approbation of Palmerston's Eastern policy of 1839-41 as reason enough
to trust that 'the basis of our policy in any revival of the Eastern Question rested on
maxims of policy on which all the members of that Cabinet had long been
thoroughly agreed'.76 Furthermore, however dubious its status, the Nesselrode
Memorandum gave the British Cabinet 'no reason to believe that ...[the Tsar]
contemplated a different course of policy, we had every right to entertain that
unsuspecting confidence in European peace which was undoubtedly the attitude of
all our minds during the earlier months of 1853'.77 Such was the attitude of the
Cabinet indeed that in the opening few weeks of 1853, according to Argyll, the
Eastern question impinged but little upon its meetings, given the faith placed in
Aberdeen and Foreign Secretary Russell and the over-riding concern with the fate of
Gladstone's budget. Only Palmerston, suggests Argyll, entertained any sympathy for
Turkey although even this was little evident at the time.78
Palmerston recognised that this was a question above all of Realpolitik, and
his Turcophile attitude was dictated largely by his conception of the British national
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interest. As he wrote to Clarendon in September 1853, 'the activity, spirit & the
Energy, moral & Physical, military & political which the Turks have displayed in
dealing with their present Crisis, must surely convince any impartial & unprejudiced
Person that Turkey is not a dead or dying Body, but that on the Contrary it possesses
Powers of Life & national Resources which render it worth maintaining as a useful
Element in the European Balance'.79 In a letter to the same a month later he
elucidated further:
We maintain the Integrity & Independence of Turkey not for the
Love & affection for the Turks, but because we prefer the existing
state of Things there, to any other state of Things which at present
wd be humanly possible, and because the Interest political and
Commercial of England & of Europe would be dangerously
injured by the Destruction ofthat Integrity and Independence. For
these Reasons we have undertaken to defend Turkey against
Russia, and we could not sacrifice those great Interests by
abandoning Turkey to her Fate merely because the Turkish Govt
might not take our advice. ...Things have in truth come to such a
Pass that the real Conflict is between Russia on the one Hand &
England & France on the other, much more than between Russia &
Turkey, & unless England & France are prepared to sink down
into the Condition of second Rate Powers they must prevail, by
negotiation if possible, but by Force of arms if necessary.80
Soon foreign policy did come to occupy a central role in politics and not only was
Palmerston brought into the inner Cabinet in March, but by late April it is reported
that every meeting of the full Cabinet was dominated by foreign affairs. Argyll
records that at these meetings Palmerston was usually quiet and passive; that he
concurred in the general thrust of the ministry's policy and did not wish to undermine
Clarendon.81 This was partly due to his own standing. It was also, perhaps, the
result of Stratford Canning directing affairs on the government's behalf at
Constantinople. There is much written on the extent to which Canning must
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shoulder the responsibility for embroiling Britain and indeed Russia and Turkey in
war, but little on the way in which this impacted upon Palmerston's own position.
Initially, Stratford found favour with the new government and Clarendon
enthused on receipt of his first dispatches from Constantinople, 'We have a real
jockey on our horse instead of a stable boy [Colonel Rose whom Canning replaced],
and the odds are highest against the Czar'.82 By May of 1853, however, the lustre
was fading and Graham complained that the British ambassador 'is a Bashaw [i.e. a
Pasha]
- too long accustomed to rule alone. Such tempers and manners are not the
pledges or emblems of peace'.83 He was not the only member of the Cabinet to
become frustrated with Stratford.
Throughout the year there was a feeling that Stratford was pursuing his own
programme at Constantinople and by November Aberdeen declared, 'I have not the
slightest confidence in him, I only feel some curiosity to see how he will contrive to
defeat the objects of his government'.84 Stratford was not necessarily intriguing to
undermine the government in London; as he acknowledged himself, in discussing
policy in correspondence with ministers, it was his duty to confine himself 'to
general intimations, conceiving that all beyond is the special domain of Her
Majesty's Government',85 but his actions did contribute to the divisions and
fragmentation of that administration. Meanwhile Clarendon, at least, feared that a
perception of Palmerstonian bellicosity within the Cabinet was fuelling Canning's
forcefulness at Constantinople, and hoped, in December, that 'Palmerston's
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resignation may make Lord Stratford more pacific1.86 If neither Canning nor
Palmerston directly encouraged the other, their outlooks still remained essentially
concordant and frequently Stratford's actions were grist to Palmerston's mill, giving
him grounds upon which to challenge the foreign policy of the government, which
he was to do in conjunction with Russell during 1853.
iii) The Aberdeen Government and the Eastern Question
1853: Hawks and Doves
It is important to remember that in most areas other than foreign policy the Aberdeen
government enjoyed a particularly successful first year. The Cabinet was united on
most issues and wherever divisions did occur, they were not along old party lines.
As Aberdeen told Princess Lieven in the autumn, 'We have brought the Session of
Parliament to a triumphant close; we have carried many useful and important
measures; our majorities were numerous; and although a coalition of very different
materials, we have adhered well together. For my part, I think I have done quite
enough, but when chained to the oar it is difficult to escape'.87 However, the
omission of any reference to questions of foreign policy is striking for in this field
there was anything but a sense of the Cabinet adhering well together. The roots of
the coalition were exposed as Whigs and Peelites adopted differing stands over
foreign policy, or at least over the Eastern question, and Greville recorded the
observation made to him by Clarendon that far from the continuity in foreign affairs
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of which Aberdeen had initially spoken, the Foreign Secretary found himself, by the
summer of 1853, 'mediating between Aberdeen and Palmerston, whose ancient and
habitual ideas of foreign policy are brought by this business into antagonism'.88 The
rivalry between Aberdeen and Palmerston was reflected more widely in the general
division between Peelites and Whigs into Doves and Hawks respectively.
This is, of course, a simplification and the split within the Cabinet was not as
straightforward as this. During the spring and summer of 1853 the Aberdonian
outlook gained an ascendancy within the Cabinet and frequently Palmerston was
obliged to back down, as on one occasion in the summer, for example, when
Palmerston, who had been advocating a forward policy through the sending of the
fleet up to the Bosphorus, admitted that Aberdeen's hesitation to adopt this line was
fair and the Prime Minister rejoiced to think that now 'all polemiques' should cease
between them on the matter.89 Palmerston, though, had not given up in his attempts
to influence foreign policy, and nor for that matter had Russell. To see the Cabinet
as neatly divided between Hawkish Whigs and Dove-like Peelites with Aberdeen's
approach in the ascendancy overstates the case and fails to convey the nature of the
dynamics of the Cabinet over the affairs of the East.
Different members of the government viewed the priorities of the session
differently. Aberdeen was concerned to preserve the unity of the Cabinet, to prove
that a coalition could succeed, and hopefully to live up to Bagehot's later description
of this Cabinet as 'the ablest we have had'. There was a full programme of domestic
legislation planned and indeed followed through, and somewhat ironically, as a
result of this, it was Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who emerged early
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on as the strong man in the government.90 In fact, had the senior members of the
Cabinet been drawn into agreement over the Eastern question, foreign affairs would
not have scuttled the ministry as they did.
As Aberdeen had himself acknowledged, whilst all foreign policy was guided
by national interest, there were differences in the methods and approaches of
different Foreign Secretaries. What he had not paid sufficient attention to was the
seriousness of this divide. From the very outset, the Aberdeen Cabinet was doomed
to fissure and fragmentation, for although there was a consensus even that in large
part the Eastern question and its particular interest for Britain was as a balance of
power question, there was not, significantly, a common view of what the balance of
power meant.
For Aberdeen, preserving the balance of power meant focusing on the
congress system of resolving disputes by negotiation. For Palmerston and Russell,
whilst not speaking with one voice by any means, a more Realpolitik approach of
checks and balances was the only way of preserving an equilibrium. Consequently,
when Russia claimed rights over Ottoman territories, the Cabinet did not react in
unison. There was, throughout the life of the government, a contest between
advocates of a forward policy which aimed at the preservation of Turkish
independence as a brake on Russian expansionist tendencies, and a more
conciliatory approach arguing for a more accommodating attitude towards Russia
given that British interests were not directly and materially affected. In terms of
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decision-making within the British Cabinet on matters of foreign policy, 1853 was a
year of discord.
Until the autumn of 1853 Aberdeen successfully held the various factions
within the Cabinet together. Whilst his views did not have currency all around the
table, there was an unwillingness to pull the government apart if this could be
avoided and even as late as September, the Prime Minister was able to hold his inner
Cabinet together. Early in that month he convened a meeting with Clarendon,
Russell and Palmerston, and though the mood was bellicose, Aberdeen's measured
response to the situation carried the day. As the Prime Minister told his friend Sir
James Graham:
The present state of Eastern affairs was fully discussed, as well as
plans for the future. There was no very great difference of
opinion, except a strong desire on the part of my three companions
to come to a decision that we should enter the Dardanelles, as soon
as the state of the weather rendered it necessary to leave Besika
Bay. I rejected this suggestion, partly as being premature, and
partly because it was a measure of too great importance to be taken
without the consent of the whole Cabinet....
Palmerston was not so warlike as Lord John; but neither of
them was very unreasonably pugnacious. I thought the manner of
both rather constrained.91
Furthermore, Aberdeen and Clarendon were able to out-Palmerston Palmerston,
presenting him with a fait accompli when the Home Secretary had objected to the
wording of a despatch to Stratford, asserting that it laid the ground for the
abandonment of Turkey, in which case, he argued, 'it is high time that another
Government was formed'.92 Yet, drawing partly on the advice of the Queen, who
recognised Palmerston's bullying tactics of old, Clarendon sent the despatch off
without attending to the alterations put forward by Palmerston. Palmerston was not
insensible of this, and acknowledged that such a pragmatic approach was quite the
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most appropriate course. 'As your Despatch is gone, it is gone,' he wrote to the
Foreign Secretary, 'and I daresay no Harm will come of it, and our future Course will
be determined by Events as they arise more than by what may from Time to Time
have been written'; adding, by way of avoiding loss of face: 'I can quite imagine that
you must have had a hard Task of it to get a Team which is disposed to go so many
different ways to agree to any common Pull together'.93
Sir James Graham in particular was concerned about the potential impact
Palmerston could have on proceedings should he gain ground within the Cabinet,
and such fears weighed heavily with Aberdeen, and perhaps also account in part for
Clarendon's loyalty to Aberdeen during the first three-quarters of the year. Two
letters which Graham addressed to Clarendon illustrate clearly the nature of these
concerns, which go to the very root of the government's troubles during these
months. In July he wrote that: 'Palmerston has seriously alarmed me by the
eagerness and impatience of his tone and language. I am afraid that he may operate
unfavorably [sic] on Walewski [the French minister in London] and thro' him on our
Ally'.94 A month later he raised the spectre of domestic troubles:
I always foreboded mischief from a H. of Commons discussion on
foreign affairs at this critical juncture. We have a stand-up fight
between Cobden and Palmerston - the former the champion of
Russia and Christianity
- the latter the sworn ally of Turkey and
Mahometanism. Both made very able speeches in opposite senses;
but both pushed their doctrines to an extreme. Cobden, in the long
run, will have England with him; but the Derbyites were enchanted
with Palmerston and cheered him to the echo. So did young India,
who were most offensive in their language towards Aberdeen.
Fortunately it is the last night of the session; and before we meet
again the Turkish affair, at least for the present, will probably be
adjusted; otherwise the breach on our side of the House would
soon spread into an open rupture.95
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Aberdeen had a delicate balancing act to play. Palmerston, and Russell, were they
allowed to exercise a commanding influence over the Cabinet would, it was
believed, jeopardise the relationship with France; their isolation, however, would
also be dangerous as there was a sufficiently large element within Parliament willing
to unite under Palmerston should he break away from the coalition. Such a
compromise policy served only to weaken the ministry, for in securing what was
ultimately only grudging acceptance of Aberdonian policy from the vociferous
Whigs, such attempted conciliation caused the policy of the government to become
vague and ill-defined.
Palmerston was keen that the government's policy should be clearly directed
towards checking the progress of Russia. By the summer of 1853 the Russian threat
had become more pronounced. In May Menshikov had demanded of the Porte that
Russia should be allowed to guarantee the position of the Orthodox Christians
within the Ottoman Empire. Possibly encouraged by Stratford Canning, Turkey had
rejected this as establishing a dangerous precedent for unchecked Russian
interference in Ottoman domestic affairs. The failure of Menshikov's mission,
however, raised the stakes and the prospect of military action by Russia in the form
of occupation of the Ottoman Principalities loomed. British warships were
dispatched to Besika Bay, just outside the Dardanelles, at the beginning of June in an
attempt to avert any potential Russian threat there, and along with a French squadron
took up position by the middle of the month. This demonstration of solidarity
steeled Turkish resolve, and Russian demands were finally rejected on 16 June. This
led inevitably to direct Russian action, and on 3 July Russian forces crossed the
Pruth into the Ottoman Empire. No power could afford now to stand down without131
loss of face, yet the positions adopted portended a confrontation.96 Palmerston,
prescient of this, urged on his colleagues that the British fleet should be ordered up
to the Bosphorus. He was 'confident that this Country expects that we should pursue
such a Course, and I cannot believe that we should receive anything but support in
pursuing it, from the Party now in Opposition',97 he told Aberdeen, who replied that
he had,
not the least doubt that the country, and the party of Opposition in
the House of Commons, would be delighted if we took such a step.
But the Country would not look to the consequences, and the
Opposition would only anticipate our speedy overthrow. In a case
of this kind I dread popular support. On some occasion, when the
Athenian Assembly vehemently applauded Alcibiades, he asked if
he had said anything particularly foolish!98
Such differences lay at the heart of the tensions within the government. Aberdeen
distrusted Palmerston's motives and objectivity; Palmerston saw Aberdeen as too
hesitant and not sufficiently cavalier. Initially it had appeared that Palmerstonian
and Aberdonian policies would work together, fulfilling Argyll's early hopes. In
Cabinet discussion, Palmerston frequently raised objections to the wording of
diplomatic instructions and Aberdeen evidently felt that he could assuage his
colleague's reservations by adopting his suggestions, since they were, as he
commented on one occasion, 'not of sufficient importance to make it worth while to
contest them; although few of them appear to me to be improvements'.99 And even
Palmerston, for a while, was prepared to give the Prime Minister the benefit of the
doubt. In July the Cabinet became the scene of squabbles over the course of policy,
centring on the value or otherwise of sending the British fleet up to the Bosphorus,
and it was Aberdeen who won the argument and pressed on his colleagues the
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desirability of negotiated peace. 'I acquiesce in Aberdeen's argument', wrote
Palnierston, 'that it is better even to submit to Insult than to Endanger the pending
negotiation by throwing into it any fresh Element of Difficulty which could afford
the Pettifogging & Quibbling Govt with which we have to deal any Pretence for
rejecting Proposals in themselves unobjectionable and I am willing to share the
Responsibility of such a Course though contrary to my first opinions'.100
Had Aberdeen's policy produced favourable results, there is reason to believe
the course of British involvement in the Eastern question would have been far
happier. However, it did not, and Palmerston, amongst others, was to become
increasingly frustrated with this state of affairs. At the time that he was making the
concessions to Aberdeen over the fleet in the Bosphorus, Palmerston was in reality
far from contented. He argued that Aberdeen was sending out signals which were
leading the Russian government on, believing the British government timid and in
search of Ia paix ä tout prix. Thus the Russians were, he argued, arrogantly
pretending to forbid the British and French fleets from frequenting the waters of
another Power, over whom the Russians had absolutely no jurisdiction, and who had
in fact invited the British and French to be there. 'It is the Robber who declares that
he will not leave the House until the Policeman shall have first retired from the
Courtyard', he complained.101 Palmerston was not the only member of the
government becoming increasingly frustrated with the progress of affairs and
Russell, too, no longer directly concerned with the impact of Palmerston's relations
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with the Crown, became an ever more enthusiastic advocate of Palmerston's
policies.102
As the summer waned, however, even Russell and Palmerston grew
discordant. 'Palmerston and Lord John Russell', wrote Argyll, 'were very far from
being close allies. Sometimes their views coincided, but as often they disagreed, and
it was evident from Palmerston's manner that old scores had been by no means
forgotten'.103 Russell, in writing to Clarendon late in September, did not suggest that
he sought in conjunction with Palmerston to upset the government, far from it in
fact. 'I trust that when I have not wholly approved your course, I have not been
wanting in the duty of fighting your battles, & sharing your responsibility', he said,
but in thus defending a policy for which he entertained little sympathy 'you have
made me feel my degradation more than I ever felt it before'.'104 If Russell did feel
that he had been degraded by his association with the government's foreign policy,
he did not see the remedy for this condition in an alliance with Palmerston. That
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A CARD PARTY AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
ABERDEEN: Shuffle, Clarendon.
CLARENDON: You are always making me shuffle. It's Palmerston's lead.
PALMERSTON: I wish it was.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I've followed your lead, Palmerston.
PALMERSTON: And won the trick. It's a way people have who do as I bid them. If
somebody I know had trumped Menshikoffs ultimatum with Dundas's Broadside, as I
advised, we four should not be sitting in a back office in the first week of September
instead of shooting partridges. However, we won't talk of that, or the Premier will go
revoking to the damage of Clarendon's peace of mind.
ABERDEEN: I wish ye'd just play. Dinna talk so much.
PALMERSTON: You never see me put out.
ABERDEEN (spitefully): Not since Christmas twelvemonth.
PALMERSTON (laughing): Very good, very good indeed. Who says the old gentleman's
memory is failing? Christmas had a February after it, hadn't it, Russell?
RUSSELL: Never mind. You play the deuce?
PALMERSTON: I did, though I ought not to say so.
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Palmerston had recommended a policy which the Cabinet had approved at this time,
for example, cut little ice with Russell.105 Not that Russell and Palmerston were
enemies, but rather they had not combined to counter Aberdonian foreign policy,
sharing only a desire to change the government's outlook. Palmerston saw little
improvement in the conduct of affairs as the weeks passed, and was to write
scathingly to protest about the weak and lacklustre leadership of Aberdeen: 'I will
confess to you in Confidence', he wrote to Clarendon, 'that the Language I have
heard on this matter in our Cabinet Discussions has often tried my Patience and led
me to the Conclusion that we are in one Respect at least like Turkey, & have also
our 'wretched' Pasha'.106 Thus two of the government's chief sources of strength and
inspiration, Palmerston and Russell, were dissatisfied with the ministry's approach to
the most important issue of the day.
The chief problem of this period was that Aberdeen's policy was inadequate
and neither Russell nor Palmerston had the ability or the desire to push the point too
far, offering only a sporadic and piece-meal alternative foreign policy. In the middle
of everything was Clarendon, who found these competing factions within the
government frustrating and problematic as he sought to strike a balance between
them. In early October, Clarendon complained to Aberdeen that the 'difficulty is
very great of reconciling the opposite views held in the Cabt & of satisfying my own
notions of moderation & firmness'.107 From Sir Charles Wood, he was 'only too
happy to receive your opinions for I feel the enormous responsibility of acting at this
most critical moment without the entire Cabt', lamenting further that, 'no one but
myself can have an idea of what I go through in endeavouring to reconcile the
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discordant views of Abn., J.R. & Palmn. but I never end by writing or doing exactly
what I myself approve'.108
Aberdeen liked to imagine that he was master of his administration. He
remained blind to the fragmentation of his Cabinet and when reporting on a meeting
during which the Eastern question had been discussed on 7 October for instance, he
told the Queen that although the 'meeting was very long, and considerable difference
of opinion prevailed in the course of the discussion', he had ultimately the
satisfaction of seeing that 'there was such an agreement as ensured a certain degree
of unanimity'.109 The royal couple were not convinced, however. A letter from
Aberdeen to Graham which had been submitted to the Queen revealed quite clearly
the divisions within the Cabinet,110 and following an interview with Graham, it
seemed to the Queen and Prince 'evident that Lord Aberdeen was, against his better
judgement, consenting to a course of policy which he inwardly condemned, that his
desire to maintain unanimity at the Cabinet led to concessions which by degrees
altered the whole character of the policy, while he held out no hope of being able
permanently to secure agreement'.111
This failure to pursue a consistent and effective line on foreign policy gave
little cause for optimism, particularly when in October matters came to a head. On
the 4th, Turkey declared war on Russia. With no room left for vacillation, these
108
Clarendon to Wood, 20 Oct. 1853, Hickleton Papers, Brotherton Library, Leeds University
(microfilm) A4.57
109
Aberdeen to Queen, 7 Oct. 1853, LQV, II, pp.551-52
110
Although the letter sought to play down the differences, that they were described at all is
significant. In reporting the course of a Cabinet summoned to discuss the Eastern question, Aberdeen
wrote: 'The aspect of the Cabinet was, on the whole, very good. Gladstone, active and energetic for
Peace; Argyll, Herbert, C. Wood, and Granville, all in the same sense. Newcastle, not quite so much
so, but good; Lansdowne, not so warlike as formerly; Lord John warlike enough, but subdued in tone;
Palmerston urged his views perseveringly, but not disagreeably. The Chancellor said little, but was
cordially peaceful. Molesworth was not present, there having been some mistake in sending the
notice' (Aberdeen to Graham, 8 Oct. 1853, Aberdeen Papers, Add.Mss.43191).
111
Memorandum by Albert, 10 Oct. 1853, LQV, II, pp.552-54136
developments in the Near East provoked important shifts within the British Cabinet.
From Turin, Minto viewed the progress of events with little satisfaction:
There is no doubt I fear that the feeble course of the English
Government in its dealing with the Turkish question has tended
greatly to lower us in the estimation of other nations and to
deprive us of much of the influence we might have. For the
impression is very general that the Aberdeenian [sic] policy
prevails with us & that our aid is no longer to be counted on in the
cause of freedom or independence. It will require some emphatic
display of vigour to remove this impression & restore our old
reputation.112
There was no doubt in Minto's mind that a 'higher tone' and 'more decided measures
at an earlier period' would have prevented the Eastern question from descending into
the troubled condition it was in by the autumn of 1853."3 It was a view widely held
within the Cabinet as well, where all members felt that a firmer and more decided
line was needed. A few continued to believe that Aberdeen's plans for negotiated
peace still desirable,"4 but the heavyweights were beginning to see the value of a
more aggressive Palmerstonian approach. Certainly Clarendon came to see
Palmerston as the prime source of advice and support during the course of this
month.115 And perhaps even more ominous for the future of the government,
Graham noted that: 'The reunion of Ld John and Palmerston is certainly formidable;
but much will after all depend on the righteousness of the Cause and on the purity of
motives and of conduct. It is premature to form even an opinion: it would be most
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unwise to come to any decision'. Premature and unwise or not, even Aberdeen
himself was forced to concede that Palmerston's interpretation of events had some
merit. War in the Ottoman Empire forced a re-evaluation: 'It is very true that I may
formerly have regarded with the utmost incredulity the possibility of war between
England and Russia but for some time past,' he told Palmerston, 'I have seen the
desire for war increase so much, as to lead me to think that it is but too probable. At
present therefore, vous prechez le Convertt.U6 Aberdeen was not the only proselyte
and a letter from Clarendon to the Prime Minister confirmed the ascendancy of
Palmerston's opinions during the course of October.117
The fluctuations within the government of October did not herald a new era
of stability and clarity, however. Throughout November, divisions within the
Cabinet grew ever more pronounced, and the split between Clarendon and Aberdeen
particularly served to undermine the solidity of the government at this critical
juncture.118 Heretofore, the majority of the Cabinet had, generally, concurred in the
Aberdonian line, and although it had not been terribly effective, it had not been
especially dangerous either and opponents of this course had suppressed their
objections to a large extent. Now, however, the Palmerstonian approach was
increasingly attractive, but there was not the flexibility amongst the Aberdonians to
adapt. The government in late 1853 therefore was characterised by indecision and
faction, and by the end of the year the pretence of a united Cabinet was impossible to
maintain, and the coalition which had initially promised so much descended into
rivalries between its component parts. Whilst Aberdeen's faith in Clarendon had
been somewhat restored, there was no denying that important divisions still existed.
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Russell had let Aberdeen know that he did not know what the Prime Minister aimed
at; 'I say the same of him,' Aberdeen told Clarendon, adding, 'The only real
explanation is that which I have already given you, viz: that he intends war, and I
intend peace'.'19
By December the government's prospects appeared even more bleak. On the
16th, the Peelite members of the Cabinet - Aberdeen, Graham, Newcastle and
Gladstone - met at the Admiralty to discuss the Eastern question and the course to be
pressed upon the rest of the Cabinet the following day, thus further establishing the
Peelites as a distinct group within the ministry.120 At the meeting the next day
Aberdeen believed that everything went off well, evidently the solidarity amongst
the Peelites had given him renewed confidence. Russell, though, was less pleased.
'I confess I was surprised & mortified...', he wrote, 'it is obvious I cannot trust to any
compromise, & must henceforth state fully my own views in the Cabinet and press
for a positive decision. If it is against me I must consider what is due to my own
character & the reputation of the country'.121
However, Palmerston was now 'out' of the government. Aberdeen took this
as an opportunity to break what ties there might have been between Russell and
Palmerston, for whilst Russell and Palmerston might only have been allies of
convenience, they were nonetheless united in their desire to upset the government's
course. However, alone they were unlikely to be able to achieve this, certainly of the
two Russell was not well-placed to supplant Aberdeen, and Aberdeen used the
119
Aberdeen to Clarendon, 3 Dec. 1853, Clarendon Deposit, MSS.Clar.dep.c.4, fol 35
120
Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition, p.238
121
Russell to Graham [?], 18 Dec. 1853, quoted Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition, p.239.
This was not the first time Russell had been unhappy with the Cabinet discussion of foreign affairs.
Only a little over a week before this episode, he had written to Graham to say: 'I cannot help telling
you that I was sorely disappointed at the result of the Cabinet of yesterday....' (Russell to Graham, 9
Dec. 1853, Graham Papers, MS. Film 124, Bundle 115).139
opportunity to appease Russell. As Graham explained to Lord John: 'I can bear
witness to Ld Aberdeen's constant and anxious desire to act in concert with you on
Foreign Affairs to the utmost limit consistent with his strong sense of public duty. It
would be a great calamity, if there were any serious misunderstanding in spite of
such a friendly disposition: I cannot believe that it will occur'.122
Palmerston's resignation and the rivalry with Russell
Palmerston had made no secret of his opposition to Russell's various plans for
Reform. Throughout his career he remained a staunch opponent of franchise
extension, and certainly regarded the 1832 Act as 'final', yet Reform became again a
current issue in December 1853. Whilst British participation in the war in the Near
East was looking increasingly likely, it was not inevitable, and there was a return
within the government to some consideration of domestic questions and particularly
of franchise reform, if only, as Albert suggested, 'pour les beaux yeux de Master
Johnny'.123 Palmerston claimed he could not tolerate membership of an
administration not only committed to, but now actively pursuing, the Reform issue.
In a letter to Lansdowne, he explained that he could no longer bring himself to serve
the government. Despite having 'Matters in Hand which I should much wish to
bring to a Conclusion', at the Home Office and believing that he could offer a
valuable counter-point in the Cabinet to those advocates of a foreign policy injurious
'to the Interests & Dignity of the Country', he concluded that he could not 'consent to
stand forward as one of the authors and supporters of John Russells sweeping
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alterations'.124 This move caused great consternation and Prince Albert wrote from
Osborne to Aberdeen urging him to seek an accommodation with Palmerston. Not
only did Palmerston have a legitimate departmental right to offer criticism of the
proposed Reform measure, but it was important also 'to balance the probable value
of the modification with the risk of allowing Lord Palmerston to put himself at the
head of the Opposition Party, entailing as it does the possibility of his forcing
himself back upon ...[the Queen] as leader of that Party'.125 Accordingly,
Palmerston's objections were considered by Lord John and Graham as well as
Aberdeen, but despite 'a sincere desire to ...meet your views, and if possible obviate
your objections', they could not avoid concluding that, 'they appear to be so serious
as to strike at the most essential principles of the measure. Under these
circumstances, we fear it would be impossible to make such alterations as could be
expected to afford you satisfaction'.126 Palmerston asked then that his resignation be
placed before her Majesty and a few days later, once Palmerston's resignation had
become public knowledge, Albert wrote that there could 'be no doubt that Lord
Palmerston will at once try to put himself at the head of the late Protectionist
party'.127
It was a source of some surprise to certain observers that Reform should
cause such turmoil within the government. Shaftesbury felt that the 'indifference in
many cases, & the antipathy in others, to Reform is singular; not a meeting, not a
letter, not a speech, scarcely an article in behalf of it!'.128 Strange indeed, it seemed,
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that Palmerston should have taken this opportunity to turn his back on the
government, but, there was a considerable body of feeling that Reform was not the
issue at stake. To the majority of his colleagues, Palmerston's resignation appeared
to be motivated by considerations of foreign policy: certainly they believed that his
going would have ramifications for that area of business.
Earl Grey, who disclosed in his diary that though 'it seems to be given as
from authority that Palmerston's resignat[io]n had reference only to the plan of
Reform the world will believe (as I confess I shall too) that it has some connect[io]n
at least with foreign politics',129 was not alone in this view. Clarendon wrote
immediately to Cowley, admitting that whilst the resignation was said to be founded
on the Reform question, and had nothing to do with the Eastern question, 'we may
swear that till we are black in the face and nobody will believe either at home or
abroad'. Not only did the Foreign Secretary regret the loss of a sincere friend and an
'invaluable colleague' on the Eastern question, but he feared that, 'our difficulties
abroad will be increased by the notion that we shall be more disposed than hitherto
to tolerate Russian encroachment on Turkey or Russian insolence to England'. He
pressed upon Cowley the importance of not allowing Princess Lieven to report to the
Tsar that, 'Palmerston's resignation is a letter of licence to the Czar, or that there will
be any change of policy here or less union with France'.1'0 Whilst he acknowledged
politely Palmerston's help over the past year, Clarendon could not help worrying
about the future prospects of the government.131 Lord John Russell concurred: 'It
increases all our difficulties, at home and abroad'.132 As Charles Wood observed:
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'Palmerston out of the Govt wd lead or support such an attack [on the government's
foreign policy], & many ofthose who wd shrink from voting against us on Reform
itself, wd gladly & eagerly avail themselves of the opportunity of voting against us
on such a question, not sorry to ward off or postpone Reform by so doing'.133
To Aberdeen, Palmerston's resignation appeared to present a good
opportunity to remove a troublesome interference over foreign affairs. At the outset,
Graham had impressed upon the Prime Minister the need to steal this march on
Palmerston. The letter which Palmerston had initially addressed to Lansdowne and
which had come into the possession of Aberdeen, Graham pointed out, 'touches very
lightly on the Eastern question and puts Reform prominently forward. For this
reason it suits our purpose best; and I would advise strongly, that you should confine
your observations in answer principally, if not exclusively, to that letter, and make
the difference on the Foreign Question secondary in your estimation'.134 When the
'mis-understanding' was exposed and Palmerston was allowed to withdraw his
resignation
- on the grounds that he had framed it on an erroneous assumption that a
definite decision had been reached regarding Reform
- the Prime Minister was keen
to keep foreign affairs out of the picture as far as possible. Palmerston had let it be
known that his decision to return to the government was due in no small part to a
Cabinet decision made in his absence to accede to French proposals about sending
the fleets.135 Aberdeen welcomed Palmerston's approval, but remarked pointedly:
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'Although not connected with the cause of your resignation, I am glad to find that
you approve of a recent decision of the Cabinet, with respect to the British and
French fleets, adopted in your absence'. Nor could he resist adding, 'I feel assured
you will have learnt with pleasure that whether absent, or present, the Government
are duly careful to preserve from all inquiry the interests and dignity of the
country'.136
To read Palmerston's resignation of December 1853 simply as a disagreement
over Reform is erroneous
- whether Palmerston genuinely resigned over this issue
alone is almost immaterial, for the perception was that the Eastern question was just
as, if not more, important
- and yet also, to see it as a clever manoeuvre over foreign
affairs, similarly misses the essence of the matter. Palmerston's resignation was, in a
sense, a personal contest; it was as much about a rivalry between Palmerston and
Russell as between Palmerston and the Aberdeen government.
Heretofore, Palmerston and Russell had acted in unison inasmuch as they had
both opposed the general Aberdonian tone of British foreign policy. However,
whilst there was indeed a genuine concern with the issues at stake, both were fully
aware that this government was a coalition, comprising two (if not more) different
and potentially antagonistic factions. Newcastle's earlier hopes that the terms 'Whig'
and 'Peelite' be dropped in favour of something of a more general 'liberal' nature had
not been fulfilled. The differences between the groups had been subsumed by the
coalition, but not extirpated, scarcely even marginalised and, whatever this might
mean for the stability of the Cabinet as a whole, it also kept alive questions about
British and French Squadrons will have the Command of the Black Sea, greatly enters into the
Considerations which have led me to address this Letter to you' (Palmerston to Aberdeen, 23 Dec.
1853, Aberdeen Papers, Add.Mss.43069).
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political leadership. By virtue of having led a Whig government, and a Whig
opposition, as well as leading the Whigs into the Aberdeen administration, Russell
was, whether de jure or de facto, the head of the parliamentary Whig faction.
Palmerston, however, remembered all too well the experiences of the late 1840s and
early 1850s, and he had little doubt that only circumstance, and not ability, deprived
him of this position. Russell, as a subordinate member of the Aberdeen ministry,
feared that his standing was undermined and that he risked losing his hold over the
great Whig legacy. Both, then, had cause to make whatever political capital they
could during the life of the government.
There were fears throughout the life of this government that Palmerston and
Russell sought to, or at least might, leave the government and supplant it.
Aberdeen's initial intimations that he would renounce the lead in favour of Russell,
'when the time was right', had raised Russell's expectations, and the failure to fulfil
them did little to fortify the government. Consequently, the tussles between
Palmerston, Russell and the Cabinet over foreign policy and the Eastern question,
were significant not only for their own sake, but also as symptoms of a struggle,
never made explicit, between Russell and Palmerston for the leadership of the Whigs
and Liberals at Westminster. Neither could afford the charge of wilfully engineering
the overthrow of the Aberdeen government and needed an issue which would neatly
polarise the Cabinet and if the ministry fell as a result (not something to be aimed at
straight away), they had to appear as the government's saviour, not the root of its
downfall.
Russell appears to have been the first to attempt to use foreign affairs to this
end. As Aberdeen wrote to Graham in September 1853:145
...it seems to me pretty clear that Lord John is determined to go. It
is probable that on reflection, he found that the intention of leaving
a Government with whom he entirely agreed, and a place, which
however exceptional, was of his own making, would put him in a
ridiculous point of view, and was in fact an untenable position. It
was therefore necessary to have some ground of difference; and
this Turkish affair presented one, out of which some capital might
be made into the bargain. He has made a bad hit this time; but he
may be more successful on the next occasion.137
However, Russell had not the means to make a more successful hit. Whilst he was ,
popular amongst the Whig grandees, it was Palmerston to whom those outside the
present government
- and upon whose support a replacement would draw - looked
for inspiration. He, too, however was obliged to await a suitable opportunity.
The re-introduction of Reform to the political arena did much to appease
Russell, giving him an opportunity to pursue a policy to which he had a long-term
commitment and with which his name was clearly and commonly identified. The
same was not to be said of Palmerston, as his correspondence of December 1853
demonstrates and in this sense he did resign over Reform. Nevertheless, both
Reform and foreign policy were central and whilst Palmerston could have resigned
exclusively over Eastern affairs, have carried the country with him, undermined
Aberdeen's government and placed himself at the head of the list of possible
replacement Prime Ministers, he probably would still remain politically shackled to
Russell. However, in making Reform the cause of his resignation, whilst allowing
foreign affairs to be cited in the country at large, Palmerston could secure popularity
for removing himself from an unpopular government, without giving Russell an
opportunity to join him in the venture and share in the credit.138
Palmerston called the government's bluff: the Cabinet could not afford to
allow him to stand outside the government, and Martin is perhaps right that
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Palmerston would have failed had he attempted to take the lead of the Tories in
opposition,139 but he had made, as Aberdeen saw early on, 'a very dextrous move'.140
He had established an ascendancy over the rest of the government regarding the
Eastern question
- that the rest of the Cabinet wanted him back on the grounds that
he posed a serious threat in this field (above and perhaps to the exclusion of all
others) is evidence of this141 - but by implication in so doing he had also stolen a
march on Lord John Russell. He was shown to be, as he had always liked to believe,
the real strong man within the government. The point was not lost on Prince Albert:
Now Palmerston is again in his seat and all is quiet. The best of
the joke is, that, because he went out, the Opposition journals
extolled him to the skies, in order to damage the Ministry, and
now the Ministerial journals have to do so, in order to justify the
reconciliation, ...I fear the whole affair will damage the Ministry
seriously. Palmerston gulps down, it is true, all his objections to
the Reform Bill (which is to be altered in none of its essentials),
but he will lead the world to believe that it is to him concessions
have been made.142
Palmerston was not yet /'inevitable, but in 1854 as the problems of the Eastern
question deepened, and Britain was plunged into war, he was, arguably, juste ce qu'il
fallait.
1854: Paimerston's ascendancy within the government
With Palmerston back in, it was hoped that the government might now survive. Earl
Grey was not at all sanguine about the prospects for harmony within the Cabinet as
letters from friends including Ellice and Charles Wood persuaded him, 'that there
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can never be a good understanding again between Palmerston & some of his
colleagues, & it will be difficult indeed for a Cabinet so avowedly divided to go
on'.143 Good understanding or not, however, Palmerston was to exert considerable
influence over the course of affairs throughout 1854.
In the opening few weeks of the new year, the likelihood of Britain becoming
involved in the fighting in the Near East became ever greater. At the very beginning
of the year, Clarendon wrote to his wife, 'for my part, I am getting in favor of war'.144
Aberdeen continued to hope for peace,145 but his hold over Cabinet opinion was
diminishing. Even those members of the government heretofore identified as being
on the peace wing of the Cabinet - namely Gladstone, Argyll, and Granville
- by
January were endeavouring to justify British participation in the war, should it
become necessary.146 Aberdeen's growing separation from his ministers is perhaps
implicit in his admission to Clarendon that war did not seem inevitable, 'unless
indeed we are determined to have it, which perhaps for aught I know, may be the
case1.147
Fresh from his 'resignation triumph', Palmerston assumed a central role in the
direction of foreign policy at this crucial moment. Significantly, even Russell was
drawn to conclude a letter to Clarendon on the nature of Russia's intentions and
possible responses of France and Britain with the observation: 'Mighty questions
these, & I should like to hear Palmerston's opinion upon them; no one sees so
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quickly & so clearly in these matters'.148 It was Palmerston who took it upon himself
in March when a declaration of war appeared imminent to lay out formally the aims
of British involvement in the war in which his 'beau Ideal' aimed at a far-reaching
re-casting of Europe designed not only to preserve peace and under-pin the balance
of power, but also to add to British prestige,149 and Clarendon observed in May that
he was 'perpetually making new maps of Europe'.150
The great problem was that, even with Palmerston attempting to drive the
Cabinet on, and a disposition within the Cabinet to pursue the war (which Britain
entered on 27-28 March), there still remained a lack of leadership from Aberdeen.
From the initial approach of war, Aberdeen had indulged in morbid reflections on
the state of affairs, and Russell observed that 'the late meetings of the Cabinet have
shown so much indecision, & there is so great a reluctance to adopt those measures
which would force the Emperor of Russia to consent to a speedy peace that I can feel
no such confidence. Indeed the sooner I can be relieved from my share of the
responsibility the better'.151 To Clarendon, Russell argued that the 'great want of all
is a head of the English Cabinet', concluding later in the year that, 'I by no means
admit that he [Aberdeen] has at any time adequately performed the duties of Prime
Minister'.152 Shaftesbury, in August, observed that the 'Government within &
without weak as sour milk; strong in nothing but the war',153 but even this would
appear generous. Those on the inside were becoming increasingly bitter about the
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government's lack of direction. The Duke of Argyll, typical of many of his
colleagues, wrote:
What I dread is our going on without some purpose more
definitely recognised
- afraid of public opinion because we do not
try to lead or guide it;- shy of each other because we do not know
exactly each others' views. I do not believe that there is any
difference which will prevent a practical conclusion, provided we
try to come to it. But there is quite enough variety of tendency &
of feeling, if we do not try, to keep our language various - our
course unsteady
- perhaps I ought rather to say, to prevent any
definite course from being shaped at all. We shall then be at the
mercy of tides; and our motion becomes a mere drift.154
At Court, too, the erstwhile favourite was losing favour, as Albert told Stockmar in
March: 'Even yet Aberdeen cannot rise to the level of the situation, the war in his
eyes "like a civil war, like a war between England and Scotland"!1.155
These problems within the government served only to emphasise the
importance of Palmerston remaining within its bounds, particularly now that, as
Prince Albert observed, 'the Country' thought him 'the only able War Minister'.156
Palmerston's advocacy throughout 1853 of a firm line towards Russia had identified
him very clearly with the 'war party' and consequently it was now in a way inevitable
that he should enjoy an ascendancy within the Cabinet as a result, if only because his
interpretation of events had been borne out. Now, however, he was seen as the
government's ablest candidate for the post of war minister and this allowed him to
gain an ascendancy over Russell.157 With Britain fighting in the war, arguments over
foreign policy gave way to concern over how to manage the war itself. With
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unprecedented press coverage of the conflict, the conduct of the military campaigns
was a matter of immediate concern and belief in Palmerston's ability to direct the
war was recognised far and wide, from the Court to the popular press. Russell, by
contrast, although during 1853 a consistent advocate of a more assertive foreign
policy was now being left behind. As Lord Minto, who had discussed matter with
Russell privately recorded:
He is almost without support in the Cabinet. On great questions of
foreign policy indeed Lansdowne, Palmerston and he, and I may
add Granville, heartily agree, and in recent questions some of the
Peelite members of the Cabinet entirely go with them. But as
regards general support of him individually as the head of their
party he can count upon none I think except Granville & I believe
the Chancellor, & probably now George Grey, but on questions of
foreign affairs the latter will bring him weakness rather than
strength, and his most wretched speech at his election at Morpeth,
as well as his conversation since has greatly lowered the estimate
of the value of his accession to the government.158
Russell undermined his own position in the course of 1854, however, by persisting
in making personal attacks the core of his political endeavours. Throughout the
year, although himself becoming frustrated and disappointed with Aberdeen's lack of
leadership, Clarendon defended the Prime Minister against Russell's attacks,
accusing Russell of disloyalty and arguing that disparaging Aberdeen would not
alleviate the government's problems.159 Russell's mistake was to persevere in
personal attacks on Aberdeen which became more frequent, almost comically so,
Prince Albert even being moved to arrange a special file, entitled 'Concerning the
part which Lord John Russell took in breaking up Lord Aberdeen's Governmt, Nov
1854-Feby 1855'.160
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Russell did much to weaken his own position and Palmerston capitalised on
this. Palmerston was assisted by the general lack of vitality among his colleagues.
On the Cabinet's decision to order Raglan to lay siege to Sebastopol at the end of
June, for example, Russell claimed that, 'the expedition had occupied the anxious
thoughts of the members of the Cabinet for several months and that it had been
discussed very carefully and maturely', but he did not deny the claim made by
Kinglake in The Invasion of the Crimea that the ministers slept whilst the despatch
was read out to them by Newcastle.161 In fact, such ministerial somnolence appears
not to have been at all uncommon.162 It was not difficult then for Palmerston to
exercise very considerable influence over the Cabinet in matters relating to the
strategy and tactics to be adopted in the war.
The decision to press an early attack on Sebastopol was, without doubt,
Palmerston's doing. The Cabinet papers relating to this resolution remain among
Palmerston's private papers and show how he persuaded his colleagues that having
entered the war at great expense and for a great purpose, Britain and France would,
'lose Caste in the world if they concluded the war with only a small Result'.163
Aberdeen noted that on this resolution to destroy Sebastopol and the Russian fleet,
'there appears to be very little difference of opinion'.164 When, at Russell's
injunction, Palmerston sent 'this Box around again in order that Each member of the
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Cabinet may see the observations made by his Colleagues', he was gratified to find
that they all shared his concerns.165
There was little doubt in the Cabinet that Palmerston was the best man to
conduct the war. For this reason, and because it appeared necessary to reduce the
demands made of the Secretary for War and Colonies, it was hoped in late 1854 to
award Palmerston this position officially. Russell wrote to Aberdeen in November,
stressing 'the necessity of having in that office a man, who from experience of
military details, from inherent vigour of mind, & from weight with the H. of
Commons can be expected to guide the great operations of war with authority and
success'. He believed that there was 'only one person belonging to the Govt who
combines these advantages', and that was Palmerston, who should therefore 'be
entrusted with the seals of the War Department1.166 Aberdeen feared that the duties
would be unduly onerous for one who 'possesses no immunity from the effects of
age',
167 but there were hints of party intrigue in this objection to Palmerston. As
Palmerston noted, such a change at the War Office would have unavoidable
repercussions:
Clarendon said that as the matter now stands, Aberdeen declares
that if Newcastle is forced out he Aberdeen will resign, while on
the other Hand he Clarendon fears that John Russell will say that
he will leave the Govt if Newcastle does not give up the Conduct
of the War. Clarendon seemed to think this an Intrigue got up for
the Purpose of breaking up the Govt and getting John Russell back
as Prime Minister.168
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Russell's claims to the premiership were not as strong as they had been in 1853,
however, if only because with the war now the central issue in politics it was
Palmerston who had won over the Cabinet and the public on this issue and not Lord
John. Thus it was Palmerston, not Russell, of whom Clarendon wrote to his wife in
December, that much 'if not all will depend' on what he determined since if 'he says
that any change at this moment wd be detrimental to the public service the thing will
fall to the ground as Johnny wd have no support at all, but if P (wch is not likely)
was to condemn Newcastle then I see nothing for it but a break up & as that wd
destroy the confidence of France & crush the nascent vitality of Austria & be worth a
dozen victories to Russia it wd I think fulfill [sic] all the conditions of treason1.169
Yet, as Clarendon supposed, Palmerston was not likely to condemn
Newcastle. Throughout the year, Palmerston and Newcastle had enjoyed a good
understanding on matters pertaining to the war and there was no reason for
Palmerston to seek to undermine his colleague. Only when Russell threatened to
resign over Roebuck's motion in January 1855 did Palmerston put himself forward
for the post at the War Department, pointing out that he did not believe that he could
do the job as well as Newcastle, but hoping that if necessary this might be one way
of saving the government from dissolution.170
Ultimately, however, the government could not be saved. Roebuck's motion
for a committee of inquiry into the conduct of the war, effectively a question of
confidence in the ministry, was carried by a vote of 305 to 148 against the
government and the Ministers resigned on 30 January 1855. The search for a
successor was not straight forward. Derby was called for but he was not able to
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form his second government just yet. The Queen and Prince, who were resolved to
exhaust everything before they send for Palmerston',171 were eventually forced to do
just that. Even Russell was obliged to concede that, 'the country wanted Lord
Palmerston either as War Minister or Prime Minister',172 and so the Queen's hand
was forced - Palmerston had to be offered the premiership:
I know this would be very objectionable in many respects, and
personally not agreeable to me, [she wrote] but / think of nothing
but the country, and the preservation of its institutions, and my
own personal feelings would be sunk if only the efficiency of the
government could be obtained. If the Peelites and Whigs would
serve under Lord Palmerston, / should not apprehend the
consequences
- for they would restrain him from mischief, and
Palmerston himself in that position would feel the weight and
responsibility of such a position in a manner that would make him
feel very differently to what he has hitherto done, as a
subordinate.173
The Queen claimed that in appointing Palmerston, she 'had no other alternative',174
and Palmerston believed that he was now I'inevitable. He had finally achieved the
position of Prime Minister.
The basis of Palmerston's political potency and ultimately of his accession to
the highest office of state rested on more than his ability to play forces off against
each other at Westminster, however. Throughout the life of the Russell government
he had set the Court against the Cabinet over his policy, with some degree of success
until the end of 1851, and during Aberdeen's ministry, from his position at the Home
Office, he offered a compelling alternative foreign policy to that of Aberdeen and
simultaneously used this as a means of overcoming Russell in the campaign to claim
the leadership of the Whigs and Liberals. His base of support and his political
standing, widely acknowledged as 'popular', were taken as tacit justifications for his
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manoeuvrings at the political centre. Lady Palmerston claimed, for example, in
January 1852 shortly after Palmerston had been removed from office under Russell:
'Public opinion is very much annoyed with Lord John, and sides whole-heartedly
with my husband',175 but there was no explicit consideration of what this meant.
The importance of 'popular support' and indeed the strength conferred by
the approbation of 'public opinion' was commonly acknowledged throughout the
political world. King Leopold, for example, had warned his niece Queen Victoria,
that in his experience the monarchy 'has its sole foundation in the will of the people.
Without that will it cannot stand and from that will it derives every prerogative and
power'.176 Prince Albert maintained that the people 'will, even if they in the
beginning lend their hands willingly, deny their hearts and in the course of the
struggle they will obey the great moral law which governs this earth more than their
governments',177 yet he also later suggested that it was perhaps possible for a minister
still to guide the feeling of these peoples. 'Lord Palmerston', he wrote in 1852 in a
survey of Palmerston's foreign policy, 'could bring no counter poise except that
which he always declares to be stronger than any material force, "the public opinion
of England"'. Significantly, Albert argued that Palmerston 'had to create this
opinion, however', and in the case of Portugal, for instance, he had achieved this by
'incessantly blackening the character of the Court of Portugal and its advisers'.178
Perhaps it was easier to manipulate public opinion over a foreign question with
arguments couched always in terms of the superiority of the British in contrast to the
Lady Palmerston to Princess Lieven, 27 Jan. 1852, quoted Lord Sudley (ed.), The
Lieven-Palmerston Correspondence, 1828-1856 (London, 1943), p.298
Memorandum by Anson, 14 July 1841, quoted F. Eyck, The Prince Consort: a Political
Biography (Boston, USA, and Cambridge, 1959), p.29
176
177
178
Albert to King of Prussia, 21 Dec. 1846, quoted ibid, p.47
Albert's memorandum on Palmerston's foreign policy, 14 July 1852, quoted ibid, p.53156
foreign. Palmerston, at least, was frequently cited as enjoying such support and it
was often conveniently identified as underpinning his position, a short-hand
explanation for any ministerial deference to his views, but in what was still a largely
unrepresentative political system, at least one in which the franchise was not widely
spread, cultivating such a base of support required careful manipulation of
extra-parliamentary, extra-governmental factors; attention to 'low' political
influences.
Presenting Palmerston and Palmerstonism beyond Westminster demanded a
more varied and sophisticated approach than did parliamentary intrigues. The
political nation, which comprised more than just the enfranchised members of the
population, particularly in terms of representing the nation abroad, operated at many
different levels. Accordingly Palmerston sought to exploit popular feeling in a
variety of ways. At no point, however, did he appeal to public opinion for guidance:
the political capital to be made from the people was derived from their post facto
approval or more general demonstrations of faith in Palmerston's ability.
To the middle classes, Palmerston could speak through the newspapers and
journals. They offered an excellent medium through which to communicate ideas
and arguments beyond Westminster. However, Palmerston was not the only
minister to recognise the value of the press as a political battle-ground. Although, as
will be seen, he was arguably one of the most accomplished manipulators of the
press, he needed still to count on support from classes beyond the newspaper reading
public. Palmerston demonstrated his ability to sway audiences and interest groups
(such as the Manchester commercial classes) through his employment of rhetorical
assurances and careful cultivation of the image of guardian of the national interest.157
Here his contribution to a new political style was perhaps the most remarkable. The
following two chapters explore these themes in more detail looking firstly at the
careful manipulation of the press followed by the less tangible but no less important
cultivation of the image of the most English minister amongst those proud to
proclaim, 'as the Roman, in days of old ...Civis Romanus sum'.119
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CHAPTER 4. COMPELLING BUT NOT CONTROLLING?:
PALMERSTON AND THE PRESS, 1846-1855
i) Perceptions of the role and influence of the press.
The role of the press in nineteenth century politics, at least prior to the repeal of the
so-called 'taxes on knowledge',1 is an ambiguous one; at once the guide and the
reflector of 'public opinion' and simultaneously both manipulated by influential
politicians and able to exercise considerable sway over them. Editors of the major
newspapers and periodicals were often no strangers to political life at the centre and
for those for whom parliamentary life at Westminster was that of spectator and not
participant, such as Walter Bagehot, journalism was a means by which a 'failed MP',
to borrow Richard Crossman's phrase, could still engage in political life, indeed even
hope to exercise more influence that way.2 For politicians, too, newspapers were
seen as valuable barometers of the mood of the nation and also a medium through
which to affect such moods. Both sides had claims upon the other, whilst newspaper
readers were their stock. Newspapers needed to sell to a wide readership, for
commercial reasons if nothing else, whilst politicians needed to appeal to an ever
widening political nation; for both sides political knowledge and insights were
therefore a staple currency.
1
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Palmerston himself partially captured the essence of the matter when he told
Lady Cowper (later Lady Palmerston), that the only influence he was able to exert
over an editor (in this instance of the Courier) was 'positive not negative'; that he
could prevail upon the editor to insert an article today but not prevent him from
inserting a quite contrary one tomorrow, in short that from within the government,
Palmerston could 'compel' (although he might more accurately have suggested that
he could 'impel'), but not 'control'. Whilst news directly from the government would
always be welcome, this did not outweigh the commercial considerations of the
newspaper editor and proprietor.3 As he explained to Lord John Russell in 1846, 'no
Govt can do any thing for a newspaper, that can compensate for a Curtailment of
Circulation & that Circulation depends upon free & unfettered Discussion of Events
at Home & abroad; & that in such Discourses, newspapers Express Either their own
opinions or those which they think will be agreeable to their readers'.4 In a similar
vein, the Times in an editorial of 1852 proudly announced that it was not the place of
the press to interfere in the duties of politicians and thus, 'our vocation is, in one
respect, inferior to theirs, for we are unable to wield the power or represent the
collective dignity of the country; but in another point of view it is superior, for,
unlike them, we are able to speak the whole truth without fear or favour'.5
The newspaper, and, to a slightly lesser extent, periodical press of the
mid-nineteenth century was both a political weapon of the ruling elite and a political
lever to be employed by those beyond the confines of Westminster; but at no time
and in no instance is either label to be taken as indicative of a fixed role. The
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position of the press within the political world remained fluid and ill-defined,
although there was no shortage of attempts made to apply specific definitions.
Members of the press themselves were clear about not only their status, but also their
duty. The idea of a 'fourth estate' was invoked ever more often as a means of
determining a society's degree of civilization, 'an index to its social state', as
Frederick Knight Hunt described it in 1850. Where there was an abundance of
journals, Hunt argued, 'the people have power, intelligence, and wealth; where
Journals are few, the many are in reality mere slaves'.6 The newspaper press was in a
sense seen by some as an integral part of the fabric of the British representative
system, the superiority of which was in no small measure attributable to the maturity
of the British press. Thus the sometime editor of the Morning Advertiser, James
Grant, felt confident enough to assert in the introduction to his history of the
newspaper press that the 'Press has before it one of the most glorious Missions in
which human agencies ever were employed. Its Mission is to Enlighten, to Civilize,
and to Morally Transform the World'.7
The belief that the press occupied a place at the heart of the British
constitution and indeed thereby conferred upon that system a degree of superiority
found voice in a number of journals. The Economist, a weekly paper, in 1852, for
example, whilst professing to believe that the press in Britain remained 'wholly
independent of Government, and exclusively dependent on its readers', perhaps
accurate for the periodical press but less so in the case of daily newspapers, still
echoed such missionary zeal. Unlike French, German and other continental journals,
6
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which suffered under the demands of corruption and intriguing for honours among
the journalistic classes, the British press 'is the natural growth of the national
progress: it belongs to all the people, is a part of their daily lives, and is
indispensable to civilisation'.8 In reality, the British journalistic classes were often
just as susceptible to corruption and intrigue as those elsewhere,9 yet the belief
remained that the British press was essentially superior to its continental
counterparts.
Crucially, the press' contribution to civilisation extended beyond simply
ensuring that the populace was well-informed about the conduct of affairs. The great
advantage of the British press over the continental, it appeared, was the ability of the
former to activate the latent political influence of its readers. By courting 'public
opinion' and presenting such through the leader columns of the newspapers, the press
could start to introduce some notion of public accountability; as the Globe suggested
in February 1848, public opinion was 'the only power to which any effectual appeal
can be made for controlling the obliquities of official action, when unknown to, or
unsanctioned by that opinion'.10 The implication was not simply that statesmen
could now, and therefore should, be reigned in by an enlarged political nation which
enjoyed a uniquely free and varied mode of expression, but that this influence, or at
8
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least recourse to appeal, ought to be employed to the greater good not only of the
British people, but especially with regard to foreign affairs, the peoples of other
states as well. The 'obliquities of official action' could be clarified through the
medium of the press. In response to a suggestion in the Spectator that diplomacy
should remain at all times a secretive pursuit, the Globe argued that, whilst exposing
the intricacies of diplomatic negotiations at every juncture would be to 'drive all
diplomatic transactions into holes and corners, or out of existence', it should remain
a maxim that 'ultimate publicity should be the rule, secrecy the exception'."
Increasingly, many editors at this time generally believed, popular feeling
and opinion were important considerations in the practice of diplomacy and by
putting these before the view of the world, Britain would carry more conviction
abroad. As another daily paper, the Morning Chronicle, had put it in 1846, there
were two ways for one country to exercise influence over another, firstly through
official channels, secondly by the force of public opinion. Whilst 'the capabilities of
the blue ribbon', and the potential of'a bundle of red tape' were not inconsequential,
the Chronicle argued that these were not alone sufficient and that it 'is the united
opinion of those millions in one country that acts upon the conduct of another far
more than all protocols or documents'. As such, the editors of that paper, as
journalists, and thus as 'the delegates of opinion, as senators are of power, should
feel ourselves wanting in the discharge of a sacred duty did we forbear from
expressing broadly what the feeling of the English people is with respect to the
question of Poland'.12
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What is omitted from the newspaper columns during these discussions of
'public opinion', however, is some attempt to define that public opinion.
Newspapers spoke confidently of the influence of the 'people' and their duty to relay
the sentiments of these people through their papers as well as to educate them, but
they represented only a relatively small, though influential, section of the population.
Editorials interchanged freely the terms 'people' and 'readers', yet they were clearly
not synonymous. The national press, still in essence metropolitan, was far from
enjoying a position of widespread currency, as circulation figures indicate.13 Whilst
circulation figures are not an accurate guide to actual numbers of readers, it is
incontestable that no newspaper or journal of the day was able to reach and therefore
claim to represent the majority of the population. But, equally, nor did they try.
Newspapers of the mid-nineteenth century, with the exception of the various
working-class, radical, unstamped and even clandestine publications, were aimed
squarely at educated readers, leisured and active, who might be deemed to make up
the 'middle classes', those who were not the only class within the political nation, but
who were arguably becoming the most vociferous, interested and therefore
important.
In writing to Palmerston in 1851, James Grant measured the growing success
of the Morning Advertiser, a paper originally established as the organ of London
publicans, (which now had 'a circulation nearly double that of any morning paper
except the Times, and almost treble that of some of its contemporaries') by the nature
13
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of its readership. Grandly claiming that the paper was now 'read among all classes',
he emphasised the increased stature of the title, saying that it 'is taken into all the
Clubs and Reading Rooms'.14 Significantly, the clubs and reading rooms, as well as
public houses in which the London newspapers were made available gave many
more people access to the press output. Newspapers may have been written
primarily for the middle classes, but they were read also by many members of the
working classes. Publicans not only subscribed to certain newspapers, but they
would frequently organise for the papers to be read to their illiterate customers; other
venues of social interaction, such as barber's shops, coffee houses and mechanics
institutes also took a number of newspapers and a number of news items would find
their way onto the street in the form of ballads. According to Donald Read such
arrangements saw readership among the urban working classes escalate during this
period.15
Grant's Morning Advertiser was perhaps read by 'all classes' but generally the
constituency to which the metropolitan press appealed was not that comprising all
social classes, but rather all classes within the political nation, and that the 'high'
political nation. It would be foolhardy indeed to claim that a circulation measured
only in four figures was in any way representative of the entire nation, but this
merely reflects the prevailing notion of what or who made up public opinion. As the
Times suggested in one of its leaders, public opinion was properly represented in the
Imperial Parliament and therein dissident voices were heard through people such as
Richard Cobden.16 However widely newspapers were read, the interaction with
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'public opinion' or 'the people' worked on different levels. The middle classes had
legitimate claims to be represented by, or even define and inform, public opinion,
whereas the lower classes read the newspapers simply to be informed. The Leeds
Operative Conservative Association looked to the press for guidance: they read 'to
furnish our minds by means of newspapers and other publications with correct views
on political subjects, and to furnish an antidote to those publications of a dangerous
tendency which are everywhere obtruded upon us1.17 It was not surprising to find a
conservative association seeking thus to be informed, but the sentiment is echoed in
a motion passed by the Manchester Literary Society which was 'essentially a radical
institution'. On 7 November 1848 that Society voted by a margin of 16 to 2 in
favour of the motion 'Is the tendency of the [journalistic] literature of the present day
in England to elevate and enlarge the public mind?'.18 The motion clearly indicates
an appreciation of the didactic qualities of the press.
From outside Parliament the prevailing (middle class) public opinion was to
be found elucidated in the newspapers, and primarily the Times: 'A charge or an
inquiry made through this journal produces an answer the next day with infallible
precision. No man refuses to set himself right with his countrymen through the
columns of The Times' it observed in late 1851,19 cognisant that the Times not only
dominated the 'national' daily press market, but also, and particularly with regard to
international stories, was the source of most news and intelligence for local or
provincial papers.
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There would have been a danger, had it gone unnoticed, of the British press
becoming so obsessed with its own importance, indeed perhaps a perceived
omnipotence, that it would lose sight of its true role and invest in the power of
'opinion' such grandiose capabilities as were not to be realised. Yet the introspective
nature of many titles' editorials during these years brought the question into the open.
In July 1846 the Morning Post expressed unease about what it saw as the growing
influence of public opinion and the stock placed in it. It was that paper's duty, it
said, to 'contend against the dogma that what popular newspapers call "public
opinion" is to be the all-prevailing power and director in matters political'.
Bemoaning the degradation of principled politics, the Post expressed concern that a
blinkered, even lazy, approach to politics would prove ultimately detrimental: 'At the
risk of being classed among those who should be sneered down as "admirers of the
heroic," we must continue to protest against slavish submission to the political slang
of the day, however general and prevalent it may be'.20 The Economist went further,
concerned about 'newspapers writing for effect'. Exaggerated and 'unmeaning'
writing, or 'rant', it contended, in former times had been more prevalent than at
present and it would be well to avoid again making 'men of reputation and ability
treat newspapers with well-merited contempt'; 'grand and comprehensive measures'
for public affairs, the Economist feared, were now being put forth by some
contemporaries 'for effect, without reflection either on the nature of society or on
what the best and wisest of governments can do for mankind'. There was no
disputing the central role played by the press, but this was potentially a force for bad
as well as good: ministers, it lamented, had 'been flattered by the vulgar demands of
20
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the multitude, including newspaper writers, into the belief that they can model
mankind and make nations great and good, and they have assumed a responsibility in
consequence that they now find most irksome, from the hopeless impossibility of
doing what is required of them.21 There was a clear distinction to be drawn here
between the 'vulgar demands of the multitude', and the more respectable or rather
legitimate, opinion advanced by the middle classes.
Even the Times, which enjoyed by far the largest circulation of any
newspaper of the day balked at investing in 'public opinion' a greater significance
than was merited. Whilst 'incessantly devoted' to the 'uses and direction' of the
power of public opinion, the Times in a leading article of August 1849 noted that
with regard to that power, 'we hold it to be inconsistent with truth and prudence to
exaggerate its efficacy or to assert its omnipotence without reference to the natural
limits and obstacles which it may have to surmount'. In a rather Palnierstonian tone,
the editorial continued that only through the employment of material force and not
simply by relying on strong words would the public opinion of England be able to
accomplish great objects such as the overthrow of continental powers like
Napoleonic France.22 Indeed it was one of the few Palmerstonian attributes which
the Times admired: 'Does not public opinion act on foreign countries precisely in
proportion to the amount of actual force which it sets in motion, and which we are
prepared to employ in support of it?' a leader of July 1849 had asked.23
Acknowledging the pivotal role the press was commonly held to fulfil
(among members of the press at least), the Times struck a chord of moderation in its
consideration of the influence of public opinion through the columns of the
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newspapers. Whilst it was no longer true that ministers could and should be able to
force through their measures in the face of popular opposition, this did not mean that
the balance had swung wholly in the opposite direction. Public opinion, declared the
Times, has a hand in the creation of ministers, but then once they are in office,
'regulates their proceedings, and modifies their measures'.24 This was in essence an
affirmation of Palmerston's earlier distinction between compelling and controlling;
neither one side nor the other had the upper hand, and by the same token neither side
could now act, successfully or at least popularly, without the cooperation or support
of some portion of the other.
In a sense, then, the press was the medium through which the readers could
communicate with ministers and ministers could communicate with those beyond
Westminster. Journal readers were not the only members of the political nation from
whom ministers would wish to solicit support, but it was important to carry them
with the government if it was to proceed smoothly and the press offered an
immediate and useful means of reaching these people. In fact, according to the
Times, such was the importance of the press in communicating with the people on
behalf of the government, that 'the duty of the Press is to speak; of the statesmen to
be silent'.25 Not only were the newspapers obliged to listen to and report opinion
outside Parliament, but to establish links within Parliament in order to give
expression to the 'governing opinion'. Delane, editor of the Times, for instance, felt
it his responsibility to make his paper the organ of this governing opinion and place
himself in close connection with the leaders of each party.26
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Prominent men within each party were well aware of the unparalleled
advantages associated with cultivating allies within the newspaper press. Beyond
Westminster, within Westminster, and for personal gain, politicians were
well-advised to establish links with one or more titles, and this lesson was heeded
across the political spectrum. The rhetorical claims made in leading articles
regarding the ability of the press to sway popular moods, and thus in a sense
stabilise, harmonise and unite the country at large, were taken on board and fully
exploited by politicians. Lord Aberdeen, erstwhile Foreign Secretary and
subsequent Prime Minister, told Delane in the autumn of 1848: 'The people of this
country may be carried away for a time by attractive notions and projects; but the
reasoning in the Article to which I refer, is quite irresistible, and I have no doubt will
come home to the feelings of every candid and impartial man'.27
Yet newspapers were not seen solely as tools with which to communicate
with the nation. Inevitably the press became politicised and as a necessary corollary
of this, polarised, causing different titles to be used as a means of fighting political
battles by proxy. An assault launched under the banner of one newspaper title was
not necessarily one between the 'public' and the government, but often one designed
to be resolved ultimately within Parliament, between contending party factions.
Thus, for example, Lord Lincoln, later the fifth Duke of Newcastle, appealed to John
Cook, then at the Times, at the end of 1845, to assist in cementing a tie between that
newspaper and the government, so that the beleaguered Peel administration might
thus withstand parliamentary onslaughts and intrigues. 'It really is of such vast
importance (now more than ever)1, he told Cook, 'to strengthen the hands of the
Aberdeen to Delane, 4 Sept. 1848, Delane Papers, Times Newspapers Ltd. Archive, 3/50170
Executive by every proper means that I am most anxious to avail myself of any
opening to make a renewed effort for this object and to allow bygones to be
forgotten'.28 In return, newspapers expected a certain amount of support from
ministers. When in 1854 it appeared to Reeve of the Times that Aberdeen had
reneged on this tacit reciprocal agreement in a parliamentary discussion of the
Eastern question, he complained to Clarendon:
it is impossible not to feel that Lord Aberdeen's conduct in this
debate has been cowardly & ungrateful, if it be true as reported
that he cheered Lord Derby's threats against the Times, & he
certainly did not take the opportunity of saying one word of
acknowledgement of those independent services which a
Government does not disdain to receive from a newspaper.
Considering how very large an amount of those services have been
rendered him, without even the slightest return of formal civility,
by persons he hardly knows, he was bound as a man of spirit &
fairness not to see them unjustly attacked in Parliament without an
attempt to vindicate their real motives & position.29
In an age when personality was often more important than notions of party in
dictating political allegiances, newspapers were also seen as a means by which an
individual at Westminster could enhance his standing beyond that palace. This was
especially important to a figure such as Palmerston, who might have denied the link,
but who was unquestionably persuaded by the example of his earlier colleague
George Canning in appreciating fully the importance of counting public opinion
amongst one's allies. As a pamphlet published in 1830, An Authentic Account of Mr
Canning's Policy, written by Canning's widow explained:
While he was at the helm there was not one of the European
governments who dared to provoke the vengeance of England,
because they well knew that a war with England would be a
measure too unpopular to hazard. Thus Mr Canning was able to
hold language and to carry measures in defiance of some [i.e. the
Tories], and contrary to the orders of the Governments of the Great
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Continental Powers. By these means he obtained over these
governments an influence which he employed not only to promote
the interests of England, but the general prosperity of the world.30
Canning had employed newspapers as a means of effecting this influence, although
he was keen to make clear that this in no way caused him to feel beholden to the
press: 'I acknowledge its power, I submit to its judgement, but I will not be
summoned to its bar!', he had declared in 1816.31 Palmerston took these sentiments
a step further, acknowledging the power of the press and refusing to be summoned to
its bar, but not necessarily believing that he must submit to its judgement. The press
had developed into a much more sophisticated medium since the days of Canning
and writing was not now exclusively that of reporting, but equally, that of polemic.
The power of the press was to be harnessed by politicians as far as possible. When
the Palmerstons visited Paris in the spring of 1846 on a bridge-mending mission,
Palmerston returned most satisfied that a visit that had been 'most gratifying to us'
would also, he believed, prove to have been 'politically useful by promoting a good
understanding between the Two Countries'. Significantly, however, he attributed the
kind reception in France 'by all Parties & Classes' to the efforts of John Easthope of
the Morning Chronicle who had in his own visits to Paris done much 'to prepare the
way for us'.32 A friendly connection with influential journals could be used as a
30
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understanding with your country. I am sure you will both act kindly together under those views. In
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valuable means of affirming cordial relations abroad and also, no less importantly,
do much to strengthen an individual ministers' standing. The Palmerstons' trip to
Paris had, after all, done much to repair Palmerston's damaged reputation. It clearly
gave Easthope considerable satisfaction to note that his influence had contributed to
this result, and also that he regarded Palmerston as having 'destroyed the
misrepresentations in Paris and London and I am sure that both yourself and Lady
Palmerston will give me credence for having heard of your triumph with delight'.33
For Palmerston, as a minister concerned primarily with foreign affairs, this
was a valuable asset. Crucially, journalists also gave him a useful additional means
of portraying himself abroad in a favourable light. Personal friendships and
animosities played an important role in characterising the external relations of
different countries
- witness only the potential impact on Britain's foreign relations it
was widely feared Palmerston's return to the Foreign Office in July 1846 might have
- and therefore it was important that Palmerston try to present himself in a
favourable light abroad.
Various journalists were available to be 'bought' by a sagacious politician.
Palmerston himself, for example, in 1851 made the acquaintance of an American
journalist named Henry Wikoff, working in Paris and writing for a number of
American journals. Algernon Borthwick, then Paris correspondent of the Morning
and advancing prosperity in both Kingdoms, with progressive good will'. Guizot replied that he
shared the desire for a good understanding and peace between Britain and France: 'I shall continue my
course', he told Easthope, adding, 'You will assist I am sure to persevere and to persevere with some
success' in the pursuit of this goal. The return of Palmerston to office, he hoped, would be to good
effect and that now a 'system of confidence and reciprocal arrangements will obtain between Lord
Palmerston and myself. Guizot concluded his letter with the wish that the Easthopes would soon be
again in Paris: 'It will be a great pleasure to me to have some conversations with you
- in the mean
time accept the expression of my sincerest hommage and regard1 he wrote (Sir John Easthope to
Guizot, 1846; Guizot to Sir John Easthope, 14 July 1846 [reply to Easthope's letter], Sir John
Easthope Papers, Duke University Special Collections Library, North Carolina, USA). 33
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Post also met this 'great supporter of Lord P.'s', who had already spent time with
Palmerston at Broadlands, and persuaded Wikoff to recycle the Post's articles in
America as an antidote to the impressions given by the Times as reported there.34
Palmerston personally and actively courted Wikoff s assistance as a means of
promoting his reputation in America, and indeed paid Wikoff from Secret Service
funds to this end.35 Only when Wikoff s unscrupulous character and later personal
disgrace came to Palmerston's attention was this connection severed.36
Whatever potential existed for the press to relay the temper of 'public
opinion' to parliamentarians, Palmerston remained steadfastly wary of such
influences. He knew his own policies well enough and sought to use the press
largely as a medium through which to lay his policy before the public, yet, knowing
the ever increasing importance attached to the press as a barometer of the national
mood at Westminster, he could also use newspaper support as supposed evidence of
popular approbation of his policies.
ii) The politics of the press: ownership, editorship and patronage.
As a preliminary to further discussion of the relationship between Palmerston and
the press, it is necessary to sketch out the practical histories of the primary
34
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newspapers to be discussed in this chapter in order to establish details of
proprietorship and editorship. The Times was unquestionably the largest newspaper
of the mid-nineteenth century with a circulation roughly ten times that of its nearest
rivals. It was taken abroad to be the official organ of British governments, indeed of
the British nation, giving it, whether deserved or not, a role in political life far more
imposing than that of its contemporaries; it 'stood unequalled in the breadth and
depth of its reporting, the gravity of its tone, the grandeur of its pretensions and its
sheer physical bulk'.37 The Times was under the editorship of John Thaddeus Delane
who had risen to that post at the age of only twenty-three within months of entering
Printing House Square in 1840, and who continued to fill that office until his
retirement in 1877, fully justifying the initial faith placed in him by the paper's chief
proprietor in 1840, John Walter. The task of editing a paper of the size of the Times
presented logistical problems not to be found in the offices of other newspapers. It
was necessary for Delane to delegate much editorial responsibility to others and he
filled the offices of the Times with Oxford contemporaries, notably George William
Dasent who became the paper's assistant editor in 1845 having spent many years as
an occasional writer and contributor to its columns.38 At the foreign news desk,
Henry Reeve, who had been with the paper since 1840, wrote the leading articles and
enjoyed 'virtual autonomy' with regard to the Times' handling of foreign affairs.39
Despite Delane's professed aim to give voice through the Times to the
governing opinion and place the paper in friendly relations with prominent political
figures, it was a paper with pre-eminently conservative sympathies. There had been
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a close connection with Aberdeen at the Foreign Office during Peel's government of
1841-1846, although not with the Prime Minister himself. Indeed it is suggested the
Times had earlier enjoyed a connection with the Young Englanders,40 but as a
consistent advocate of free trade it is more convincing to see the paper as siding with
the Peelites; and on questions of foreign policy Delane certainly continued to admire
many of Aberdeen's policies. When Lord John Russell came to the premiership, he
did not find the Times welcoming him with a friendly attitude, nor did Palmerston
find that his return to the Foreign Office was very warmly applauded,41 but for the
duration of this government, Delane did maintain close links with Sir Charles Wood
and Lord Granville; Wood, indeed, appears to have acted as an occasional conduit
for a supply of documents directly from Palmerston to Delane.42 Henry Reeve
meanwhile enjoyed an extensive correspondence with Clarendon who also
maintained a connection with Delane which he was able to use to the benefit of the
governments of both Russell and Aberdeen.43 Potentially more damaging to the
government, members of the diplomatic corps were found to be leaking information
40
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to the Times from time to time, as Palmerston warned Lord Ponsonby, the British
Ambassador in Vienna, in late 1849:
I think it right to tell you that I hear from several Quarters, that Mr
Samuel your secretary is one of the correspondents of the Times; a
newspaper particularly & pointedly hostile to me individually &
politically, & whose language on all Foreign Affairs is unEnglish
while it makes itself on every occasion the subservient apologist
and Defender of Everything that is arbitrary & Tyrannical &
hostile to England, in the Conduct of any Foreign Govt great or
small in any part of the world. It is not fitting that any Person
connected with the British Embassy at Vienna (or with any
Mission anywhere else) should be in communication direct or
indirect with the Times; & I can assure you that the Impression,
whether founded or not, which prevails on this subject is injurious
to yourself; as People, however unjustly, are led in some degree to
connect your opinions with those which they imagine come to the
Times from your private secy, & they thence infer that the British
Embassy does not rightly represent the Feelings & sentiments of
the English Government & nation.44
When Aberdeen returned to office, in 1852, as Prime Minister, the close links which
had been maintained throughout the previous seven years were initially to bind the
Times to the leadership of the government, but similarly the connection with Lord
Clarendon offered the Times an alternative view from within the Cabinet which was
to prove absolutely critical as the Crimean war developed. By the end of 1854 the
Times could no longer with any justice be regarded as Aberdonian in its view of
foreign affairs and Aberdeen, while conceding that 'it is believed that The Times is
especially my organ', claimed in early 1854 that 'in fact there is very seldom an
Article in it from which I do not entirely dissent1, significantly attributing the attitude
of the Times by this point to information garnered directly from Clarendon's Foreign
Office.45
The Globe, unlike most other important dailies was an evening paper, which
had started out in 1803 as a trade journal for booksellers. Gradually it developed
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Whig tendencies and following an amalgamation with the Traveller in 1823 it
became a forum for political economists. By 1830 so strong were its Whig
sympathies that the paper had become something of an embarrassment to the Whig
leaders. Thereafter editors of the Globe steadfastly resisted dictation from the
leading Whigs, but in the 1840s could not avoid the attentions of Lord John Russell
and Palmerston who 'played at "battledore and shuttlecock" with the Globe's
editorial policy' from which tussles it was Palmerston who emerged as victor
enjoying close connections with and the support of that paper henceforth,46
exploiting through his Foreign Office clerks, a connection with Wilson of the
Globe.'1
Two morning papers, the Morning Chronicle and the Morning Post have a
particular significance for considerations of Palmerston and his relations with the
press. John Easthope had headed a syndicate which had acquired control of the
Morning Chronicle in 1834 and quickly set about turning it into a Whig paper.
Lords Brougham, Althorp and Durham were all early allies of the Chronicle, but it
was Palmerston who most carefully cultivated a contact with Easthope and 'quickly
eclipsed1 his Whig colleagues.48 Very soon it was widely believed that Palmerston
was writing regularly for the Chronicle and supplying from his desk at the Foreign
Office a good deal of foreign news; certainly Lord Grey saw in the accuracy of the
46
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Chronicle's, articles a Palmerstonian influence and he learned from Clarendon that
Palmerston was in daily contact with Andrew Doyle, Easthope's nephew and
manager of the paper.49 In return Palmerston commanded from Easthope a 'slavish
worship', as Charles Mackay, a former employee of the Chronicle, described it, and
certainly the baronetcy which Easthope was awarded did much to preserve his
loyalty.50 Despite his willingness to play the Chronicle off against the Globe
throughout the 1840s, much to the annoyance of Lord John Russell who was
attempting to use the Globe as something of a mouthpiece of his own, Palmerston
retained the friendship, personal and political, of Easthope and the support of the
Chronicle, in spite of Easthope's general irritation with the government's various
connections with the Times, until the Chronicle was bought out by a group of
Peelites in February 1848. Henceforth, the Chronicle ceased to be a reliable ally for
Palmerston, despite Easthope's parting appeal that this aspect of the editorial policy
be preserved.51 The Chronicle had been purchased by a group including Lord
Lincoln, Sidney Herbert, Edward Cardwell and possibly Gladstone, although reports
concerning the latter's involvement were unconfirmed.52 The Peelites installed John
D. Cook as editor of the Chronicle and found in him a willing devotee to the Peelite
cause, which the paper pursued with ever-greater vigilance after the death of Peel in
1850. Cook, a personal friend of Lincoln's, who had relied fully on Lincoln's
counsel in the course of his career to date, appears to have taken no important step in
49
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the editorial management of the Chronicle in these early years without prior
reference to his 'Chief.53
Having 'lost' the Chronicle, Palmerston turned his attention to the Morning
Post, which since the change in its ownership in the summer of 1849 was disposed
to accommodate him, indeed it became from that date 'Palmerston's Paper',
according to one historian of the Post.54 The history of the Morning Post may be
traced back to 1772 and in its first three-quarters of a century it experienced a
diverse history.55 In the 1840s, under the editorship of C. Eastland Michele, the Post
had been solidly Protectionist and numbered amongst its contributors Benjamin
Disraeli. Seeking overall control of the paper, Michele raised a mortgage of 25,000
in 1842 in order to buy out the other shareholders and steel the paper's anti-Peelite
resolve. It was an ill-advised financial venture, however, and within five years
Michele was desperately seeking new backers, only to find that leading
Protectionists such as Lord George Bentinck and Lord Henry Bentinck were not
prepared to supply the necessary capital. Eventually, finding no willing investors,
Michele was obliged to concede defeat and the paper passed into the hands of T.B.
Crompton, a Lancashire paper manufacturer and Michele's chief creditor. Crompton
immediately installed Peter Borthwick, M.P. for Evesham, as the paper's new
editor.56 Borthwick had been connected with the Post for some time already and was
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a known admirer of Young England and protectionism.57 He was perhaps on initial
inspection a curious ally for Palmerston, but that he became. Palmerston's
association with the Post is not necessarily inconsistent, however. He was regarded
as a conservative at home, indeed had been attacked by the Post from the left in
earlier days, and thus upon his death in October 1865, the Post did not hesitate to
salute him as having been 'the staunchest Conservative in the kingdom'.58
Palmerston's close connection with the Borthwicks (both Peter and his son
Algernon) and the Morning Post lent him a most valuable political support over the
coming years.
Having lost the support of the Chronicle, Palmerston had been on the
look-out for a new title to manipulate to his own ends, and with changes afoot at the
Post, he saw, and seized, an opportunity, taking a close interest in the machinations
as Michele tried to sell the paper. Ironically, Palmerston had scarcely established his
new ties with the Post, when a Peelite challenge to the proprietorship threatened to
undermine his influence there in a manoeuvre exactly reminiscent of events at the
Chronicle a little over a year-and-a-half earlier. Whether in either case the aim was
to scupper Palmerston as much as to wrest control of a paper for Peelite ends, the
coincidence is too striking not to be remarked upon. As a letter from John Cook to
Lord Lincoln reveals, the new owners of the Chronicle were keen to expand their
newspaper empire:
I have taken the necessary ...[steps to] obtain the information
required; ...[and] you may rest assured that I have expressed]
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...myself in the most guarded manner. ...[I have] mentioned no
name, and merely state[d] that some friends of mine, who had no
party nor political objects in view, wished to purchase the M.P., if
they could ob[tain] ...it upon reasonable terms. There is noth[ing]
...in my letter to commit any one to the purchase; but I have
promised to let the party, to whom I have written, kn[ow]
...whether my friends can agree to the proprietor's terms...'9
iiO Palmerston and the press, 1846-1855
According to Stephen Koss, Palmerston was, in the mid-nineteenth century, 'the
envy of his parliamentary rivals':
Although the diminished resources of the Morning Chronicle had
been lost to him, the Morning Post stuck to him through thick and
thin. The Globe was in his corner and, it was said, in his pocket.
Neither the Daily News, with its progressive leanings, nor the
Standard, with its ultra-Tory ones, was immune to his appeal.
And despite 'the well-known fact' (cited by Greville) that The
Times 'was Aberdeen's paper', it was veering in his direction; after
1855, when Delane's instincts had triumphed over Reeve's bias, it
took its natural place in the Palmerstonian ranks.60
Palmerston was the ablest manipulator of the press of his time, or least in this regard
he was unsurpassed. Nevertheless, his ability to command such loyalty and win over
admirers who later became adherents is remarkable; whatever his talents, he was not
the only important political figure with influence amongst members of the press and
yet over one of the key questions of the mid-century decade with the potency to
divide the political nation, namely the Crimean war, it was Palmerston and not any
of his rivals who carried the bulk of the newspaper titles with him. Significantly,
Palmerston's public image and his standing with the press was based upon his
reputation as forged in the field of foreign affairs and foreign policy.
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External policy, unlike any other area of public business was not judged
along the partisan lines that frequently dictated a newspaper's view and
representation of issues relating to domestic politics. Thus it was that papers which
were avowedly Whig or Tory, free-trade or protectionist, were not by these terms of
reference bound in the case of foreign affairs. A 'national' perspective meant that a
paper might criticise every principle of a particular party at home and yet rally to the
cause of that party's foreign minister; similarly a pro-governmental organ would not
support a foreign secretary exclusively on the grounds of party allegiance. Not that
by virtue of its different character would foreign policy always command universal
support
- far from it in fact - but foreign politics nonetheless transcended all other
political divisions, as an article written in the immediate aftermath of the Don
Pacifico debate in the Morning Post suggests. The Post had remained a staunch
advocate of protection and vehement critic of Peel in the wake of the repeal of the
Corn Laws in 1846, but was forced to concede that 'the importance to a great
commercial country like this of the maintenance of sound principles of foreign
policy, such as were in question in the late debate, is much too grave to permit of a
wrong decision, even had that decision tended to the re-establishment of a sounder
system of financial economy at home'. Whilst a return to protectionism, which
would require the ejection of the Russell ministry was in itself a noble objective, to
pursue that goal when the prospects of a protectionist government were poor (given
the defection of the Peelites) was foolhardy and to use the debate on Palmerston's
foreign policy as a tool to effect this change represented a 'dark and dastardly183
conspiracy' which would be 'utterly destructive of all hope of a return, at least for
many years, to the domestic policy for which we have all along contended'.61
In joining the Russell government, the Times felt that for one who 'had
always dealt rather with European than insular quarrels', Palmerston's loyalty to his
'party' had demonstrated 'an attachment even raised to the pitch of devotion by the
personal sacrifices which it has cost', referring to the repeal of the Corn Laws and the
supposed adherence to the principles of free trade which this entailed.62 The Times
is not the only observer to see some measure of personal sacrifice in Palmerston's
return to the Foreign Office in 1846, but that his concern had always been primarily
with foreign policy suggests not that party loyalty swept him into office, but rather
that in this domain he felt able to stand above the 'insular quarrels' and domestic
political disputes which in the main delineated the parties at this time.
On this footing Palmerston was able to command the support of disparate
political journals for his foreign policy, even if his domestic views ran contrary to
their own. Whilst the Economist could express a 'cordial acquiescence in its
doctrines' when Palmerston made a speech at Tiverton in support of free trade in
which he claimed 'I feel that I am foreseeing and expressing an opinion in favour of
the continuance of that system which is for the benefit of all classes of the
community';63 such sentiments did not necessarily alienate the protectionist papers in
their consideration of his foreign policy. Reginald Lucas in his book Lord Glenesk
and the 'Morning Post' suggests that Palmerston's membership of a Liberal ministry
was no bar to approval of his foreign policy in the Post, especially after 1849. The
paper was, as Peter Borthwick maintained, Postite before all things, and thus whilst
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over trade policies Palmerston and the Post differed - and the belief in protection
was one of the Post's most strongly felt convictions - so long as they could find merit
in Palmerston's foreign policy, 'there was nothing to make the connection repugnant
or difficult; and although he was neither a Conservative nor a Protectionist, he
became their Minister, if they did not become his agents'.64
This relationship between foreign policy, the Foreign Secretary and the press
was in no small measure determined by the peculiar way in which the press could
assist in the presentation of Britain abroad; indeed in the case of the Times, there was
a duty to act with this consideration always in mind. The influence ofthat paper was
'enormous', largely by virtue of the fact that its articles were 'looked for, & watched
with greatest anxiety', as Charles Greville observed to its editor.65 Not only did its
articles have an important bearing upon what Aberdeen described as 'the general
feeling of the country', but those especially concerned with foreign policy were, he
felt, to be taken as 'some indication of the sentiments of the Government'.66 The
Times in particular, of all British journals, thus had a particular responsibility.
Whilst other titles might be regarded as the exponents of cliques, the Times, as
Clarendon told Henry Reeve, was seen as the organ of English public opinion
- what
that opinion 'is or will be'
- and 'as it is thought that whatever public opinion
determines with us the Govt ultimately does, an extraordinary & universal
importance attaches to the views of the Times'.67 Therefore in November 1846, for
example, when Aberdeen felt that as Anglo-French relations became 'very critical', it
was the Times, of all instruments, that held the balance between peace and war
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between the two countries: it was the duty of the Times to urge a pacific course, he
argued, since a 'little more excitement may place it beyond control in both
countries'.68 Palmerston, conscious of this power of the Times, feared that without
proper management it would only provoke unwanted results in diplomatic affairs. A
presumptuous declaration of the resolution of the British Cabinet, presented as an
established fact by the Times in 1850 for instance, Palmerston complained was not
only 'a departure from all Rule' but as it was over a question involving the French
government and the interests of the Russian, it was liable to dangerous
misconstruction. 'I should very much wish that before the Times uses in future his
[the editor's] double Edged sword drawn avowedly from the Government Scabbard
he should receive from me Instructions in the Sword Exercise so that his Cuts might
tell upon Foes & not upon ourselves & our Friends'.69
Foreign affairs, then, were above party political considerations and
newspapers were as much a tool of the diplomatic trade as they were its critical
observers. Clarendon had pressed this point on Lord John Russell in the first year of
Russell's government, as he reported to Reeve in a letter of spring 1847:
I had some talk with Ld John about the expediency of rousing
public opinion & informing the people of England that they are not
the powerless effete community wch Foreign Powers delight in
thinking them. I told him that this altho difficult might be possible
if the Govt & the Press acted together, but that the latter wd
become ridiculous & perhaps mischievous if it blew up a great fire
& the former had nothing to cook by it.70
Newspaper criticism of policies in general could be constructive and healthy, but
there was a prevailing sense that whilst foreign policy was by no means sacrosanct,
attacks made upon it were potentially more dangerous and thus to be made with
68
Aberdeen to J.T. Delane, 22 Nov. 1846, Delane Papers, T.N.L., 2/48
69
Palmerston to Wood, 26 Oct. 1850, Hickleton Papers, A4.63.10-1 lA; Broadlands Papers
(Copy), GC/WO/188/1-2
70
Clarendon to Henry Reeve, 1 April 1847, Clarendon Deposit, MS.CIar.dep.c.534, fols 43-46
70186
greater care.71 This is evident from the correspondence between Aberdeen and
Delane during the years of the Russell government. Having overcome the dismissal
from office in July 1846 and his initial dismay that the Times appeared to have
'established a very intimate connection' with the new administration, Aberdeen,
buoyed up by assurances that the Times was still in fact, 'independent', told Delane
that he felt 'no objection to communicate with you confidentially upon the subject of
the Spanish Marriages, or upon any other you may desire'.72 The character of the
succeeding correspondence, however, is instructive. Aberdeen, in his letters to
Delane, did not seek to discredit the new government. His letters stressed how
efficacious and productive his tenure of the Foreign Office had been and how the
transfer of that responsibility could now only usher in a period of poorer diplomatic
management and relations, but he continued nevertheless to regard the Times as
occupying a position in foreign politics in some way simultaneously dependent on
(or connected with) and independent of the government. Thus, whilst the Times'
articles were taken as illustrative of the government's position, those concerned with
foreign policy were above party intrigue; they had a responsibility to portray and
present a 'true' version of events given the immense influence which the Times, as
has been demonstrated, was perceived to exercise. Aberdeen's letters to Delane
therefore lacked vitriol and tended to offer, superficially at least, an attempt to
provide a reasoned view of foreign affairs.73
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Given that foreign policy was not exclusively a party political subject, and as
reactions to changes in the administration of that policy from abroad indicate, it was
an area of public business in which the role of the individual was paramount. The
main change in British foreign policy in July 1846 was not from Conservative (or
Peelite) to Whig, but from Aberdonian to Palmerstonian. The Morning Chronicle
celebrated the close of the first session under the new government in August 1846
with the claim that: 'Never were the "continued assurances of friendly dispositions
from Foreign Powers" more reliable than at the conclusion of a session which has
not only witnessed the adjustment of a particularly anxious and harassing
international controversy, but widened the basis of those friendly and mutually
gainful international relations which constitute the best guarantee of the world's
peace', and the Economist was reassured that in Palmerston Britain had 'a man of
high spirit and great firmness, and about the least likely statesman living to allow
any power in Europe to take a sharp advantage of him', but their eulogies were in a
sense premature.74
The most pressing foreign question when Palmerston came to the Foreign
Office in July 1846 was arguably that of the Spanish Marriages.75 The Globe
acknowledged that it had not given as much attention to the question as some of its
contemporaries because it did 'not attach equal importance to it', preferring to see
this as a perpetual Franco-Spanish struggle in which the protagonists were 'not in the
present century... likely to be more fruitful than heretofore'. Approving of British
misrepresentations of his years at the Foreign Office under Peel (see for example, Aberdeen to J.T.
Delane, 30 June 1849, Delane Papers, T.N.L., 3/88), but by the same token, the Russell government,
he wrote in conclusion to a letter discussing foreign policy, 'have no realm [?reason] to complain of
the Press; and I have not the least wish to deprive them of the support which they now receive'
(Aberdeen to J.T. Delane, 22 Nov. 1846, Delane Papers, T.N.L., 2/48). His letters then, in the main,
fulfil his initial promise that he would engage in a confidential discussion of foreign policy. 74
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abstention, the Globe presented this as an issue which it was beyond the realm of
Downing Street to influence.76 This was a somewhat naive attitude, but at least in
the view that Palmerston could not be held directly responsible for its course it did
find something of an echo in an article in the Times a couple of months later.
Making, from a Palmerstonian perspective, an unfavourable comparison between
Aberdeen's handling of the question prior to July and Palmerston's subsequent
handling of the affair, the Times did concede that: 'The sinking tide has, however,
disclosed rocks and shoals about our course, over which we floated a few months
ago in confidence and safety.... We are not so unreasonable or so unjust as to impute
to Lord PALMERSTON evils which he could not prevent and cannot repair'.77 In
absolving Palmerston of blame for the problems with which he was now faced, the
Times did not, however, speak for all of its contemporaries. The Spanish marriage
question was not new in 1846 and, perhaps with some legitimacy therefore, hostile
papers could refer back to Palmerston's tenure of the Foreign Office during the
governments of Grey and Melbourne for evidence with which to condemn him. The
Morning Post, still under the old regime of C. Eastland Michele, in looking back ten
years, found ample grounds upon which to charge the Foreign Secretary:
Lord PALMERSTON and his French friends were at that time
redolent of a mutually overflowing admiration; they were
congratulating each other on the success of their aggression. By
transgressing all principles of individual justice and international
respect and equity, they had just 'planted liberty on the soil of the
Peninsula,' and were in no wise measured in interchange of
compliments. But the entente cordiale was a bond forged in fraud
and dishonour; and, like most combinations against the right and
the truth, has brought forth its issue of enmity and discord.78
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Whilst the French were proving to be unreliable allies, the Post could not resist the
conclusion that it was Palmerston's management of affairs that served to exacerbate
the situation.79 Indeed, such was Palmerston's bad influence, the Post believed, that
to foreign courts London had become 'the point de mire of all the revolutions of
Europe, and Lord PALMERSTON to be considered by them as the "Messiah on
whom they rely for the accomplishment of all their projets de bouleversemenf" .so
This was extreme, but there was some merit in ascribing worsening relations to the
return of Palmerston to office once again. As Aberdeen told Delane, he had done
everything in his power to smooth the advent of his successor to office, but
everywhere his return was met with apprehension. 'This state of feeling might easily
lead to mischief;1 he wrote, 'and I never expected that the cordial understanding with
France, which depended so much on personal confidence, could possibly have any
longer duration'.81
Above all, the strength of British policy overseas was determined by the
strength of the Foreign Secretary. As Clarendon put it to his correspondent at the
Times, Reeve: 'We may be isolated at this moment, but if P[almerston] were the
blandest of God's creatures with what Power eld we at this moment fraternize?'82
Thus when the Times attacked Palmerston over his Greek policy in May 1850,
Clarendon reproached Reeve, significantly, for writing articles that were
'antinational as well as antiPalmn'.83
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A statesman, and particularly one who had built his reputation in the field of
foreign affairs, had to be personally 'popular'. Lacking any direct control over a
newspaper, Palmerston had to ingratiate himself with journalists and not rely
exclusively on them remaining well disposed towards his policies. Palmerston was
quite determined in his courting of journalists. He met them socially, indeed invited
them to Lady Palmerston's soirees, and as he had with Wikoff, bribed them with
material rewards. James Grant, of the Morning Advertiser, who claimed to have had
the 'privilege to enjoy some measure of personal intimacy with him', wrote in 1870
that there 'never was a man who was so great a favourite personally with, not the
reporters only, but with all the gentlemen filling higher positions on the press, as the
late Lord Palmerston'.84 This affection was the product of careful attention to the
needs of journalists over the years, testament to the principle of reciprocity. When
he spoke in Hampshire or Tiverton, Palmerston always attracted the attention of the
metropolitan press, but the distance from London made it difficult on occasion for
reporters to return to their offices with accounts of the speeches in time for the
following day's issue. According to Grant, when this was brought to Palmerston's
notice, he would seek to re-arrange the times of the meetings, or when this proved
impossible, would provide the reporters with advance notice of the subjects he
intended to refer to in order that they could still write up the speech, and since both
Palmerston's 'matter and manner were familiar to reporters', this was enough to
satisfy their needs. Crucially, Grant stresses that whenever he sought to re-arrange
the schedule of a meeting, Palmerston 'put all such applications on the footing of
Grant, The Newspaper Press, I, pp.205-206191
favours personal to himself; and whenever and wherever circumstances would
permit, their solicitations never failed to be successful'.85
There was no surer way of winning the admiration of reporters than by
flattering them in this way. Indeed, Palmerston was disposed to go yet further.
Grant tells the story of three sessional reporters who, in search of a story, had
travelled to Tiverton to report on Palmerston's re-election at their own expense, only
to be disappointed to find that Palmerston had not made a speech such as they had
anticipated. They therefore followed Palmerston to his hotel where they put their
case before him and begged for an interview. He apologised for not having been
able to oblige the reporters at the Town Hall where the election had taken place, but
acceded to their requests that he give a speech now to the three reporters and two
other companions of Palmerston's who were also present, talking 'at considerable
length' about Reform, about which initially, it is suggested, he had told the
journalists he hardly knew what it would be expedient to say on the subject.
Speaking at length but committing himself to nothing specific, Palmerston in this
way gave the reporters matter for an article which 'was made the subject, on the day
following its publication, of leading articles in each of the journals of that day'.86
Winning over individual reporters, for whom an interview with Palmerston could
mean the difference between employment or otherwise was one thing, to command
the loyalty of an entire newspaper was quite another. Yet, the ability to compel,
even if he could not control, was a vital weapon in Palmerston's political arsenal.
Different newspapers were used in different ways. Manipulation of a
particular paper did not mean control. Whereas Newcastle and his fellow Peelites
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were able to exercise a guiding influence over the Morning Chronicle where
ownership conferred certain rights over editorial policy, Palmerston never bought a
paper and owned it in this way, although he was not averse to buying a journalist
with money or favours. Proprietorship, however, was not the only way a politician
could gain position with a newspaper, and by adopting different approaches,
Palmerston was able to accumulate various papers under his banner, although each
one fulfilled a different role. A paper such as the Globe placed itself so much at
Palmerston's disposal that he was able to direct its articles as best suited his
purposes, whilst the Morning Post, after 1849, though well disposed towards
Palmerston, was not in his pocket in the same way and Palmerston had to earn the
respect of that paper. Located somewhere between these two poles, was a paper
such as the pre-Peelite Morning Chronicle which enjoyed close and regular
communications with Palmerston but which did not hang on his every word.
Palmerston had been in close connection with the Globe for several years and
had established with that paper a sound understanding. The Globe was open to his
solicitations and many of its articles were written at Palmerston's initiative: in letters
'to the Globe', for instance, Palmerston is to be found requesting that a particular line
be taken in the following edition.87 Further, it was widely believed, and with good
reason, that Palmerston also wrote directly for the Globe at this time. In the
Broadlands Papers, a series of notes survive to which Palmerston had attached
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copies of articles for insertion into the Globe which he directed his secretary to
forward to the offices of the paper. A pretence of anonymity was maintained as
Palmerston instructed his clerk that an article be forwarded to Wilson 'merely saying
he is requested to insert it in the Globe of Tomorrow, but without mentioning my
name but signing your own and dating F.O.'.88 The notes all deal with foreign affairs
and enclose articles to be reproduced verbatim or very careful coaching of the editor
about the tone of articles and supplying the information upon which to base them.89
Having established this foot-hold in the Globe's office, Palmerston used his
influence there not so much to effect changes in public opinion, but rather primarily
as a means of correcting falsehoods and mis-representations. When in March 1848
several papers expressed concern about the departure of the Montpensiers from
England, fearing that Palmerston had instructed Normanby to make apologies to the
French, the Globe stepped in to 'deal with idle rumours on delicate subjects' and state
the facts of the case since 'silence might be taken for assent of their truth'. Surely,
then, it was the hand of Palmerston that allowed the Globe to write that it was 'happy
to be able to assure our contemporary that no instructions were given to our
Ambassador to offer any explanation on a subject, which he very justly states could
require none'.90 It was no coincidence that when this subject of Britain having
afforded asylum to the royal family of France came before the House, and
Palmerston was faced with questions from that chamber, the Globe could report that
88
Note by Palmerston, 24 Dec. 1848 [to Spencer Ponsonby?], Broadlands Papers,
PRE/B/lSS/enc.l; attached to article 'for the Globe' Broadlands Papers, PRE/B/138.
89
Broadlands Papers, PRE/B/137-147; letters and articles 'for the Globe', 26 Nov. 1848-30
June 1851. The original drafts of articles and accompanying letters have become separated and the
articles are no longer to be found among the Broadlands Papers. Therefore, being unable to identify
the articles to which these letters refer specifically, it is difficult to know whether these articles were
published according to Palmerston's directions. However, given that it has been noted pointedly on
one (only) that the article was 'not inserted' (PRE/B/147/1-2) it seems likely, and the tone of these
letters confirms this, that the articles were usually published in the Globe.
90
Globe, 20 March 1848194
those questions, 'our readers are aware, had been answered in our columns; and Lord
PALMERSTON'S replies fully confirmed the correctness of those we had given'.91
Through the medium of the Globe, Palmerston could insert articles which would
address what he regarded as false representations of his position. In the summer of
1848, for instance, the publication of another edition of the Revue Retrospective
attracted attention in one of the Globe's leading articles. Concerning the
Montpensier marriage of 1846, the Revue laid before the public fresh evidence
which the Globe deemed worthy of note 'not only on account of their bearing upon
an important and disputed point of international law, but also because they throw
some light upon the spirit in which the discussion upon that point was conducted by
the French government'. On this ground, the article continued,
we add a few observations upon the contents of the letters now
published, not for the purpose of calling down censure upon those
whose duplicity is exposed, but because we think it important that
a correct judgement should be formed respecting the justice of the
frequent and violent attacks made upon Lord PALMERSTON, on
account of the resistance which he most properly opposed to the
accomplishment of the designs of the French government.92
In 1848 Palmerston was increasingly under attack at Westminster for his conduct of
foreign policy and to be able to present his case in this way was especially important.
As well as retrospective justifications of policies, it was well to undermine
opponents. Thus ten days after the initial mention of the Revue Retrospective's
content, the Globe returned to the theme, but this time to ridicule the handling of the
affair before July 1846 by the 'easy, good-natured, imbecile minister', Lord
Aberdeen, who, it asserted, had been ready 'to acquiesce in every demand made on
him, and to be ready on all occasions to echo the sentiments of our rivals'.93 In many
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ways, the Globe was the mouthpiece of Palmerston, and though this afforded him an
invaluable means of putting his case forward, it was not necessarily the most useful
political support he possessed.
Whilst he had enjoyed a long connection with the Morning Chronicle,
pre-dating even that with the Globe, Palmerston's treatment of this paper was
noticeably different from that of the Globe. Letters to Easthope and Andrew Doyle
from Palmerston were warm and contained much useful political intelligence, but
they fell short of dictation. Information was exchanged, but as the basis for the
Chronicle's articles and not for direct use; in a sense Palmerston was buying the
editor with news, which was a valuable bargaining token given that the Times was
the only paper with its own foreign sources, which were often more efficient than the
government's own.94 Unlike the Globe, the impression given by the correspondence
between Palmerston and the Chronicle is one of a connection based on mutual good
understanding and respect.95 Thus, when an article appeared in the Chronicle critical
of the Russell government's recent handling of domestic affairs, Palmerston clearly
did not feel in a position to demand redress, only to make an appeal:
Those who manage the Chronicle must of Course be supposed to
be the best Judges of the way in which they can best execute their
own Intentions, and it may appear intrusive on my Part to make
any suggestions on the Subject; but wishing sincerely well to the
Paper, and being desirous of seeing it in a state of good Relation
with the present government, I cannot refrain from expressing a
Doubt whether any advantage can accrue to the Chronicle from
such personal attacks on members of the Government as are
contained in the article of this morning about Lord John Russell's
the Globe asserted that any attacks on Palmerston's conduct were 'not only unfair, but absolutely
stupid. And we trust we shall have no more of them' (Globe, 29 Aug. 1848).
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speech yesterday on the Factory Bill, and in some articles which
have appeared about Mr Duncombe's motion on the subject of the
Payment of Rates & Taxes as a Qualification to vote...96
Throughout Easthope's tenure of the editorship, the Chronicle remained generally
well-disposed towards Palmerston yet within a month of its take-over by the
Peelites, the tone of the paper changed markedly. Articles in this paper henceforth
criticised Palmerston's diplomacy and when in the summer of 1848 the Chronicle
lamented the lack of information forthcoming from Palmerston, in this case about
the River Plate, it was as much an illustration of the severed ties between them as a
criticism of his policy.97
By contrast, the Morning Post of the 1840s was essentially a protectionist
journal quite hostile to Palmerston. His diplomatic style, the Post maintained, was
'offensive to foreign Governments' and failed to uphold 'the dignity of his own'; his
failure to give a full account of his policy to Parliament was well-known where his
or his delegates' conduct was 'sure not to cut the most decent or dignified of figures';
his policy in general appeared to have no 'other principle than that of favouring the
cause of revolt all over the world', at least if that were not the case, 'he uses so much
skill in its concealment that no one can make out what that other principle is'; and
when called upon to defend his policy on one occasion, the Post found Palmerston's
exposition 'unsound from beginning to end' and 'very specious'.98 With the change in
ownership in 1849, however, this relationship changed and Palmerston found the
paper a much more sympathetic witness. As with the Chronicle though Palmerston
could not command support, merely win it, and this he was obliged to do rapidly in
order to counteract the loss of the Chronicle. The Borthwicks, Peter and Algernon,
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were keen to cultivate Palmerston as a source, but at the same time, were not
disposed to rely on him alone for information about foreign policy. During his time
as the Post's correspondent in Paris, Algernon sought out Normanby, British
Ambassador there as an official source, but the Post in this way was not placing
itself squarely as a Palmerstonian organ. Although it appears to have come to little,
Algernon wrote to his father in May 1850 to say that he was 'delighted to find that
we are to work with the Times'."
The Post was broadly won over to the Palmerstonian line through a series of
social meetings and also a frank interchange of political news between the
Borthwicks and Palmerston, although there remained the possibility at least of
personal advancement for a sympathetic editor.100 Thus when he was dismissed
from the Foreign Office in December 1851, Borthwick wrote to Palmerston with the
note that 'You are entitled well to the hearty service of every Englishman and I am
desirous to be a faithful servant' and he even organised a number of 'confidence
meetings' for Palmerston 'to express public gratitude for your administration of
foreign affairs and public admiration for your Character'.10' Even more than with
Easthope and the Chronicle, perhaps, Palmerston had won over an editor and held
his loyalty through a relationship based on respect. The Post maintained its
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protectionist views throughout, yet managed to combine this with an enthusiasm for
Palmerston and his foreign policy. Whilst there was not a direct correlation to be
made between party allegiance and foreign politics, as suggested, it would have been
easier for Palmerston to maintain friendly links with a Whig title such as the
Chronicle (prior to 1848) than with a paper whose principles in a crucial area of
domestic politics were at variance with those of the party to whom the foreign
minister belonged. Allies won this way, however, were more valuable than those
known to be in Palmerston's pocket. As the Times had observed in November 1846,
the support of an independent paper which deems a statesman's policy wise and
national 'is the more worth his acceptance, inasmuch as he knows it to be
spontaneous and sincere; and if we are obliged to record our dissent, it may be worth
while for such a statesman to ask himself which of the two conflicting lines of policy
has the real support of the nation'.102
The support of the nation as a factor in foreign policy came into sharp focus
as an issue over the Don Pacifico debate in the middle of 1850. This debate
represents something of a turning point, not least because, as R.M. Keeling suggests,
it 'is a revealing reflection of the attitudes of the British middle classes toward
foreign policy'.103 Palmerston's invocations of 'civis Romanus sum' brought the
question down to the basic interests of every member of the population and out of
the exclusive realm of high political debate. As the Globe observed, 'Lord
PALMERSTON, the House of Commons, and the Nation, are henceforth at one', and
the question now before the country:
awoke a sentiment through the length and breadth of England, to
which we have been strangers since the days of Free-trade and the
102
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Reform-bill. The nation was outraged at the assumption that its
contented apathy should be identified either with acquiescence in
the Absolutist reaction, or indifference to the spread of German
and Italian Constitutionalism. The great seats of manufacturing
industry became aware that they were fighting for their own cause
in supporting a Minister whose protecting arm was over every one
of his countrymen, at the Court of the most arbitrary despot, or
amid the mobs of the most unbridled democracy; and last night the
House of Commons worthily answered the call of its constituents,
by a vote which has silenced and shattered all the elaborate
intrigues of these foreign exiles and their English confederates.104
Palmerstonian journals took up this sentiment and followed the Foreign Secretary's
course as he sought victory for a moral cause. As the Economist argued, it was
undoubtedly true that Don Pacifico's claims upon the Greek government were
exaggerated, but nonetheless they were valid in principle and it was important that
Palmerston campaign for redress of grievances for a British subject who was the
victim of a 'popular prejudice'.105 It was also, according to the Globe, something of a
judgement on Palmerston. The debate, that paper argued, confirmed the 'the national
affection and respect' which Palmerston had earned, but stressed also the extent to
which it had demonstrated that he was the country's ablest foreign minister, not only
on account of his popularity abroad, but also in uniting 'the classes which carried
Free-trade', who had 'unmistakeably [sic] shown that they are determined to hold fast
by their love of liberal institutions in foreign as well as in domestic politics'.106 It
applauded the strong-arm approach of Palmerston as a welcome counterpoint to the
'remplissage for blue books' of what it derided as 'menacing Aberdonian notes'.107
There was another aspect to the debate, however. The Morning Post touched
upon it in a leading article which praised Palmerston's handling of the affair. The
real object of the opposition assault on Palmerston, it contended, was the restoration
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to office of leading Peelites in alliance with as many Protectionists as could be
persuaded to join them. This manoeuvre, however, the Post regarded as a most
unfortunate piece of intrigue: not only did it offend the Post's protectionist
sympathies as a strategy likely to damage rather than enhance the chances of the
installation of a protectionist ministry in Britain, but it represented intolerable
cynicism on the part of the protagonists in their use of this issue for other ends. It
was beyond the comprehension of the Post that the principles which had guided
Palmerston's handling of Don Pacifico's claims could legitimately be questioned.108
On the other side of the political debate, the moral right of Palmerston's
course was not so readily recognised. The Times had taken the inflated nature of
Don Pacifico's claims as reason enough to undermine his case, and in May expressed
doubts about the willingness of the country to follow Palmerston in his cause
- he
had after all, shown 'so little confidence' in it himself it claimed - particularly if it led
(as it surely could) to war.109 To speak in June of Palmerston as having a paramount
claim to be regarded as 'English Minister' who had 'represented with unrivalled spirit
and success the interests and the opinions of this country' struck the Times as
ridiculous. He was above all a statesman of the utmost inconsistency, 'for although
there is no constituted authority in Europe with which Lord PALMERSTON has not
quarrelled, there is no insurrection that he has not betrayed'."0
.
The debate in June 1850 seemed to the Morning Chronicle too broad to serve
any useful purpose. Whilst Palmerston's answers had been unsatisfactory, the
subject had become obscured anyway: 'the Government, or their advocates,' it wrote,
'have preferred to change the issue, and to enlarge it to a compass which compels
108
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their adversaries to prove a great deal, at the risk of now seeming to prove
nothing'.111 The only conclusion was that the Whigs were seeking to fudge the issue
and their real goal was to win a vote over Palmerston's foreign policy in order to
bolster the ministry and keep Russell in office.112 This provides an interesting
contrast with the argument of the Morning Post, illustrating the concern on both
sides of the debate with the party political implications of the affair.
In the face of Palmerston's victory, narrow as it might have been, yet still
presented as popular, his antagonists contented themselves with issuing a warning to
the 'triumphant' Whigs. It fell to the rest of the Cabinet to rein in Palmerston at the
Foreign Office; to exercise 'discretion and prudence' in the management of foreign
affairs which the Chronicle felt had been 'deplorably deficient' under Palmerston
and, the Times urged, in the correspondence of that department 'to renounce its
unbecoming acerbity of tone'.113 They had made a faulty attack, however, confusing
what was presented as a moral question with one of party political intrigue.
Palmerston had won a popular victory, charmed the so-called middle classes with his
patriotic rhetoric, and those who had focused on the Peelite-Russell angle were
obliged in the end to acknowledge, however grudgingly, Palmerston's enhanced
standing. With an ever broader popular base of support and a reputation forged in a
field which stood to some extent above party intrigue, Palmerston's policies were not
to be used to contest party disputes. In December 1851, when he was expelled from
office, the same mistake was not made again and newspapers across the political
spectrum focused on Palmerston first and party interest second.
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Palmerston's dismissal occasioned such outrage at the Morning Post that the
subject was the main leader article every day from 25 December 1851 until 2
January 1852. The loss, in the 'present critical state of European affairs', of the
services of a minister whom, the Post believed, history would accord a place 'in the
very highest ranks of statesmanship' was a setback at both the domestic and
international level.114 The Post was greatly troubled that the explanation for this loss
was that, in effect, Palmerston was too unpopular abroad. 'Public opinion will not be
satisfied with light explanations of so great a misfortune;' an article observed, 'still
less with explanations which attribute the result to unworthy or discreditable causes',
more especially since it was Palmerston above all others to whom the longevity of
the Russell government ought to be attributed.115 To remove a politician whose only
fault was 'that he loves his country so well, and serves his SOVEREIGN so
faithfully, that he prefers the independence of the one and the dignity of the other to
the good or ill pleasure of certain foreign politicians', was unjust indeed.116
Significantly, it was not only the Palmerstonian papers that expressed such
sentiments. Both the Times and the Morning Chronicle rued Palmerston's dismissal.
Whilst adhering to the ministerial line, which the Times had been charged with
presenting to the public, that paper set aside the belief that Palmerston's removal was
almost certainly in the country's best interests, and focused on the abilities thus lost.
In the article which first announced the Foreign Secretary's fall, the Times wrote of
Palmerston (suspecting it had seen the last of him in office) commending his
industry, courage and charm and steadfastly refrained from repeating the charges
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previously made against his foreign policy.117 The Morning Chronicle, too, was
sorry to lose the services of Palmerston. In an article on Christmas Day 1851, it
chastised the Russell Cabinet for its inconsistency in dropping a Minister whom the
government had heretofore defended stoically, and described his dismissal as a
'national humiliation'. Palmerston had not only been 'the keystone of the arch' for the
last five-and-a-half years, but he was 'their only man of first-class ability; his policy,
though dangerous always and injurious often, was at least bold, spirited, and not
essentially un-English'.118 The dismissal in December 1851 and the Don Pacifico
debate in 1850 are undeniably different questions in terms of their ramifications and
impact but, crucially, in 1851 newspapers across the political spectrum supported
Palmerston, or at least regretted his loss, and implicitly recognised him as a national
figure, whose fortunes and conduct ought not necessarily to be tied in with party
interests; this contrasts markedly with the situation eighteen months earlier when
discussion of his handling of foreign affairs was seen quite widely as having direct
party political implications.
Palmerston's political force was not spent by the end of 1851. As the
Morning Post noted of his speech on the Militia Bill which heralded the downfall of
his erstwhile colleagues in February 1852, he had shown 'at once that he had sagacity
to comprehend, and ability to meet, what Parliament and the public felt to be the
wish of the nation, and the necessity of the time'.119 The Derby government which
replaced that of Russell in February sustained a precarious balancing act for the
following ten months, but it was unable ever to establish itself as a sound and secure
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ministry.120 Palmerston, meanwhile, consolidated his own position and a certain
detachment from party allegiance (with whom would he have logically sided?) gave
him an influential position in politics, perhaps in a sense, something of a kingmaker,
if not, indeed, a future leader-in-waiting himself.121 As the Derby administration
stumbled to its fall in the autumn of 1852, attention in the press turned to the
question of its replacement. Lord John Russell was dismissed as unfit again to
become Prime Minister by the Morning Post: between him and that station were
now 'raised up obstructions permanent and insurmountable', primarily popular and
parliamentary distrust.122 Palmerston, however, held a very strong hand, as one who
'in his present independent position, enjoys a wider popularity, and exercises a larger
and more wholesome influence on the European mind, than any other living man'.
On this ground, the Post argued, he need 'make no approaches to any party in the
State... for to him "Tout vient apropos", whether he wait or not'.123
The Globe placed in Palmerston's hands the ability to turn out the Derby
government. Alluding to an old French caricature in which Calonne offered the
Assembly of Notables the choice 'Mes chers animaux, ä qu'elle sauce voulez-vous
120
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etre mangesT, the Globe asked the same question of the current British ministry, and
helpfully outlined the options: 'The Chancellor of the Exchequer's, ä Ia financiered
-
Mr VILLIER'S Wolverhampton?
- or Lord PALMERSTON'S Tiverton sauce? It
will be of little use for our poor Protective animals to reply, like CALONNE'S -
"Mais nous ne voulons pas etre manges!"... That is a foregone conclusion'. The
Globe believed it would be the Tiverton.124 Palmerston's standing no longer
depended on his day-to-day political activity. He could therefore effect a
parliamentary defeat for the free traders and, though the Globe admitted that for this
he was owed no 'gratitude for his conduct', and while there might thus be 'abundant
grounds why Liberals should complain of Lord PALMERSTON', this did not mean
that his contributions in the field of foreign policy to civil and religious liberty all
over the world should be ignored. Indeed 'it would be a scandalous injustice to
wreak our disappointment in slanders on the great achievements' of his diplomatic
career.125 Even the Peelite Morning Chronicle, once Palmerston had taken over the
Home Office, acknowledged that his 'great ability and long familiarity with affairs
will add authority to his office as Secretary for the Home Department, while his
influence in the House will, in case of need, be available for the assistance of a body
of colleagues who will only be embarrassed by the absence of competent
opponents'.126 Whereas Palmerston during the Russell government had been
portrayed as the ministry's representative in the field of foreign affairs, admittedly a
distinctive one, by 1852, he was much more widely regarded as an important figure
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in his own right and his reputation, based as it was on foreign policy, was concerned
with his own standing and personality. This change was to have important
ramifications for the years of the Aberdeen government.
It took the newspapers a little while to adjust to Palmerston's new
employment. As late as the summer of 1853, the Times still felt the need to make
explicit this change and made a point of observing to its readers that 'though his
heart may be on the Danube, his hand must be in the Holborn sewers'. Nonetheless,
Palmerston had committed himself to numerous domestic measures which if
executed with the same 'dexterity and fortune' as had characterised his foreign
secretaryship, would give 'little reason for regretting the revolution which transferred
such indefatigable energies to the peaceful fields of the Home-office'.127 At the end
of the first parliamentary session of the Aberdeen government, the early positive
forecasts about the ministry's potential looked well-founded, and Palmerston's
measures at the Home Office, especially those directed towards the improvement of
towns and repression of crime, attracted favourable notice in certain sections of the
press.128
Nevertheless, Palmerston was still seen first and foremost as a foreign
minister; and there was no reason for this impression to be challenged given
Palmerston's close involvement in Cabinet discussions of foreign policy from the
very outset of this government.129 Protectionist journals persisted in complimenting
the abilities of Palmerston and suggesting that the conduct of the country's foreign
127
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policy would have been quite different had he been re-instated in his old station.
These assertions Palmerston strenuously denied in public speeches, but it is
significant that in reporting one such speech, delivered in Perth, the Economist noted
that there was no better judge of what is due to the country's honour than
Palmerston, 'and he would neither continue to sit in the Cabinet, nor eulogise the
Foreign Secretary, were he not perfectly convinced that the course pursued with
respect to other countries is equally wise and spirited, calculated to preserve peace,
...and raise the national honour'.130 Still, then, Palmerston's explicit support for
Clarendon's conduct at the Foreign Office was looked for: if Palmerston was not to
manage affairs himself directly, it was a source of comfort that he still watched over
and approved what his successor was doing. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore,
that when Palmerston resigned from the government, almost a year since joining,
there were some voices to be heard from the press suggesting that in this, as in all
matters, Palmerston's first concern was still with foreign policy and the Reform
question was a mere facade.
In the first instance, however, as the Times originally reported, it was
believed that Palmerston's resignation was wholly unconnected with the foreign
policy of the government, and especially that relating to the Eastern question.m The
Economist, the Globe and the Morning Chronicle all strenuously denied a link
between the Home Secretary's action and the conduct of foreign policy. On the basis
that, as the Globe had it, no step had been taken by the Foreign Office without
Palmerston's 'previous knowledge, and perfect concurrence', it upheld the official
account.132 By that token the same could be said of the Reform issue up to that
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point, but whether it was true or not
- and the Morning Post maintained throughout
that foreign policy disagreements were just as important as any over Reform'33 -
there was agreement that Palmerston's membership of the government was beneficial
to the effectual execution of foreign policy. Upon his return to the Cabinet, once the
'mis-understanding' had been cleared up, the Post, for example, saw that this would
guarantee that British policy in the East would henceforth be 'of a more worthy and
active nature1.lj4 More telling still was the response of the Morning Chronicle.
Having assured readers that reform was the only question at issue, the Chronicle
welcomed his return and couched this relief exclusively in terms of its implications
for foreign affairs. That the Cabinet once again appeared united at a critical juncture
in European history was true enough and the value of that was not questioned, but
Palmerston's renewed adherence signalled more than just domestic harmony:
To a large class of politicians, who feel rather than reason
- who
admire rather than understand - the name of Palmerston is a
symbol of pluck and public spirit
- a sort of epitome of all that is
most English in the English character. It was, indeed, amusing to
see the pertinacity with which, for some time after the formation of
the present Government, people refused to recognise him in his
new post of Home Secretary.135
No less importantly, Palmerston's return would, the Chronicle added, display to
foreign governments, especially those of Russia and Turkey, 'his approval of the
foreign policy of the Government'.136 Interestingly, whilst in some quarters
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Palmerston was still held up as the most able minister for the direction of British
foreign policy in the East, most press attention in 1854 concerning Palmerston
focused on his domestic politics and his work at the Home Office. The Morning
Post was one of the few newspapers in this year, particularly once war had been
declared by Britain, to continue to peddle the argument that a more determined and
consistent Palmerstonian line from the outset would have avoided this war.137
Whatever might have been the value of Palmerston's support for the
government's foreign policy, it is clear that as soon as he had been re-admitted to the
Cabinet, it was to his domestic reforms that members of the press looked.138
Newspaper coverage of Palmerston's political activities in 1854 was concerned
primarily with domestic issues such as the work of the Board of Health; smoke
abatement; the reforms of prisons, universities, and police; and town improvements
such as sewage systems.139 The absence of meaningful connections between
Palmerston and foreign policy in newspaper articles during this year and a far greater
preponderance of articles discussing his domestic undertakings is remarkable.
Towards the end of the year, the Times observed how Palmerston was no longer at
the forefront of diplomatic debates, at least those before the public gaze, and
wondered at his propensity to busy himself with other issues:
So now, if people have time to look back - and the long intervals
of the intelligence give us time for almost anything
- it is likely the
question is now and then asked, 'What is Lord PALMERSTON
doing? What does he think of the war? Would he have averted it?
Would he have brought it earlier to a crisis? Is he gathering
friends and concerting measures with a view to his old post?' We
cannot undertake to answer all those questions, but the world may
see at once one thing that Lord PALMERSTON is doing. Deep in
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the heart of the country, somewhere between the New Forest and
Salisbury Plain, he is presiding over innocent rustic celebrities,
delivering prizes to bucolic excellence, and teaching labourers
how to be happy, and merry and wise.140
Meanwhile, the debate over the correct course in the war raged on at Westminster.
Crucially, however, whereas it had been Palmerston as much as, if not more so than
Russell, who had challenged the Aberdonian approach, the contest was now, in
1854, presented in the press as being between Russell and Aberdeen. In the
Morning Post an article appeared in July highly critical of the leadership of the
Prime Minister, or 'Lord FEEBLEMIND' as it dubbed him. Significantly though, in
discussing the merits of the Aberdonian versus the alternative policy, the Post,
whilst accepting that many in the Cabinet were losing faith in the premier's approach
(although these were not named), identified Lord John Russell and Lord Clarendon
as the leading lights among those 'expressing and acting on directly opposite
opinions'. In the same edition, indeed, Palmerston was mentioned in the following
leading article, but solely in connection with police reform.141
Three days later the Post returned to its attacks on the government, this time
critical of its performance in all areas of public business, condemning the ministry as
susceptible to parliamentary majorities not its own, indeed majorities resulting 'from
chance combinations, which appear to have been formed rather without than within
the walls of Parliament'. Unacceptable by any measure of ministerial conduct, the
Post was especially critical of this situation in the face of the current turbulent
foreign context, arguing that weak government at home would send out obscure
signals to foreign powers about British policy. A firm hand was required, but again,
it was not Palmerston, to whom on a reading of the press prior to the beginning of
140
Times, 2 Nov. 1854
141
Morning Post, 21 June 1854211
1854 might it have been suggested an appeal would be made. Rather, on the
question of who directed policy, the Post asked; 'Is it the Earl of ABERDEEN or
Lord JOHN RUSSELL?'.142 Not that Palmerston was completely silent on the
subject of the Eastern question
- as the Post again reported, a month after this attack,
Palmerston's recent speech on this subject had contained 'manly and English
declarations',143
- but he was not being put forward as the statesman who should be
given the opportunity to take up the reins of the Foreign Office and execute his 'beau
Ideal'.
Only once the war could be seen to be going badly did the press seek to tie
Palmerston's fortunes in with those of his colleagues. Of a meeting at the Horn's
Tavern in Kennington, in which a resolution was passed critical of Aberdeen's
handling of the Eastern question and war, the Morning Chronicle noted that 'Lord
PALMERSTON and Lord JOHN RUSSELL have been equally guilty of the
"extreme folly" which is denounced; and they are equally responsible for the "alarm
and disgust" which the Ministerial policy may call forth'.144 It was an implicit
recognition of the careful manoeuvring on the part of Palmerston which had allowed
him to present himself after December 1853 as the government's ablest foreign and
subsequently war minister without having to put those claims to the test, and thus the
Peelite press by the end of the year was clearly concerned lest he win, by default, the
credit for his wise, though unheeded, counsels in this matter.
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By the autumn of 1854 most titles were advocating a Palmerstonian line,
whether they had supported his approach from the outset or been converted by
witnessing the progress of events. The Times, for instance, had started out at the
beginning of the Aberdeen government as an Aberdonian journal, but by the end of
the first year the Prime Minister was starting to lose the support of Delane and the
Times, who, no doubt influenced by the intelligence received from Clarendon, could
see the divisions which were carving up the Cabinet, and became increasingly
bellicose.145 The Times in 1854 acted increasingly independently of Aberdeen and
was no longer swayed by his counsel, printing articles on a regular basis which the
Prime Minister deeply regretted. But as the paper's owner, John Walter, told John
Bright in March, 'when the country would go for war, it was not worth while to
oppose it, hurting themselves and doing no good'.146 Yet it was not a purely political
decision. Delane himself visited the Crimea in August and September and foresaw
the coming winter hardships which British soldiers there were about to face. When
the Duke of Newcastle, at the War Department, took no notice, he became more
vocal in his criticism of the government, and significantly, joined the campaign
behind Palmerston.147 But by now, there was no reason for Palmerston to fear that
his name might be attached to the ministry's: he had made his stand, been proven
'correct' in his view of the Eastern question and had contrived to steal a march on his
nearest Whig rival, Russell.
Palmerston's avoidance of the limelight during the critical months of 1854 is
interesting. Clearly he did not court press attention for his opinions on foreign
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policy. Even in the Morning Post, 'which is notoriously his paper' Aberdeen
complained in February,148 Palmerston was not represented as the Cabinet's chief
anti-Aberdonian - that distinction went to Russell. This was not coincidental;
whether Palmerston guided this editorial policy or not, he was certainly pleased with
its results. His resignation of December 1853 was in many respects, an attempt to
gain political ground at Russell's expense.149 He returned at the beginning of 1854
having given the impression that he disliked the government's foreign policy and that
he could offer a better alternative, but for reasons of national stability and strength,
he had agreed to return. He could not leave the government with any degree of
credit as this act would probably cause its downfall, at least undermine its
credibility, but he had brought into question his level of support. Believing the
government weak, however, hopes for its long-term survival were slim and thus it
was that Palmerston was presented with an opportunity of laying the foundations for
his 'inevitable' accession to the premiership within a year.
He had two main tasks: firstly to undermine Russell; and secondly to secure
or confirm a broad base of popular support. His letters to Russell demonstrate his
desire to prevent Lord John from increasing his stock. Over Reform, Palmerston
counselled caution from Russell. Not only would it be dangerous at the present
moment to bring into question the future of the government, but: 'Your measure may
possibly give you some small & fleeting Popularity among the lower Classes,' he
wrote to his colleague,
though there seems good Reason to doubt whether the Balance of
Feeling would not be against you for not giving to all that which
you would grant to a few. But your intentioned Course is openly
disapproved by all the intelligent & respectable Classes whose
good opinion is most to be valued, & you can hardly be aware of
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the Feelings of personal Hostility towards you which are daily
spreading through all the Party which has hitherto acknowledged
you as their Leader.150
Palmerston was not seeking to assist Russell, however. At this point, Palmerston
was himself ready neither to assume Russell's mantle as leader of the Whigs, nor to
mount a challenge for the premiership should the government fall. Palmerston
needed to re-establish his credibility with the rest of the Cabinet again, having done
much in the previous December to win popular support, but also consolidate this
support outside Westminster. Were Russell to gain the upper hand now by either
passing Reform and winning popular acclaim, or upsetting the government,
Palmerston's domestic policies were not enough to win popular support and the
Eastern question was not yet far enough advanced for him to dis-associate himself
from the ministry; indeed, it might still have been possible for a positive foreign
policy to carry the day. The most effective way for Palmerston to 'defeat' Russell,
was to wait for Russell to damage himself. If the anti-Aberdonian policy was not to
gain widespread currency within the Cabinet, there seemed little prospect of a happy
outcome in the war, and better then that Russell go down as the minister who
compromised Aberdeen's leadership, than Palmerston. Thus, attention in the press,
and especially the pro-Palmerston journals, recognised Palmerston's diplomatic
ability but did not attribute to him responsibility for the current divisions: Russell
was the disloyal one.
Focusing on Palmerston's domestic policies was not a wasted enterprise. The
new Palmerston, socially aware, reforming, even philanthropic, was designed to
appeal to the middle classes whose concerns, especially in the growing industrial
regions, were heavily focused on public health and social conditions. And as the
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war, through Gladstone's budgets, imposed financially on the middle classes in
particular,151 it was important to be seen as their ally. Furthermore, the nature of the
Eastern question, as it related to Britain, by 1854 was not exclusively a foreign
policy issue. Whatever Palmerston might have said in his Cabinet memorandum
outlining his 'beau Ideal', at home the Crimean war was seen as essentially a test of
Britain's greatness; of British institutions faced with the despotic menace of Russian
absolutism and of the fitness of the British government to execute successfully what
was expected to be the first world war.152 For Palmerston to be associated with these
institutions, indeed as a reformer and improver of them, was no impediment to his
growing popularity, indeed it was essential, however misplaced such expectations
might ultimately prove to have been.153
Palmerston won his victory. The Morning Post observed in January 1855
that 'the people of England at this important juncture, when the fate of England and
Europe hangs in the balance, require and will have for Minister the only Statesman
to whose great spirit, far-seeing wisdom, and thoroughly English character, they are
ready to confide their destinies, and the issue, under PROVIDENCE, of this great
war. That Statesman is Lord PALMERSTON1.154 The Globe echoed this sentiment:
'Out of doors,' it claimed, 'there is not a part of the country that has not contributed
spontaneous expressions of the wish for Lord PALMERSTON to untake
[?undertake] the chief conduct of affairs'.155 Even the Morning Chronicle was forced
to admit that, on account of the damage that would have been caused to Britain's
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foreign relations, had Palmerston not been able to form a government, 'his failure
would have been a national misfortune'.156 In this sense, then, he was indeed,
I'inevitable.
After the 1850s, as the rivalry with Russell intensified, Palmerston came to
see the means by which he could secure an ascendancy over other Whigs in search of
the leadership for himself were to be found in no small measure beyond
Westminster. Hence his withdrawal from foreign policy debates in public in 1854:
Russell, Aberdeen Clarendon et al were all equally equipped to fight to manipulate
middle-class opinion through the press, and although even here Palmerston gained
an ascendancy, it was by default, as he had expected, but nonetheless, dependent
upon the failure of Aberdonian and Peelite foreign policy and the growing
unpopularity of Russell. To secure a strong basis of support to underpin a
premiership bid, he needed popular support. Thus, he set about cultivating the
image of man-of-the-people, to re-affirm his liberal (and popular) reputation in the
field of foreign policy, but also to challenge the view that he was the last candle of
the eighteenth century and to show that he could be a popular, liberal domestic
politician as well. His use of newspapers went a long way towards establishing such
an image but newspapers were not read by the whole country and thus a reputation
amongst members and readers of the press had little resonance among the wider
population. And even amongst groups such as the Manchester commercial classes
who did read the newspapers, Palmerston won support, or at least established
himself as the true guardian of their interests. How he went about achieving this will
be explored further in the following chapter.
156
Morning Chronicle, 7 Feb. 1855217
CHAPTER 5. MOST ENGLISH MINISTER OR RUSSIAN SPY?:
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY INFLUENCES ON, AND PERCEPTIONS OF,
PALMERSTON, 1846-1855
i) Palmerston and the nation.
It had been relatively straightforward for Palmerston to court the support of the
newspaper reading public in that there was, by definition, a ready and effective
medium through which to communicate with them. Less obviously could he speak
to the broader population. In large part, his reputation with 'the people', of whatever
social class, from those deprived of the vote to the commercial middle classes, rested
on the construction (and appreciation) of positive images and impressions of
Palmerston and Palmerstonism, propagated variously by potent rhetorical devices
invoking various characteristics of national greatness and indeed solidarity.
It has been suggested by Muriel Chamberlain that the Victorian high-political
view of the people, or commonalty, was akin to that held of the Roman mob, as
represented in entertainments popular during this period such as Shakespeare's
tragedy of Coriolanus} The allusion, indeed, is not unduly contrived and it is no
coincidence that an extension of this view resulted in December 1853 with the Press,
essentially Disraeli's newspaper at this time, ascribing to Palmerston the mantle of
Coriolanus himself.2 Whether or not Palmerston shared Coriolanus' dislike of the
people and popular politics ('I would they would forget me like the virtues/Which
1
M.E. Chamberlain, 'Who founded the Liberal Party', Inaugural lecture delivered at the
University College of Swansea, 26 November 1990 (University College of Swansea, 1991), p.5 2
Press, 24 Dec. 1853218
our divines lose by 'em') and found that only obligation caused him to solicit such
support ('Why in this wolvish toge should I stand here/To beg of Hob and Dick that
does appear/Their needless vouches? Custom calls me to't'), he certainly, like his
supposed literary alter-ego, heeded the advice of Menenius that he would 'mar all', if
he did not speak to the people 'in wholesome manner'.3
The broadening political nation
The political world was no longer defined and limited to Parliament and a
metropolitan clique. By mid-century it was apparent to the astute observer that the
parameters of this world had shifted, as W.R. Greg suggested in the Edinburgh
Review in 1852:
Before the reform bill, parliament was the arena where, by the
theory of the constitution, and with nominally closed doors, the
affairs of the nation were discussed and settled
- it was the body to
which the people delegated the task of thinking and acting for
them in all political concerns....
But now all this has changed... Parliament is no longer the
only, nor the chief arena for political debate. Public meetings and
the press are fast encroaching upon and superseding its original
exclusive functions. Every man has become a politician.... The
country often takes precedence of the Legislature, both in the
discussion and decision of public affairs. Public opinion is formed
out of doors; and is only revised, ratified and embodied within....
The functions of parliament are no longer initiary.... The
independent thinker originates; the Country listens, disputes, sifts,
ripens; the Parliament revises and enacts....4
The early nineteenth century had witnessed a politicisation of the lower classes
which was to have far-reaching ramifications in the politics of the post-1832 period.
As Margot Finn observes, 'although local patriotisms continued to flourish beyond
the eighteenth century, their grip on even plebeian culture was increasingly tempered
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by the wider claims of the nation', yet Finn herself perpetuates an Anglo-centric view
of this period by identifying these local patriotisms within an English national
identity.5 Nevertheless, this phenomenon, the product of cultural, technological and
economic influences, tended to the emergence of a national identity in Britain in
advance of other European countries, and external affairs and warfare were essential
means by which this identity was consolidated. As Linda Colley has argued, only
since the Act of Union of 1707 which linked Scotland to England and Wales does a
notion of 'Britishness' have any resonance, and this derives largely from a negative
impetus to define 'Britain' and 'Britishness' by reference to 'the Other'.6 During the
eighteenth century this meant that Britain came to be defined largely in terms of
what the nation's chief enemy, France, was not: thus Protestant Britain stood as a
natural counter-point to Catholic France.7 France could be represented as inferior to
Britain in terms of civilisation and freedom, thereby assuaging envious feelings
about French high culture and military prowess and offering therein grounds to rally
around a notion of Britishness if only to emphasise this superiority.8
Whilst 'Britishness' did not supplant internal differences - the notion of a
'blended' modern British identity which had currency in the nineteenth century still
speaks of a mix or amalgam comprising the original ingredients of 'Englishness' and
'Scottishness' and (although rarely meriting specific contemporary mention),
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'Welshness'9 - a collective identity was to some extent superimposed over this array
of internal divisions, if only gathering together the component parts of the one other
crucial factor separating Britain from its rivals, that of being an island.10 It has been
suggested recently that Colley has overstated the importance of Protestantism as a
common bond amongst Britons,11 but as Colley argues, whilst there were indeed
profound divisions within the Protestant Church, Protestantism as a supposed
national characteristic went beyond theological disputes and took on more overtly
secular connotations. Thus: 'the Protestant world-view was so ingrained in this
culture that it influenced people's thinking irrespective of whether they went to
church or not, whether they read the Bible or not, or whether, indeed, they were
capable of reading anything at all'.12 Despite the ultimate artificiality of this concept
of a national identity founded on a common Protestantism, rhetorically it was a
powerful image and certainly contributed to the evolution of a 'Victorian world
picture' in which 'a national pecking order for European countries', according to
David Newsome, placed Germany at the top, Switzerland and the Low Countries 'in
the second rank', and Latin nations at the bottom, clearly symbolic of this supposed
overarching Protestant outlook, though not necessarily accurate.13
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Inevitably, a growing sense of national identity and belonging brought within
the political realm social classes officially excluded from that domain.
Consequently it was important for a statesman such as Palmerston concerned with
foreign affairs to consider these sections of society. The working classes, whilst
generally displaying more interest in cheap and sensationalist stories than in
domestic political news did, nevertheless, want to read about foreign affairs in the
newspapers. As Virginia Berridge has observed, there was 'a noticeable amount of
working class concern', inspired in no small measure by a sympathy for continental
struggles of the 1830s and 1840s (especially Belgium in 1830; significantly a cause
with which Palmerston was closely identified), which it was felt were not.
unconnected with the history of an English liberal tradition. Thus it was reported to
the Newspaper Stamp Committee in 1851 that 'foreign news is as attractive as any
other matter' that appeared in the papers read among the working classes.14 Debates
conducted at the Hope and Anchor Inn, a public house in Birmingham, for example,
in the years following the repeal of the stamp duty on newspapers point to a working
class concern with foreign affairs above all other issues, energised perhaps by the
greater availability of information after 1855.15
The impetus for this search for a national identity came from within, it rested
on an idea of English history since the sixteenth century, but it was perpetuated by
constant references to foreign identities and interests. Concomitant with this
14
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developing sense of nation, was a growing perception among all classes of the
potential and indeed necessity of combined action. In the lower classes, this
naturally led to a greater belief in their political influence. In 1834, for instance, a
working class socialist proclaimed: 'Those who call themselves the liberal statesmen
of the present day, must go progressively with the people; but in the word PEOPLE
...they must, brethren, include us, the productive labourers, for what are the people
without us?'. But as the writer also observed, 'while we work not for ourselves, but
for the capitalists and profit-mongers, we can hardly rank with the people'.16
Few mid-century politicians would have disagreed with Richard Cobden
when, in advocating a broadening of the political nation, he spoke of'the middle and
industrious classes' as 'the people'.17 In domestic politics, such a view was certainly
widespread, but in the field of foreign affairs - where questions might boil down to
ones of peace or war
- the nation, on whose behalf a Foreign Secretary spoke,
comprised all members of the population, high and low. In this sense, whilst still
remaining beyond the pale of the constitution in any official capacity, a wide
spectrum of the population was given a role in political life through the Coriolanean
approach of a figure such as Palmerston. Palmerston was favoured by a fortunate
coincidence of circumstances, but he played his hand with great care and skill.
Alongside the growing confidence of the lower classes, important shifts in
intellectual life were occurring during this period. In publishing On Heroes,
Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History in 1841, Thomas Carlyle to some extent
captured the spirit of the early to mid-nineteenth century. Among the educated
classes, Romantic influences and the effects of the late-eighteenth century Hellenic
16
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revival inspired Victorians with 'the power to see man as a hero and the heart to
respond with the appropriate worship'.18 Heroic imagery from Scott and Byron, and
from the Napoleonic Wars (Nelson and Wellington) abounded in Victorian culture.
Thus, enthusiasm and a disposition to acknowledge 'the superior being', infused
nineteenth century life with a tendency to hero-worship, and as Walter Houghton has
suggested, this tradition was nourished and thrived in such conditions: 'For it
answered, or it promised to answer, some of the deepest needs and problems of the
age. In the fifty years after 1830 the worship of the hero was a major factor in
English culture'.19
There are many different types of hero. One of the most significant, and
certainly in the context of Palmerston and foreign policy, most pertinent, is that of
the patriot. Patriotism had been used throughout English history to mark out the
characteristics of the hero, and figures such as Hampden, Sydney and Cromwell all
loomed large in such works.20 A member of Palmerston's own constituency,
Tiverton, indeed, made just such an association in writing to Palmerston in 1848
urging the Foreign Secretary to use his influence to secure religious liberty and
self-government in Europe. 'And what cannot you now do in Italy & Spain!', he
wrote, adding: 'Old Cromwell would not let such an opportunity pass and I trust your
Lordship will not do less'.21 Cromwell, however, as an essentially non-conformist
'hero', inspired only limited reverence in an age of significant religious differences
-
however effectively a British national identity might be couched in terms of
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reference to Catholic forces abroad, domestic religious tensions within the national
Church, continued to plague the country22
- and Palmerston, whilst he might thus
win particular non-conformist support, had to establish his popularity in a much
broader context and exploit the unifying properties of a being a 'national' minister.
Victorians imbued patriotism with notions of virtue and godliness; the embodiment
of national greatness. According to Houghton, then, 'the nationalistic and the
moralistic functions of patriotic hero worship tended to merge, and in the
concreteness of experience a great soldier or statesman was an inspiration to a noble
life - for the glory of England'.23 Heroism and hero-worship, therefore, acquired
above all a political significance, and something of a unifying strand in Victorian
political life: to refer to Houghton once more, 'it exorcises the antisocial forces of
personal or class ambition, bred by the doctrines of liberty and equality, and in their
place calls forth the uniting emotions of loyalty and reverence for one great man who
is our common leader'.24 For the anti-democrats the hero-governor would stem the
tide of popular politics; for the democrat he would draw the nation together
- in
some respects a natural corollary of democratic government. Yet in a heterogeneous
and disparate state, such a common leader had to court a wide range of popular
feelings and sentiments.
Radical politics in mid-century are commonly seen to have suffered a blow
with the supposed failure of Chartism in 1848, and the decades between the late
1840s and the emergence of socialism in Britain in the 1870s are widely held to have
represented a caesura in British lower and middle-class political life. Recent studies
22
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have acknowledged this impression, but have sought not simply to consign the
history of the middle decades of the nineteenth century to a closed file labelled 'age
of equipoise', and have tried, rather, to establish the meaning and importance this
period inevitably represents. According to Margot Finn, radicals, and particularly
Chartists, focused on the national aspect of their liberalising course, relegating
notions of class conflict to a secondary position. Having embraced the revolutions
of 1848 in terms of a class issue, wherein the 'Chartist internationalists wilfully
ignored distinctions between national and economic liberation', in the aftermath of
these revolutions attention turned to the common ties between working and middle
class interests. There were similarities to be drawn between the Chartist movement
and the European upheavals from which there emerged a fear of perpetual class
conflict which might be engendered in Britain. Thus was the emphasis laid upon
notions of national identity, a community of interests, which would bind the country
together. It was at this time, therefore, that Harriet Martineau, the well-known
advocate of political economy and middle class improver of the lower orders, and
the Chartist Charles Knight, launched Voice of the People in which they sought to
down-play the vitality of class differences: 'The "Populus" of the Romans, the
"Peuple" of the French, the "People" of the English, each, in the broad and
comprehensive sense of the term, means the whole community
- the nation', they
asserted.23
As a corrective to such interpretations
- regarding the shift to liberalism 'not
as a political development, but as a retrograde step in class-consciousness' - Miles
Taylor has argued that taken from a longer perspective, the developments of the
25
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1850s acquire a different significance. Changes in the political landscape since the
Reform Act of 1832, granting radicals a much greater influence at Westminster, had
eroded much of the raison-d'etre of radical politics whilst the changing realities of
international as well as domestic politics contributed to the shaping of British
liberalism during these years in advance of the Gladstonian influences of the 1860s.26
Whatever the differences in interpretation between Taylor and Finn, it is striking that
they both focus on the importance of nation, patriotism and notions of British
politics being crafted by reference to international (primarily European)
developments.
It was against this background
- of radical politics focusing more
emphatically on the significance of the nation, of the appeal of hero worship, or at
least the disposition in Victorian society to such elevation of the individual, and to
the perhaps fortuitous coincidence of European revolution and consequent challenge
to the status quo
- that Palmerston was able to build a rapport with the people, but
more than that, with the nation, in order to strengthen his hand at Westminster. He
was the natural candidate in mid-century for the title of Patriot Minister and came in
many ways to embody the very essence of'Englishness'.
To the reform-minded and radical members of the House of Commons,
Palmerston came to be seen very much as the Patriot Minister in the aftermath of the
revolutions of 1848 and 1849. As Miles Taylor has demonstrated, the close of the
parliamentary session of 1849 saw the radical members of the House 'in a hiatus'.27
Financial reform and Irish relief, for instance, elicited from within the Reform party
different and conflicting strategies, while the Whig ministry, and especially its
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supposedly most reform-minded members, Russell and Wood, was proving to be a
great disappointment. Thus, partly in consequence of this fissuring of the radical
movement, Taylor argues, members of the Reform party turned to Palmerston, and
gave their support to his foreign policy, notably that concerning Hungary, when it
went before the House in the summer of 1849. Palmerston, at least, demonstrated
'purpose' (if nothing else) and ultimately, 'his popularity arose from his patriotism
-
but a patriotism which had more in common with eighteenth-century
constitutionalism than bombastic nationalism'.28
From the Palmerstonian perspective, the nation, clearly, as any perceptive
political observer was aware, was becoming increasingly important to political life;
in the arena of foreign affairs it was vital, and it encompassed people from all social
classes. Palmerston found that, like Canning, his foreign policy carried more weight
when invested with what was termed vaguely 'popular support1, and by mid-century
the conditions were ripe for a populist, liberal, national and purposeful policy to
elicit a broad demonstration of approbation. Yet Palmerston was not to win popular
acclaim with a monolithic approach: his appeal was manifold and his
characterisation as the Minister of England is as much a symbol of his ability to
bridge the differences inherent within the nation as about his bellicose defence of
national interests overseas.
By the early nineteenth century comprehensive military defeat of France in
1815 and emancipation of Catholics in Britain in 1829 had to some extent
undermined the usefulness of Protestantism as a cement in British society. Whilst
there was a certain residual Protestant feeling which Palmerston was still able to
28
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exploit, as will be seen, he needed some other rhetorical device if he was to secure
popular support for his policies. Palmerston himself failed to appreciate, or rather
did not see any distinctions between 'British1 and 'English' and used the latter term as
synonymous with the former.29 This in itself was not necessarily inconsistent with
English contemporary usage, as a ballad entitled 'The Englishman' demonstrates:
The Briton may traverse the pole or zone,
And boldly claim his right;
For he calls such a vast domain his own,
That the sun never sets on his might.
Let the haughty stranger seek to know
The place of his home and birth.
And the flush will spread from cheek to brow,
As he tells of his native earth.
'Tis a glorious charter deny it who can!
That's breathed in the words 'I'm an Englishman'.10
'Englishness' to Palmerston meant certain values, applicable to the whole of Britain
and not England exclusively. In place of a rigid anti-Catholic prejudice, though not
to its complete eradication, a national consciousness could now be forged more
simply by representing Britain as more liberal, tolerant and wealthy than continental
rivals. Thus Palmerston's support for the abolition of the slave trade, for example,
was not just a humanitarian impulse, but also an implicit demonstration of the moral
legitimacy of a pax Britannica. When he heard of slave-trade atrocities in Zanzibar
in 1846 Palmerston did not hesitate to declare that 'the nations of Europe are
destined to put an end to the African slave trade and that Great Britain is the main
instrument in the hands of Providence for the accomplishment of this purpose'.31
Still therefore, there was the construction of a national consciousness which was
defined by reference to external factors. The continued deployment of rhetoric
which invoked religious concepts allowed all social classes to share in this sense of
29
Colley, Britons, p. 174
30
'The Englishman', Harding Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford, B. 11 (1080)
31
Quoted Colley, Britons, p.380229
the national character. Palmerston was writing to the local British consul about the
grievances in Zanzibar, but the sense of British liberalism and freedom which lay
behind Palmerston's declaration found echoes elsewhere in society. Significantly, in
Dicken's Little Dorrit, which was published in the mid-1850s, the inhabitants of
Bleeding Heart Yard, by common agreement, 'poor', 'hard-up', earthy and coarse,
continued to regard the foreigner as inferior to an Englishman. It was, in such
places, regarded as 'a sort of Divine visitation upon a foreigner that he was not an
Englishman, and that all kinds of calamities happened to his country because it did
things that England did not, and did not do things that England did'. Furthermore:
They believed that foreigners were always badly off; and though
they were as ill off themselves as they could desire to be, that did
not diminish the force of the objection. They believed that
foreigners were dragooned and bayonetted; and though they
certainly got their own skulls promptly fractured if they showed
any ill humour, still it was with a blunt instrument, and that didn't
count. They believed that foreigners were always immoral; and
though they had an occasional assize at home, and now and then a
divorce case or so, that had nothing to do with it.32
The failure to recognise or acknowledge the inherent contradictions in their own
position was something Palmerston could play upon. He need not advocate
far-reaching domestic reform, since British (or English) liberties were not thus
defined. It was therefore not inconsistent for an 'Edinburgh Elector' to urge
resistance to Lord John Russell's proposed Reform bill in 1852 in favour of
Palmerston's advocacy of liberty and freedom for oppressed nationalities abroad (at
the expense of overt domestic reforms).33 Concerning itself exclusively with foreign
affairs and defining itself purely by reference to nationalisms that were less liberal,
32
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free and providentially favoured, a broad-based national identity for Britain was thus
fostered and consolidated.
Commerce and patriotism
To the commercial middle classes, Palmerston's appeal was not simply that of a
minister with some degree of dynamism. By the 1850s, the radical politicians
through whom they had typically expressed their interests were failing. Manchester
School philosophies seemed by mid-century to be flawed and a new darling of the
industrial classes was sought to replace Cobden. Palmerston again offered the
required alliance. According to V.A.C. Gatrell, the cause of free trade, embodied
most visibly in the Cobdenite, or Manchester School, campaign for repeal of the
Corn Laws, ushered in a decline in the fortunes of the commercial classes and
caused them to re-evaluate their political sympathies. It has been demonstrated,
however, that the economic crisis of 1847, the effects of which were felt in the
economy until 1849, was a relatively short-lived one in which downward cyclical
trends in textiles and railways, alongside increased speculation in food prices and a
credit crisis all exacerbated a downward spiral. Certainly an unfavourable balance
of payments situation, particularly over corn imports, lay at the heart of this crisis,
yet it was the instability of 1848 and the external disruption of markets and
confidence that did as much to prolong the depression as any domestic commercial
policy.34 Thus whilst it appeared, according to Gatrell, that the diagnoses of the
Anti-Corn Law League regarding the economy 'were indeed at fault', and
Manchester's commercial classes, the bedrock constituency of the Cobdenite school,
34
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were gradually 'emancipated... from their respect for the League's efficiency in the
1840s, and tacitly justified their political realignment in favour of the foreign
policies of the Manchester School's arch-enemy Palmerston',35 it is significant that
the Manchester industrial output, particularly the dominant textile produce, relied on
many markets beyond the relative safety and familiarity of the European continent.
It was a dependence on these markets 'which were most vulnerable to the incursions
of diplomatic, commercial and if need be naval pressure, by which Palmerstonian
policy was to be characterised' that allowed Palmerstonian policy to gain an
ascendancy.36 Free trade and Cobdenite doctrines were not necessarily moribund,
but it could not be denied that Palmerston's gun-boat diplomacy, a cliche though it
might be, was a potent image and offered reassurance to cotton merchants with
interests in far-off markets.
Integral to this is what Linda Colley has called a 'cult of commerce', in which
'stout-hearted commercial activity and ideal patriotism were one and the same'.
Patriotism was not simply something orchestrated from above, but something that
was expected to generate profits for all.37 Romantic images contributed as much as
economic realities to a Palmerstonian ascendancy amongst the commercial classes.
Cobdenite critiques remained persuasive explanations of the declining fortunes of
the later 1840s, and the widespread continental sympathy for Cobdenite policies
demonstrates the continued popularity of this creed in the face of Palmerstonian
35
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bluster.38 The textile elite of Manchester by mid-century were growing weary of
questions concerned with domestic reform and turned their attentions more
frequently towards Europe. As Anthony Howe has argued, 'Palmerston's policy in
Europe which brought him most criticism from his fellow aristocrats, mirrored, in
some ways, the international concerns of the liberal bourgeoisie', concerns which
were motivated less by conceptions of vested interests and more as a reflection of
important middle class attitudes. Support for Italy mobilised a latent Protestantism
within the English middle class, whilst simultaneously standing as a model for the
working classes in their search for political emancipation.39
In turn, this faith in mercantile interests impacted on the political centre. As
Professor Searle confirms, under these circumstances, 'Cobdenite cosmopolitan
pacifism seemed economically irrational, as well as politically unacceptable,
whereas Palmerston's foreign policy had much more to offer'.40 For Palmerston,
such a shift was significant indeed. Harold Perkin has argued that it was the
entrepreneurial class which held the balance of power in Victorian politics during
this period: this class, he argues, 'ruled, as it were, by, remote control, through the
power of its ideal over the ostensible ruling class, the landed aristocracy which
continued to occupy the main positions of power down to the 1880s and beyond'.41
It was the fulfilment of Marx's claim that the British middle class was content to
entrust government to the great Whig families, to act as the 'aristocratic
representatives of the bourgeoisie'.42 This was not mere hyperbole, for as Perkin
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asserts, in accepting Repeal in 1845, the aristocratic or ruling class had, in effect,
accepted the middle class view of national interest - whereby the needs of consumers
and the prosperity of producers were placed before the unearned incomes of the
landlords. Maybe this was, as Kitson Clark maintained, the 'Indian summer of the
British aristocracy', but nevertheless, what emerges is a sense that it was the
entrepreneurial spirit that now held considerable sway over the government.43 Thus,
Palmerston, the advocate of free trade which as he told an audience at Tiverton in
1851 he regarded as 'that system which is for the benefit of all classes of the
community',44 became the new hero of the Manchester School entrepreneurial class.
Palmerston's appeal, however, went deeper than his declared political faith.
In attracting popular support outside parliament from radical and working classes, he
relied as much upon his reputation and charisma, as he did on support for his
political beliefs. He might have been one of the aristocratic representatives of the
bourgeoisie, but he was also the aristocrat with whom the greatest number of the
people could identify.
Palmerstonianism, according to Antony Taylor, 'acted as the main mode of
mass political expression prior to the emergence of the movements for parliamentary
reform in the middle 1860s',4i which perhaps held true following the demise of
Chartism. Not only was attention increasingly being paid to international affairs,
whilst domestic politics appeared relatively quiet by comparison, but Palmerston
himself demonstrated qualities with which working classes could identify. His love
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of boxing and reputed sexual prowess as they became enshrined in popular folklore
and through the medium of the popular press, endeared him to the people at street
level, Taylor argues, and 'his image as the "bucolic squire", and his inveterate
gambling and womanizing earned him the affectionate sobriquet of "Lord Cupid"
and reinforced his identification with the outward excesses of popular culture'.46 In
his treatment of the Haynau affair in 1850 and his determination to receive Kossuth
the following year, Palmerston did much to appeal to radicals and Chartists47 To the
working classes and radicals Palmerston embodied European liberty and defence of
constitutionalism. To middle class educated and entrepreneurial classes, he
represented a particular form of patriotic heroism, a just and honourable crusader in
the national interest. He was able to latch on to the classically inspired search for a
hero and to supply the leadership, or focus, for the radical campaign for nation and
defence of liberty. The search for a figurehead to represent interests was a pan-class
phenomenon and Palmerston, forging his reputation in the field of foreign affairs
was able to exploit this. Whether or not he was by 1855 /'inevitable, he was during
the preceding decade widely regarded as the Minister of England, and for now that
was good enough.
ii) Palmerston and extra-parliamentary opinion, 1846-1852
The worlds of high and low politics came together at elections and it was here that a
politician could most clearly demonstrate his view of the value and role of the
people, both members of the electorate and the disenfranchised masses whose place
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in the constitution was ill-defined but nevertheless important. Here symbolism had a
key role to play in politics during the Victorian period. Whilst it was no easier for a
disenfranchised citizen to secure a place in the official political nation, it was
increasingly being recognised by those at the centre of political life that ceremonies
and symbolic practices were important means by which to allow such people to
participate in the theatre of politics. Not least, this legitimised the prevailing power
balance and symbolic practices and ceremonies, according to James Vernon, were
'used to "convey and reaffirm the legitimacy of governing in thousands of unspoken
ways"'.48
At an election the presence of the candidate could be just as important as
what was said. From the very beginning of the process, with the first entry of the
candidates into a town, the play began. The public, enfranchised and otherwise,
would commonly turn out by way of demonstrating their gratitude for the candidate's
decision to contest the seat on their behalf, whilst for the candidate this was an early
opportunity 'to project the romantic image of themselves as the people's choice,
bravely battling on their behalf.49 Often, indeed, such was the superficial nature of
the event, Vernon suggests, that just 'a sight of a candidate seems to have been
enough to create that fiction of personal familiarity which was so important'.50 Yet,
the nomination ceremony and hustings contests were vitally important aspects to an
election. The approbation of the disenfranchised members of the audience, which
could be demonstrated though a show of hands, was a crucial demonstration of
moral support for a candidate but these public demonstrations of political sparring
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were also one of the few opportunities the disenfranchised had to challenge a
member of the ruling class, a means by which they could 'avenge themselves upon
the official political arena and to assert their right to be included within the story the
local political community was telling itself.51 Palmerston himself recognised this, as
he told a meeting in Glasgow when receiving the freedom of that city. 'It is,
gentlemen,' he said:
the privilege of the people of a free country, thus in public
meetings to express their opinion of the conduct ofthose whose lot
it may have been, in any capacity, high or less exalted, to serve
their country. In countries where the Governments are
unfortunately framed upon a different model, public opinion is
gagged, and expresses itself only in ways which do not often
conduce to public tranquility [sic] or to the general welfare; but it
is the privilege and the good fortune of constitutional countries
that public men are there enabled from time to time to have as
their guide the expression of public opinion; and when they are
fortunate enough to obtain, as I have now the honour to obtain the
approbation of their countrymen, they receive the greatest reward
for their past conduct, and the most ample encouragement to
pursue that course which they have thought for the benefit of the
country. (Loud cheers).32
For a politician such as Palmerston an election was an ideal opportunity to assess his
standing with the people and add more grist to his mill for the coming contests at
Westminster and within the Cabinet. At the general election of 1847, he was given
the opportunity to test his popularity with the people of Tiverton in the face of the
famous challenge laid down before him by the Chartist George Julian Harney,
although at first the challenge appeared to Palmerston a weak one. 'I have been so
little with my Constituents of late', he told Russell, 'that I am advised to make a
personal Canvass although I have no opponent but a certain Mr Harney a Chartist
who announces his Intention of proving on the Hustings that I am not, and that he is,
51
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a fit Person to represent Tiverton. Such a Contest is more likely to be amusing than
dangerous'.53
Harney ventured down to Tiverton with no more object than to 'get at'
Palmerston. Arriving three days before the nomination was due, Harney attempted
to whip up the electors with Chartist speeches and charges against Palmerston. By
the third and final speech, he had succeeded, it seemed, in winning the popular
support of the people of 'Palmerston's Borough': 'The town was now in a very lively
state; some thousands were at the meeting, and the enthusiasm of the Chartists rose
to the highest pitch when Mr Harney concluded a lengthy and impassioned appeal
with the somewhat grandiloquent sentence
- "Tonight we sleep upon our arms;
to-morrow we march to battle and victory!'".54 The main theme of Harney's orations
by this point, however, was the discreditable conduct of Lord Palmerston. Chartist
principles were admired, but it was the assaults on Palmerston which won the
applause. At the hustings, Harney promised, 'I will prove him to be devoid of true
patriotism, a breaker of pledges, and a foe to the liberties of the people, whose
dearest rights he will trample in the dust', and his promises were met with
'tremendous cheering'.55 These were the very basics of Palmerston's appeal: honest,
true, liberal patriot. It was not the policies which Palmerston represented that
Harney sought to attack, but the image of Palmerston the popular hero.
Harney ranged over the whole of Palmerston's ministerial career and
endeavoured at first to damn him by association with the governments headed by
Spencer Perceval ('a constitutional tyrant'), Canning ('a clever jester, a talented
53
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buffoon, the able and brilliant flunkey of the aristocracy'), Wellington (the ally 'of
despotism'), Melbourne (leader of 'the profligate Whig Government'), before
entering into a careful and minute criticism of Palmerston's foreign policy, country
by country.56 Contrary to custom, Palmerston had waived his right to speak before
Harney, preferring to make his defence in answer to charges actually made rather
than assaults anticipated. There was a logic to this, clearly, but Palmerston was also
aware that the theatrical nature of the platform addresses favoured the most recent
speaker. Since all arguments appeared to be well received with cheering, the
advantage lay with the candidate who was heard last. It is instructive to consider
the grounds upon which Palmerston made his counter-attack.
Harney's speech, Palmerston declared, was in many respects unobjectionable,
but there were grounds upon which he took exception. Firstly, he sought to remedy
a mis-representation: Palmerston was stung by the accusation that 'I displayed a want
of due feeling and sympathy for the misfortunes of the lower classes' in the House of
Commons. Harney, he claimed, 'knows that what he has stated is not true (cries of
"Oh, oh," and "Hear, hear")', given the approaching close of the parliamentary
session when the subject was raised. Against the other charges made by Harney,
Palmerston defended himself. He denied that his Irish estates yielded increased
incomes, despite his attempts to improve them; he asserted that he was 'a decided
advocate of reform', but that he wished to see it introduced 'by agitation of mind, and
not by the agitation of physical force'; he acknowledged his political debt to
Canning, but stressed the 'honour to his country' of Canning's conduct; he declared
that he drew no distinction between Ireland and England nor Irish and English and
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fully supported attempts to relieve the distress caused by the famine; and he
identified himself as a champion of factory, health and educational reform.57
Knowing, perhaps the weakness of these claims, if pressed too far, Palmerston
focused for the rest of his speech on foreign policy, his acknowledged specialism:
Now, when I say that he knows nothing of the matters he has been
talking of, all I mean is, that he appears to me to have got by rote a
certain number of empty declamatory phrases (great laughter and
interruption), a jargon and jingle of words - (Renewed laughter
and loud cheers)
- which have no reference to facts, which have no
bearing upon anything that has happened, and that his statements
are founded on a total misconception of the history of the last
twelve or fourteen years. Mr Harney is of opinion that the great
object and the grand result of my foreign policy has been the
establishment of tyranny and despotism all over the world - (A
voice, "So it has," and laughter)
- and the suppression of the
liberties of the people.
This Palmerston found amusing and ridiculous, since, as he continued, 'I have been
accused all over Europe of being the great instigator of revolution - (Laughter)
- the
friend and champion of all popular insurrections, the enemy of all constituted
authorities', and this opinion, he said, was founded on 'matters which are not really
matters of opinion'. Like his opponent, Palmerston retired from the front of the
husting at the end of his speech, 'amid loud and prolonged cheering'.58 It seems
incongruous that two opposing arguments should have elicited the same response if
the substance of the propositions were attended to. Harney might have won a
show-of-hands poll on the day with a majority support of two-thirds of the audience,
but until put to the test of an official ballot, which Harney declined to contest, the
victory was somewhat illusory. Perhaps the show of hands demonstrated a ground
swell of support among the disenfranchised, but it was from this same body that
Palmerston also received loud and prolonged cheers. Harney may have seemed
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plausible as 'the friend of the people' which his proposer Mr Rowcliffe had
promised, but Palmerston, too, could offer similar rhetorical assurances, and
crucially, he could also offer more convincing leadership. He was the gentleman
leader, not of the people, but certainly for them. And as Vernon explains, the
'narratives of leadership may have played upon the melodramatic imagination of
struggle and conflict, but these tensions were primarily moral and political in nature,
the social languages of class being conspicuously absent'.59
.
Certainly Harney's charges of illiberal and unpatriotic conduct did not stick,
and even though doubts may have been expressed in certain middle class, educated
circles about his sincerity,60 Palmerston continued to flatter his audiences and exploit
the need for strong-willed leadership, to be, as Carlyle would have had it, a great
man. Thus, when in the autumn of 1851 Palmerston 'availed himself of the leisure
of the recess to pay his constituents a visit', he carefully canvassed their support for
measures which would win popular liberal support. He opened his speech by
referring to subjects regarding some of which his sympathy was surely questionable,
and over which his responsibility was negligible, but which were undoubtedly
intended to add to his reputation. 'This country,' he told his listeners,
not long ago, had to contend with great difficulties at home, and
we have had to witness terrible convulsions abroad. Those
domestic difficulties, by the blessing of Providence, have, to a
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certain degree, passed away
- the convulsions abroad have, for the
present, ceased. (Cheers.) And not only this, but that dreadful
scourge, the scourge of famine, which ravaged so large a portion
of the sister isle, has, if not entirely disappeared, been substantially
diminished.
He was not above flattering his listeners, reporting to them that he had great pleasure
in telling foreigners who expressed an interest in the subject that the 'admirable order
which our population preserves', was owing 'in the first place to the great good
sense, the goodness of heart, and the noble qualities which belong to the British
nation', and that these noble qualities, finding expression in public opinion,
exercised a positive influence over political life. But he reserved questions of
foreign policy for his closest attention. In this department, Palmerston could
emphasise the qualities which underpinned his popular appeal, and he contrasted the
illiberal tendencies of other, primarily southern, European countries with the liberal
and constitutionalist tendencies of Britain.61
These sentiments struck a chord at all levels of society and he found various
and diverse confirmations of the positive effects of such images with regard to his
own popularity and standing. In June 1848 'A Constituent', who had been an elector
for the University of Cambridge when Palmerston had represented that particular
seat, wrote to the Foreign Secretary noting that he found that 'in every part of
Europe, that you were the Representative of my inviolability and dignity as an
Englishman' (an interesting prologue to Palmerston's civis Romanus sum speech of
two years later). Significantly, the anonymous correspondent, assuring Palmerston
of his political impartiality and desirous of apprising the Foreign Secretary of
reliable intelligence, proceeded to make the following observations:
First as to yourself. The English People trouble themselves very
little about foreign politics. This arises partly from the low
61 Illustrated London News, 27 Sept. 1851242
estimation in which they hold all Foreigners; but principally from
the neglected state of general Education. The masses know so
little of the geographical division of Europe, that the great majority
of them might reverse the position of the Alps and the Pyrenees, or
annex Spain to Italy or Germany. So they wisely avoid
discussions of these subjects. Yet they fully recognize in you the
Protector of constitutional Freedom on the Continent; and they
consider England's honour and interests safe in your hands.62
It might have been true, as this writer asserted, that some of the English People were
critical of certain aspects of Palmerston's Spanish policy, but essentially Palmerston
had won more than just support for his political conduct, he had gone some way
towards fashioning himself as 'England's Protector'. Other letters from members of
the public echoed this impression. In May 1850 'A Commercial Traveller' wrote
from Portsmouth seeking to reassure Palmerston as the Greek question brought
foreign policy to the fore and the Don Pacifico debate loomed:
I think it only right that you should know the feeling of the people
generally of this country toward you at such a time as this & more
particularly when the leading paper of the day is so
mis-representing every thing connected with the Foreign Policy of
the Country. Sensible Englishmen are proud My lord to think they
have so experienced & excellent a statesman filling the office you
now do
- you may depend you have their entire confidence. I visit
many Towns & converse with numbers & I can safely say My
Lord your Foreign Policy is approved by the very great majority &
we all trust (as we feel sure) you will for many many years
continue to serve the Country in your present official situation.
The Times paper perhaps in the pay of the Despots does not
represent the opinions of the people of this country on Foreign
questions.63
A newspaper editor, James Birch of the World, was also keen to redress the false
impression given in certain quarters, notably the Times, of the state of Palmerston's
standing in the country at large:
It is impossible now to penetrate into any circle
- high or low - to
travel by land or water
- whether you enter the aristocratic Club -
or the humble free and easy or sans souce [sic] of the artisan
- the
mart of commerce
- or the threepenny omnibus - without hearing
the policy of Lord Palmerston discussed - and as much as it is
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discussed - warmly applauded. Your Lordship I do believe is now
one of the most popular Ministers that ever swayed the destiny of
affairs in England.64
Such, then, was the reported state of feeling when Palmerston was called to account
by the House of Commons after a defeat for the government in the Lords over his
handling of the affairs of Greece and of Don Pacifico in particular. Riding the wave
of popular enthusiasm, Palmerston, whom the editor of the Sun in a letter to a
Colonel Freeston described as 'one of the manliest intellects in England; one of the
noblest statesmen in all Europe, perhaps the wisest and certainly the most
accomplished diplomatist who ever directed the foreign affairs of our Country', did
indeed appear to carry with him 'the hearty sympathies of the people'.65 Allusions to
Palmerston's manliness and Englishness were common affirmations of his popular
standing as the strong, true patriot of the nation. Masculinity itself became an
important aspect of British political identity, grounded in no small degree in the
public school system which emphasised the importance of 'manly', physical
demonstrations of strength. As W. Turley wrote in 1872, 'a nation of effeminate
enfeebled bookworms scarcely forms the most effective bulwark of a nation's
liberties'.66 Even at Rugby, under Dr Arnold supposedly more liberal than other
schools,67 the bookish George Arthur of Tom Brown's Schooldays ends his school
career triumphantly scoring runs for the first eleven and agreeing with Tom Brown
that cricket, 'more than a game ...an institution', was still, 'the birthright of British
boys old and young, as habeas corpus and trial by jury are of British men'.68
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Palmerston's own sporting interests allied him closely with such an institutional
national identity.
Thus it was that the Foreign Secretary did not find allies wanting at this time
and declarations of support came in from all over the country, offering on occasion
practical assistance, such as from James Aspinall who wrote from Bawtry in
Yorkshire enclosing a copy of the Albion, a Liverpool newspaper which had printed
a very hostile account of the Lords' censure of Palmerston's foreign policy, criticising
Stanley's laboured and insulting speech, and observing further that 'of the Earl of
Aberdeen's twaddling mediocrity in this debate it would be a waste of words to
speak', whilst concluding that the end result was that 'Lord Palmerston stands higher
than ever in the estimation of his countrymen'. 'I believe that I can induce many of
the liberal papers in this district to adopt the same tone', promised Aspinall.69 On the
day of Palmerston's contribution to the debate in the Commons, he found his arrival
at the House warmly cheered and when finally he had delivered his speech applause
once more rang out, this time from the public gallery and later outside once again.70
To some, Palmerston had made a poor job of defending himself, however. In
a letter to Palmerston published as a pamphlet, 'a Greek Gentleman1, who had
hitherto been disposed to regard Palmerston as 'the Ulysses of the Foreign Office
-
versatile, plausible, ingenious, and acute', found now these qualities wanting: 'It was
a wonderful performance,' he acknowledged, 'and had an astonishing effect. You
touched the sublime of clap-trap, and roused an accompanying enthusiasm'.
Palmerston's employment of the principle of citizenship the writer found
questionable and he charged the Foreign Secretary with possessing a very thin
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understanding of the true state of affairs in Greece. Other abuses committed by the
Greek government Palmerston had paid little attention to and now, in the case of
Don Pacifico, such was Palmerston's acquaintance 'with the details of the reasons for
which you have gone to the extent of endangering the peace of Europe, that there is
no such case whatsoever in the list of claims'.71 Whilst this pamphleteer might have
grasped the essence of the debate, he had missed its point. Few observers were
particularly concerned with the rights or wrongs of Don Pacifico's case or the
legitimacy of his claims. It was, being a debate about the relative constitutional
positions of the Lords and Commons in the sense that the question was whether or
not the Lords had the authority to effect the dismissal of a minister or indeed a
government, by extension a debate about Palmerston's continued tenure of the
Foreign Office. Thus, as Keeling has observed, Palmerston strove to present the
attack on his foreign policy as a conspiracy against him personally.72
In the aftermath of the debate, Palmerston's victory was applauded widely
throughout the country. Local newspapers such as the Renfrewshire Reformer and
Glasgow Saturday Post made sure that Palmerston was acquainted with their
approval of his conduct by sending him cuttings, whilst the Sligo Champion, an Irish
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Tory paper, reiterated the perception of Palmerston as the patriot hero by describing
him as 'a second Chatham - one equal to him in vigour of mind - in perspicacity,
brilliancy and strength'.73 From other quarters, tributes to his manly conduct and
'noble generous and patriotic course' confirmed the impression that Palmerston had
done much to consolidate, even enhance, his popular image of the masculine English
minister.74 Popularly, at least it seemed, Palmerston had convinced certain numbers
amongst the British people that he was their ablest minister. His appeal went beyond
the political appeal of nationalist interest and won admiration from other quarters
too, as Edwin Budell, author of a hand-book, The British Tariff, 1850-51, observed
in a letter to the Foreign Secretary:
Your Lordship has indeed heard the triumphant cheers of the
senate and of the club, but not less grateful would it have been to
your Lordship to have heard, as day by day I have heard, from men
of various shades of political opinion, and of all grades of
mercantile pursuits, the most emphatic expressions of admiration
and delight, in reference to Your Lordship's memorable speech
-
which contained an exposition of policy that made many Converts,
by its eloquent force & conclusive argument.75
The mercantile classes, already growing disenchanted with the shortcomings of
Cobdenite policies and sensing that financial reform was all but exhausted, looked
ever more favourably on the promise of Palmerstonian force to defend commercial
interests and thus found in the Don Pacifico debate an early vindication of their
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defection.76 As the Manchester Guardian, mouthpiece of the Manchester
entrepreneurial classes observed:
The merchants of this neighbourhood are largely embarked in
foreign commerce, and have numerous establishments scattered
over the world, in countries under every variety of government,
and in every stage of civilisation. We imagine they will not hear
with much satisfaction that, in the deliberate opinion of the British
house of lords, they are entitled to, and must expect to receive, no
other protection, in their persons or their property, than that which
they can obtain from a due enforcement of whatever law may
happen to exist for the time in the country in which their
establishments are.77
Palmerston's speech demonstrated, if nothing else, the Guardian maintained, that
there were two discernible principles of British foreign policy: political freedom and
freedom of trade. 'In this point of view', ran a leading article four days after the close
of the debate, 'we consider that the rights of individual and of nations, are the same;
and though either may erroneously exercise those rights, there can be no more doubt
of their existence in the one case, than in the other'.78 Palmerston promised thus to
protect commercial interests, which was more than could be said for the mercantile
classes' erstwhile figureheads, Cobden, and, to a lesser extent, Bright. The Guardian
was highly critical of the opposition from Cobden and Bright to Roebuck's motion
upon which the Don Pacifico debate was founded suggesting that the failure of the
motion and the implicit censure of Palmerstonian foreign policy 'would have
blighted their most cherished policy at home, and endangered the progress of all they
profess to hold dear in the condition of European states'.79 The Guardian's readers
appeared to agree and letters to that paper confirmed the popular approval of
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Palmerston's course and simultaneously expressed dissatisfaction with the position
taken up by Cobden and Bright.80 The effects of this demonstration of typical
Palmerstonian determination were still felt in the early years of Palmerston's own
premiership: his stature into the late 1850s amongst the Manchester business
community, Gatrell asserts, 'rested in large measure on the fact that he had
guaranteed that protection without equivocation'.81 He had shown himself to be
unswerving in the pursuit of British interests and had managed to tie that in with a
demonstration of sympathy towards liberalism across Europe. He won the approval
of people across the social and political spectrum.
It is not surprising, then, that when Palmerston was dismissed in December
1851, his going was deeply regretted. As with the national newspapers, which had
failed to acknowledge the force of Palmerston's personal popularity in 1850 at the
time of the Pacifico debate, his fall in December 1851 was seen widely in terms of a
personal loss, the loss of the English minister. Apprehensive that the Foreign
Secretary might be pushed out in favour of a Grey or a Peelite, Bell's Life in London,
a sporting paper, warned in early December:
No, Lord John Russell, you had better get rid of twenty Lord
Grey's [Palmerston's emphasis], and preserve the respect,
obedience and loyalty of the Colonies, than sacrifice one Lord
Palmerston, and with him sacrifice the sense of England's national
independence. There is in England, and in such as are worthy of
the name of Englishmen (the intriguers who are trying to coerce
Lord John on this point are not worthy of it), no inclination to
truckle to foreign domination of any kind.82
Palmerston collected a variety of newspaper cuttings from this period, and not
surprisingly, they are all from articles displaying a sympathy for his cause, but it is
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interesting to note the diversity of their origins, and the uniformity of their
sentiments. The Dundee Courier was alarmed to witness the ill-treatment of
Palmerston, suggesting that the real causes of his removal were being masked and
the Foreign Secretary's policy was not so out of line with the sentiments expressed in
other parts of the government. In Dublin, the Warder, an Orange newspaper clearly
concerned about France and the renewed threat posed by Catholicism, regarded the
events of December as 'the most unseasonable exhibition of "the white feather," as
of the most calamitous augury for the ultimate interests of peace', whilst from
London the Morning Advertiser, originally a publican's paper, though by this time
much more widely read, asked: 'Will Englishmen submit to this?', doubting surely
that they would acquiesce in the sacrifice of 'the most English Minister1 ever to hold
the seals of the Foreign Office being '"basely" sacrificed to the despotic Courts of the
Continent'. A letter to the Lincolnshire Times of February 1852 suggested that
perhaps they would not.83
Letters of support emphasised three crucial reasons for bemoaning
Palmerston's removal: the threat to national honour, the ill-treatment of the people's
hero, and the precarious state of European affairs. His claims to represent England
were unquestionable, as a former Cambridge contemporary observed,84 whilst the
'People's Minister' (as the Mayor of Southampton described him) was the one upon
whom 'the people' relied above all others.85 As far as Europe was concerned, such a
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veteran diplomat could scarcely be spared at this moment.86 Patriotism by the late
1840s no longer stood so clearly for opposition to government, as it had at the end of
the eighteenth century, but it did, amongst the radicals, encapsulate a certain sense of
fraternal internationalism.87 In this sense could Britain, the home of freedom, be
regarded as the natural defender of liberties abroad.
Onwards again on the glad path of duty,
Onwards a joy and a blessing to be;
And blest be the spirit, the patriot spirit,
That snapt our fetters and bade us go free.88
"
On this basis Palmerston could invert the traditional antagonism towards France
-
and in December 1851 the return of a Bonaparte to the head of the French
government was viewed widely with suspicion and unease
- and be held up as the
defender of liberty and peace. Having established himself, rhetorically, as the
defender of these principles, public opinion had grounds upon which to believe that,
however much the spectre of earlier Napoleonic menace might now be resurrected,
Palmerston still stood as the defender of the national interest.
Having seen the Foreign Secretary dismissed, not all was despair, however.
The Leicestershire Mercury hoped that in time Palmerston's 'brilliancy' and 'genius'
would once again be recognised and that 'then shall we speedily see his lordship
carried back to office on the shoulders of the people'.89 The Morning Advertiser
suggested that the people of the City of London now had a duty to demonstrate their
86 See J Davidson, The Fall of the Pope, and the Fate of the French President (London and
Aberdeen, 1852), which concludes: 'But, whatever be the cause [of Palmerston's resignation], never
could the Queen's government less spare the veteran diplomatist than at this juncture in Foreign
affairs. The continent of Europe is now in such a precarious condition, that the "war of opinion'"
predicted by Mr Canning, may suddenly burst forth - a conflict more terrific than any of the great
battles fought from Marathon to Waterloo' (p.7). Davidson sent this pamphlet to Palmerston on 17
Jan. 1852, (Broadlands Papers, GMC/76; GMC/76/enc.l) Clearly in any 'war of opinion', it was
necessary to have at the helm a statesman who was well versed in such popular politics.
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dissatisfaction with the current representative of that parliamentary seat, Russell, by
replacing him with Palmerston.90 Indeed, Palmerston had already been approached
by the City of London Tradesman's Club who had just such an objective in view, as
did Henry Berkeley, the liberal MP for the City of Bristol when he asked Palmerston
to join him in the next contest as a second liberal member for that constituency, and
Mr A. Drummond who wrote inviting Palmerston to stand for the liberal interest for
the City of Glasgow at the next election. To each of these requests, Palmerston
gratefully acknowledged the honour of being approached, but answered that loyalty
to the electors of Tiverton, with whom he enjoyed an intimate and friendly
connection, prevented him accepting what would otherwise be a very tempting
offer.91
Soon the shock wore off, and Palmerston's supporters began to hope for more
than to secure his services as their new representative. Eager to portray events in the
best possible light, and recognising that this was an opportunity to undermine the
Russell group in the Whig party, they began to see Palmerston's departure from the
Cabinet not as a dismissal, rather as a liberation. The members of the Working
Men's Institution of Leamington Priors in Warwickshire congratulated Palmerston
on his 'withdrawal' from the government and a London correspondent acquainted
with that town's civic leaders observed that, less than a week after the news of his
removal became known, all over the city, and especially in the Lord Mayor's house,
Palmerston's name was widely mentioned ('"Long live Palmerston", "Palmerston for
90
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ever" - "Vive Palmerston" -') and it was felt that it would not be long before
Palmerston headed his own ministry.92
The Sheffield branch of the Rational Society welcomed Palmerston's
dismissal on just these grounds. At a general meeting in January 1852, the Society
rejoiced 'in the liberation of Lord Palmerston from the thraldom of office', whilst
Ambrose Brewin wrote again from Tiverton, this time to express the hope that 'a
little cessation of intense labour will give you fresh strength and recruit the effect of
past toils'.93 There was a sense that Palmerston was being feted as the
saviour-in-waiting of his country. From Kent the Reverend Clotworthy Gillmor
wrote to say that he believed that 'the talent, the energy, & the Protestantism of Lord
Palmerston ...[will] come to the rescue of England', and another correspondent
hoped that although he had 'only the Ace (the People) and Knave of Trumps in
hand', he would be able to return to office as 'the Guardian of the Protestant Religion
and the freedom of England'.94 Here is a very clear invocation of the very essence of
the patriotic hero: godly and determined in the maintenance of liberty and freedom.
Clearly there was still a latent Protestant feeling into which Palmerston, or
Palmerstonism, could tap. The Reverend Gillmor almost certainly was excited by
the concern over 'papal aggression' which since about 1850 had threatened to
re-establish the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Britain and which signalled absolutism
and an end of religious liberty.95 Anti-papist feeling was still apparently widespread
92 Address by the Members of the Working Men's Institution of Leamington Priors,
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1851, Broadlands Papers, GMC/97
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in the 1850s and so there was still a keen disposition within certain sections of
society to celebrate the Protestantism of Britain over the popery of the continent.96 It
is significant, then, that in a street ballad proclaiming 'The Political Alphabet for
1855','F:
Stands for Palmerstone [sic],
Who will his duty do,
Kill Puseyites and Jackabites [sic],
And all the Russian crew.97
This prematurely raises the issue of Palmerston as Prime Minister, yet in early 1852,
there were already voices advocating just such a role for Palmerston. And in
championing the cause of Palmerston's claims for the premiership, supporters were
urged to discount Palmerston's supposed anti-reform (anti-democratic?) tendencies
and focus instead on the potential he promised for uniting the nation: in the shape of
a hero-governor, such as Prime Minster Palmerston, national greatness and honour
would be assured and the tacit and symbolic inclusion of the disenfranchised 'people'
would more than compensate for any perceived lack of political reform. Indeed,
would not the nation be freer under such a ruler? As 'an Edinburgh Elector' warned
in a letter to the Edinburgh News:
Thus the Daily News writes - 'Lord John Russell promises us a
new reform Bill. Let us see what it will be like before we try to
upset him in favour of one whose opinions on reform are far less
known than those of the present Premier.'
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Electors, and people of Britain, beware of this piece of
cunning and carry back Lord Palmerston as Premier to the
Councils of Her Majesty and of the nation in favour of Kossuth,
down-trodden nationalities, and the independence of this land
from foreign dictation.98
Not everyone shared in these hearty aspirations for Palmerston's future career,
however. The Manchester Guardian's, immediate reaction was one of 'regret if not
alarm', and the leading article which first considered Palmerston's resignation
declared that 'nothing but the triumph of principle can reconcile us to his loss'.99
Upon more mature reflection though, the Guardian tempered this view with the
suggestion that Palmerston, aware of his great popularity in the nation at large, was
perhaps becoming something of a liability: 'A long series of great successes', a
leading article noted, 'had undoubtedly given to Lord PALMERSTON a confidence
which, to say the least, was dangerous, in so delicate a matter as foreign
diplomacy'.100 The re-alignment in Manchester politics towards Palmerston was
clearly a more gradual process than Gatrell's thesis allows. Nevertheless, even those
elements which saw some good in Palmerston's removal - with the exception of the
more extreme interests such as the republican movement led by figures such as
William James Linton101 - still expected great things from Palmerston in the future.
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In the same article which criticised the over-confidence of the displaced minister, the
Guardian concluded that: 'Lord PALMERSTON has acted with many sets of
politicians; but there is one uniform characteristic of all his changes;- he always
went forward;- he never took a step backward, and he will not do so now'. There
was no reason to expect him to desert his principles and erstwhile sympathies
- 'all
of the most liberal kind' - and thus his contribution to parliament would still be a
force for good.102
iii) '"The coming man" in the legislature': Palmerston and extra-parliamentary
opinion, 1852-1855
The Times might have believed that Palmerston's political force was spent by
December 1851,103 but that was not a view widely held in the country, and with little
grounds for justification once Palmerston had returned to the ministerial fold in
December 1852. Little matter that he now served under Lord Aberdeen, as Home
Secretary: foreign affairs, and particularly the Eastern question, were coming to the
boil and it was Palmerston whom many clearly hoped would take a lead. When, by
the summer, Palmerston still seemed to be playing second-fiddle to the leadership of
Aberdeen and Russell and relinquishing claims to the Foreign Office in favour of
Clarendon, one anonymous correspondent asked:
What can have become of you? Your friends say that you are
frightened at Nicholas. Your Enemies, that you have sold the
Liberties of Europe to him and are preparing to become a Cossack.
I try to reassure both
- that you are biding your time and may
shortly be expected to flash out as of yore....
Oh, my Lord,! I did ever hope better Things of you and that
whilst you bind [?] Europe would not verify Napoleon's Prediction
102 Manchester Guardian, 31 Dec. 1851
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by becoming a Cossack. But it is a sad Condition that you are
placed in! And you friends sorrowfully pray that you could
emancipate yourself from the tame elephants.104
Whilst Palmerston may have been making progress in his domestic reforms,
attracting 'a new and widely extended public attention to the subject' of smoke
abatement, as Edwin Chadwick noted,105 chief among his identifiable characteristics
was his association with foreign policy. In September 1853 he received honours
from two sources in Scotland. The Guild Incorporation of Perth bestowed the
freedom of the Corporation on Palmerston in recognition 'particularly of the firm,
manly, independent and truly British spirit uniformly displayed by his Lordship,
more especially when in the management of the foreign relations of the United
Kingdom'.106 Still prominent too are the symbolic images of heroic leadership:
strong-willed, manly and in the interests of the nation; and significantly, given the
common feeling that the main challenge of the Crimean War was as a test of the
abilities of the traditional ruling class to manage the war efficiently (these terms are
important),107 Palmerston's standing as no less an able manager than he was a
member of the aristocratic elite is important.
These sentiments were echoed at the same time in Glasgow where
Palmerston was granted the more prestigious honour of the freedom of the City. In
his formal speech presenting Palmerston with the freedom, the Lord Provost referred
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Lord Palmerston is in earnest about it and therefore they are all stirring
- because they expect him to
go to this as he does to most other things
- vigorously and efficiently'.
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to Palmerston being 'considered by your countrymen as the greatest statesman of the
age, and the most distinguished public man of your day. (Loud cheers)' and
highlighted 'the courage and determination you have so often displayed in protecting
the interests and the privileges of your countrymen abroad - (loud cheers)
- or the
manner in which you have upheld the honour and maintained the dignity of your
Sovereign and your country. (Loud cheers)'. Even the one reference made to
Palmerston's current tenure of the Home Office was vague and emphasised still the
national character of the value to the country of Palmerston still serving 'in so
prominent place in her Majesty's Councils'.
In his acceptance speech, Palmerston praised the virtues of an enlightened
and civilised society in which such honours as he was now in receipt of were all the
more valuable, and then turned to Lord John Russell and Thomas Babington
Macaulay whom, as the Lord Provost had boasted in his speech, had also been
similarly honoured. It perhaps jarred with Palmerston to be thus compared with
Lord John, but he took advantage of the situation and it is interesting to consider the
qualities which he perceived he and Lord John shared. He described Lord John as
'the most energetic, the most consistent, the most persevering champion of the cause
of civil and religious liberty in every quarter of the world'. On this basis, it was
probably true that holding the freedom of the city in common with Russell added to
the satisfaction of that honour. Likewise, Palmerston praised Macaulay's 'rare
faculty of combining in his person the sagacity, the wisdom, and the practical
experience of a statesman, with that intellectual distinction which qualifies him to be
one of the greatest historians this country has ever produced'. By implication
therefore, Palmerston was underlining his own libertarian and wise and sagacious258
conduct; appropriating the finer attributes of those with whom he was compared for
his own self-enhancement. In common with the bestowers of the honour,
Palmerston spoke primarily of his record in foreign affairs, and also made a good
deal of his attempts to suppress the slave trade, which he surely knew would gratify
non-conformist consciences with its moralistic overtones and more than that,
reinforce the notion that, as Colley puts it, 'Great Britain was still Israel, and its
crusade against slavery was just one more vital proof and guarantee of its supremacy
among the nations'.108 He reiterated his belief in the principles which had
underpinned the famous 'civis Romanus sum' speech and talked of the responsibility
he had felt to promote free and constitutional government throughout the world. By
contrast, of his present employment he said simply: 'I can only say, in regard to the
department which is now committed to my charge, that I shall always be thankful to
any one who may suggest improvements, pointing out what may in their opinion be
wrong, and enabling me to set that which is wrong right1.109 Here was no pro-active
manifesto: Palmerston it seemed had learned the value of courting popular support
for his foreign policy and now sought also popular guidance for his domestic policy.
It was, perhaps, a tacit admission that he had neither the desire nor the foresight to
propose a grand scheme of domestic reforms.
Palmerston's real vision and grandiloquence, which swayed his
extra-parliamentary audiences, found their expression in the domain of foreign
affairs only. However sincere Palmerston might have been in the reforms he
pursued at the Home Office it was still with foreign affairs that people most readily
associated him and it was in this respect that, primarily, Palmerston regarded
108
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himself. Even when Palmerston offended Protestant feeling in his domestic
measures
- refusing, for example, to sanction a day of fast and prayer in the face of a
request from Edinburgh presbyters concerned about the threat of cholera in October
1853, and, the following year, actually pleading for the pay of Roman Catholic
Chaplains110
- he continued to stand, in many ways, as an important counter-point to
a Catholic alternative, as a Protestant guardian of the nation.
War in the Crimea
For the working classes foreign events which were most likely to attract their
attention were those with militaristic or sensationalist aspects. Thus the diplomatic
implications of the Crimean War were not analysed but as a war involving British
interests, it was soon boiled down to a conflict between good (liberalism as
embodied by Palmerston and, somewhat ironically, the Sultan) and bad (Tsarist
reaction and Prince Albert).111 Here, then, support for Palmerston was easily won.
For Radicals, the issues were more complicated. As Miles Taylor has shown,
allegiances were not determined so readily. The very nature of the dispute
-
extra-European
- was an initial problem and was not alleviated by the view that this
was a conflict between two different types of absolutism: the Mahommedian
(essentially 'un-European') illiberal and moribund Ottoman empire versus the
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aggression of the absolutist Tsar. But as accounts of Russian barbarism became
more widely known, and sympathy for Greek Christians who were portrayed as
victims of religious intolerance took hold (emphasising thereby the inconsistencies
in the logic which determined allegiances over this question), 'the threat posed by an
empire in the ascendant was far more menacing than that of an empire in decline',
Taylor suggests.112 With little effort, Turkey could be portrayed as the ally of
European liberalism: the country which had offered sanctuary to Kossuth in 1849,
for example. Sympathy for Russian satellites such as Poland and Hungary, also
fuelled latent Russophobia."3 So much so, indeed, that an alliance with France for
the purposes of having 'a go in at the old Russian bear' seemed quite natural."4 The
marrying of the working and radical classes' support for the war found its logical
expression then in ballads such as 'John Bull and the Russians' which appeared at
street level:
The Russian's pride must be brought down, in
spite of his imperial crown,
For England fears no tyrant's frown, her sons
are born to freedom.
He robbed poor Poland of her rights, though
she sustained a hundred fights,
Now let him try his boasted might against our
British cannon....
The Hungarians felt the tyrant's screw, when he
112
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pinched the aged nobles through,
And flogged the backs of women, too, but,
now now [sic] he'll pay the piper.115
With the exception of Bronterre O'Brien, all Chartist leaders found themselves
joining other radicals in support for Palmerstonian approaches to the Eastern
question in the early 1850s."6 Palmerston was the one statesman who was believed
to be capable of standing above faction and preventing the administration of the war
'falling into the chicanery and secrecy of the Foreign Office'."7
Whether or not it was connected, when Palmerston resigned from the Cabinet
in December 1853, he did so in the knowledge that outside Parliament he was still
widely apprehended as the government's ablest manager of foreign policy,
particularly significant at a time when the country appeared to be on the point of
going to war in the East. Concurrently, he was, as certain sources within Parliament
attested at this time, riding high at Westminster. C.H. Frewen, an independent
Member of Parliament, suggested that seven eighths of the Conservative party in the
Commons and many independents such as himself, would support Palmerston as
Prime Minister."8 Throughout 1854 indeed, whilst the talk around the Cabinet table
might have been about replacing Newcastle with Palmerston as War Secretary,
outside those closed quarters the debate was whether (perhaps even when)
Palmerston should become the Prime Minister. Certainly there was little regard for
Aberdeen's 'unstatesman-like views' among the 'Inhabitants of London' who had
addressed a protest to the Lord Mayor about Aberdeen's speech in the House of
Lords of 19 June 1854 which, they felt, stood in stark contrast to the 'manly and truly
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British declarations' of the Cabinet's anti-Aberdonians, Russell and Clarendon.119 In
September 1854 E. Davies sent Palmerston a letter enclosing a copy of a pen portrait
which he had composed and published in an un-named London weekly journal. The
sketch of Palmerston's character acknowledged the difficulty in seeking to label
Palmerston's political affiliations (without engaging in the debate) and praised his
abilities and his industry. 'His importance is felt so much in the whole kingdom, by
almost all parties,' it continued, 'that he is looked upon as the only one to be an
efficient English premier'. He was free from party ties (though able to unite a broad
spectrum of opinion), his character 'peculiarly masculine' and English, and his habits
gentlemanly. 'The country expects much from him', the article concluded: 'We
believe that he is "the coming man" in the legislature. It is possible that
circumstances may shortly bring about such changes as to place him where he ought
to be, in the government of this great country'.120 When John Bright needed a police
escort to defend him against protesters in his own Manchester constituency angry at
his anti-interventionist stance, it was only further evidence of the extent to which
Palmerston had secured the support of the Manchester commercial classes.121
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The problem for those opposing Palmerstonian approaches was that in London, where the debate was
liveliest, opposition was weakest (see rest of this chapter).263
'The Captain of Shams': Extra-parliamentary criticism of Palmerston
There was criticism of Palmerston, however. A pamphlet published in 1854 entitled
Palmerston for Premier! set about testing the validity of claims for just such a
campaign. In a systematic destruction of Palmerston's record on questions of foreign
policy tracing his career through the history of his diplomatic engagements and
dealings with questions relating to Persia, Poland, Cracow, Greece, China, The Vixen
(a British schooner confiscated by a Russian man-of-war in 1836), Don Pacifico and
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the un-named author concluded that the charges laid
down by David Urquhart should not be dismissed as mere Russophobia and that
rather Palmerston should accurately be seen as responsible for engineering 'the union
of England and Russia'. Russia, it continued, 'now believes that the time has arrived
for the accomplishment of the will of Peter the Great, and she is about to strike her
grand blow for universal empire!'; this was not the time, then, to install Palmerston,
whose past policies had 'mainly contributed to make Russia what she is at the
present day', as Prime Minister.122 A similar approach was taken by Washington
Wilks in a pamphlet entitled Palmerston in Three Epochs. After detailing
Palmerston's misdeeds, Wilks too urged that Palmerston's claims be passed over:
His brilliant tongue might continue to conceal an un-English
policy, until, the victim of his own false Liberalism, he involved
himself in ruin by involving the country in an irretrievable
calamity. Better, better far, to await the advent from amidst the
strife of emulative patriots, of a true embodiment of English force
and honesty,
- than again expose ourselves to disasters which we
cannot bear alone, and yet on none can shift the blame. In the
commencement of a contest of terrible realities, it will be the best
augury of victory that we have dismissed a 'Captain of Shams' into
the limbo of exploded reputations.123
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It is significant that a large proportion of the pamphlet literature concerning
Palmerston for the decade under review, and especially that for the 1850s, in any
discussion of foreign policy identifies David Urquhart as his chief antagonist.
Urquhart was a curious political force in the mid-nineteenth century, a former
diplomat whose subsequent career, superficially at least, seemed concerned primarily
with pursuing Palmerston and charging him with being a Russian spy.124 Over the
Crimean War he was an early and vociferous opponent of British intervention on
behalf of Turkey and in September and October of 1853 he began delivering a series
of speeches around the country calling for a greater involvement of 'the people' in
foreign affairs. He couched his attacks on the government in terms of challenging
the evil of 'secret diplomacy', but he meant to condemn the whole of the Cabinet for
going to war with Russia with a Russian agent in their midst.
The logic of Urquhart's attacks was tortuous, but in the event this was
perhaps of little consequence. His oratorical skills were very poor and it is reported,
for instance, that at a meeting at the London Tavern the man who rose to second
Urquhart's resolution admitted that he could not understand the second part of it and
when this particular meeting moved its resolutions it was remarkable that amongst
the names most loudly cheered was that of Palmerston.125 This is a most important
example, which partly explains why Palmerston was able to overcome opposition to
his policies at the grass roots level. For whilst politics was increasingly a subject
124 For background on Urquhart see: M.H. Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David
Urquhart, 1833-56, with special reference to the affairs of the Near East', (unpublished PhD thesis,
University of London, 1964); R. Shannon, 'David Urquhart and the Foreign Affairs Committees', in P.
Hollas (ed.), Pressure from Without in early Victorian England (London, 1974); M. Taylor, 'The Old
Radicalism and the New: David Urquhart and the Politics of Opposition, 1832-1867', in E.F. Biagini
and A.J. Reid (eds.), Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism. Organised Labour and Party
Politics in Britain, 1850-1914 (Cambridge 1991), 23-43; C. Webster, 'Urquhart, Ponsonby and
Palmerston', English Historical Review, LXII (1947); A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers (London,
1985edn.),pp.40-67
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with national implications, and whilst Palmerston was keen to win over provincial
interests such as the Manchester commercial classes, the debate over key questions,
such as foreign policy and especially in the case of the Crimean situation in 1853
and 1854 was London-centric. As Antony Taylor has demonstrated, pro-Palmerston
feeling was particularly strong in London, if only because the opposition there was
so weak.126 Urquhart might have courted popular support all over the country, but
the foundation of his support was pre-eminently northern,127 and in terms of popular
politics, relying on strong oratorical performances and wide-ranging reporting of the
same, the bias was definitely towards the capital, where significantly,
non-conformity was also at its weakest.
Yet the very core of Urquhart's supposed support has rightly come into
question recently. Miles Taylor has suggested that Urquhart's closest allies were not
the working classes Urquhart himself liked to claim he represented, but in fact were
much more middle class figures such as Charles Attwood, George Crawshay and
Isaac Ironside - three of Urquhart's 'staunchest colleagues'
- who had 'inherited the
manufacturing and mercantile wealth of their fathers, and Stewart Rolland who was
a newspaper proprietor.128 Letters from Urquhart's friends and agents around the
country suggest even more clearly the mis-direction (or mis-interpretation) of
Urquhart's social targets. In Manchester, Langley told Urquhart, there was a lack of
direction and 'I am every day more and more convinced that a meeting here got up
merely by a few working men would be damaging'.129 Indeed, the potential of the
126
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working classes in Manchester seemed especially poor: Tor twenty years there has
been a political organisation here,' wrote Langley again, but, 'during the last two
years it has disappeared and nearly every leading man amongst the working classes,
disgusted at the apathy and ingratitude of those for whom he had laboured has retired
altogether from public life1.130 Elsewhere, the prospects of rousing support seemed
just as bleak. In Wolverhampton and Birmingham, reported William Peplow, 'there
is no life in those towns' and on behalf of Urquhart, Peplow wrote to an un-named
source to ask if 'you cannot do something in Macclesfield towards arousing the
nation to a sense of its Duty at this important crisis, while the honour & the Dearest
interests of it are being swamped by a Corrupt and imbecile Govt!'.131 According to
Taylor, Urquhartism was not a movement concerned with activating the working
classes, nor indeed was it primarily concerned with foreign policy. Free trade
liberalism, Taylor argues, was a key feature of Urquhart's programme and it was this
that particularly attracted the radicals. Commerce, Urquhart had stressed
throughout, should be a major determinant of British external policy: peace and
retrenchment were the ideals Urquhart promoted and in this, then, he was courting
the commercial classes in the manufacturing districts he visited and not the working
classes.132 Thus his antagonism towards Palmerston was largely personal (perhaps
he was still bitter about his treatment when a diplomat under an earlier period of
Palmerstonian management of the Foreign Office) and served as a conduit for more
serious complaints about executive influence and secret diplomacy. Ironically, and
as far as Urquhart was concerned, unfortunately, it was Palmerston whom radicals
130 S. Langley to David Urquhart, 26 Oct. [71853], Urquhart Papers 1:E3
131 William Peplow to David Urquhart, 'Friday night1 [71853]; William Peplow to ?, 11 Oct.
1853, Urquhart Papers 1:E3
132 Taylor, The Old Radicalism and the New: David Urquhart and the Politics of Opposition,
1832-1867', pp.26, 31,32267
saw as best able to guarantee and upright and true foreign policy, making him, as
Taylor illustrates, the chief beneficiary of the reform movement's anxieties about
secret diplomacy as Urquhart portrayed them.
In fact it was Louis Kossuth who charmed the people whom Urquhart sought
to win over and in meetings across the midlands and in London he consistently
overshadowed Urquhart's earlier performances in those districts.133 And as Kossuth's
speeches demonstrate, it was Palmerstonian interventionism that enjoyed the
broadest popular support at this time:
I am led to believe that, as well from a natural sympathy for
liberty, justice and right, as also from the instinctive knowledge of
the fact that the welfare, interest, and honour of England go all that
way, the people did and does not shrink from all the dangers and
sacrifices of a great war, by the only reason, because it means to
fight for freedom; because it believes that a real advantage to the
cause of oppressed nationalities will be the issue. I am led to
believe that it is by this reason, that the war is popular with the
people of England. Is it so, or is it not so? Please answer me. Am
I right or am I wrong in my supposition? (Cries of "yes")... How
is it that England is leaning just the other way, and her statesmen
straining every diplomatic nerve to ally despotic Austria to you?
Why, it is simply because the people of England has not
pronounced its will until now. Let that will be spoken, and, I trust,
there shall not be wanting good and true men in Parliament to
represent it, and to make the people's will efficient.134
It was Palmerston who sought and, it was hoped, would make this will efficient. It
was important that he should exploit such extra-parliamentary support, or sympathy
as it was here that opposition to him was weakest. It was within Parliament that he
found his antagonists most forceful and vociferous. Here could dissentient voices
such as Cobden's and Urquhart's, whose views were not ultimately dissimilar, at
least in their common suspicion of Palmerston,135 be most effectively expressed.
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Here Palmerston's successful cultivation of the role of 'Minister of England1 and his
'triumph' amongst former Cobdenites, stood him in good stead. The value of a
popular groundswell of support was felt beyond the confines of the Cabinet, where,
undoubtedly, such impressions did represent a significant and persuasive force, as-
has been seen in discussion of high political manoeuvring, but also in the wider
context of Westminster politics, this backing was not without consequence.
However successfully Palmerston had used the organs of the press to fight
his political battles by proxy and sway extra-parliamentary opinion, and however
well he had instilled in the country at large the idea of him as the defender of
national interests and the protector of liberties, he was still obliged to defend himself
in Parliament. It was still important to defend policies against parliamentary
opposition which to some extent, and particularly during the government's of Russell
and Aberdeen which never commanded large majorities, held the fortunes of the
ministry in its hands. Whatever strength Palmerston derived from beyond
Westminster, he could not dominate parliamentary contests on the back of that
alone.269
CHAPTER 6. NO ETERNAL ALLIES AND NO PERPETUAL ENEMIES:
PALMERSTON AND PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION, 1846-1855
i) The parliamentary arena: Lords and Commons
'The supposed political invincibility of Palmerston in 1855-6 had some reality
outside Parliament,' says John Vincent, 'but little inside Parliament where it
mattered'.1 This is certainly a valid argument, but it is questionable whether the
implication that extra-parliamentary support did not matter is sustainable. As the
previous chapter illustrated, Palmerston's support in the country at large was broad
and not inconsequential when it came to affecting the political beliefs and
inclinations of politicians. However, Vincent is right to point out that both as Prime
Minister and before, Palmerston could not manipulate opinion at Westminster as
effectively as he could that outside. It was in Parliament that opposition to his
policies and criticism of his conduct found their most meaningful voices. It was in
this arena that he was called upon to make his stoutest defences.
Despite the general acceptance that in the wake of the repeal of the Corn
Laws there was less ground separating political parties, in the House of Lords, party
was still a potent notion. The majority of peers remained loyal to a party (or political
group) and demonstrated a high degree of party consistency.2 Thus, Earl Grey,
1 J.R. Vincent, 'The Parliamentary Dimension of the Crimean War', Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 5th Series, Vol.31 (1981), p.37
2 J. Hogan, 'Party Management in the House of Lords, 1846-1865', Parliamentary History,
Vol.10, pt.l (1991), p. 124270
Palmerston's long-standing political adversary publicly suppressed his continuing
hostility towards Palmerston's foreign policy in the interests of Whig unity after
1845. On 5 May 1848, for example, Grey recorded in his journal that Stanley had
given notice that he intended to move in the Lords for the recent correspondence
between Bulwer and the Duke of Sotomayer to be laid before parliament. 'He did so
accordingly this ev'g1, noted Grey, '& made a very severe speech against Palmerston
but I am sorry to say his censure was quite as just as it was severe'.3 Two days later
he admitted that, this attack had caused a 'very great sensation in the political world'
which he hoped would lead to Palmerston's enforced retirement.4 Yet, despite such
hostility towards Palmerston's foreign policy, even Grey felt obliged to desist from
making such sentiments public. When the Sicilian guns issue became known in
early 1849, Grey was persuaded that Palmerston's position at the Foreign Office had
become untenable. He told Sir Charles Wood that this must be impressed upon
Russell and he would have done it himself had it 'not been for what happened in
Dec/45',5 but when he actually came to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister he
adopted a different tone:
At 11 I went to Ld John's we had much conversat[io]n about the
posit[io]n in which we are placed by this affair of the guns
furnished to Sicily wh ended in my saying that while I disapproved
of the course determined upon I will acquiesce in it rather than
take upon myself the responsibility of perhaps breaking up the
Govt. It was however clearly understood that I am not to be
expected to defend the proceeding in the Lds and Ld J admitted
that he thought it wd very likely lead to the defeat of the Govt in
both Houses.6
3 Third Earl Grey, Journal, 5 May 1848, Grey Papers (3rd Earl), Durham University Library,
C3/14
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For Grey at least, political differences were not necessarily to be allowed to translate
into partisan political conflicts for their own sake.
Whilst the Protectionists remained throughout this period the single largest
party in the Lords, during the Russell government of 1846-1852, ministers won 64 of
the 82 divisions they faced in the Lords on government bills or opposition
resolutions and censure motions.7 Significantly, however, one of those defeats was
over a question of foreign policy in the attack on Palmerston's and the government's
handling of the Don Pacifico affair.
In June 1850 Lord Stanley introduced a motion censuring the government's
handling of claims against the Greek government, claims which, he maintained,
were of a dubious and exaggerated nature and the pursuit of which could, and indeed
had, damaged British relations with other great powers.8 Palmerston, he said, was a
private friend, but this was no cause for leniency: 'I am bound here to speak, not of
the man, but of the Minister; and thus feeling and regarding him as a man, I must, in
this case, express my deep regret at the conduct which, as a Minister, he has felt it
his duty to pursue, and call upon your Lordships to recollect that this is no case in
which personal feelings ought to be indulged'.9 In reply, Lord Lansdowne, leader of
the government in the Lords, rose to rebut these charges. He was well acquainted
with the ministry's foreign affairs, and found himself frequently in accord with
Palmerston and found no great difficulty in dismissing Stanley's allegations.
Palmerston, Lansdowne declared, enjoyed the general support of the House of
Commons, an assembly, he asserted, in which 'the mercantile and manufacturing
7 J. Hogan, 'Party Management in the House of Lords, 1846-1865', Parliamentary History,
Vol.10, pt.l (1991), p.125
8 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., CXI, 1293-1332 (17 June 1850)
9 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXI, 1332 (17 June 1850)272
interests of the country and of the world are adequately represented', and in which
'there is a party which has adopted for its standard and watchword the preservation
of peace', and in which 'there has not, up to this moment, been one single intimation
of an intention to bring these transactions into question; but that the questions that
have been put upon this affair, when subjected to the test of fact and truth, have
vanished into air, and there has been left behind no recorded intimation of the
intention ever again to renew them'.10 The principle which underpinned the
government's policy, namely the right of subjects to demand protection abroad, was
legitimate, Lansdowne argued; indeed the enforcement of such rights, by force if
necessary, was not without precedent and not only had Britain adopted such a policy,
but so too, in the past, had France and the United States. If the current employment
of the principle had 'clouded' Britain's relations with any other power, that was
temporary and not cause of grave concern.11
At the end of the debate, in which the motion was carried by a majority of 37
against the government, it is not surprising to find Lansdowne's name in the list of
Non-Contents; it is perhaps a little more interesting to find also Earl Grey's name
there.12 At a Cabinet meeting held to discuss the government's response to this
defeat, Grey opposed an attempt to secure a counter vote in the Commons and
advocated simply a declaration that British subjects abroad would continue to
receive support from the British government, clearly acknowledging the force of the
Lords' censure. He allowed himself to be carried by the rest of the Cabinet,
however, and rather than pressing for a ministerial resignation, he ultimately
10 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXI, 1333 (17 June 1850)
11 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXI, 1333-1350 (17 June 1850)
12 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXI, 1401-1403 (17 June 1850). The voting figures for this debate were:
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accepted the party line that there should be no resignation and that the government
should seek a counter vote in the lower House, even though this determination, he
recorded in his diary, 'I have since seen reason to regard as a great error'.13
Parliamentary opposition in the House of Lords was certainly not
inconsequential. However, whilst it was possible for the government to suffer
defeats, careful party management and the development of more sophisticated
whipping procedures14 meant that much of what was transacted in the upper House
was somewhat theatrical. Indeed, ever since the passing of the 1832 Reform Act,
according to G.H.L. Le May, the upper house had ceased to dominate the legislative
process. Melbourne, Le May observes, ostentatiously refused to be undermined by
an adverse vote in the Lords whilst his ministry continued to enjoy the support of the
Commons and, significantly, the Crown, as he demonstrated in 1839 when the Lords
expressed no confidence in the government's Irish policy."
Even when the Lords did successfully censure the government, as over the
Don Pacifico affair, a successful counter vote in the House of Commons was
sufficient to overcome the effects of such a set-back. Thus in many ways the House
of Commons was the key arena for parliamentary debates over foreign policy during
this period, if only because more of its members were directly involved or interested
in such questions.
There were, arguably, three main types of opposition in the House of
Commons to Palmerston's policies during the decade under review. Each sought to
bring him to book before Parliament, but each was inspired and driven by different
13 Grey, Journal, 18 June 1850, Grey Papers (3rd Earl), C3/15
14 See J. Hogan, 'Party Management in the House of Lords', esp. pp. 127-149
15 G.H.L. Le May, The Victorian Constitution: Conventions, Usages and Contingencies
(London, 1979), p.l31274
aims and objectives. And whilst each failed to upset his inexorable rise to the
premiership, they failed because of peculiar inherent weaknesses as much as through
specific defeat at the hands of Palmerston. There was, firstly, the hostility to
Palmerston's foreign policy and management of the Foreign Office that was of an
essentially personal character, as typified by David Urquhart, which failed to
undermine Palmerston from without, tried from within and, failing there also, sought
once again to win converts beyond Westminster. Secondly there was the
party-political opposition, from the Conservatives, which was weakened by the
sympathy for Palmerstonianism from one of its chief protagonists, Benjamin
Disraeli, and from the factional nature of opposition politics. Finally, there was the
opposition from particular interest groups, most visibly in this period the Manchester
School, voiced especially by figures such as Cobden. This latter was perhaps the
most effective opposition in the sense that it was the most consistent
- elevating this
opposition into a system, Cobdenism - but it was ultimately undermined by
circumstances (primarily the Crimean War). Palmerston by 1855 was not invincible
within Parliament, but no-one had really found his Achilles' heel.
ii) The Urquhartite challenge
Urquhartism was one of the longest standing and bitterest campaigns against
Palmerston, yet whilst on occasion Urquhart and his acolytes might have had
justified grounds of complaint against Palmerston, they rarely, as the previous
chapter suggested, succeeded in making an accurate and impressive attack. David
Urquhart was, by profession, a diplomat. He had served at the Constantinople275
Embassy in the early 1830s, whilst Palmerston was at the Foreign Office, and
secured the support and even admiration of the Foreign Secretary whilst he served
there. Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to the Porte, wrote to Palmerston
about Urquhart in the most glowing terms in 1834 and Urquhart was accorded a
relatively free rein in the discharge of his duties.16 Urquhart's letters to Palmerston
for 1836 and 1837 demonstrate a professional correspondence and a generally
sympathetic disposition on Palmerston's part in his treatment of Urquhart as a
member of the diplomatic staff.17 Even when Urquhart's handling of the negotiations
for a commercial convention between Britain and Turkey began to irritate
Palmerston, he still regarded Urquhart as the man best suited to bring the
negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, even if this was, as Jenks suggests, because
Palmerston little understood the intricacies of these commercial affairs.18 Urquhart
himself insisted that his conduct was always consistent with British policy, although
there are signs, by the summer of 1837, of the rift between Urquhart and the Foreign
Office developing which Urquhart initially attributed to the malign influence of Lord
Ponsonby.19
Since 1835, however, Urquhart had been editing a polemical periodical, the
Portfolio, in which he published and discussed documents relating to foreign policy.
The tone of this journalism caused some consternation within government given
Urquhart's official connection with the Foreign Office, and by the late 1830s,
16 Ponsonby to Palmerston, 25 Nov. 1834 (rec'd 21 Jan. 1835), Broadlands Papers,
Southampton University Library, FO/H/1/enc.l
17 See, for example, Urquhart to Palmerston 1 Jan. 1836, Broadlands Papers, GC/UR/1; 26
May 1836 (GC/UR/2); 4/29 April 1836 (GC/UR/3)
18 M.H. Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart, 1833-56, with special
reference to the affairs of the Near East', (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1964),
pp.56-82
19
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Palmerston was keen not to confer upon Urquhart any official recognition. He told
his private secretary, Strangeways, late in 1837, that if Urquhart again called for an
interview, as he had arranged to do, and if Strangeways persisted in wishing to
receive him, 'pray tell him it is as Strangeways & not as Under Secy'.20 Evidently
Strangeways took Palmerston at his word and was known to Palmerston to be 'in the
habit of holding intimate communication' with Urquhart, but still refrained from
doing so in any official capacity.21 The Foreign Secretary's course appeared
judicious when in the aftermath of Urquhart's removal from his diplomatic post, the
character of his journalism became ever more extreme and poisoned against
Palmerston.22 Increasingly after 1840, Urquhart's attacks on Palmerston spoke of
treason and sought to portray him as a Russian agent. Only such an explanation
could account for Palmerston's failure to help Turkey in 1833, or his refraining from
challenging Russia over the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, or, far that matter, his
4,'*
decision to recall Urquhart himself.23
It became Urquhart's life mission to establish these beliefs as truths, and he
sought, initially, to solicit support from among his fellow countrymen. He fell in, to
20 Palmerston to Strangeways, 18 Dec. 1837, BP: FO/H/61. Contrast this with Palmerston's
reception of Kossuth in December 1851. Palmerston it seems, sincerely believed that it was perfectly
possible and consistent for a public figure to behave simultaneously as a public and a private person
and this perhaps suggests that his reception of Kossuth was not quite so much deliberately
provocative as simply ill-advised.
21 See Palmerston's discussion of Strangeways, Urquhart and the Portfolio in his Commons
speech of 1 March 1848, Hansard, 3rd sen, XCVII, 106-109, (quote from 108).
22 Not only had Palmerston advised Strangeways to exercise discretion in his dealings with
Urquhart but had himself rejected Urquhart's appeals for assistance with the expenses of the Portfolio
when in its infancy (see Urquhart to Palmerston, 25 Dec. 1837, Broadlands Papers, GC/UR/7).
23 Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart', p.2O5. In fact, Palmerston's
decision to recall Urquhart had been based on Urquhart's deviation from the line of British policy, as
Palmerston explained to Urquhart in the spring of 1837: 'It appears by that letter [from Urquhart to
Strangeways of 7 Dec. 1836] that you took steps with respect to Mr Bell's voyage in the Vixen, which
I regret to say were in my opinion wholly incompatible with your public duty as a diplomatic servant
of the Crown; & I should not think myself properly performing my own Duty if after a knowledge of
such a circumstance I were to continue you in the situation which you now hold' (Palmerston to
Urquhart, 10 March 1837 (Copy), Broadlands Papers, GC/UR/8).277
some extent, with the Chartists in the 1840s, but it was an uncomfortable alliance as
Urquhart saw even in Chartist uprisings evidence of Russian designs. Failing to
convince Chartist leaders of this danger, he settled for using Chartism as a platform
for attacking Palmerston and his foreign policy. It was a reasonably efficient
platform, however, as the Chartists for the time being adopted many of Urquhart's
views on foreign affairs, despite what Urquhart perceived as the Russianism of their
outlook (although he failed to illustrate this tendency effectively). As John Salt has
demonstrated, in a town like Sheffield Urquhart's views attracted considerable
support, although it is significant that his chief apologists there were figures such as
Isaac Ironside who admired what he saw as the essentially anti-governmental aspects
of Urquhart's system. Ironside, who provided Urquhart with an important medium
to propound his views in his paper the Sheffield Free Press, found in Urquhartism
the ultimate expression of his Chartist suspicion of local government.24 The system
of local administration which Urquhart expounded found a natural accommodation
in radical circles such as these.25
It was around this time, however, that Urquhart looked for potentially more
effective allies and struck up a connection with Disraeli, which Urquhart clearly
hoped would prove to be a channel through which his extra-parliamentary agitation
would find a parliamentary voice. The relationship between the two was never in
fact anything more than that of acquaintance, but Disraeli certainly saw in Urquhart
a valuable source of intelligence about foreign affairs.26
24 J. Salt, 'Local Manifestations of the Urquhartite Movement', International Review of Social
History, 13 (1968), pp.353-355
25 See below, pp.281-282
26 See below, pp.288-292278
Meanwhile, as extra-parliamentary pressure seemed to be having
comparatively little impact, Urquhart sought a parliamentary role for himself. He
contested and secured the parliamentary seat for Stafford in the general election of
1847 standing as a Tory, but winning his seat with some Chartist support and later
showing himself sympathetic to certain non-protectionist principles. Once in
Parliament, he found in Thomas Anstey a recent but committed addition to the
Urquhartite movement.27 Anstey, a barrister and a Catholic, was, during this
parliament, the MP for Youghal and whilst described as a Liberal, his political career
appears somewhat erratic and inconsistent. Having acted alongside Urquhart in the
later 1840s, Anstey was easily won over to Palmerston a decade later by means of a
little Palmerstonian flattery.28 Anstey's Urquhartism of the late 1840s speaks of little
more than a temporary commitment, one which, nevertheless, promised at this time
to be a useful source of Urquhartite strength which was still pre-eminently
extra-parliamentary.
As Miles Taylor argues, Urquhart actually shared many radical concerns over
questions of national expenditure (particularly the increasing army and navy
estimates since 1835) and a commitment to free trade, which, along with his
supposed Russophobia, underpinned much of his criticism of Whig foreign policy.29
Nevertheless, Palmerston was not to be let off the hook: Urquhart was not to be
distracted by sympathy for other radical causes from pursuing the treacherous
Russian in the Cabinet who held the seals of the country's Foreign Office. In
February 1848 he persuaded Anstey to introduce a motion in the House of Commons
27 See Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart', pp.262-263
28 J. Ridley, Lord Palmerston (London, 1970), pp.334, 524-525
29 M. Taylor, 'The Old Radicalism and the New: David Urquhart and the Politics of
Opposition, 1832-1867', in E.F. Biagini and A.J. Reid (eds.), Currents of Radicalism: Popular
Radicalism. Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914 (Cambridge 1991), pp.30-31279
for the production of papers relating to British foreign policy since 1830 as a
preliminary to an impeachment of Palmerston.30
On 1 March Palmerston came before the House to defend his record and
delivered a speech which deflected the assault made by Anstey (but with which there
was certainly much wider sympathy) and which has gone down as a defining
exposition of Palmerstonian politics. Anstey made a multi-headed charge against
Palmerston, in fact the motion comprised forty points of criticism, but as the Foreign
Secretary observed at the outset, he had 'skipped about from transaction to
transaction, and jumbled the various matters adverted to in his notice in such a
manner, that the topics of his speech might be likened to the confused mass of
luggage brought to the Custom-house by some of the continental steamboats, when
no man knows where he is to find his own'.31 Nevertheless, Palmerston proceeded to
address, as best he could, the charges point by point.32 In defence of a certain degree
of secrecy in diplomatic business, he argued that the competence of the Foreign
Secretary would be undermined if all of his transactions were made public (although
if the House wished to appoint a secret committee to go through the 2,775 volumes
of documents, he wished 'them joy of their task'). He claimed that Anstey's
arguments about the Treaty of Adrianople were ill-informed and charges against the
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi failed to appreciate the considerations by which it was
necessary to balance steadfast defence of minute details against a desire to go to war.
Palmerston acknowledged Urquhart's own role in helping to frame the Treaty of
Commerce of 1838, but pointed out that this did not give Urquhart a direct say in the
conduct of foreign policy and any belief that he had been wronged by the Foreign
30 Hansard, 3rd ser., XCVI, 291, 1132, (Feb. 1848)
31 Hansard, 3rd ser., XCVII, 67, (1 Mar. 1848)
32 Hansard, 3rd ser., XCVII, 66-123, (1 Mar. 1848)280
Secretary demonstrated a misunderstanding on the part of the Urquhartites of the
constitutional position of a Secretary to an Embassy.33 On the Treaty of 1840 and
other questions, Palmerston was adamant that enough information had already been
laid before Parliament and whilst happy to contest points, he felt confident that his
conduct would be borne out by the balance of information available. Many of the
charges were in some way designed to prove Palmerston's duplicitous connection
with the Russian court. This general charge Palmerston refuted directly:
...what then becomes of the charge which the hon. and learned
member makes against me of being such a determined instrument
in the hands of Russia? He says from 1830 to 1839, during the
nine years in which I was in the office I have now the honour to
hold, there had been such mutual distrust between the English and
the Russian Governments that it was necessary Baron Brunnow
should be sent as Ambassador to represent the real views of the
Emperor, in order to remove that distrust. I am satisfied with that
statement, which is likely to be true.34
Palmerston defended his conduct and handling of various affairs against such
charges and presented his policy as either misunderstood by Anstey, or as acquiring
validity through popular approval as in the case of the Treaty of Nankin, or in the
case of a genuine infringement of British interests or failure to fulfil obligations (as
it was perceived was the case with regard to Polish struggles against Russia), the
weighing of interests did not justify war. He concluded with the famous peroration
that Britain had no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only interests that were
eternal and perpetual, and in a catch-all defence of his career to date he finished by
saying: 'And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I
think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning,
33 This was ironic given that, as Asa Briggs has noted, in his Foreign Affairs Committees,
Urquhart directed that amongst the subjects for study were 'the Constitution of England: what it is', the
Privy Council, 'the necessity of Impeachment', 'why the law is the safeguard of our liberties' and, most
significantly, 'Ambassadors and their Use'. See A. Briggs, 'David Urquhart and the West Riding
foreign affairs committees', Bradford Antiquary, 39 (1958), p.2O4
34 Hansard, 3rd ser., XCVII, 80, (1 Mar. 1848)281
and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the
shibboleth of his policy'.35
Palmerston effectively crushed this Urquhartite assault with his
grandiloquence and confident manner. It was also both the first and last significant
attempt by the Urquhartites to effect a parliamentary defeat on Palmerston by direct
means. They had found little support for their course in the newspapers and within
Parliament, and both Anstey and Urquhart found their stock much diminished.
Jenks has written of the way in which any further parliamentary efforts of Urquhart's
were ridiculed, that is when they were listened to at all, for as is also noted,
whenever he attempted to speak there was often either a 'general exodus1 or 'obvious
impatience, occasionally amounting to uproar'.36 Urquhart continued to make
regular contributions to parliamentary debates throughout the session of 1849, but
his failure to make any meaningful impression
- an increasingly acute problem
- led
to a developing sense of disillusionment with parliamentary opposition. Indeed,
Urquhart's attendance at the House grew less frequent after 1849 and he did not
stand for re-election in 1852. Even when he did again attempt to stand for
Parliament, opposing Russell's re-election for the City of London in the summer of
1854 on the grounds that the Cabinet was employed in carrying out the designs of
Russia, he could not even find a proposer for his nomination.37
Certainly, as Miles Taylor suggests, ill health and personal impecuniosity
'may have taxed his enthusiasm', but it was the demise of the independent opposition
which coincided with, and, it seems, impacted upon, his sense of disappointment.
With Peelites, protectionists and radicals all drawing together to challenge Whig
35 Hansard, 3rd ser., XCVII, 123, (1 Mar. 1848)
36 Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart, 1833-56', pp.269-271, 272
37
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financial policy, the place of the independent voice seemed ambiguous, if not wholly
obscured.38 It was a significant blow to Urquhartite hopes. One of his parliamentary
ambitions had been to redress the wrongs of executive authority
- which he claimed
had been compromised by the system of William of Orange
- through the
re-introduction of traditional forms of local administration and government which
harked back to a non-specific golden age, extolling a certain romantic Tory ideal,
and the resumption by the privy council of its full rights and powers as a corrective
to the illegitimate construct, the Cabinet.39 He had hoped that Parliament would
execute this remedy, but as his own experience had sharply demonstrated, such
expectations were misplaced. Parliament, he later declared, was a 'bastard
imposition', undermining popular organisation and the council of the king.40
Parliamentary reform seemed henceforth to be a waste of time.
It was this sense of disappointment and failure which caused Urquhart to
look once more to extra-parliamentary forms of opposition, and hence his concern
with activating the interest and support of 'the people', most obviously through the
Foreign Affairs Committees, but also variously and in a less structured manner, as
the previous chapter illustrated. Corruption at the heart of political life, Urquhart
felt, meant that the nation was 'perishing through Faction'; only those untainted by
privilege were 'exempt from defilement' and henceforth, Urquhartite initiatives were
to be aimed at 'the more simple and unperverted' working men.41 Yet, as Richard
Shannon has shown, here again Urquhart's hopes were disappointed. Even at its
38 Taylor, 'The Old Radicalism and the New: David Urquhart and the Politics of Opposition,
1832-1867', p.31
39 See R. Shannon, 'David Urquhart and the Foreign Affairs Committees', in P. Hollis (ed.),
Pressure from Without in early Victorian England (London, 1974), p.242
40 Newcastle Foreign Affairs Committee, Limitation of the Supply of Grain. Constitutional
Remedies. Evidence of Mr Urquhart before the Above Committee (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1855),
p.25; quoted ibid, pp.242-243
41 Address of the Men of Birmingham to the People ofEngland (1855), p.4, quoted ibid, p.25O283
height, the Urquhartite movement's hold over the hearts of the working classes was
thin, and it does not appear to have established any meaningful sense of solidarity
with the constituency it aimed at and thus failed to negate a feeling of middle class
patronage of the workers.42 'We do not disparage what you have done for us,' wrote
Michael Rafferty from Birmingham:
your efforts for our improvement we appreciate, your labour to
impress us with a knowledge of our duties we applaud; for the
books and documents, from which we learned much we thank you
and for your own elucidations we are grateful. But Sir for the
'means' which sets us free from the pressure of hourly toil, recoils
about us and glaringly stamps us as subsidised Working men, of
which the majority of our Committee is formed, and poor as we
are and though perhaps we may be consigned to incessant bodily
labour, yet we would rather have remained ignorant of ministerial
treachery, and the wiles of diplomacy, together with Russian
aggression and Turkish subjection, Danish succession and
Austrian duplicity, than be branded as subsidists. Better by far had
you contented yourself with giving us instruction after our hours of
labour, than caused us to abstain from our usual occupation and
thereby left us open to the charge of paid tools bribed agents and
hired politicians. You will perhaps say, 'You should have seen
that at the time'. But how could we when judicial blindness
obscured our eyes, and occult propositions darkened our view.43
Urquhart's main fault, or obstacle, was that the issues with which he dealt were often
too complicated for the average working man to comprehend. Without ready (or
indeed any) access to information and leisure to consider the questions raised by
British foreign policy, attempts to dissect that policy were doomed from the outset.
Although the Russophobia which underpinned most of Urquhart's charges was easily
grasped, Urquhart's assaults upon Palmerston were in fact so obscure and contrived
in their logic that they were unlikely to appeal to those without the facilities to
42 Shannon, 'David Urquhart and the Foreign Affairs Committees', pp.252-253, 255.
Consider also, for example, an extract from one of Urquhart's pamphlets which appears
somewhat lofty and arrogant and lacking in a sense of common interest: 'People of England, your
Ministers tell you that they have been credulous
- cannot you suspect that you are so? 1 have now
completed my task. I have shown you the road to safety; warned you of the certainty of ruin. There is
something more at stake between us than my foreknowledge and your infatuation...' (David Urquhart,
The War of Ignorance: A Prognostication (London, 1854), p.31)
43 M. Rafferty to David Urquhart, 16 June 1856, Urquhart Papers, 1:G284
follow the argument closely. As a chairman of one of the Committees advised an
Urquhartite pamphleteer in 1856, there was little point assuming a comparable level
of knowledge in his readers as he himself possessed. Rather, he suggested, the 'most
easy mode of reaching them is by taking up matters from the point of view of
character alone & doing this frequently. If there were no Russia our acts are not the
less wicked'.44 If they were to have any force at all, challenges to Palnierston's
foreign policy needed to be addressed to audiences with the means of efficiently
testing and evaluating them.
Palmerston's own extra-parliamentary speeches were littered with very
simple and easily grasped rhetorical turns: Englishness, nation and freedom. By
contrast, whilst simple accusations could be levelled against Palmerston
- that he
was un-English, unpatriotic, a Russian agent
- they carried little force. People could
not see Palmerston as such, when his actions in support of European constitutional
government and liberty were much more visible. Only once Palmerston had
assumed responsibility for the course of the war on becoming Prime Minister in
1855 did he become a legitimate working class target. Heretofore the demands of
the Urquhartite leadership were unduly onerous for a burdened working class, but
with the outbreak of war, foreign policy came to have a direct and material impact
on the lives of those recruited to execute the war and consequently awoke a more
vehement Urquhartite agitation.45 Urquhart's intricate charges against Palmerston,
then, made little impression on the majority of the working classes, but as a
Committee member explained in 1859, the working classes to whom Urquhart
appealed were 'not of this or that class, party or faction', but were interested simply
44
Crawshay to ?, 13 Sept. 1856, Urquhart Papers, I:G
45 J. Salt, 'Local Manifestations of the Urquhartite Movement', pp.350-351285
in 'the salvation of their country'. Only when the Crimean War revealed 'Treachery
at home and the extravagant and lawless waste of blood and Treasure abroad' did an
Urquhartite critique gain currency.46
Charges against Palmerston were more complicated and more subtle than the
hustings and out-of-doors speechifying could accommodate and such arguments
found their expression much more logically in Parliament where a debate could be
sustained for several days and where those with a professional (rather than a passing
or sensationalist) interest in the issues, namely politicians and to a lesser extent
perhaps political journalists, could deliberate on the evidence. Richard Cobden, for.
example, acknowledged that Palmerston enjoyed widespread popular support, but in
a speech at Manchester in 1851 he appealed to his audience that if, 'notwithstanding
you have an impression in favour of Lord Palmerston, your Members come to a
different conclusion, why, give them credit for the same honesty of purpose and
intelligence with yourselves; and bear in mind, that they have the better opportunity
of forming an opinion than yourselves'.47 He saw no reason to apologise for this
attitude, telling the House of Commons in a speech of February 1854 for example, 'I
would sooner address this audience than any other with which I am acquainted upon
the important and serious question which we have now before us; because I do not
believe that there is in the Kingdom an assembly more deeply impressed with the
gravity and importance of the question, or more disposed to approach its discussion
with that earnest consideration which its magnitude demands'.48
46 Letter by John Wilson of Cononley, a local committee leader, to The Craven Pioneer, 23
Sept. 1859, quoted A. Briggs, 'David Urquhart and the West Riding foreign affairs committees',
pp. 198-199
47 Speech on the 'Policy of the Whig Government', Manchester, 23 Jan. 1851, in J. Bright and
J.E. Thorold Rogers (eds.), Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden, M.P.
(London, 1880),p.537
48 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXXX, 917, (20 Feb. 1854)286
Those seeking to challenge and discredit Palmerston outside Parliament faced an
uphill straggle, as has been demonstrated above. Palmerston's hold on the popular
imagination and mood was strong, and thus Parliament, where debate could be more
reasoned, was the place for consciences to be exercised and (sometimes unpopular)
challenges made. As John Bright admitted in 1854: 'For myself, I do not trouble
myself whether my conduct in Parliament is popular or not. I care only that it shall
be wise and just as regards the permanent interests of my country'.49
Parliamentary debates were seen as somehow nobler or more worthy than
extra-parliamentary ones in such circles. Not necessarily more important, but
certainly more valuable in themselves as expositions of policy. As John Delane
wrote approvingly to Disraeli in the autumn of 1853 when affairs in the East were
dominating political discussion: 'I have no doubt you are right to reserve your speech
for an audience more worthy than your Aylesbury constituents. Brilliant speeches
addressed to dull farmers were very well in '40 and '41 but the science of agitation is
too well understood now not to make the contrast between the speaker and his
audience somewhat ridiculous'.50
Urquhart's ability to influence affairs in Parliament did not correlate with his
membership of the House, if anything, the reverse. Indirectly his agitation and
arguments made a far greater impression on parliamentary politics than did his own
contributions to debates. As a pamphlet written in 1846, before Urquhart entered
Parliament, suggests, Urquhart may not have always won clear adherents, but his
constant haranguing of Palmerston may have planted seeds of doubt and concern in
certain quarters. Had Urquhart and his writing in the Portfolio, wrote a 'Free Trader',
49 Hansard, 3rd sen, CXXXII, 267, (31 Mar. 1854)
50 J.T. Delane to Disraeli, 13 Sept. 1853, Hughenden Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, dep.
Hughenden 124/2, fols 199-200287
contributed to Earl Grey's determination not to serve with Palmerston in December
1845? Grey might well not have ever read anything by Urquhart:
But the vague knowledge, which has been forced on most public
men, may and ought to have had its weight; and the fact that such
accusers are, that such works are written
- this fact barely known,
was perfectly entitled to give the edge to personal observation, and
to screw wavering courage up to the sticking point for the late
energetic act, which has provoked your passing anger and my
enduring gratitude.51
Similarly, the Chartist Washington Wilks, had used the denunciations levelled at
Palmerston by Urquhart as the means of measuring Palmerston's right to be regarded
as the 'English Minister', as Russell had described him previously.52
Urquhart seems to have exercised some degree of influence over many
important politicians of this period, or at least been to them a source of information.
Gladstone, Disraeli and Cobden, for instance, all at one time or another, took notice
of Urquhart's knowledge of foreign affairs.53
This contact was the most striking with Benjamin Disraeli. In the late 1830s
Disraeli had sought Urquhart's counsel, seeing in the disenchanted diplomat a
valuable source of advice and potential political support.
51 Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston. A letter addressed to the Right Honourable T.B.
Macaulay, M.P. on the occasion of his letter to Mr M'Farlane, from a Free Trader (London,
1846),p.25-26
52 W. Wilks, Palmerston in Three Epochs: a comparison of facts with opinions (London,
1854), esp. pp.51-56. Discussion of policy through pamphlets was a curious feature of the period. As
well as being a medium for post-facto justifications of policy and for extra-parliamentary writers to
address questions and raise points with ministers, even those with direct access to ministers in
Parliament, such as the MP Sir Harry Verney, who had in 1846 sought employment in the diplomatic
corps under Palmerston (Sir H. Verney to Palmerston, 17 Nov. 1846, Broadlands Papers, GC/VE/1),
published a pamphlet addressed to Palmerston for the purpose of laying before him certain
observations about German affairs (Sir Harry Verney, Some Observations on the affairs of Germany,
in a letter addressed to the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston (London, 1849)). Perhaps Verney
simply hoped to influence educated readers outside parliament, but he acknowledged himself that it
was not within his power to guide British public opinion, in this case in favour of German unity
(Verney, Some Observations on the affairs of Germany, p.9). Rather, it would seem, parliamentary
debates were dominated by a relatively small clique of senior political figures and it was to this group
that Urquhart directed much of his attention once he had entered Parliament.
53 Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart', pp.237-49, 251. A.J.P. Taylor, The
Trouble Makers, p.50. Cobden, says Taylor, was actually first drawn to thinking about foreign affairs
by Urquhart.288
If ever we meet, I will confer with you in a spirit of the utmost
candor [sic] on the grave matter of your observations. I entirely
concur with them. As regards the trammels of party, I believe
there is not a man in the house, whose seat renders him more
independent of them, than my own. As regards my own views, I
have no other impulse than a fair love of fame, & a deep interest in
the glory of my country; but for my capacity, I can say nothing;
except that I believe I cd do justice to a subject of which I was
master.54
In a similar vein, Disraeli demonstrated his faith in Urquhart's abilities and sagacious
perception of foreign affairs describing in 1841 a recently published dissertation of
Urquhart's as 'unquestionably one of the most important & interesting of modern
contributions to Diplomatic Literature', it was, he continued, 'original, profound, &
luminous', and concluded by saying that 'I look forward with extreme satisfaction to
cultivating the acquaintance of its author'.55 It seems, however, that Urquhart and
Disraeli were already acquainted with each other. A letter from Urquhart written in
1839 spoke of disappointment 'at not seeing or hearing from you this morning' as he
had some important matters to discuss with Disraeli regarding Palmerston's handling
of the 'N.A. Boundary'. 'On this subject', he told Disraeli, 'I wish to speak with you
and I think you will think it of sufficient importance to make some sacrifice of time
or arrangements in order that we may meet as early as possible'.56 Further, in 1841,
at the time that Disraeli was praising Urquhart's pamphlet and seeking to make his
acquaintance, Urquhart wrote to Disraeli enclosing some materials relating to
54 Disraeli to David Urquhart, 23 March [1839?], Urquhart Papers, I:Jla. Neither Disraeli nor
Urquhart noted the year, although Urquhart's wife has returned to these papers at some point and
minuted 'year about 1838, HAU'. According to more recent sources, however, this letter seems more
probably to have been a reply to Urquhart's of 25 Feb. 1839: Benjamin Disraeli Letters (vols.IIl-V
(1838-1841; 1842-1847; 1848-1851), ed. M.G. Wiebe, J.B. Conacher, J. Matthews and M.S. Millar
(Toronto, 1987; 1989; 1993); vol.VI (1852-1856), ed. M.G. Wiebe, M.S. Millar and A.P. Robson
(Toronto, 1997)), III, 908 & n.l
55 Disraeli to Urquhart, 26 April, 1841, Urquhart Papers, l:Jla
56 Urquhart to Disraeli, 'Saturday Evg, 24th' [71839], Hughenden Papers, dep. Hughenden
146/1, fols 5-6. This letter is almost certainly 24 Aug. 1839 when (according to Disraeli Letters, III,
994 n.3) Urquhart had written to Disraeli on behalf of the 'N.A. Association' to ask him to present 'a
Petition praying for the appointment of a committee for enquiry into Ld Pn's conduct in reference to
the N.A. Boundary...'. Disraeli duly acceded to this request on 26 August 1839.289
Persian affairs and extending an invitation to Disraeli to visit Urquhart at his home,
Bitterne Manor, if he wished to discuss the matter. Significantly, he saw his role not
to rouse Disraeli, but rather to make sure that Disraeli was well prepared to fulfil his
obligations. 'My object in writing this', Urquhart said, 'is not to ask your care or
attention to that which it is your duty (not the less so because you live amongst such
men) to know and which it is a shame & a crime to neglect
- but to place at your
disposal whatever is within my reach supposing that you desired to avail yourself of
it'. Disraeli was Urquhart's chosen advocate because he had, so Urquhart believed,
the 'powers of mind & the daring of spirit1 to effect important changes.37
There was, perhaps, a natural basis for a connection between these two
figures beyond their shared Tory romanticism. Unlike other politicians, and critics
(or potential critics) of Palmerstonian foreign policy, Disraeli 'was sufficiently
unorthodox not to be completely alienated by Urquhart's eccentricity'; there may be
something in this, but Disraeli never made any great show of his connection with
Urquhart.58 Nevertheless, their interests did overlap noticeably. Over the
Schleswig-Holstein question in the late 1840s, Disraeli and Urquhart were both
deeply interested in Danish affairs, speaking regularly on such matters in the House,
and when the situation there escalated into war, it was Disraeli and Urquhart who
emerged as the leading speakers on the subject in parliament, vehemently opposing
the German arguments.59 Indeed, this was to be an example of parliamentary
pressure forcing Palmerston's hand: he sided with the majority pro-Danish view,
57 Urquhart to Disraeli, 24 March 1841, Hughenden Papers, dep. Hughenden 146/1, fols 8-9
58 See Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart', pp.250-251
59 S.H. Short, 'British Attitudes to the Schleswig-Holstein Question, 1848-50', (unpublished
PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1969), pp. 77-81; 226. Palmerston recognised Disraeli's keen
interest in this question, and when peace was established he was quick to apprise Disraeli of the
details of the Treaty of Peace between the German Confederation and Denmark and of the date for its
formal ratification (Palmerston to Disraeli, 5 July 1850, Hughenden Papers, dep. Hughenden 139/2,
fols 14-15)290
though it brought him into conflict with the Germanism of the Court, and despite his
fears that the Danes might become 'too cock a hoop from their powerful backing and
indisposed therefore to reasonable terms', he placed himself in opposition to the
German, or more specifically Prussian, aggressive demands.60
By the mid-1850s Disraeli was not prepared to sever all links with the
Urquhartites, but he was increasingly luke-warm in his regard for Urquhart. He told
Mr Potter, secretary of one of the Foreign Affairs Committees, that he thought
Urquhart was: 'a gentleman of great acquirements, ingeniousness, & energy. I am
well acquainted with his works, & I have had the advantage of his conversation. I
have given due consideration to both. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the
conclusions, at which he has arrived, with respect to public affairs, and the principal
actors in their transaction'. Significantly, however, he did acknowledge that
whatever his own opinions, he did 'respect the patriotic feeling, which has induced
you, & your companions, as a matter of duty, to impress your convictions on your
Countrymen'.61 The trouble was that by the time of the Crimean War, Urquhart had
lost a great deal of what credibility he had ever possessed. It was unfashionable to
be associated with him, especially in Parliament.
Yet, there is reason to believe that Urquhart did play an important role in
fashioning Disraeli's political outlook with regard to foreign affairs. Jenks might
raise doubts about the coincidence of Urquhart's and Disraeli's opinions over
Afghanistan in 1838-1839,62 but it seems that Urquhart's influence may have been
subtler than that. Reading Urquhart's pamphlets and discussing matters with him in
60 H.C.F Bell, Lord Palmerston 2 vols. (London, 1936), II, p. 10. For fuller discussion of the
Schleswig-Holstein dispute at this time see either Short's thesis or Bell, Lord Palmerston, II, pp.6-11
61 Disraeli to Potter, 5 March 1856, Urquhart Papers, I:J 1 a
62 Jenks, 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart', pp.246-247291
private evidently made some sort of impression on Disraeli. A letter to Urquhart
which survives amongst his papers, undated and anonymous but clearly written
sometime after 1846, includes a cutting from a newspaper which reads:
POOR D'ISRAELI - The Spectator says,
- 'One of the "great"
passages of the vituperative orators of 1846 has been traced, we
believe, to a pamphlet by poor David Urquhart. The question is
mooted, what in D'Israeli's works is Disraeli's?'
'Is this a true bill?' asked Urquhart's correspondent: 'It amused us & perhaps you
have not seen it. D'Israeli seems to have passed an Appropriation Clause in his own
favour & stealing a bright thought wherever he could find one but as you are rich in
such you can spare a few to such as D'Israeli'.63 Certainly Urquhart was not disposed
to criticise Disraeli's parliamentary performances. A speech concerned with the
events in the Crimea in 1854, Urquhart said, Disraeli delivered 'in the tones of a
male Sybil', which he hoped might save the nation. Urquhart had gathered together
and published in a pamphlet a collection of his letters to the Morning Advertiser and
Morning Herald from March 1854, and in further discussion of this speech of
Disraeli's he noted:
I said, in the letter you inserted yesterday
- 'If there be any member
anxious for the present and careful for the future, he will at least
now announce beforehand the results, and when this mighty
bubble bursts, his now despised words may place him in a position
of as proud and beneficial influence as has ever been achieved by
man. Announced beforehand, the event, when it comes, may be
understood; and the then aroused passions of the nation may not be
alone poured forth on Turkey and on France.' Within twelve hours
this anticipation has been realised. Mr Disraeli has realised it, not,
indeed, as the leader of a party, but as an individual member of the
House.64
This was a perceptive comment. Disraeli had made a useful attack on the
government's foreign policy and Palmerston, but as Urquhart also noted: 'Had he
63 ? to [Urquhart], 10 Dec. [?post-1846
- given nature of newspaper cutting], Urquhart Papers,
I:Jla
64 Appendix: 'Letter on Mr Disraeli's Speech1, 21 Feb. 1854, in David Urquhart, The War of
Ignorance: A Prognostication (London, 1854), pp.40-41292
been leader of a party, most assuredly would his conclusion not have been obnoxious
to the sarcasm of the Home Secretary; he would not only have concluded with a
motion for with-holding the supplies, but with one for a committee of inquiry, with a
view to an impeachment'.65 This was essentially Disraeli's problem. He represented,
in many respects, the interests of the Conservative party, as the protectionists had
refashioned themselves, but he retained for himself a certain freedom of action and
was often out of tune with that party's attempts to undermine Palmerston and
Palmerstonism.
iii) The shortcomings of the official opposition
As Robert Blake has suggested, after the death of Palmerston ('whose patriotism in
foreign policy could hardly be challenged'), Disraeli was finally able to acquire the
'national' colours for his own party in foreign as well as domestic affairs.66 More
than this, indeed, throughout the 1870s, according to John Vincent, Palmerston more
than any other figure, including Derby, was Disraeli's role model.67 During the
1840s and 1850s, then, Disraeli was struggling in the face of Palmerston's
pre-eminence to reconcile the conflict between his supposed party-political
obligations and his personal faith in Palmerston, or at least Palmerstonism. He had,
after all, demonstrated an early attachment to the Whig minister and an implicit
approval of Palmerston's policies.
65 Appendix: 'Letter on Mr Disraeli's Speech', 21 Feb. 1854, in David Urquhart, The War of
Ignorance: A Prognostication (London, 1854), p.41
66 R. Blake, Disraeli (New York, 1987 edn.), p.283
67 J.R. Vincent, Disraeli (Oxford, 1990), p.l2293
In December 1845, Disraeli had acted as Palmerston's go-between in Paris,
exploiting his contacts with the King of the French, whom he persuaded that 'all may
be well' with Palmerston at the Foreign Office after all. Disraeli also indicated a
sympathetic desire to assist Palmerston in the presentation of his foreign policy in
the House of Commons.68 Indeed, two years after the formation of the Russell
government, Disraeli conceded that: 'As for Palmerston, I have not only not opposed
him, but, to the occasional dissatisfaction of my comrades, have even interfered to
prevent parliamentary criticism, or any concerted move, against him'.69 The extent to
which he was 'Palmerston's factotum' says John Vincent, cannot be ascertained, but
nevertheless it was remarkable that a Tory back-bencher was working secretly for a
Whig leader.70 Whilst this raises questions about Disraeli's commitment to a
political career versus the appeal of a literary one; more broadly it brings into
question his suitability to oppose the policy of a Whig ministry in which Palmerston
took a leading role. In the later 1840s, whilst Palmerston was at the Foreign Office,
Vincent has suggested that Disraeli sought a diplomatic posting from Palmerston in
return for the services rendered in Paris, and again in 1855 that Palmerston proposed
Disraeli for the Istanbul embassy, although Vincent offers no evidence to
corroborate this latter 'secret connection'.71
Such an attitude is not necessarily surprising. If nothing else, both
Palmerston and Disraeli shared a certain common heritage in their reverence for
George Canning. As he demonstrated in his biography of Lord George Bentinck, a
68 Disraeli to Palmerston, 14 Dec. 1845, Disraeli Letters, IV, 1453
69 Disraeli to Ponsonby, 9 July 1848, Disraeli Letters, V, 1664
70 Vincent, Disraeli, p.4
71 Ibid, p.32. 'Tory leaders are not often agents for Liberal Foreign Secretaries,' says Vincent,
'which is maybe why the evidence has again disappeared. But there was certainly a secret
connection...'294
Canningite Tory of former days, Disraeli had learned the importance of
extra-parliamentary support, repeating Bentinck's judgement that once the 'people
out of doors [are] with you', then 'all the rest follows'.72 More explicitly, Disraeli had
laid claim to a share of the Canningite legacy in 1845 when he told the Commons
that the name of Canning was 'never to be mentioned, I am sure, in the House of
Commons without emotion. We all admire his genius; we all, at least most of us,
deplore his untimely end; and we all sympathize with him in his fierce struggle with
supreme prejudice and sublime mediocrity,
- with inveterate foes, and with - "candid
friends'".73 According to one Conservative colleague, Disraeli's Canningite
sympathies served only to weaken his position within the party. Over a dinner in
May 1850, Edward Henry Stanley, later the 15th Earl of Derby, observed that
Disraeli: 'wanted, like Canning, to combine Liberal ideas with Tory connections: but
Canning had failed. There is certainly a very prevalent impression that Disraeli has
no well-defined opinions of his own: but is content to adopt, and defend, any which
may be popular with the Conservative party at the time'.74 Disraeli had long
maintained that in politics 'I come forward on independent grounds, & am resolved
to coalesce with no one',75 but it was not possible for him to remain entirely
indifferent to party connection.76 Hence the impression that he took up only what
was popular with the Conservative party at any given moment.
72 B. Disraeli, Lord George Bentinck: A Political Biography (London, 1905 edn.), p.376
73 Hansard, 3rd sen, LXXVIII, 155-156 (28 Feb. 1845)
74 25 July 1850, J.R. Vincent (ed.) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and
Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869 (Hassocks, 1978), p.29
75 Disraeli to [Sir William Henry Fremantle?], 14 June 1847, Disraeli Letters, IV, 1568
76 Nevertheless, as Robert Stewart observes, Disraeli's lack of obvious commitment to the party
was noticed and when the question of leadership arose in 1849 on the death of Bentinck, Disraeli
could count on the support of only about one third of the Conservative party (R. Stewart, The Politics
of Protection: Lord Derby and the Protectionist Party, 1841-1852 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 136-138).295
Not only did Disraeli share an admiration for an old political leader with
Palmerston; he also looked to Palmerston himself with a good deal of approval. He
warmly applauded Palmerston's speech on the Corn Laws in March 1846,77 and once
Palmerston had returned to the Foreign Office, Disraeli was gratified to learn from
Jarnac, the French ambassador, 'that foreign affairs are all right' and that 'every thing
went right betn. Palmerston & France, except the Sonderbund affair & that they were
in almost hourly expectation of his acceding to the solicitation of all the other great
powers under the Treaty of Vienna, for a mediation'.78
Disraeli, then, was forced into opposition to Palmerston purely by the
adversarial nature of politics. Vincent suggests that Disraeli fashioned much of his
political agenda before 1865 in a sort of inverse relationship to Palmerston:
Palmerston represented national interests and therefore Disraeli had to look to
questions of social cohesion. In the 1850s and 1860s, Vincent contends, 'Disraeli
was reduced to seeking any position that was not occupied by Palmerston',79
although this rule does not apply universally: over Ireland and (before 1866)
Reform, for example, Vincent's argument is unconvincing. The argument of Blake,
that Disraeli was 'the first statesman systematically to uphold the doctrine that it is
the duty of the Opposition to oppose1 seems most pertinent.80
77 Disraeli to Palmerston, 28 March 1846, Broadlands Papers, GC/Dl/136
78 Disraeli to Lord John Manners, 16 Nov. 1847, 25 Nov. 1847, Disraeli Letters, IV, 1607,
1608
79 Vincent, Disraeli, p. 116
80 Blake, Disraeli, p.355. Indeed, by 1872 Disraeli, however ironically, asserted that: 'I believe
that, without party, parliamentary government is impossible' in a speech to the people of Manchester
in April of that year (quoted A. Hawkins, '"Parliamentary Government" and Victorian Political
Parties, c>1830^.18801, English Historical Review, CIV (July 1989),p. 638. Hawkins asserts that this
claim was 'in 1872 ironic and ambiguous, as the concepts of both party and "parliamentary
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Despite his alleged parliamentary alliance with Palnierston which he
described to Ponsonby in July 1848,81 Disraeli did, only a month later, sketch out the
foundations of a policy contrary to that pursued by the Foreign Office. Disraeli was
at this time much under the influence of Prince Metternich and the two met
frequently to discuss political affairs.82 It is this connection, according to Disraeli's
official biographers, which served to inform the two speeches Disraeli delivered
during the summer of 1848 in which he offered an alternative to the government's
foreign policy.83 In June, taking as his subject the dismissal of his friend Bui wer
from Madrid - 'a gross outrage has been inflicted upon this country'
- Disraeli set
about attacking the system of a liberal foreign policy. 'My objection to liberalism is
this
- that it is the introduction into the practical business of life of the highest kind -
namely, politics
- of philosophical ideas instead of political principles', he said.
Palmerston, he acknowledged, was 'the great prophet of liberalism in foreign affairs',
and indeed was 'the most able expounder' of the strain of liberalism embodied in the
Quadruple Alliance of 1834 'which has been the characteristic of the foreign policy
of England now for too many years'. However, significantly, Disraeli blamed the
Liberal ministries and not Palmerston himself for this 'sentimental' approach to
politics. He further exonerated Palmerston of blame for the course of foreign
relations highlighting the damaging effects caused by the Foreign Secretary's lack of
Cabinet support, something particularly unsettling to the court of France he claimed.
'I am exceedingly loth to assent to any vote which singles out the noble Lord
81 See above p.293
82 Disraeli to Sarah Disraeli, 30 May 1848, Disraeli Letters, V, 1654 & n.3: Disraeli had been
introduced to Metternich by Lord Londonderry on 17 May 1848 from which point they regularly met
and corresponded. See also W.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl
ofBeaconsfielde vols (London, 1910-1920), III, pp. 180-181
83
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[Palmerston] as a Member of the Government who has followed a policy so
pernicious to this country', argued Disraeli. 'We ought to strike at the system, and
not at the individual1.84
The following month, Disraeli 'crossed lances with Palmerston' in a speech
which dealt with British relations with Rome, Naples, Sardinia and Austria.85 He
feared that 'the sentimental principle' which guided the country's foreign policy was
'to develop the principle of nationality1, but this appeared to Disraeli to raise
immediate contradictions regarding the plan for independence for Lombardy but not
Venetia. 'If this House does not take the earliest opportunity to discourage the
sentimental principle in settling the affairs of nations,' he argued, 'I am convinced
that we shall be involved in difficulties which it is impossible to contemplate; for I
believe that such a policy, if it be fully developed, will really resolve Europe into its
original elements, and will not leave any social or political system in existence in the
form which it now assumes'. It behoved the Foreign Secretary, Disraeli concluded,
to demonstrate a determination to uphold 'the principles of national law'.86
Palmerston, Disraeli clearly felt, was unpleasantly constrained by the over-arching
principles of the government to which he belonged and which were serving to
confuse and weaken the country's foreign policy. A year later Disraeli still seemed
to be losing faith in the Foreign Secretary, telling Metternich that the perusal of
papers relating to Italy had 'somewhat lowered my opinion of Palmerston. He has
been fortunate, but he has not deserved to be/e/zx'.87
84 Hansard, 3rd ser., XCIX, 388, 396-400 (5 June 1848)
85 Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 19 Aug. 1848, Disraeli Letters, V, 1690
86 Hansard, 3rd ser., CI, 147-163 (16 Aug. 1848)
87 Disraeli to Metternich, 2 Sept. 1849, Disraeli Letters, V, 1874298
Ultimately Palmerston weathered Conservative attacks and, whether
deserved or not, was felix. To a large extent this was due to a certain sympathy on
Disraeli's part, but was also grounded in much more pragmatic political
considerations. Throughout the life of the government, Russell's ministry appeared
weak and there was a constant search for a replacement. Amongst the Protectionists
there was a disposition in the late 1840s to seek a reunion with the Peelites, but this
would have required Palmerston to be replaced at the Foreign Office with Aberdeen,
assuming Palmerston would not defect from his Whig colleagues. Aberdeen,
however, was not likely to accede to such a scheme even if other Peelites were and
this in itself offered a insuperable obstacle to notions of a new Conservative
administration. As Edward Stanley noted in May 1849, 'Lord Aberdeen's final
alienation from us makes it useless to displace Palmerston'.88 Such was Disraeli's
disposition to believe in the Foreign Secretary that he found it difficult to condemn
Palmerston's brinkmanship and audacious policies, such as that relating to Greece
and more specifically, Don Pacifico, in 1850. Certainly this policy did not threaten
the status quo in Europe as it had been feared Palmerston's Italian policy might.
Lord Stanley, who was later to serve as Prime Minister as the 14th Earl of
Derby, along with Lord Aberdeen, had led the censure of the government's foreign
policy in the House of Lords, but he feared that Disraeli was not to be relied upon to
make a clear and firm attack against Palmerston when the debate moved to the
Commons:
Forgive me [he wrote on June 22] if I impress upon you the great
importance, on many accounts, of hitting hard and not sparing.
Anything short of guerre a I'outrance would have the effect of
reviving, in suspicious minds, old misconceptions, and expose you
to misconstruction on the part of those who may look with envy at
88 19 May 1849, Vincent (ed.) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and
Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869, p.8299
your present high position. Pray excuse me for touching on such a
topic, which I can have but one motive for doing.89
As Londonderry told Disraeli, 'The Protectionists rather (I hear) suspect your
intimacy with Pal. & that you will not strike home when the moment occurs'.90
Disraeli did not rise to make a speech until the fourth and final night of the debate
(in fact he was the last person to make a speech at all), and immediately he made it
clear that it was a sense of political obligation that induced him to say anything at
all: 'I cannot but feel that I should be wanting in, not only in self respect but in duty
to those Gentlemen with whom I have the honour and satisfaction to act in political
connexion, were I to give a silent vote on this occasion'.91 Rejecting claims that it
was a breach of constitutional duty that Disraeli had not moved the vote of censure
following the vote in the Lords, but had left that to an independent member
(Roebuck), he seemed as much concerned with defending his own record as a
supposed leader of the Opposition as with attacking Palmerston and the
government's foreign policy.92 Significantly, however, Disraeli then proceeded to
acknowledge the sagacity of Aberdeen and though he claimed to have 'no political
connexion' with that statesman, he did note that 'during the four years to which the
observation of the noble Lord applies, I can recall no one statement of Lord
Aberdeen as to our foreign affairs that was not fully justified by preceding facts; and,
I might add, no judgement which subsequent events have not fully warranted'.93
Disraeli concurred in the attack on the Greek policy in that he doubted the wisdom
of the civis Romanus sum principle, but largely because he believed in the law of
nations and the course of legal redress rather than aggressive military measures to
89 Stanley to Disraeli, 22 June 1850, quoted Blake, Disraeli, p.297
90 Lord Londonderry to Disraeli, 20 June 1850, Disraeli Letters, V, 2013 n.4
91 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXI I, 720, (28 June 1850)
92 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXIl, 720-721, (28 June 1850)
93 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXII, 722, (28 June 1850)300
demand justice. He had no doubt that legal means could and would provide the
required redress: in the case of a wrong being committed by another government
(constitutional or despotic), 'the law of nations steps in to assist the municipal law
that is deficient, and ...the remedy of the suffering foreigner is secured by treaty'.94
Disraeli doubted the claims of Pacifico, and those of Finlay, but believed that their
cause was being exploited with a view to establishing a bigger point. Yet he drew
back from censuring the Foreign Secretary directly. 'The Secretary of State', he said,
has complained that the attack on his policy has been made, both
abroad and at home, a personal attack. I can assure the noble Lord
he shall have no cause to make this complaint of me. I have,
before this, taken the opportunity of expressing my disapprobation
of a mode which has only of recent date entered onto our
discussion, and that is of visiting on the head of a department the
consequences of a policy for which the whole Cabinet is
responsible.95
If the government believed in upholding constitutional liberty, why did its conduct
not tend to the reinforcement of that belief? Disraeli found many examples of
governmental betrayal of this doctrine and concluded that whilst an admirable
motive for governmental activity, 'surely it would be monstrous for Parliament to
vote confidence in a Government merely on account of its sentiments, and not on
account of a policy which had aimed at and obtained results of great general
importance'.96 Moving, finally, to oppose the motion in the spirit of the Lords'
censure, Disraeli concluded with the hope, and indeed expectation, that the result of
this examination of the country's foreign policy would 'virtually announce to Europe
and to another hemisphere, that the Parliament of England is resolved that, in future,
her policy shall be conducted with a due regard to the rights of nations'.97
94 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXII, 725, (28 June 1850)
95 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXII, 726-727, (28 June 1850)
96 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXII, 736-737, (28 June 1850); for Disraeli's examples of the
government's inconsistencies, see esp.727-735
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Disraeli had stopped short of attacking Palmerston outright, and in this had
weakened the best line of attack the Opposition possessed. It might have been, as he
claimed some years later that a sense of unpreparedness on the Opposition benches
to take over the reins of government had influenced him,98 but this was not all. He
had also recognised the hold Palmerston had over the popular imagination and had
not wanted to challenge that directly. He was concerned that Palmerston's approach
might set a dangerous precedent for other powers to weigh in with military force to
seek redress of grievance, but he also acknowledged that Palmerston embodied that
'nationalism of the middle classes and the artisans' and thus the only real ground of
attack was, as Paul Smith notes, to press for this assertiveness in foreign policy 'at
the keenest price, not pushed so far as to involve expensive collisions with
substantial enemies or good customers'.99
Yet the weakness of the opposition's attack was not entirely of Disraeli's
making. Stanley had not wanted Disraeli to repeat the censure passed by the Lords
in the Commons recognising that it would have been foolish to attack the most
popular man in the country. His aim, rather, had been to use the debate to force the
Peelites into opposition to the Whigs and thereby enhance the prospects of a
Protectionist reunion with the Peelites.100 But as Stanley's son recorded, it seemed
more likely that the Peelites would themselves divide, Gladstone and Graham
98 Some years after the debate itself, Disraeli wrote: 'The great difficulty would have been the
Leadership of the House of Commons. I was leader of 250 men and, so far as numbers were
concerned, no one could compete with me; but I not only had no experience of high office, but I had
positively never held even the humblest office. There was no confidential intimacy at that time
between Lord Derby and myself, and I don't think he would have much hesitated in suggesting a
Peelite, one of his old and even recent colleagues, as Leader, if I consented and the party generally...
But who? I have always thought that old Goulburn was the man whom Sir Robert Peel and Lord
Derby (then Stanley) would have brought forward and furbished up like an old piece of dusty
furniture, under whom we might have all served without any great outrage of personal feelings. But 1
could never penetrate this. (Quoted Blake, Disraeli, pp.297-298)
99 P. Smith, Disraeli (Cambridge, 1996), p. 185
100 Stewart, The Politics of Protection, pp. 166-167302
turning against Palmerston, whilst Peel supported him.101 As hopes for such a
Conservative union receded, it appeared again important to tempt Palmerston to
cross the floor and there were therefore good reasons for resisting the temptation to
drag him down over Don Pacifico. By February 1851 Disraeli was arguing that a
union between Palmerston and Lord Stanley offered the best chance of achieving a
Conservative parliamentary ascendancy, as Edward Stanley recorded in his journal:
Again and again he recurred to the idea of a coalition between my
Father and Palmerston: said Aberdeen had played us false: that we
ought not to trust him: we had been more than once his catspaws.
'Palmerston was a man who bore no malice, who liked office,
whose tendencies were Conservative, and who would find no
difficulty in throwing over former colleagues, especially as he and
Russell were not on the most cordial terms[']. He felt confident
that he, D., could arrange with him in 24 hours, if permitted.102
Nevertheless, Disraeli's name was the one most often associated with the Foreign
Office in Conservative circles during the next couple of years. In February and
December 1851 and also in February 1852, in each of these failed attempts to
construct a Conservative ministry, Disraeli was mentioned in some capacity with
that department.103 Disraeli himself appears not to have been too active in seeking
such an appointment, perhaps he did not want to have to live in Palmerston's shadow
at that moment. He still, after all, regarded Palmerston as 'a man for whom I have
the greatest regard, & a statesman for whom I have always entertained the greatest
admiration'.104
Palmerston's political conduct, though it may have possessed no didactic
force in the Disraelian mind, at least mirrored to a large extent Disraeli's own
101 9 June 1850, Vincent (ed.) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and
Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869, pp. 19-20
102 16 Feb. 1851, ibid, pp.40-41
103 Blake, Disraeli, pp.301-303, 306, 308, 311-312
104 Disraeli to Palmerston, 22 Nov. 1852, Broadlands Papers, GC/DI/137. This letter is dated
'Nov. 1852' but is an immediate reply to a letter from Palmerston of 22 Nov. 1852 (GC/DI/142).303
conception of the political nation. Whilst Disraeli claimed never to have welcomed
letters from his Buckinghamshire constituents,105 this was more an example of his
style than a statement of fact. The moral (such as it was) of Disraeli's novels
Coningsby (1844) and Tancred (1847), says Paul Smith, is that 'social and political
reconstitution, the building of community out of conglomeration, depended on the
power, not of the politician to manipulate elites, but of the genius to mobilise
masses'.106 Novel writing for Disraeli, argues Smith, in the 1830s and 1840s
particularly, 'was his means of by-passing a Conservative party and a House of
Commons too slow to recognize his pre-eminence and appealing directly to a public
opinion conceived as more powerful than an effete aristocratic elite'. In the
Vindication of the English Constitution (1835) and Coningsby, Disraeli
demonstrated his belief that legitimate political authority derived from
extra-parliamentary opinion and found its expression in the newspaper press.107
These opinions he had arrived at quite independently of any example offered by
Palmerston.
With the formation of the Aberdeen ministry in December 1852 it seemed
that hopes of a Protectionist reconciliation with the Peelites were finally crushed. A
union with Palmerston, whose importance Disraeli had already impressed on Lord
Derby,108 did still seem, if not immediately possible, at least ultimately desirable.
Thus when called on to deliver a speech on foreign policy in February 1853, which
he determined upon 'in a half apologetic tone, pleading the necessity of keeping his
105 For example, he told Lady Janetta Manners on one occasion that, 'during that time I scarcely
ever received a letter from a constituent, certainly never answered one' (Lady Janetta Manners to
Salisbury, 10 June 1880, quoted Smith, Disraeli, p.85).
106 Smith, Disraeli, p.89
107 P. Smith, 'Disraeli's Polities', in C.B. Richmond and P. Smith (eds.), The Self-Fashioning of
Disraeli, 1818-1851 (Cambridge, forthcoming), p. 167
108 See above p.96-97304
party in good humour',109 Disraeli used this as an opportunity to underline the new
alignments. He made a point of 'sparing Palmerston throughout', whilst criticising
Wood, Graham and Aberdeen, outwardly three of Palmerston's potential antagonists
or rivals in the new government.110
Whilst there was a feeling that Palmerston would be disposed to unite with
the Conservatives politically, their weak condition prohibited such a plan.
Malmesbury told Derby in September that: 'If Palmerston left the Government there
is no doubt that many of our staunchest supporters would follow him as leader of the
Commons, but our present divisions are not likely to encourage him to leave his
post'.111 The disunity of the Cabinet, maintained Disraeli in the autumn, 'is one of
the inevitable consequences of a coalition between statesmen of totally different
systems',112 yet even in this state of affairs, 'great as [is] the embroglio', it was
insufficient grounds upon which to 'galvanise our party' and the Aberdeen
government remained 'a necessity'.113 Even in the wake of Palmerston's resignation
when he believed 'that P. has lost caste terribly with the country by his levity of
conduct', (something which it seems Disraeli did not really believe) the ministry
remained strong enough largely because the opposition was so weak.1
H
From 1850, Disraeli had been much concerned with improving the
Conservatives' record with public opinion pursuing various schemes to produce a
party-newspaper, which finally resulted in the emergence of the Press in 1853.115
This publication reveals a great admiration for Palmerston on the part of Disraeli, for
109 16 Feb. 1853, Vincent (ed.) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and
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114 Disraeli to Lord Stanley, 30 Dec. 1853, Disraeli Letters, VI, 2610
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although he sought to keep his connection hidden, it is well known that Disraeli's
contributions to its pages were frequent and full. Thus, when Palmerston walked out
of the Cabinet in December 1853, the Press regretted the loss of 'the most eminent
member of the Administration',116 and a few days later in a satirical piece on the
'Downing Street Christmas Playbill', 'Mr Stone Palmer' appeared as 'The Genius of
the Cabinet'. The end result, significantly, was promised as 'DESTRUCTION OF
THE CABINET, AND TRIUMPH OF BRITISH POLICY'.117 Furthermore, not only
was the Press loudly singing Palmerston's praises, but in the new year clearly hinted
at a natural and positive connection between the genius of the Cabinet and Disraeli,
if only party connection did not stand in the way:
CARMEN AMCEB/EUM
BY MR GLADSTONE AND LORD PALMERSTON
In the Characters of Horace and Lydia
G
- While in the Home-office seals were thine,
Blest in my faithful PAM's alliance,
Calm I beheld the funds decline,
And bade the South Sea Stock defiance.
P
- While GLADSTONE, Oxford's darling child,
Presided o'er John Bull's finances,
Time was, at Democrats I smiled,
Nor heeded GRAHAM'S reforming fancies.
G - Me JEMMY GRAHAM now makes his tool,
In cant and recant without rival,
In whom I only wish John Bull,
Felt half the confidence that I feel.
P
- DISRAELI'S charms my bosom feels,
Whose name suggests the thought unpleasant,
That some have held Exchequer seals,
When funds were higher than at present.
G- What if by common interest led,
Once more to burn with mutual flame,
You treat DISRAELI, say, as dead,
And I throw over JEMMY GRAHAM?
116 Press, 17 Dec. 1853
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P
- Though he is versed in Tory arts,
And thou'rt, I fear, a ratting Raddy,
Still, till our Coalition parts,
I'll live and die colleagued with GLADDY.118
By this point, Disraeli was losing ground within the Conservative party and indeed,
many other in that party are said to have been looking warmly at Palmerston.
Disraeli denied that he was intriguing with Palmerston to form a union between
themselves,'19 but he was widely believed to be closely connected and associated
with Palmerston and Palmerstonism, to the extent that in March 1854 Lord Stanley
felt that in making attacks on the government's handling of the Eastern question,
Disraeli 'relies, as before, on Palmerston's secret support'.'20 Palmerston indeed
appears to have been prepared in 1854 to cooperate with certain members of the
opposition in order to promote criticism of the government's foreign policy.
Malmesbury records in his Memoirs that in May of that year he 'had a long and
confidential conversation with Palmerston, whom I met at dinner at the Walewskis,
and we agreed perfectly on all points of foreign policy'. Palmerston supplied
Malmesbury with information about the fleets at Odessa which Malmesbury was
able to use as the basis for a question in the House of Lords the following week. The
issue was evidently a sensitive one since the 'Duke of Newcastle refused to answer
the question'.m
By the time the war broke out in the Crimea, Disraeli was offering the
government general patriotic support, and though from the opposition benches he
might have been critical of the invasion of the Crimea towards the end of 1854, his
118 Press, 7 Jan. 1854 (the emphasis is that of the Press).
119 Disraeli to Ponsonby, 22 Jan. 1854, Disraeli Letters, VI, 2624
120 24 March 1854, Vincent (ed.) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and
Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869, p. 123
121 Lord Malmesbury, Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, An Autobiography 2 vols. (London, 1884), I,
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role in the war, according to Blake, was a minimal one.122 Only once Palmerston had
acceded to the premiership did Disraeli feel comfortable about attacking him, and
then with what was perhaps a surprising vehemence, as in this famous letter on the
eve of Palmerston's 'triumph':
[Palmerston] seems now the inevitable man, and tho' he is really
an imposter, utterly exhausted, &, at the best, only ginger beer &
not champaign, & now an old painted Pantaloon, very deaf, very
blind, & with false teeth, wh:, wd. fall out of his mouth when
speaking, if he did not hesitate & halt so in his talk
- he is a name,
wh: the country resolves to associate with energy, wisdom, &
eloquence, & will until he has tried and failed.123
Hampered throughout the previous decade by party factions and a minister who
successfully monopolised the national colours, perhaps Disraeli felt he had finally
been given his opportunity to appropriate Palmerston's mantle. If the Conservatives
appeared still unsettled and Palmerston, whom Disraeli respected and could not
effectively oppose, now seemed weakened, there seemed perhaps a chance to steal a
march on the new Prime Minister. It was not, after all, indicative of a lasting
separation of Disraeli from his admiration for Palmerston.124 But it is revealing
about the previous decade: one of the main prongs of the Opposition attack during
this period was undermined by a sympathy for the targets' policies and, in any case, a
weak platform from which to launch an attack.
122 Blake, Disraeli, pp.356-357; 359-361
123 Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 2 Feb. 1855, Disraeli Letters, VI, 2730
124 In 1859, for example, Disraeli wrote to Palmerston resurrecting the notion of a union of
Palmerston and Derby, acknowledging not only Palmerston's continued political potency but also his
right to control the foreign policy of any ministry of which he was a member (Disraeli to Palmerston,
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iv) Systematic opposition: Palmerston and Cobdenism
Potentially more effective, however, was the Cobdenite opposition. Based on a
principled system, these 'trouble makers' were fighting less for a political interest
than (what they perceived at least) as a national one: prosperity, trade and peace. As
Disraeli himself observed, Cobden was well-equipped for his task:
He had great tact, & always conciliated his audience. He was a
very amiable man, & extremely well informed. No man entered
the house of Commons with a greater prejudice against him among
the Country gentlemen, yet in time he quite overcame it. He was
naturally well-bred, because he was considerate for the feelings of
others, wh is the true course of good breeding. He was modest
without being humble, never elated by his great success.125
Richard Cobden had risen from being an unknown 'Manchester business man' to
become 'one of the most influential politicians in England' by the mid-1840s and
furthermore, argues A.J.P. Taylor, whilst Cobden rejected the crude connection,
there were many who saw in the gradual acceptance of Cobdenite principles the
triumph of middle class liberalism, or more specifically, of the cottonocracy, in
mid-Victorian politics.126 Significantly, however, with the effective scuttling of what
Taylor describes as the Romantic radical opposition to Palmerston of Urquhart and
his associates by about 1850, a new force emerged to challenge the Palmerstonian
ascendancy
- the 'rational radicalism' of Cobden.
Cobdenism was founded on the principle of peace and judicious interference
abroad, but denigrated the manoeuvrings of governments and secret diplomatic
negotiations. Through a policy genuinely directed in the interests of free trade,
Cobden believed, peace and prosperity would follow. He felt, he told his colleague
125 'Observations on men and things: Cobden and Bright', Hughenden Papers, dep. Hughenden
26/3, fols 18-20
126 A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers (London, 1985 edn.), p.54309
John Bright, 'how impossible it is to ensure the peace of the world, and guarantee us
against all the burdens which our present warlike attitude entails upon us by any
means excepting a free commercial intercourse between all nations'.127 Palmerston's
tenure at the Foreign Office did little to inspire Cobden with confidence, however. 'I
thought free trade would have been the prelude to a wiser foreign policy', he told
George Wilson, the former Chairman of the Anti-Corn Law League, 'that common
sense would have been admitted to a seat at Downing Street
- But we seem to be
playing the fool in our foreign policy worse than ever'. More than this, he
complained: 'Oh, I wish the English people knew how little good their 800 millions
of debt had done for foreign nations, and how little the people of the Continent feel
indebted to us for our sacrifices'.128
It was a desire to challenge this public ignorance that lay at the heart of
Cobdenism. In Edinburgh in 1853 Cobden declared, 'we have too many people in
this country who are ignorant of the state of society in foreign countries, and who do
not do justice to the condition in which the people are placed in other countries'.129
This was why, Cobden asserted, over the Eastern question in the 1850s Palmerston
was able to mislead the people in to thinking the Ottoman Empire to be at a more
advanced state of reform than it was and thus support Turkey against Russia on an
entirely false basis.130 Public opinion still had a crucial role to play in Cobdenism
(just as it did in Palmerstonism and Disraelianism) but Cobden hoped that if this
opinion was better informed it could be guided not into a bellicose course but rather
127 Cobden to Bright, 24 Oct. 1846, quoted N. McCord, 'Cobden and Bright in Politics,
1846-1857', in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain (London, 1967), p.9O
128 Cobden to G. Wilson, 21 June 1847, quoted ibid, p.91
129 Speech delivered by Mr Cobden at the Peace Conference, held at Edinburgh, 12 Oct. 1853,
in R. Cobden, Reminiscences of Richard Cobden (compiled by Mrs Salis Schwabe) (London, 1895),
p. 197
130 Ibid, pp. 192-207; Cobden to House of Commons, 22 Dec. 1854 in Speeches on Questions of
Public Policy by Richard Cobden, p.317310
in the interests of peace. Certainly Bastiat in France had given Cobden to believe
that a more pacific opinion in Britain would benefit free trade and prosperity whilst
it seemed to Cobden that western opinion being against Russian aggressive demands
for the return of Hungarian refugees from the Ottoman Empire in 1849-1850 had
been sufficient to alter the Tsar's outlook.131
It was clear that the prevailing Palmerstonian policy was not conducive,
according to the Cobdenite model, to a profitable and harmonious foreign policy.
The essence of Cobdenism is captured in part of Cobden's speech on what was
possibly the most important set-piece foreign policy debate of the Russell
government, that on the Don Pacifico affair. Cobden asserted that: 'The progress of
freedom depends more upon the maintenance of peace, the spread of commerce, and
the diffusion of education, than upon the labours of cabinets and foreign offices'.132
More than Urquhartite assaults or Disraelian challenges, Cobdenism represented a
much more rounded and consistent form of opposition to Palmerston and the Whig
government and therefore possessed much greater potential for success. Over Don
Pacifico the so-called rational radicals were offered their first substantial opportunity
to test their principles against the prevailing Palmerstonian standard.
Perhaps A.J.P. Taylor is correct in describing this debate as possibly 'the
greatest debate on the principles of foreign policy in our parliamentary records', for
not only was Palmerston called to account for his conduct of foreign affairs since
1830, but the radicals used this as a platform for exploring questions of morality in
foreign policy.133 In many ways this was both an advantage and a mistake. For
whilst a clear and logical opposition to the official foreign policy of the country now
131 J. Morley, The Life of Richard Cobden (1 vol. edn., London, 1903), pp.476-478, 530-531
132 Hansard, 3rd sen, CXII, 673, (28 June 1850)
133 Taylor, The Trouble Makers, p.56311
found its expression, the chance to use this opportunity to undermine the credibility
of the ministry's chief proponent ofthat policy was missed.
Cobden spoke on the last night of the debate. He opened with a discussion of
the essential points of the case before the House
- that of Don Pacifico
- but
grounded his censure of the government's policy not in terms of the validity of the
cause, but the method of its execution. 'I will not go into the merits of them [the
grievances against the Greek government];' he said, 'say the Greeks were wrong, or
we were wrong, just as you please; but admit they were wrong, and what I want to
know is, whether the wrong was not one that might have been readily settled by
other means than by sending fifteen ships of war into the Bay of Salamis?'.134
Gunboat diplomacy of this sort, contended Cobden, rather than exaggerating the
potential of a nation's power
- making a big stand over a little question and thereby
causing more threatening rivals to pause for thought
- actually achieved the opposite
effect. Such a course placed a country such as Britain in a disadvantageous position
relative to, for example, a power like Russia and thus open to abuse:
And why are you obliged to submit to it? Because you are
committing an injustice, and conscious you do so; for otherwise,
so far from this country being in a condition to be menaced by
Russia, such are the advantages you possess in your great wealth,
and your maritime commerce, in the knowledge and use of
mechanical science, and in the advanced state of the arts over
Russia, that if you behaved with dignity to small States, she would
not venture even to look at you disparagingly, far less to use such
language towards you.135
A more efficient mode of settling diplomatic disputes, Cobden maintained, was
through the process of arbitration and restrain from direct intervention wherever
possible.136 Cobden's dissent from Roebuck's motion, then, ultimately was founded
134 Hansard, 3rd ser., CXII, 663, (28 June 1850)
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on his refusal to sanction a continuous trend of interventionist foreign policy during
the last two decades. Palmerston, he acknowledged, was presented frequently as the
champion of liberalism and constitutionalism abroad, but, Cobden stressed, 'I cannot
fall into this delusion'; Palmerston, he continued, was a man 'of an active turn of
mind
- that he likes these protocols and conventions
- and that the smaller the subject
the better it suits his taste'.137 Yet despite offering a reasoned radical alternative to
Palmerstonian foreign policy, Cobden took with him into the division lobbies very
few colleagues, and even then they were some of his staunchest allies such as John
Bright and William Molesworth.
Taylor argues that Palmerston's victory in the debate 'was more in the nature
of a caution not to do it again than a triumphant acquittal',138 yet a victory it was
nonetheless. Cobdenism, or the Manchester School interest, had, in some respects,
overplayed its hand. The Manchester Guardian, in a leading article published a few
days after the conclusion of the debate, was highly critical of John Bright for
opposing the government as he had done and rather than voting against a supposed
long-standing principle of interventionism, argued that he should have moved an
amendment directed specifically at the issue under discussion (in fact Bright had
made no direct contribution to the debate).
A principle or a rule of action must merely be deduced, [ran the
article] either from the express declaration of the party to whom it
is ascribed, or from something like an invariable practice on his
part. Now, where is the practice, on the part of Lord
PALMERSTON, from which any such rule can be deduced? If we
grant that he interfered somewhat unnecessarily, as we believe he
did, with Spain, we conceive that does not altogether establish a
principle or a rule of action. And, if not, pray where are the other
instances of interference in other people's affairs?139
137 Hansard, 3rd sen, CXII, 673, (28 June 1850)
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Rather than demonstrating a genuine commitment to their professed cause, the paper
argued, Bright and his associates were merely exploiting an opportunity to
undermine the Russell government in the hope that a different, more appealing
ministry, might thus be ushered in. Bright himself even tacitly admitted in private
that party considerations were as significant as those of principle when he noted in
his journal in response to hostile assessments of his conduct such as that in the
Manchester Guardian, that he was determined not to be 'a mere joint of a Whig
tail'.140
Yet the Manchester Guardian was no real friend of the movement led by
figures such as Cobden and Bright which emanated from the same commercial city
-
John Bright specifically identified his opponents as the 'Guardian party'141
- and its
criticism of the Manchester School's stand in parliament over Don Pacifico signifies
something other than a dissatisfaction with the parliamentary exposition of attitudes
relating to the Guardian's constituency. For, in effect, the Guardian and Cobdenism
represented different interests, or, more accurately, differed in their perception of
those interests. As A.J.P. Taylor suggests, the Cobdenites were 'not the business
men, but the business-like, a matter of mentality, not of class'.142 Entrepreneurship,
which demands flair and nerve, was attracted to Palmerstonian politics which
offered a spirit of chance and daring, whereas Cobdenism, in a sense, was almost too
rational: it represented commercial interests in the abstract. The Manchester
Guardian represented the Manchester business-man whilst the Cobdenites stood for
Manchester's economic interests theoretically apprehended and understood.
Cobdenism in this regard had not been defeated in the Don Pacifico debate, although
140 Quoted K. Robbins, John Bright (London, 1979), p.89
141 Ibid, p. 72
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the class-interest it was (in this sense erroneously) believed to represent had not been
well-served by Cobden himself. Thus can Cobdenism be argued to have prospered
in spite of this particular result: the supposed pacifism of British policy and its
attitude to international affairs which was represented by the Great Exhibition of
1851, maintains Taylor, 'seemed to mark the victory of Cobden's outlook',141
coinciding as it did with a Conservative (and in particular Disraelian) retreat from
protectionism.
Yet in this same year, an issue which brought Palmerston into conflict with
the Cabinet also revealed the inherent conflict between Cobdenite policies and the
prevailing Palmerstonian ethic. When Palmerston received Kossuth and thereby
applauded the efforts of a noble patriot, Cobden and Bright, whilst sharing this
sympathy for the fallen hero would not allow themselves to condone intervention
abroad to support their causes. Continuing to place their faith in peaceful free
commerce to guarantee liberty, they soon failed to act in tune with the popular mood.
As Cobden observed when Bright attended one of Kossuth's speeches: 'Really a
public man has a hard work to give a generous welcome to a patriot and martyr,
without falling into the trap laid for him by Palmerston's tools'.144
By the winter of 1853-54 Britain was engaged on a course which
demonstrated little of this peaceful philosophy. To the Crimean War the Manchester
School could offer little by way of effective opposition, although dissent from the
government's policy was recorded, as a salve to troubled consciences if nothing else.
When the Eastern question became one involving issues of war or peace for
Britain, Cobden maintained a stout belief in the pacific disposition of the nation at
143 Ibid, p.57
144 Cobden, 13 Nov. 1851, quoted McCord, 'Cobden and Bright1, p. 104315
large. 'The great mass of the people', he told J.B. Smith, an old friend from the
Anti-Corn Law League,
is always ready to hear the truth. ...They have no interest in
wrong-doing. Let us then by our great meetings in Edinburgh and
elsewhere show that we are not afraid to appeal to the people
against those who from ignorance, prejudice and sinister motives
are trying to mislead them. We may roll back the tide of military
enthusiasm whilst at its height if we will now make one great
effort on behalf of the right.145
Indeed, within the very highest echelons of government, voices were to be heard
praising the Cobdenite view. The Peace Conference, said Aberdeen in a letter to
Delane of the Times, went beyond the limits of his support, but the essential message
the Conference sought to convey was warmly applauded by the Prime Minister.
Suspecting that the Times was wavering in its support for peace, Aberdeen thus
wrote to Delane: 'I think that both the principal speakers [Cobden and Bright] uttered
so much truth as to deserve a different treatment, by which the cause of peace might
have been further advanced'.146 Aberdeen, however, did not necessarily speak for the
nation. Rather, the popular mood seemed quite at odds with the Cobdenite view and
whilst Cobden might maintain, somewhat hopelessly perhaps in December 1853,
that he still carried the middle classes with him - that they were, as he put it
'fanatically devoted to peace'147
- he eventually was drawn to admit some months
later that this was not absolutely accurate. Retreating to his home in the country,
Cobden tacitly admitted the defeat of his approach, asking an old friend:
how can I better escape from the humbling spectacle of a nation
given up to the dominion of its fiercest animal passions, whilst
flattering itself that it is wielding the sceptre of justice, than in
taking refuge in my nursery, where the children, if not more
logical, are at least less hypocritical than those of a larger growth
145 Cobden to J.B. Smith, 5 Sept. 1853, quoted W. Hinde, Richard Cobden: A Victorian
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whose 'fe, fa, fi, fi, fum' is now resounding from our streets,
theatres, churches and chapels? To confess the truth, I am afraid I
am growing cynical, and I am half disposed to take to my tub, let
my beard grow, and pass a vote of want of confidence in
mankind.148
Cobden had not been a completely silent observer of events, and his disillusionment
is understandable. Having presented to the House of Commons, on two notable
occasions, his view of events in the East and the government's handling of those
events, all that Cobden held dear and believed about the sagacity of the people he
thought he represented was controverted when his counsel was not heeded. Yet
these parliamentary speeches demonstrate not only the rational approach adopted by
the Cobdenites, but also, in this case, its bankruptcy.
On 16 August 1853, Cobden gave an early illustration of his view of events
in the East. Russia, he agreed, had acted in a manner that was 'treacherous,
overbearing, and violent', and should be compelled as swiftly as possible to evacuate
the occupied principalities. But this was not a plea grounded in any special regard
for Turkey: 'you cannot maintain Mahomedanism in Europe' he argued and whilst
Russian invasion of Constantinople was to be regretted, the Ottoman Empire thus
constituted was not an appropriate ally of Britain. And whilst it was the case that
many subjects of Turkey in Europe, rayahs, were Christian, this did not necessarily
demand an automatic defence of their interests against Russia; indeed, noted
Cobden, 'I should prefer a Russian or any other government rather than a
Mahomedan one'. Combining an unwillingness to over-stretch Britain in a cause for
which there were no clear grounds, with a greater degree of admiration for Russian
than Turkish culture, civilisation and commercial maturity, Cobden could find no
compelling reason to go to war. He could, however, identify good reason not to.
148 Cobden to Hargreaves, 7 Oct. 1854, quoted ibid, p.25O317
Commercial interests, he argued, were not threatened by Russian advances, but in
any event, free trade principles did not require a military defence: 'I have too much
faith in my principles to go to war for them', he said, 'I believe that free-trade
principles will spread and make converts by means of peace1. Furthermore, a war of
this nature, whilst stimulating industrial output in the short-term to serve the
campaign, would ultimately prove damaging to commerce: unknown numbers of
markets stood to be lost or disrupted in case of war and as he observed in a remark
addressed to Mr Blackett, the M.P. for Newcastle, 'there is no port which would
suffer more severely, more in proportion to the magnitude of its commerce, than
Newcastle would do, if we should go to war'.149
He returned to this theme in February 1854 when war had been waging in the
Near East between Russia and Turkey for over four months and Britain seemed to be
on the point of entering the fray. Expressing various doubts about the benefit to the
Ottoman Empire of sustaining it in this manner, and consequently its ability or
encouragement to reform itself, and questioning the extent to which the Ottoman
Christians were suited to Ottoman, rather than Russian, rule, Cobden ultimately
admitted that he was unconcerned with whether or not the proposed war was right or
wrong, only that there were insufficient grounds for such an undertaking. Placing
before the House he calculations of the value of Russian trade with Britain, he
argued:
Compare the Russian and Turkish trades together, and you will
find that in the former you have one of three times the importance
of the other. There is no one foreign country whose trade is so
important to us as Russia, excepting the United States; and it is
well to remember that all the carrying trade between our ports and
Russia is in our hands. Now, is there any ground for urging this
country into a war with Russia, for the purpose of protecting our
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commercial and trading interests? None whatever. The advantage
is all on the other side.150
Cobden's arguments contained a certain logic and force, but missed the real essence
of the matter. As Palmerston
- significantly it was he who responded to Cobden's
speech of August 1853
- argued, whilst Cobden's speech did not appear quite
consistent, and refusing to accept the Cobdenite denigration of the commercial
importance of Turkey which was, he insisted, important 'as the channel through
which our manufactures pass into Asia', it was all for nought when the views
expressed ran so much counter to the prevailing mood:
Nothing is so painful as to see a man of great ability labouring to
bring about a conviction which he knows to be contrary to the
opinions of the great majority of his fellow-countrymen, and
which, therefore, he is afraid -1 will not use a stronger expression
- openly to express, but which he endeavours to conceal under
every specious device which human ingenuity could afford to the
precise orator.151
As Cobden himself admitted in his speech of February 1854, it was 'not to speak
upon abstract principles of non-interference, or upon abstract questions of peace, that
I rise to address the House; but with reference to the points at issue between Turkey
and Russia, and of the war between England and France on the one side, and Russia
upon the other'.152 Yet herein the weakness of his case. For in the war with Russia
the calculations were not those of balance sheets and account books, but of
perceived violations of liberties and affronts to national honour and interest. Only
once the war started to go badly did John Bright's initial questions about the nobility
and popularity of the endeavour have any real resonance.153
Cobdenism had currency in parliament over the Crimean War to some extent
- speeches were cheered and applauded in certain quarters although were never
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actually put to the test directly in the division lobbies
- but it lacked sympathy in the
country at large. Fundamentally, it also lacked the support of its traditional
constituency. Cobdenite opposition to the war not only offended Whig and Tory
sensibilities, but as N. McCord has demonstrated, with many Radicals viewing the
war as a crusade against a tyrannical Russia in defence of the peoples of Europe, it
also alienated much parliamentary radical feeling.154 Former allies from the League
turned on their erstwhile leaders and denounced their anti-war stand; Cobden
regretted their adherence to 'an absurd policy'.155 In fact Cobden and Bright had
already alienated much radical feeling in 1850 over Don Pacifico,156 and now the
backing, such as it was, that they would have liked to receive from radical leaders
such as John Roebuck in the 1853 and 1854 went instead to Palmerston.157
Only once the war became a drawn-out and costly one did anti-war feeling
really gain ground and perhaps Cobdenism, then, was not so much vindicated by the
course of the war but more as anti-war sentiments increased, Cobdenism was
well-placed to exploit this feeling. Nevertheless, there is a clear inference to be
drawn here. With regard to foreign policy, reasoned opposition to the prevailing
foreign policy still failed to capture the moment fully in the face of popular
Palmerstonian bluster, bluff and pro-active policies. A.J.P. Taylor may well see
Cobdenism as having embodied the ascendancy of liberal politics in the
mid-nineteenth century, but even he does not attribute to Cobdenism such an
accolade in effect until the later 1850s.
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Cobden, who in private believed that a military defeat might better serve
British interests than a victory,158 was believed by his former supporters now to be
pursuing an 'anti-national policy'.159 Cobden recognised his own political defeat:
It is a delusion to propose economy in the public expenditure [he
told Wilson in 1856] so long as the people of this country as
represented by almost every leading politician and newspaper
-
from Palmerston to Roebuck
- from The Times to the Despatch
-
lay it down as their duty that they must regulate the affairs of the
whole world, and protect Europe in particular against the
encroachments of Russia or any other ambitious power. So long
as such a policy is seriously professed by the country, I cannot
honestly tell it that there should be a moderate peace
establishment.160
So long as Palmerston carried with him, in the broadest sense, the nation, or at least
was perceived somehow to represent the mood of that nation, and so long as
parliamentary (party) politics kept him at the heart of non-Protectionist ministerial
combinations, opposition to his foreign policy proved ultimately ineffectual.
Ironically, only once he had assumed the highest office himself, in February 1855,
did he become a much more vulnerable target. He could no longer manipulate
senior colleagues into positions of support, explicit or implicit as the case may be,
for his policies and also could no longer, to the same extent, appeal to collective
Cabinet responsibility as not only a support but also a constraint. With the explosion
of the Palmerstonian myth at Scutari, Sebastopol and elsewhere in the Crimea, and
the exposure of Palmerston himself to much more direct attack (contrast the Don
Pacifico debate of 1850 in which the government was on trial yet which was also the
closest thing to a personal attack on Palmerston with the bombardment of Canton on
158 On 31 May 1853 Cobden wrote to Bright: 'speaking in the interests of our children, 1 doubt
whether it be desirable that our arms should have a great triumph in the Crimea
- for it would only
foster the war spirit and make us more eager for further intervention'. The following month he wrote
again on the same theme: 'Nothing I fear short of the loss of an army by disease will break up this
confederacy and turn the public mind against both government and public instructors' (Cobden to
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which Cobdenism defeated Palmerston in parliament in 1857 for example) it is
significant to that not only did Cobdenism gain ground, but Disraeli felt better able
to challenge his 'ginger beer' opponent and, whilst outside parliament admittedly,
David Urquhart's challenge to Palmerstonism also regained much of its lost
momentum through the Foreign Affairs Committees.322
CONCLUSION
In September 1846 the new Prime Minister, Russell, had warned his Foreign
Secretary, Palmerston, 'there is nothing the country dislikes so much as foresight in
foreign affairs. They would rather wait to see the shell burst than take measures to
get out of the way'.1 Nearly seven years later, this time when events in the East were
pressing, Palmerston told Russell, 'there are Things so contrary to Right and Justice
and so adverse to essential Interests of this Country and of Europe that the Decision
to regard them cannot depend upon the Course of any future Events'.2 The
divergence of their views owes as much to the course of politics in the intervening
period, during which 'Palmerstonism' had evolved and established itself as a clear
and distinct political creed, as to any differences in their received political
philosophies.
It may have been that there were many people with an interest in foreign
policy but little time in which to study it, and that this 'large class of persons take for
granted any specious statement connected with a subject they do not understand, and
are ready to re-echo every popular cry that is raised in connection with it',3 but
Palmerston had still been able to exploit this disposition to express opinions
1 Russell to Palmerston, 13 Sept. 1846, Broadlands Papers, Southampton University Library,
GC/RU/111/1
2 Palmerston to Russell, 20 June 1853, Russell Papers, Public Record Office, PRO 30/22/11 A,
fols 94-98
3 [Anon], Palmerston for Premier! The claims of Lord Palmerston to fill the post of Prime
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(however much they were simply uncritical echoes of vociferous interests) to his
own ends. In the face of Whig disorganisation, indeed what Angus Hawkins has
called 'the bankruptcy of Whig doctrine' as uniformity of purpose gave way to 'a
series of shifts and compromises',4 Palmerston was able to supply leadership which
ultimately placed him at the very heart of government. The Times had complained
in October 1846 that Peel had failed to supply clear leadership and purpose and that
there remained an absence of a great man now to lead the country.5 As Lord John
Russell also failed to provide the required leadership, Palmerston sought to impress
direction on the government in his stead.
Hawkins has argued with regard to Palmerston's first premiership that
Palmerston's rhetoric illuminates only the political world 'outside parliament and
Clubland' and in this sense such rhetoric 'is not an explanation of Palmerston's
political ascendancy following the fall of Aberdeen's coalition' since 'it tells us very
little about the reality of Palmerston's situation within Westminster'.6 This may hold
true for Palmerston's own governments when, as Prime Minister, Palmerstonism
'was in essence Palmerston' and defined itself very much as 'anti-Russellism', making
for a rather vulnerable central administration,7 but when he had been a Secretary of
State the situation had been subtly different. As this thesis has sought to
demonstrate in the decade immediately preceding the formation of Palmerston's first
ministry in February 1855, Palmerston's rhetoric and courting of extra-parliamentary
support was vital to his parliamentary position.
4 A. Hawkins, Parliament, Party and the Art of Politics in Britain, 1855-59 (Stanford,
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Palmerston's manoeuvring at Westminster can be studied and indeed to a
certain extent explained by an examination of the course of high politics, but only
when underpinned by an appreciation of Palmerston's highly effective and indeed
novel invocation of a wide and very general popular support
- to forge the reputation
of the national minister
- do his political career and the nature of mid-century
politics acquire a convincing gloss. Whilst not dissenting, therefore, from Hawkins'
broader argument that both 'the distinction and relation between Palmerstonian
language and parliamentary circumstance are crucial to an understanding of the true
nature of Palmerston's pre-eminence during 1855 and 1856',8 this thesis urges an
important qualification of that view. It was during the period 1846-1855 that
Palmerstonism was really established and building upon the legacy of George
Canning it infused political life with a greater appreciation of the role and
importance of public opinion and a more responsible attitude to a system of virtual
representation. Palmerston, however, did not regard himself as the servant of public
opinion: Palmerstonism required a mastery over that opinion in order to channel it
towards Palmerston's own ends. To a large extent, arguably, he succeeded in
demonstrating such mastery, although this may have been as much the result of the
inability of his rivals to articulate the view of a contrary public opinion. Thus,
whereas after 1855 Palmerston's rhetoric might fail adequately to elucidate the
nature of Palmerston's parliamentary position, before he became Prime Minister it
was precisely this rhetoric and more widely, Palmerston's invocation of
extra-parliamentary pillars of support, that gave his parliamentary position what
strength it had.
8 Ibid, p.23325
Palmerston in 1846 was already sixty two years old and by the time he
became Prime Minister he was seventy. No one at the time really expected him to
achieve very much politically and indeed, as the Times observed on the occasion of
his death in 1865: 'Had he died at seventy he would have left a second class
reputation. It was his great and peculiar fortune to live to right himself.9 In the
sense that a retrospective review of his career in 1855 would have revealed a
curmudgeonly Cabinet colleague who served in the important offices of Foreign
Secretary and Home Secretary, his career would have appeared solid, respectable,
occasionally noteworthy and inflammatory, but perhaps not unduly remarkable.
However, it would be wrong to judge Palmerston's career in the fashion of
the Times. By 1855 Palmerston's place in political life (and history) was already
much more than second class and indeed his association with foreign affairs before
1855 has attracted much more historical interest than his career after that date. He
had not only secured for himself a prominent role in Westminster politics but had
done much to place foreign affairs at the centre of political debate and had used this
not only to advance his own position but to help change the face of parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary politics in the mid-nineteenth century.
Traditionally foreign policy has been discussed in terms of an abstract
concern of the political elite. Diplomatic history as a discipline emerged between
the two world wars of the twentieth century in an attempt to learn lessons about
international relations in order to avoid future conflict. It focused on the intercourse
between governments and diplomats and whilst many important studies emerged
during this period, the historiographical trend in the later twentieth century has been
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to seek to place foreign policy in a much broader context; to regard it as illuminating
domestic political situations as much (if not more than) external ones.10
Diplomatic business
- dry, intricate and frequently legalistic
- was the
preserve of an educated clique, capable not only of understanding the issues but of
discussing them in a foreign language. There is something to be said for this view -
perhaps more than any other area of public life, foreign policy demanded a specialist
interest - and Palmerston believed, when he returned to the Foreign Office in 1846
that his expertise should be relied upon in the conduct of that business. However,
the Crown and the Cabinet both laid claims to a role in foreign policy as well. In an
age of constitutional ambiguity, Palmerston had to defend himself against these
interventions, if he was to preserve for himself the independence he sought, through
a series of bluffs and threats. In terms of foreign affairs, this made British policy
frequently vague and ambiguous; for Palmerston himself it was the means by which
he could use an obscure area of political business to carve out a unique and
pre-eminent position for himself.
As this thesis has argued, Palmerston used his 'expertise' to confound the
Court and the Cabinet, and his conduct, especially during the fragile administration
of Russell, was tolerated largely because he was perceived to be 'popular' with the
country. There was little contemporary examination of the nature of this popularity,
however, and Palmerston was able, until the government ceased to regard tolerance
of him a necessary price to pay for office, to use this popularity to make himself
politically indispensable, or at least central to politics, by the early 1850s.
10 For example, P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on
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After he had accepted the Home Office under Lord Aberdeen, it was not long
before Palmerston made explicit his continuing pre-occupation with foreign affairs.
Neither did his colleagues in this government pretend that Palmerston was really
retired from foreign policy debates and if he was kept in largely because he was too
dangerous to be left outside this reflected again Palmerston's perceived strengths in
the field of foreign policy. This was a period, after all, in which Cobdenite critiques
of policy were still a force to be reckoned with. It is significant that from the Home
Office, Palmerston was able to engineer his accession to the premiership, or at least
lay the foundations for such an appointment, on the grounds that he was the one best
qualified to take charge of a question of foreign policy.
Palmerston's use of popular support aimed at more than establishing an
ascendancy for his views of foreign policy. He cultivated an extra-parliamentary
constituency of support which extended beyond the traditional political nation in
order to underwrite his own political position and through which he could steal a
march on rivals within the party. Through the newspapers and periodicals
Palmerston could appeal (primarily) to the middle classes and lay the Palmerstonian
view before them. Such publicity was vital but in this, whilst he was arguably one of
the period's most skilful manipulators of the press, he was not unique. Other
politicians could similarly speak through the press to the burgeoning middle classes
and campaign for their approbation. Palmerston needed to establish a rapport with a
community possessing political weight but over which he could exercise a more
individual mastery. Enjoying little real dominance or control of a political party and
being the object of antagonism for the Crown and the Cabinet, Palmerston looked to
a more broadly defined political nation for support.328
Here his association with foreign policy was vital. Uniquely this could be
presented as an area of business of pre-eminently national significance in which even
the most oppressed inhabitants of a London slum could share in the reflected 'glory'
of the pax Britannica. Whatever the paradoxes of Palmerston's foreign policy and
the inconsistencies of his attempts to present that policy as directed in the interests of
liberalism all over the world, these flaws were not always apparent to a population
easily swayed by an emotive Palmerstonian rhetoric. The force of Palmerston's
popular support was felt throughout the high political world. Not that Palmerston
was universally applauded, but in the absence of a more effective interpreter of
popular feeling, he was able to present (and substantiate) the image of himself that
he wanted to. Here arguably was his greatest contribution to the evolution of a new
political style. Both Disraeli and Gladstone recognised the importance of
Palmerston's example. Disraeli quickly sought to appropriate the Palmerstonian
mantle after 1865 and even Gladstone, however much the words must have stuck in
his throat, knew in 1879 the necessity of identifying himself with Palmerston. 'The
name of Palmerston will ever be honoured by those who recollect the erection of the
kingdom of Belgium, and the union of the disjointed provinces of Italy', he declared
at the end of his third Midlothian speech. He also mentioned Russell approvingly in
this speech, but more importantly he also eulogised Canning,11 and as Richard
Shannon has argued convincingly, Gladstone's attitude towards Balkan policy owed
a great deal to Canning.12 Canning's name was eminently more pronounceable than
Palmerston's yet there was no denying the impact Palmerston had on the People's
William.
11 Gladstone's third Midlothian Campaign Speech, 27 Nov. 1879, in K. Bourne, The Foreign
Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford, 1970), p.422
12 R. Shannon, 'Gladstone, Canning and Bulgaria', Etudes Balkaniques, 4, (Sofia, 1977), 78-88329
Sympathy for Palmerston had been, after all, one of the causes of weakness
in the opposition to Palmerston during 1846-1855, at least in the case of Disraeli: the
success and value of Palmerston's popularising foreign policy, Disraeli realised,
could not justifiably be criticised. Not that Palmerston had convinced all of his
political opponents, however. Palmerstonism had not achieved its final victory over
the minds of politicians (witness for example the opposition led by Urquhart and
Cobden), but the inability of parliamentary opponents to make a telling strike (due to
their own shortcomings as much as to Palmerston's strengths) against Palmerston
allowed him to pursue that goal.
John Vincent argues that in 1857 'the old school in the Cabinet', including
Palmerston, came 'to regard the public as a millstone', and that 'the participation of
the public in the making of foreign policy, or even their support, was hardly
canvassed because they were presumed to be hostile, wrong, or ignorant'.13
Palmerston had never looked to the public for guidance in the making of policy, only
for its approval in the execution, but even if Vincent's argument holds true for the
specific instance he is concerned with in 1857,14 it is hollow if reflected back to the
period prior to Palmerston's becoming Prime Minister.
Palmerston established foreign policy as central to popular politics and he
placed himself as one of its key exponents. He brought the role of public opinion
into sharper focus and illustrated the political capital to be made from efficient
representation of the people (significantly he remained throughout an opponent of
more representative government for the people). Political success in the
mid-nineteenth century was determined now not solely in terms of tenure of office
13 J.R. Vincent, The Formation of the British Liberal Party, 1857-68 (Harmondsworth, 1972),
pp.280-281
14 Vincent uses public opposition to the Persian war in 1857 as an example here.330
and the confidence of the high political elite but in the support more widely of the
country. The Peelite Morning Chronicle declared in February 1855 that if
Palmerston had been unable to form a government, 'his failure would have been a
national misfortune'; the Globe attributed his success in large part to the force of
opinion 'out of doors'.15 Palmerston may have achieved his 'inevitable' rise to the
premiership with a generous measure of luck, but it was a result he had long aimed
at and one he had done much himself to make possible.
Morning Chronicle, 7 Feb. 1855; Globe, 5 Feb. 1855331
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I: PRIMARY SOURCES
a) Manuscript Sources
Aberdeen Papers, British Library
Glenesk-Bathurst Papers (Peter and Algernon Borthwick), Brotherton Library, Leeds
University
Broadlands Papers (Palmerston), Southampton University Library
Broadlands Papers (Shaftesbury), Southampton University Library
Broughton Diaries, British Library
Clarendon Deposit, Bodleian Library, Oxford
Delane Papers, Times Newspapers Ltd. Archive, News International Record Office,
London
Sir John Easthope Papers, Duke University Special Collections Library, North
Carolina, USA
English Manuscripts (MSS.Eng.c.2O85: correspondence of Lady Clarendon),
Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Firth Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford
Sir James Graham Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford (microfilm)
Grey Papers (3rd Earl), Durham University Library
Harding Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford
Hickleton Papers (Sir Charles Wood), Brotherton Library, Leeds University
(microfilm)
Hughenden Deposit, Bodleian Library, Oxford332
John Johnson Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford
Lansdowne Papers, British Library
Minto Papers, National Library of Scotland
Newcastle Papers, Nottingham University Library
Palmerston Letter Books, British Library
Lady Palmerston Papers, Hatfield House, Hertfordshire
Russell Papers, Public Record Office, Kew
David Urquhart Papers, Balliol College Library, Oxford
Westmoreland Papers (1 lth Earl), Duke University Special Collections Library,
North Carolina, USA
b) Printed Sources
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, second series
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, third series
Cabinet Reports by Prime Ministers to the Crown: A reproduction of the series of
manuscript letters preserved at Windsor Castle (Hassocks, 1978, microfilm)
c) Newspapers and Periodicals
Economist
English Republic
Globe
Illustrated London News
Manchester Guardian
Morning Chronicle333
Morning Post
Press
Times
Quarterly Review
d) Pamphlets (Listed in chronological order of publication)
Lord Grey and Lord P'aimerston. A letter addressed to the Right Honourable T.B.
Macaulay, M.P. on the occasion of his letter to Mr M'Farlane, from a Free Trader
(London, 1846)
Charles de la Pryme, The Roman Embassy. A Letter to Vuscount Palmerston, M.P.,
2nd edn. (London, corrected, 1847)
Speech of Lord Viscount Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the
Electors of Tiverton, on the 31st July 1847, 2nd edn. (London, 1847)
Snooks (pseud.), A letter to Lord Palmerston, on the "Condition of England
Question," elicited by his speech to the electors of Tiverton. (London, 1847)
Augustus Bozzi Granville, On the Formation and Constitution of a Kingdom of
Upper Italy. In a letter to the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston. (London, 1848)
Augustus Bozzi Granville, The Italian Question. A second letter to Lord
Palmerston, G.C.B, M.P., etc. etc; with a refutation of certain misrepresentations by
Lord Brougham, Mr D'Israeli, and the Quarterly Review, respecting the rights of
Austria and the Lombardo Venetians (London, 1848)
Charles MacFarlane, Sicily; her constitutions, and Viscount Paimerston's Sicilian
Blue-Book. Being an appendix to 'A Glance at Revolutionized Italy'. (London, 1849)
Sir Harry Verney, Some Observations on the affairs of Germany, in a letter
addressed to the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston (London, 1849)
Thomas Lloyd, A letter to Lord Viscount Palmerston. Containing a refutation of Mr
Turnbull's statements that the British merchants are implicated in the slave-trade
(Printed for private circulation, [1850])
On the Speech of Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary, delivered in the House of
Commons June 25, 1850. A letter to the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, in
reference to the Greek Question, exclusive of His Lordship's general foreign policy.
By a Greek Gentleman (London, 1850)334
Germanicus Vindex, A Letter to Viscount Palmerston concerning the question of
Schleswig-Holstein (London, 1850)
John Aiton, Letter to the Right Honourable Lord Palmerston. Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, on the Political Imprisonments and Present Condition of
Naples (Edinburgh, 1851)
James Thomson, British Religious Liberty Abroad, and General Religious Liberty in
all Nations: in a letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Palmer ston (London, 1851)
J Davidson, The Fall of the Pope, and the Fate of the French President (London and
Aberdeen, 1852)
Opinions and Policy of the Right Honourable Viscount Palmer ston, G.C.B., M.P.,
&c, as Minister, Diplomatist, and Statesman, during more than Forty Years of
Public Life. With a memoir by George Henry Francis, Esq. (London, 1852)
Thomas Wilson, England's Foreign Policy, or, Grey-Whigs and Cotton-Whigs, with
Lord Palmer ston's Pet Belgian Constitution of Catholics and Liberals (London,
[1852])
J. Kenyon Blackwell, Explosions in Coal Mines, their causes, and the means
availbale for their prevention or control; containing a review of the report of the
committee of 1852 on this subject; A letter addressed to Lord Palmer ston on the late
explosions and on mining inspection; and notes on various forms of the Davy Lamp
and their relative value (London, 1853)
The Flag List and its Prospects. A letter to the Right Hon. Lord Palmerston,
Secretary for Home Affairs, by An Enquirer (Edinburgh, 1853)
Charles John Vaughan, A Letter to the Viscount Palmerston, M.P. on the Monitorial
System of Harrow School (Privately printed, not published, 1853)
Arthur Parry Eardley-Wilmot, A Letter to the Right Honourable Viscount
Palmerston, M.P., one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State, &C, on the present
state of the African Slave Trade and on the necessity of increasing the African
Squadron (London, 1853)
Thomas Bailey, Village Reform: The Great Social Necessity of Britain. A letter to
Viscount Palmerston, M.P., Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home
Department (London and Nottingham, 1854)
Sir Richard Broun, Metropolitan Extramural Sepulture. London Necropolis &
National Mausoleum Company. Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Palmerston, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Home Department; with a copy of a letter to Messrs
Rother ay, Dahin, Chatterton, Hinds, Croll, Wilkinson, and others, advertising
themselves as Directors of the above named Company; reviewing the PROSPECTUS335
recently issued by them to the Public, and exposing its numerous Misrepresentations
(London, 1854)
George R. Burnell, Letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.,
M.P., &c, Her Most Gracious Majesty's Secretary of State for the Home
Department, in reply to the Report of the General Board of Health, on the
Adminstration of the Public Health Act, and the Nuisances Removal and Diseases
Prevention Act, from 1848 to 1854 (London, 1854)
W. Coningham, Lord Palmer ston and Prince Albert (London, 1854)
[H. Fortesque], Representative Self-Government for the Metropolis. A letter to
Viscount Palmerston, from Viscount Ebrington (London, 1854)
Frederick Oakley, The Religious Disabilities of our Catholic Prisoners Considered,
with a view to their removal, in a letter to the Viscount Palmerston, M.P., &c, &c,
&c (London, 1854)
Joseph Kingsmill, Roman Catholic Chaplains to Gaols. A letter to the Rt. Hon.
Viscount Palmerston, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department, on this
Subject; occasioned by a letter of the Rev. Frederick Oakley, M.A., entitled, 'The
Religious Disabilities of our Catholic Prisoners considered, with a view to their
removal' (London, 1854)
Sir George Stephen, Magesterial Reform suggested in a letter to Viscount
Palmerston, &c, &c (London, 1854)
[Anon], Palmerston for Premier! The claims of Lord Palmerston to fill the post of
Prime Minister of England considered (London, 1854)
Washington Wilks, Palmerston in Three Epochs: a comparison of facts with
opinions (London, 1854)
Authentic Report of Kossuth's Speeches on the War in the East and the Alliance with
Austria, at Sheffield, June 5, and at Nottingham, June 12, 1854. Published by
Himself. (London, 1854)
David Urquhart, The War of Ignorance: A Prognostication (London, 1854)
David Urquhart, 'Limitation of the Supply of Grain by the Past Action of British
Diplomacy'. Report of the Sub-Committee of the Newcastle-on-Tyne Association for
Watching the War (Newcastle, 1855)
David Urquhart, The Home Face of the 'Four Points (London, 1855)336
e) Memoirs, Journals, Collections of Letters and Speeches
Ashley, E., The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount
Palmerston, 2 vols. (London, 1879)
Benson, A.C. and Esher, Viscount (eds.), The Letters of Queen Victoria: a selection
from Her Majesty's correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861, 3 vols.
(London, 1907)
Bolitho, H. (ed.), The Prince Consort to his Brother: Two Hundred New Letters
(London, 1933)
Bourne, K. (ed.), The Letters of the Third Viscount Palmerston to Laurence and
Elizabeth Sulivan, 1804-1863 (Camden Fourth Series, Vol.23, 1979)
Cambell, George Douglas, Eighth Duke of Argyll, Autobiography and Memoirs ed.
by Dowager Duchess of Argyll, 2 vols. (London, 1906)
Bright, J. and Thorold Rogers, J.E. (eds.), Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by
Richard Cobden, M.P. (London, 1880)
Cobden, R., Reminiscences of Richard Cobden (compiled by Mrs Salis Schwabe)
(London, 1895)
Cobden, R., The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, 2 vols., 4th edn. (London,
1903
Connell, B. (ed.), Regina v. Palmerston: The Correspondence between Queen
Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister, 1837-1865 (London, 1962)
Benjamin Disraeli Letters, vols.III-V (1838-1841; 1842-1847; 1848-1851), ed. M.G.
Wiebe, J.B. Conacher, J. Matthews and M.S. Millar (Toronto, 1987; 1989; 1993);
vol.VI (1852-1856), ed. M.G. Wiebe, M.S. Millar and A.P. Robson (Toronto, 1997))
Disraeli, B., Lord George Bentinck: A Political Biography (London, 1905 edn.)
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second
Earl Granville KG., 1815-1891, 2 vols. (London, 1905)
Gooch, G.P. (ed.), The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-1878, 2
vols. (London, 1925)
Greville, C.C.F., The Greville Memoirs (second part): A Journal of the Reign of
Queen Victoria, from 1837 to 1852 (ed. H. Reeve), 3 vols. (London, 1885)
Greville, C.C.F., The Greville Memoirs (third part): A Journal of the Reign of Queen
Victoria, from 1852 to 1860 (ed. H. Reeve), 2 vols. (London, 1887)337
Guedalla, P. (ed.), Gladstone and Palmerston: being the Correspondence of Lord
Paimerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865 (London, 1928)
Hobhouse, J.C, (later Lord Broughton), Recollections of a Long Life edited by Lady
Dorchester, 6 vols. (London, 1910-1911)
Jennings, L.J. (ed.), The Correspondence and Diaries of the Late Right Honourable
John Wilson Croker, 3 vols. (London, 1884)
Leader, R.E. (ed.), Life and Letters of John Arthur Roebuck (London, 1897)
Lewis, G.F. (ed.), The Letters of the Right Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bart.
(London, 1870)
Malmesbury, Lord, Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, An Autobiography, 2 vols. (London,
1884)
Maxwell, H., The Life and Letters of George William Frederick Fourth Earl of
Clarendon, 2 vols. (London, 1913)
Parker, C.S., Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet of Netherby,
1792-1861, 2 vols. (London, 1907)
Russell, Earl, Recollections and Suggestions, 1813-1873 (London., 1875)
Snell, F.J., Palmerston's Borough: A Budget of Electioneering Anecdotes, Squibs
and Speeches (Tiverton, 1894)
Sudley, Lord (ed.), The Lieven-Paimerston Correspondence, 1828-1856 (London,
1943)
Taylor, M. (ed.), The European Diaries of Richard Cobden, 1846-1849 (Aldershot,
1994)
Vincent, J.R. (ed.) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and
Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869 (Hassocks, 1978)
II: SECONDARY SOURCES
a) Books and Articles
Airlie, Countess of, Lady Palmerston and her Times, 1 vols. (London, 1922)
Anderson, M.S., The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London, 1966)338
Anderson, M.S., The Ascendancy of Europe, 1815-1914, 2nd edn. (Harlow, 1985)
Anderson, O., A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the
Crimean War (London, 1967)
Aspinall, A., Politics and the Press, c. 1780-1850 (London, 1949)
Aydelotte, W.O., 'Constituency Influence on the British House of Commons,
1841-1847', in Aydelotte, W.O., The History of Parliamentary Behaviour
(Princeton, NJ, 1977), 225-246
Bagehot, W., The English Constitution (1867; London 1993 edn.)
Bartlett, C.J., Defence and Diplomacy: Britain and the Great Powers, 1815-1914
(Manchester, 1993)
Battiscombe, G., Shaftesbury: A Biography of the Seventh Earl, 1801-1885 (London,
1974)
Beales, D.E.D., England and Italy, 1859-60 (London, 1961)
Beales, D.E.D., 'Parliamentary Parties and the "Independent" Member, 1810-1860',
in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain (London, 1967), 1-19.
Bell, H.C.F., Lord Palmer ston, 2 vols. (London, 1936)
Bell, H.C.F., 'Palmerston and Parliamentary Representation', Journal of Modern
History, IV (1932), 186-213
Bentley, M., 'Party, Doctrine and Thought', in M. Bentley and J. Stevenson (eds),
High and Low Politics in Modern Britain (Oxford, 1983), 123-153
Bentley, M., Politics Without Democracy, 1815-1914 (London, 1984)
Best, G.F.A., 'Popular Protestantism in Victorian Britain', in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas
and Institutions of Victorian Britain (London, 1967), 115-142
Bindoff, S.T., 'The Unreformed Diplomatic Service, 1812-1860', Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., XVIII (1935), 143-172
Blake, R., Disraeli (New York, 1987 edn.)
Blake, R., The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London, 1985)
Boot, H.M., The Commercial Crisis of 1847 (University of Hull Occasional Papers
in Economic and Social History, no. 11, Hull, 1984)339
K. Bourne, 'Lord Palmerston's "Ginger Beer" Triumph, 1 July 1856', in K. Bourne
and D.C. Watt (eds), Studies in International History (London, 1967), 145-171
Bourne, K., The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford, 1970)
Bourne, K., Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784-1841 (London, 1982)
Bourne, K., 'The Foreign Office under Palmerston', in R. Bullen (ed.), The Foreign
Office, 1782-1982 (Frederick, Maryland, 1984), 18-45
Boyce, D.G., 'Public Opinion and the Historians', History, 63 (1978), 214-228
Braithwaite, R., Palmerston and Africa. The Rio Nunez Affair: Competition,
Diplomacy and Justice (London, 1996)
Bridge, F.R. and Bullen, R., The Great Powers and the European States System,
1815-1914 (London, 1980)
Briggs, A., 'David Urquhart and the West Riding foreign affairs committees',
Bradford Antiquary, 39 (1958), 197-207
Briggs, A., Victorian People (Harmondsworth, 1965 edn.)
Briggs, A.,The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867 (Harlow, 1979)
Brockliss, L. and Eastwood, D. (eds), A Union of Multiple Identities: The British
Isles, c.l 750-1850 (Manchester, 1997)
Brown, L., 'The Treatment of the News in Mid-Victorian Newspapers', Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 27 (1977), 23-39
Brown, L., Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford, 1985)
Bullen, R., Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London,
1974)
Bullen, R. (ed.), The Foreign Office, 1782-1982 (Frederick, Maryland, 1984)
Bulwer, H.L., The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 3 vols.
(London, 1870-1874)
Burrow, J., 'Sense and circumstances: Bagehot and the nature of political
understanding', in S. Collini, D. Winch and J. Burrow, That Noble Science of
Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History (Cambridge, 1983),
161-181
Carlyle, T., On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841; Oxford,
1935 edn.)340
Carr, R., Spain, 1808-1975 (Oxford, 1982)
Carr, W., A History of Germany, 1815-1985, 3rd edn. (London, 1987)
Chamberlain, M.E., Lord Aberdeen (Harlow, 1983)
Chamberlain, M.E., Lord P almerston (Cardiff, 1987)
Chamberlain, M.E., 'Pax Britannica'?: British Foreign Policy 1789-1914 (Harlow,
1988)
Chamberlain, M.E., 'Who founded the Liberal Party', Inaugural lecture delivered at
the University College of Swansea, 26 November 1990 (University College of
Swansea, 1991)
Chariot, M., Victoria: The Young Queen (Oxford, 1991)
Colley, L., 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument', Journal of British Studies,
Vol.31, no.4 (1992), 309-329
Colley, L., Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London, 1996 edn.)
Collini, S., 'The Idea of "Character" in Victorian Political Thought', Transactions of
the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, Vol.35 (1985), 29-50
Colls, R., and Dodd, P., (eds.), Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920
(London, 1986)
Conacher, J.B., 'Peel and the Peelites, 1846-1850', English Historical Review,
LXXVIII, (1958), 431-452
Conacher, J.B., The Aberdeen Coalition, 1852-1855 (Cambridge, 1968)
Cook, E., Delane of the Times (London, 1915)
Cunningham, H., 'The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914', History Workshop
Journal, 12 (1981), 8-33
Dasent, A.I., John Delane, 1817-1879, 2 vols. (London, 1908)
Dickens, CJLittle Dorrit (1857; Oxford, 1982 edn)
Dreyer, F. A., 'The Whigs and the Political crisis of 1845', English Historical Review,
LXXX, (1965), 514-537
Droz, J., Europe Between Revolutions, 1815-1848 (London, 1985 edn.)
Edwards, R.D., The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist, 1843-1993 (London, 1993)341
Eyck, F., The Prince Consort: a Political Biography of Prince Albert (Boston, USA,
and Cambridge, 1959)
Feuchtwanger, E.J., Gladstone, 2nd edn. (London, 1989)
Finn, M.C., After Chartism: Class and Nation in English Radical Politics,
1848-1874 (Cambridge, 1993)
Fulford, R., The Prince Consort (London, 1966)
Gash, N., 'Peel and the Party System, 1830-50', Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society, 5th Series, I, (1951), 47-69
Gash, N., Sir Robert Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830 (Harlow, 1985
edn.)
Gash, N., Reaction and Reconstruction in English Politics, 1832-1852 (Oxford,
1965)
Grant, J., The Newspaper Press
- its origins -progress
- & present position, 3 vols.
(London, 1871-2)
Grenville, J.A.S., Europe Reshaped, 1848-1878 (London, 1976)
Goldfrank, D.M., The Origins of the Crimean War (Harlow, 1994)
Gooch, B.D., 'A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War',
American Historical Review, (October 1956), 33-58
Guedalla, P., Paimerston (London, 1937 edn.)
Hardie, F., The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861-1901, 2nd edn. (Oxford,
1938)
Hawkins, A., Parliament, Party and the Art of Politics in Britain, 1855-59
(Stanford, California, 1987)
Hawkins, A., 'Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism: A Reappraisal',
Parliamentary History, 6 (1987), 280-301
Hawkins, A., '"Parliamentary Government" and Victorian Political Parties,
0.1830-0.1880', English Historical Review, CIV (July 1989), 638-669
Hearder, H., 'Queen Victoria and Foreign Policy. Royal Intervention in the Italian
Question, 1859-60', in K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (eds), Studies in International
History (London, 1967), pp. 172-188
Hearder, H., 'Clarendon, Cavour, and the Intervention of Sardinia in the Crimean
War, 1853-1855', The International History Review, XVIII, 4, Nov. 1996, 819-836342
Hearnshaw, F.J.C. (ed.), The Political Principles of Some Notable Prime Ministers
of the Nineteenth Century: A Series of Lectures Delivered in King's College,
University of London (London, 1926)
Henderson, G.B., Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays (Glasgow,
1947)
Herkless, J.L., 'Stratford, the Cabinet and the Outbreak of the Crimean War',
Historical Journal, XVIII, 3 (1975), 497-523
Hinde, W., George Canning (Oxford, 1973)
Hinde, W., Richard Cobden: A Victorian Outsider (New Haven and London, 1987)
Hindle, W.H., The Morning Post, 1772-1939: Portrait of a Newspaper (London,
1937)
Hogan, J., 'Party Management in the House of Lords, 1846-1865', Parliamentary
History, Vol.10, pt.l (1991), 124-50
Holiis, P., 'Pressure from Without: an introduction', in P. Hollis (ed.), Pressure from
Without in early Victorian England (London, 1974), 1-26
Houghton, W.E., The Victorian Frame of Mind (New Haven, 1957)
Howe, A., The Cotton Masters, 1830-1860 (Oxford, 1984)
Howe, A., Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946 (Oxford, 1997)
Hughes, T., Tom Brown's Schooldays (Harmondsworth, 1983 edn.)
Humpherys, A., 'Popular Narrative and Political Discourse in Reynold's Weekly
Newspaper', in L. Brake, A. Jones, L. Madden (eds), Investigating Victorian
Journalism (London, 1990), 33-47
Hyamson, A., 'Don Pacifico', Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society, 18,
(1958), 1-39
Jones, A., 'Local Journalism in Victorian Political Culture', in L. Brake, A. Jones, L.
Madden (eds), Investigating Victorian Journalism (London, 1990), 63-70
Jones, A., Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power and the Public in
Nineteenth-Century England (Aldershot, 1996)
Jones, R., The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History
(London, 1971)343
Jones Parry, E., 'Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 1782-1855', English
Historical Review, XLIX (1934), 308-320
Karsten, P., Patriot Heroes in England and America. Political Symbolism and
Changing Values over Three Centuries (Madison, Wisconsin, 1978)
Kennedy, P., The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1981)
Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988)
Kitson Clark, G., 'The Repeal of the Corn Laws and the Politics of the Forties',
Economic History Review, 2nd. ser., IV, No.l (1951), 1-13
Rrein, D.F., 'War and Reform: Russell, Palmerston and the Struggle for Power in the
Aberdeen Cabinet, 1853-1854', The Maryland Historian, VII, No.2 (1976), 67-84
Krein, D.F., The Last Palmerston Government (Ames, Iowa, 1978)
Koss, S., The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: Vol.1 The Nineteenth
Century (London, 1981)
Le May, G.H.L., The Victorian Constitution: Conventions, Usages and
Contingencies (London, 1979)
Longford, E., Victoria, R.I. (London, 1967 edn.)
Lucas, R., Lord Glenesk and the 'Morning Post' (London, 1910)
Lyall, A., The Life of the Marquis ofDufferin and Ava (London, 1905)
McCord, N., 'Cobden and Bright in Politics, 1846-1857', in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas
and Institutions of Victorian Britain (London, 1967), 87-114
Maccoby, S., English Radicalism, 1832-1852 (London, 1935)
Magraw, R., France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century (London, 1983)
Mandler, P., Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform: Whigs and Liberals,
1830-1852 (Oxford, 1990)
Martin, K., The Triumph of Lord Palmerston: A Study of Public Opinion in England
before the Crimean War (London, 1963 edn.)
Matthew, H.C.G., Gladstone 1809-1874 (Oxford, 1986)
Middleton, C.R., 'The Foundation of the Foreign Office', in R. Bullen (ed.), The
Foreign Office, 1782-1982 (Frederick, Maryland, 1984), 1-17344
Mitchell, L., Holland House (London, 1980)
Mitchell, L., Lord Melbourne, 1779-1848 (Oxford, 1997)
Monypenny, W.F. and Buckle, G.E., The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of
Beaconsfield, 6 vols (London, 1910-1920)
Moore, D.C., 'Social Structure, Political Structure, and Public Opinion in
Mid-Victorian England1, in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas and Institutions of Victorian
Britain (London, 1967), 20-57
Morley, J., The Life of Richard Cobden, 1 vol. edn. (London, 1903)
Morley, J., The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 2 vols. (London, 1908)
Morley, T., "The Arcana ofthat Great Machine": Politicians and The Times in the
Late 1840s', History, 73 (1988), 38-54
Munsell, F.D., The Unfortunate Duke: Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of Newcastle,
1811-1864 (Columbia, 1985)
Newsome, D., The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and Introspections in an
Age of Change (London, 1997)
Nicholls, D., 'The English Middle Class and the Ideological Significance of
Radicalism, 1760-1886', Journal of British Studies, 24 (1985), 415-433
Parry, J.P., Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875
(Cambridge, 1986)
Parry, J.P., The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain, (New
Haven and London, 1993)
Partridge, M.S., 'The Russell Cabinet and National Defence, 1846-1852', History, 72
(1987), 231-250
Perkin, H., The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880 (1969; London, 1985
edn.)
Piatt, D.C.M., Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914
(Oxford, 1968)
Prest, J., Lord John Russell (London, 1972)
Read, D., Cobden and Bright: A Victorian Political Partnership (London, 1967)
Read, D., Peel and the Victorians (Oxford, 1987)
Ridley, J., Lord Palmerston (London, 1970)345
Robbins, K., John Bright (London, 1979)
Robbins, K., Nineteenth-Century Britain: Integration and Diversity (Oxford, 1988)
Robbins, K., Great Britain: Ideas, Institutions and the Idea ofBritishness (Harlow,
1998)
Roberts, D., 'Lord Palmerston at the Home Office', The Historian, XXI, No.l (1958),
63-81
Rose, J., 'Workers' Journals', in Vann, J.D. and VanArdsel, R.T. (eds), Victorian
Periodicals and Victorian Society (Toronto, 1994)
Sainty, J. and Cox, G.W., 'The Identification of Government Whips in the House of
Commons, 1830-1905', Parliamentary History, Vol.16, pt.3 (1997), 339-358
Salt, J., 'Local Manifestations of the Urquhartite Movement', International Review of
Social History, 13 (1968), 350-365
Schmitt, B.E., 'Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War', American Historical
Review, xxv, no.l (Oct. 1919)
Searle, G.R., Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain (Oxford, 1993)
Shannon, R.T., 'Gladstone, Canning and Bulgaria', Etudes Balkaniques, 4, (Sofia,
1977), 78-88
Shannon, R.T., 'David Urquhart and the Foreign Affairs Committees', in P. Hollis
(ed.), Pressure from Without in early Victorian England (London, 1974), 239-261
Shannon, R.T., Gladstone, Vol.11809-1865 (London, 1982)
Shattock, J. and Wolff, M. (eds), The Victorian Periodical Press: Samplings and
Soundings (Leicester, 1982)
Smith, &., Radical Artisan: William James Linton, 1812-97 (Manchester, 1973)
Smith, P., Disraeli (Cambridge, 1996)
Smith, P., 'Disraeli's Polities', in C.B. Richmond and P. Smith (eds.), The
Self-Fashioning of Disraeli, 1818-1851 (Cambridge, forthcoming)
Southgate, D., 'The Most English Minister...': The Policies and Politics of
Palmerston (London, 1966)
Southgate, D., The Passing of the Whigs, 1832-1886 (London, 1965)
Steele, E.D., Palmerston and Liberalism, 1855-1865 (Cambridge, 1991)346
Stewart, R., The Politics of Protection: Lord Derby and the Protectionist Party,
1841-1852 (Cambridge, 1971)
Strachey, L., Eminent Victorians (London, 1986 edn.)
Stuart, C.H., 'The Formation of the Coalition Cabinet of 1852', Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, IV (1954), 45-68
Taylor, A.J., 'Palmerston and Radicalism, 1847-1865', Journal of British Studies
Vol.33, No.2 (April 1994), 157-179
Taylor, A.J.P., The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939
(Harmondsworth, 1985 edn.)
Taylor, M., 'The Old Radicalism and the New: David Urquhart and the Politics of
Opposition, 1832-1867', in E.F. Biagini and A.J. Reid (eds.), Currents of
Radicalism: Popular Radicalism. Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain,
1850-1914 (Cambridge 1991), 23-43
Taylor, M., 'John Bull and the Iconography of Public Opinion in England,
c.1712-1929', Past and Present 134 (1992), 93-128
Taylor, M., The Decline of British Radicalism, 1847-1860 (Oxford, 1995)
Temperley, H.W.V., 'Stratford de Redcliffe and the Origins of the Crimean War',
English Historical Review, XLVIII (1933), 601-621
Temperley, H.W.V., 'The Alleged violations of the Straits Convention by Stratford
de Redcliffe between June and September 1853', English Historical Review, XLIX
(1934), 657-672
Temperley, H.W.V., England and the Near East: The Crimea (London, 1936; Repr.
1964)
Temperley, H.W.V., The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827, 2nd edn. (London,
1966)
Thompson, D., England in the Nineteenth Century (Harmondsworth, 1991 .)
Thompson, F.M.L., The Rise of Respectable Society: A Social History of Victorian
Britain, 1830-1900 (London, 1988)
Vernon, J., Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture,
c. 1815-1867 (Cambridge, 1993)
Vincent, J.R., The Formation of the British Liberal Party, 1857-68
(Harmondsworth, 1972)347
Vincent, J.R., 'The Parliamentary Dimension of the Crimean War', Transactions of
the Royal Historical Society, 5th sen, vol.31 (1981), 37-49
Vincent, J.R., Disraeli (Oxford, 1990)
Walpole, S., The Life of Lord John Russell, 2 vols. (London, 1889)
Webster, C, The Art and Practice of Diplomacy (London, 1961)
Webster, C, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841, 2 vols. (London, 1969)
Winch, D., 'The System of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils', in Collini, S.,
Winch, D. and Burrow, J., That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in
Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History (Cambridge, 1983), 23-61
Woodward, L., The Age of Reform: England, 1815-1870, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1992)
Wyatt Tilby, A., Lord John Russell (London, 1930)
Ziegler, P., Melbourne (London, 1976)
b) Unpublished Theses and Dissertations
Berridge, V.S., 'Popular Journalism and Working Class Attitudes, 1854-1886: a
Study of Reynolds Newspaper, Lloyds Weekly Newspaper and the Weekly Times',
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1976)
Dreyer, F.A., 'The Russell Administration, 1846-52', (unpublished D.Phil thesis,
University of St. Andrews, 1962)
Gatrell, V.A.C., 'The Commercial Middle Class in Manchester, c.1820-1857',
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971)
Gray, P.H., 'British Politics and the Irish Land Question, 1843-1850', (unpublished
PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992)
Jenks, M.H., 'The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart, 1833-56, with special
reference to the affairs of the Near East', (unpublished PhD thesis, University of
London, 1964)
Keeling, R.M., 'Palmerston and the Pacifico Debate', (unpublished PhD dissertation,
University of Missouri, Columbia, 1968)
Short, S.H., 'British Attitudes to the Schleswig-Holstein Question, 1848-50',
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1969)348
Smith, D.A., 'Cabinet and Constitution in the Age of Peel and Palmerston.',
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1966)
Taylor, A.C., 'The House of Commons and Foreign Policy, 1830-1867',
(unpublished B.Litt thesis, University of Oxford, nd)
Taylor, A.D., 'Modes of Political Expression and Working Class Radicalism,
1848-1874: the London and Manchester Examples', (unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Manchester, 1992)